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Introduction 
Economic crime has come to be regarded as a high-reward and comparatively 
low-risk criminal activity. The phenomenal profits that can be generated from 
economic crime and the rather unlikely possibility of effective law 
enforcement action, renders such activity highly profitable, to those with a less 
than a whole-hearted commitment to the values which we normally extol in 
society (Rider, 1990). 
Obtaining by false pretences as a type of economic crime is relatively unique in terms 
of its modus operandL its perpetrators, its victims, its extent, and its impact. This 
fraud has consequences for the victims such as emotional and financial loss. It also 
affects society at large with regard to breakdown of trust in business and other forms 
of human relations including various costs to the law enforcement agencies involved 
in the investigation and prosecution of offenders. In certain countries, it is known to 
have stalled projects for the benefit of the populace. 
In the course of business and other forms of human endeavour, different types of 
fraud have emerged. This thesis attempts to understand a particular type of economic 
crime/fraud that involves obtaining money, goods or/and services upfront, by false 
pretences. A relatively common pattern of this type of fraud is known as Advance Fee 
Fraud. Here, the fraudster convinces the victim to make financial commitments ahead 
of a given transaction, investment, service or business. It is not intended for the 
business to materialise. Thus the victim losses his or her deposit. One of the aims of 
this thesis is to examine why individuals part with their resources voluntarily. 
The researcher's interest in this pattern of fraud emanates from several factors which 
include the fact that it is an area under-researched and under-emphasised by 
institutions and organisations including the government responsible for policy and its 
control. Beck and Willis (1995: 6) note that "there is an unfortunate tendency for 
criminology as a discipline to ignore collective criminal victimisation. in favour of 
studying crimes against the person and his or her property. Only a modest proportion 
its literature involves the study of business related and financiall offences such as 
fraud". Generally, the focus of attention is more on the individual victim and his or 
her property than on the contexts of their victimisation (Beck and Willis, 1995). With 
regard to economic or 'white-collar' crime, it can be argued that at present, more 
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attention is directed at frauds that involve billions or millions of pounds either in 
anticipation of its occurrence or after the offence has been committed. These frauds 
include grand corruption, money laundering, banking and insurance, and corporate 
frauds to mention a few. 
In this thesis, it is argued that 'smaller' frauds are equally important. The loss per 
victim may be small, but when taking together can be enormous. This is supported by 
Levi's (1999) remarks that in Britain, Fraud Squad officers are tied up in dealing with 
major international frauds and other 'high profile' offences. Thus, there are few 
resources left to deal with the frauds under E2 million which either individually or 
collectively may cost businesspeople, consumers, or taxpayers a great deal more, 
financially or emotionally. Likewise, he notes that only a tiny number of persons are 
prosecuted annually for tax evasion or for other corporate offences. 
In addition to the government's concern for the more 'important' types of economic 
crime, other probable reasons for the low-keyed approach to this problem has to do 
with the difficulties associated with its research. The cost of criminalising fraudulent 
activities otherwise dealt with by Trading Standards and other regulatory bodies is 
also contributory. Traditional law enforcement agencies, for a variety of reasons 
associated with resources, perceptions, priorities and jurisdiction tend to focus on the 
more manifest aspects of criminal conduct (Rider, 1999b). More so, research has 
shown that fraud victims rarely report their ordeal officially, either because they are 
ashamed to show how gullible they were, or because their actions may also be viewed 
as fraudulent. This pattern of behaviour affects proactive prevention and policing 
strategies. 
Further, because most scams are ongoing and the fraudster is always adopting new 
methods to cope with change, it would be ambitious to expect those caught to divulge 
all information. The major way of getting to understand frauds of this nature is from 
the narration of victims that are willing to do so. Very few researchers have succeeded 
in getting complete access to all the major "players". Worthy of mention is Levi's 
(198 1) study of long-firm fraud -a pattern of advance fee fraud. 
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It is known that the consequences -of fraud and its impact can be grave. Large-scale 
frauds disrupt the social, economic and political systems of countries associated with 
the activities. This is especially the case since frauds such as Advance Fee Fraud, 
associated with the outright abuse of trust, diminish business values and the integrity 
of countries and citizens in general. The National Crime Intelligence Service (NCIS) 
has regularly reiterated the seriousness of fraud especially advance fee fraud. In their 
1997 Annual Report, the cost of fraud was put at about E3.5 billion a year in the UK- 
The fraudsters were said to concentrate on con-tricks and benefit fraud, drug 
trafficking - mainly cocaine, and illegal immigration. 
The NCIS Annual Report 199912000 listed or categorised certain criminal activities as 
high impact. These include benefit fraud, business fraud, drug trafficking, intellectual 
property fraud and revenue fraud. The Director General of NCIS noted that "the 
activities of organised crime threaten the economic fabric of this country". In a recent 
NCIS (10/07/01) Press Release, Advance Fee Scams were described as one of the 
most profitable areas of organised crime. The press release notes that potential loss 
from all areas in the UK is estimated at L150 million per annum. over the last three 
years. This figure is base on analysis of samples of fraudulent letters in early 2000. In 
total, over three years, 1,435,000 Advance Fee Fraud letters were removed. The 
Metropolitan and City of London areas received 5.4% of the letters (78,029 over 3 
years). Based on the average loss of E3 1,000, the London area would stand to lose E24 
million from theses letters over three years. In sum, the press release also states that 
potential regional losses prevented by NCIS and its partners in the last three years 
include Scotland (E63 million), Northumbria (f6.8 million), West Midlands (E27.2 
million), South Yorkshire (E15.5 million) and Greater Manchester (fl. 5 million). 
According to The Law Commission's consultation paper on Fraud and Deception 
(1999, No. 155), the Association for Payment Clearing Services revealed that in 1997 
fraud involving the abuse of payments with plastic cards reached L122million in the 
UK. The Benefit Agency also suffered an estimated level of fraud of EIA billion for 
income support. In the spring of 1998, fraud emanating from fraudulent prescriptions 
was estimated to be within the range of E70 million and ElOO million a year. In the 
insurance industry, bogus claims were costing the British motor sector E30 million a 
year. This consultation paper also states that estimates by the Institute of Chartered 
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Accountants for 1992 put losses from reported frauds at E8,5000 million, compared to 
E500 million or under for reported burglaries, E560 million for retail crime and E700 
million for vehicle crime. 
Finally, the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) (2000) stated that the 
Association of British Insurers put the cost of crime in the United Kingdom (UK) as a 
whole at L35 billion per annurn of which at least a third is fraud. Other estimates 
range between a low of E6.7 billion and a high of L13.8 billion. These are figures that 
concern economic costs of fraud to the UK economy where information is available. 
She adds that because these compilations are prone to error, as such, they do not 
reflect the true picture. Other reasons for this include that they do not take into 
account undetected fraud; and are not representative of all geographical areas in the 
UK especially where figures are not available. The Director observed that fraud is 
commonly said to cost the UK public annually seventeen times the amount lost 
through burglaries. Its impact is felt directly by victims of fraud and indirectly by all 
citizens through the increased cost on goods and services which banks, insurance 
companies and other services are known to provide. 
It is important to note that all these figures are not precise because it is not possible to 
have exact figures when analysing fraud committed, money at risk, and recoveries. 
From the above, we can have an idea of the extent of the problem. We can be assured 
that though the types of frauds are concerned are not strictly iternised because in 
reality they do overlap. Figures from investigated or partially investigated and 
prosecuted cases of obtaining money; goods; and services by false pretences are 
capable of giving an idea of the extent of the problem. 
For instance, a pyramid or get-rich- quick scheme is said to have cost over a billion 
from about thousands of women who paid E3,000 each in advance for a high return on 
investment - the scheme has not been completely stopped. A timeshare racket is 
known to have swindled about E30 million from about 17,000 holidaymakers between 
1990 and 1997 (the trial was said to have cost the taxpayer about LIO million) - 
victims deposited money for properties in holiday resorts. In another scam involving 
the shipment of sugar cost a bank over fl. million in 1990 - con men operating from a 
bogus bank in Torquay succeeded in getting about E7 million from victims. The 
4 
Belling Company, fraud, payments in advance cost the company and pensioners about 
E2.3 million in total, with other victims, about E12 million was lost. The two 'Ostrich 
Breeding Scams' uncovered recently in the UK cost victims about E23 million. The 
list is endless, and there are other 'smaller' frauds per victim that have not been 
aggregated. The impact of these frauds on the victims and society at large cannot be 
overemphasised. 
The central theme of this thesis concerns the dynamics of the nature of trust. The 
abuse of trust vis-A-vis the presence/exploitation of legitimate 'risks' are important 
prerequisites for most scams. The resultant confidence trust creates is principally what 
encourages the victim to voluntarily part with cash for goods, services or any other 
business or personal arrangement yet to be received or physically fulfilled. In this 
regard, irrespective of preventive strategies and sanctions already in place, the 
voluntary action of the victim and the non-violent approach of the fraudster in most 
cases, mitigate against the zeal in which victims and regulators pursue the offenders. 
It is therefore important to understand the processes involved that induce people to 
part with their cash and assets voluntarily. In the course of this thesis, the researcher 
has arrived at a possible typology that explains this phenomenon (a). 
Thus, the objectives of this thesis include: 
* To draw more attention to criminal fraud involving the obtaining of money, goods 
and services by false pretences, or to the significance of 'small' frauds (per 
victim), and to highlight the victim's circumstances in scams and criminal justice. 
9 To offer plausible theoretical explanations, and to contribute to the literature and 
understanding of the use of advance fees, upfront payments in cash or kind in 
fraud internationally and locally from theoretical perspectives. 
9 To examine the dynamics involved in the use of trust/deceit, confidence and risks 
in obtaining benefits by false pretences. The processes and structures that facilitate 
the use of this approach are examined. This would involve an analysis of the 
nature, trend and pattern of frauds of this nature. Making use of examples from the 
UK and other countries, previous research, reports of cases, court records and 
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interviews to deduce traits that are peculiar to scams involving the manipulation of 
trust. 
9 Finally, to draw attention to possible policy implications with regard to preventive 
strategies, taking into consideration the victin-4 the law and the fraudster. 
This thesis argues that the solutions to fraud are better examined and arrived at via the 
social, economic and political economy of systems concerned. The characteristics of 
the fraudsters especially with regard to their rationality and economic motive of their 
crimes makes certain criminal justice approaches ineffective. For the researcher, tniq, 
is necessary and inevitable in everyday life and in all areas of human endeavour, 
especially in business activities. The 'con man' or fraudster exploits this situation. In 
the course of most scams, trust/confidence is created - what encourages the victim and 
would-be victims to hand over valuables (cash, goods or services) voluntarily in 
anticipation of obligations that do not materialise. Therefore, it is important for certain 
structures and conditions to exist in our society that are concerned with educating 
members of the public, changing attitudes of would-be victims and fraudsters (if 
possible), increasing the risks of offending/apprehension, and the certainty of 
sanctions. Punitive measures should include shaming and ensuring that the fraudster is 
permanently deprived of the proceeds of fraud. In surn, the prevention of all types of 
fraud should involve the processes of minimising risk to victims and maximising the 
risk to offenders. 
It is important to note that in the course of this research, the intended empirical data 
could not be accessed to the extent anticipated by the researcher (Chapter 6.2). This 
led to a stronger emphasis on theoretical analogies (Chapters 4 and 5) and the use of 
available data from the public domain, in addition to in-depth interviews (Chapters 
6.2.1 and 6.3) in establishing an argument. 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One is the introduction, and it 
includes the defmition(s) of fraud - obtaining by false pretences. Relevant concepts. of 
fraud and deception are also examined. Brief descriptions of certain types or forms of 
other frauds with some examples are also presented. The definitions of other frauds or 
types of deception reveal the peculiar nature and characteristics of upfront payments 
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and fraud as a form of economic crime. In other to throw some lights on trends, the 
practice of certain schemes or scams are looked at from a historical perspective. 
In Chapter Two, issues discussed include the importance and extent of fraud. The UK 
official statistics on fraud are examined. Problems associated with crime statistics 
with reference to fraud especially those involving upfront payments or advance fees 
are highlighted. The recent Police Fraud Survey (Flanary, 2000) on fraud, which 
breaks down the offence of fraud into various types, is also examined. Other issues 
from the fraud survey regarding investigation, costing and prevention are enumerated 
in relevant areas of this thesis. Also examined in this chapter is in the impact of the 
offence of fraud using Nigeria as a case study. The role of particular fraudsters from 
Nigeria has attracted a lot of government and media attention over the years. Thn-', 
some of the consequences of this are highlighted. 
Chapter Three looks at fraud and the Criminal Justice Process (CJP). Issues discussed 
include the investigation, prosecution, the role of the jury in fraud trials, and the 
sentencing of offenders. The offence of fraud is also compared with that of burglary fti 
this regard. Burglary was selected because it is one of the most common types of 
property crime or theft, which is perceived as serious by the authorities and the public. 
Its modus operandi is different to that of fraud but the objective is the same - to obtain 
property from victims. 
Chapters Four and Five are the theory sections of this thesis. From a broad 
perspective, the theories have been categorised into criminological explanations and 
those associated with the execution of fraud or the manipulation of trust - deceit or 
deception, lies, and confidence. Given that the explanation for fraud is 
multidimensional as with explanations for crime in general, related or closely 
associated theories/explanations are used for this purpose. Chapter Four is concerned 
with the criminological/causal explanations for fraud, while Chapter Five deals with 
deceit and trust. Tle nature of 'risks', its implications for deceit and trust are also 
analysed in Chapter Five. This is in addition to the significance and role of trust, 
confidence and other forms of deceit such as lies, which are explored. This would 
enable us understand why and how fraudsters are able to collect cash or money 
upfront for services and goods that the victim never receives or receives but not in the 
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condition or quality promised. The victim/trust/fraudster relationship is what 
lubricates or takes the scam to a conclusion. 
Understanding criminal fraud involving the use of upfront payments in cash or kind, 
is the major theme of Chapter Six. Subjects examined include the methodological 
issues associated with research into economic crimes or fraud. Examples of some 
criminological research on economic crimes and fraud are also discussed. Difficulties 
associated with economic crime research are enumerated such as the fact that in most 
cases, convicted offenders may still have a stake directly or indirectly to the continued 
perpetration of their activities. Hence their refusal or likely refusal to assist 
researchers. Included in this chapter is the analysis of the methodology and data 
adopted in this thesis. The characteristics of victims and fraudsters are also 
highlighted. In the course of an analytical discussion of the research, a typology of the 
fraud of obtaining by false pretences has been developed from which the disposition 
of the victim vis-A-vis the methods used to establish trust are brought to bear. Finally, 
sentences given to offenders are examined comparatively with that of burglary. This 
section attempts to address the view that in general, fraudsters receive lighter 
sentences when the value and impact of their crimes are taken into consideration. 
Finally, Chapter Seven is the conclusion of this thesis, where preventive strategies and 
their policy implications are discussed. As with other forms of crime, the complete 
elimination of fraud will be difficult if not impossible to achieve. Certain steps can be 
taken to minimise loss on the part of the victim and the state. This would allow for 
more resources and time to be spent on other areas of concern to the public. Following 
the end of this chapter is an Appendix containing the list of sample cases used 
including references. Some examples of Advance Fee Fraud letters attempting or used 
to lure 'victims' into financial commitments are also attached in the Appendix. 
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Chapter One 
Fraud: Obtaining money, goods and services by faIse pretences 
Fraud is a generic concept, which covers a wide range of activities, some of which 
may not be criminal as defined by the law. The usage of the term 'fraud' is associated 
with illegal actions or practices that are dishonest and deceptive. First, from a broader 
perspective, Emsley (1987) notes Sharpe's (1984) definition of crime, which is any 
activity, or action that violates the criminal law, and if detected, would lead to 
prosecution in a criminal court of law or an accredited law enforcement organ. Fraud 
definitely falls into this category. For Page (1997), a fraud is committed when a 
person is intentionally deceitful, by commission or ornission, with a view to gain for 
themselves or another, in connection with: entering into a binding promise, or 
performing or failing-to perform a binding promise. Thus, an examination of the 
general law on fraud or deception is important, while paying more attention to those 
closely associated to the offence of obtaining by false pretences. 
Certain activities or behaviour regarded as fraudulent are known to differ and change 
over time and space or geographical areas. For Hills (1971), generally, there are two 
major perspectives or theories that have attempted to explain the social foundations 
and functions of criminal law. These are the 'value-consensus' theory and the 
'interest-group' theory. In sum, the value-consensus position asserts that criminal 
laws reflect those societal values, which transcend the immediate, narrow interests of 
various individuals and groups, expressing the social consciousness of the whole 
society. The legal norms embodied in the criminal codes emerge through social 
change in response to the needs and requirements essential for the well-being of the 
entire society. 
The exponents of the 'interest group' approach perceive the criminal law as an 
expression of social values that serves to meet the needs of the society considered as a 
whole. Emphasis is on the ability of particular groups to shape the legal system in 
their favour. The interest group position states that diversity in society (race, religion, 
class, economic and political interest groups, life styles and value orientations, etc. ) 
has lead to the enactment of general and specific laws on certain behaviours and 
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activities. Tbus, it is possible for strong and powerful interest groups to influence 
legislation and its application. 
In addition to the above, the broad nature of 'fraud' makes it dffficult to identify a 
precise definition. Thus, legal definitions of fraud tend to contain elements of 
flexibility with regard to activities that are classified as fraudulent. No deftition can 
adequately comprehend fraud and the nature of fraud varies according to the context 
in which it is used (Leigh, 1982). Similarly, since fraud has no specific definition, the 
boundaries are always changing (West, 1988). This can be attributed to varying 
parameters of what is appropriate or inappropriate at any given time and as it concerns 
the particular society or country. Various actions and activities that are regarded as 
'fraudulent' are identified in statutes or laws of a country. 
Definitions show that fraud is a word which describes a variety of criminal activities 
(mainly criminal deception) whereby through lies, deceit, cheating or otherwise, false 
promises are made and victims suffer some form of loss (for example, loss of money). 
In Britain the criminal and civil laws both involve offences of fraud. Civil law relates 
to disputes between individuals, groups or organisations affecting only themselves, 
Whilst criminal law is concerned with acts and omissions affecting the community at 
large or activities that are harmful physically or otherwise. In most fraud cases, 
elements of civil law exist and can be pursued, but this usually takes second place to 
the criminal law issues (West, 1988). Also, the prosecution of offenders against the 
criminal code is primarily the responsibility of the Crown Prosecution Service in 
collaboration with the police. In civil law action it is the responsibility of the disputing 
parties. 
In fi-aud, the concept or term 'upfront' involves the collection of money, goods or the 
use of services in advance by the offender/fraudster, from the victim who anticipates 
that an agreed transaction or business will be fulfilled. The broad nature of the 
concept of fraud covers other benefits such as services by false pretences. For 
instance, in most jurisdictions, offences can be found under the umbrella of 'obtaining 
by false pretences'. Slome jurisdictions emphasise certain aspects of particular 
offences or laws. 
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For example, in Nigeria, the relevant legislation is that of Section 4 (19) of the 
Nigerian penal code, hence the alias '4-1-9' associated with deceptive schemes and 
practices known as advance fee fraud. In an attempt to expand its reach and make it 
more focused, the government at the time put forward the Advance Fee Fraud and 
Other Related Offences Decree No. 13 (1995) 'AFFAOFRO'. In Section 1 (1) of the 
decree "... any person who by any false pretence and with intent to defraud obtains 
from any other person in Nigeria or in any other country, for himself or any other 
person in Nigeria or any other country, to deliver to any person any property whether 
or not the property is obtained or its delivery is induced through the medium of a 
contract induced by false pretence; is guilty of an offence" (Osimiri, 1997: 271). The 
decree stipulates sanctions of imprisonment of between 5-10 years or more (at the trial 
judge's discretion) without the option of fme. 
In the United Kingdom (UK), of relevance to the statute for fraud is the Theft Act 
1968 (sections 15-20) and the Theft Act 1978, which are mainly concerned with 
obtaining any form of material or financial advantage from a victim through deceitful 
conducts. This extortion could either be deliberate or due to carelessness, and may 
also be verbal. In the UK, a Law Commission was established for the purpose of 
promoting the reform of the law (The Law Commission, 1999) and this paper was part 
of their work on offences of dishonesty. The detailed examination of the nitty-gritty of 
the law on fraud and its provisions are outside the scope of this thesis. Some aspects 
and issues of the Law Commission consultation paper are examined in this section. 
The legislation on fraud and deception are highlighted hereunder. 
First, the basic features of the main offences of fraud were identified as: 
" Theft 
" Deception offences 
" Conspiracy to defraud 
" Fraudulent trading and 
" Cheating revenue 
With regard to theft, under section 1 (1) of the Theft Act 1968 "a person is guilty of 
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention Of 
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permanently depriving the other of it". The Commission states that this definition 
shows that there are five ingredients of the offence of theft, namely 
(i) an appropriation, 
(ii) of property, 
(iii) belonging to another, 
Ov) which is dishonest, 
(v) with the intention of permanently depriving the other of the property 
appropriated. 
For deceptive offences, the Theft Act creates eight offences of dishonestly getting 
something by deception, namely: 
(i) obtaining property (Theft Act 1968, s15); 
(H) obtaining a money transfer (Theft Act 1968, s 15A inserted by the Theft 
(Amendment) Act 1996 as recommended in Law Commission Report on 
Money Transfers); 
(iii) obtaining a pecuniary advantage (Theft Act 1968, s 16); 
(iv) procuring the execution of a valuable security (Theft Act 1968, s 20(2); 
(V) obtaining services (Theft Act 1978, s 1); 
(vi) securing the remission of a liability (Theft Act 1978, s 2(l) (a); 
(vii) inducing a creditor to wait for or to forgo payment (Theft Act 1978, s 2(l) (b); 
and 
(viii) obtaining an exemption form, or an abatement of, a liability (Theft Act 1978, s 
2(1) (c). 
The three elements common to all the offences above are 'deception', benefit being 
obtained by 'deception', and the deception being 'dishonest'. Deception is defined as 
"any deception (whether deliberate or reckless) by words or conduct as to fact or as to 
law, including a deception as to the present intentions of the person using the 
deception or any other person7 (Theft Act 1968, s 15(4). The Law Commission notes 
that the courts are known to have given generous interpretation to the concept of 
deception by conduct. 
With regard to obtaining property by deception, it was provisionally proposed that for 
the purpose of obtaining property by deception, it should be sufficient that the person 
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to whom the property belongs is deprived of it by deception, whether or not anyone 
else obtains it. Further, the Commission expressed its desire for the greater reliance on 
prosecutorial discretion. On obtaining services by deception, the Commission 
concludes that deception should be understood as the inducing of a state of mind by 
words or conduct, with or without a representation. On obtaining services without 
deception, it notes that with technological change and development especially as it 
concerns the Internet, it is now possible to fraudulently obtain services of substantial 
value without deceiving the human mind. Noting that such a conduct is at present 
criminal, the following conclusions were made: (1) That it should be criminal to 
obtain a service without the permission of the person providing it, albeit without the 
deception of a human mind. But (2) that this change should be effected by extending 
the offence of theft or creating a separate theft-like offence, rather than by extending 
the concept of deception (The Law Commission, 1999: 122). 
To sum up, from all the issues concerning the English law on fraud, deception and 
obtaining by false pretence among others, the importance of creating or having 
explicit statutes cannot be over-emphasised. In a good number of cases involving 
fraud, loopholes are exploited for the benefit of the defendant or prosecutor. Jurors or 
judges have to grapple with the public's interpretation of a given offence at any given 
time in history. The problems encountered in the prosecution of fraud cases, role of 
the jury and their understanding of the system (legal and criminal) are areas that are of 
concern to the public and criminal justice system. This is discussed later in this thesis. 
At any rate, in the course of the initial investigation the fraudulent motives of the 
offender will most likely have been established. 
In conclusion, though various jurisdictions have attempted to provide laws targeted at 
fraudulent activities, it is not possible to itemise an possible areas or circumstances of 
fraud. Thus, going by the generally accepted modes of conduct as defmed by the 
government, various professional bodies, and the public in general, the use of 
discretion by the police, prosecutors, judges and the jury are important determinants 
in the overall conduct of the criminal justice process. It is not uncommon to find 
conflicts in opinions among various interest groups on what is fraudulent and criminal 
at the same time. For instance, cases handled by Trading Standards authorities such as 
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the sale of sub-standard products (depending on the I: Te) attract fmes or warnings, 
but consumers would prefer stiffer penalties and the perpetrators branded as criminals. 
1.1 The nature of obtaining by false pretences and upfront payments in cash or 
kind 
An appropriate way of understanding the unique nature of this type of fraud is to 
examine the offence through the various arenas in which they occur. These areas of 
their occurrence are what determine the specific or overlapping definitions associated 
with the particular fraud or scam. This thesis reveals that fraud can be carried out in 
virtually all spheres of human endeavour. Not all frauds or business crimes involve 
the use of upfront payments or advance fees. In other words a particular scam or 
fraudulent activity must involve the collection of fees or deposits which could be in 
cash or kind for it to fit into the definition of fraud of interest to us in this thesis. 
Below are some examples of frauds and situations that could turn them into an 
'upfront payment' type of scam. As indicated earlier, the essence of this is to buttress 
the broad nature of fraud, and show the unique characteristic(s) of fraud involving the 
manipulation of trust. Thus, this analogy has been categorised into two broad groups 
that are not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
9 Other frauds 
* Typical scams involving upfront payments 
First, most frauds involve some commercial transaction and reports show that 
commercial fraud is very broad. Levi (1988) noting the significance of commercial 
fraud observed that its victims range from the very wealthy to the very poor. Also, 
commercial frauds include swindles by 'professional criminals' against suppliers of 
goods on credit, banks and credit card companies, mail-order purchasers, and people 
willing to pay money upfront for a promised job or loan. Business people also swindle 
consumers and employees. 
14 
Hence, a distinction can be made between frauds against individuals and those against 
businesses. For instance, individual frauds include consumer frauds such as the 
manipulation of weights for edible items, and frauds involving investments (Levi, 
1988). Investment frauds are known to come in different forms. In frauds against 
businesses, Levi (1981) identified three types of frauds: external frauds - those that 
originate from outside the business and involve primarily the abuse of credit facilities, 
for example long-firm fraud. Internal frauds relate to the conversion and diversion of 
cheques especially via mail transfers by authorised officers in a firm and various 
forms of fraud involving claims or expenses. Computer frauds can be said to belong 
to this category. Third is collusive fraud, which involves the collusion between 
employees or officers of an organisation and persons outside. 
1.1.1 Other frauds 
Liquidationfrauds 
Liquidation fraud occurs when companies are dissolved when in debt or in adverse 
business conditions. This action is fraudulent if the company's indebtedness was 
deliberately achieved. For example, for this type of fraud to occur, the fraudster needs 
to establish a legitimate company based on industry standards. The firm is then 
deliberately mismanaged until it is insolvent. Part of this process involves obtaining 
loans and credit from financial institutions. It is often difficult to ascertain whether a 
firm's liquidation is as a result of fraud or genuine failure as staff could collude to 
achieve this. In a fraudulent set-up, directors would have gradually cleared their 
personal obligations and probably established another company similar or different 
from the one undergoing liquidation (West, 1987). The modus operandi of scams 
involving upfront payments can be applied if the business proprietors encourage 
investors or, buyers and suppliers to part with deposits or payments for goods or 
services, which they know, will not be supplied. When enough upfront deposits are 
collected the fraudsters abscond. In Britain the occurrence of liquidation frauds led to 
The Insolvency Act of 1985 which was introduced to control the activities of 
fraudsters. The Act creates some liability on the part of directors and stipulates 
varying degrees of punishment. 
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Computerftaud 
This involves the use of a computer and its associated facilities or programmes to 
commit fraud. The crimes usually referred to in this context are fraud by computer 
forgery, hacking, software and chips piracy, data theft or espionage, and damage to 
computer programs data or both, particularly by infecting them with viruses or other 
forms of sabotage (Mulder & Kleve, 1993). Fraudsters find this technology useful 
because computer discs can store detailed information of contact addresses and 
events. Also, damaging evidence stored in files can easily be erased or hidden. 
Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh (1995) note that employee incompetence, technical 
failure and other external causes rather than the activities of the computer fraudster 
principally cause losses from computer-related frauds. Levi (1988) notes that 
computer fraud is more feared by management than any other kind of fraud. For 
Croall (1992), management's fear of computer crime is probably based on the feelings 
of vulnerability. More over, the financial loss can be staggering as large sums can be 
moved across boundaries in seconds. Computer/printing technology has also 
enhanced the art of forgeries and various forms of impersonation emanating from it. 
Computer fraud using advance fees would involve the collection of payments upfront 
for computers or related equipment, which are eventually not supplied or delivered by 
the vendor or fraudster. 
Cyberfraud 
The expanded use of computing technology has developed into what is commonly 
referred to as Cybercrime and general Internet Crime. Various forms of fraud such as 
deceptive advertising, unauthorised credit card transactions, copyright violations etc 
occur in this environment. For Rider (2001) cyberspace is simply a concept 
encompassing exciting but essentially conventional mechanisms for communication, 
relay and retention of information. Rider also notes that Internet provides 
opportunities for advance fee fraudsters who can offer victims all over the world 
different deals. In certain scams, the fraudsters utilising traditional mail as the. 
medium for communication obtains genuine letterheads, which could be used for 
'flash' purposes. The use of the Internet (e-mails) helps to eliminate this 'burden'. 
Finally, the anonymity through this form of technology is important for the fraudster. 
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The fraudtser can assume different names and identities. Unlike the telephone, voice 
identification or recording cannot be done. 
Social securityfraud 
This involves the claiming of unemployment benefits by the employed (Bose & Gunn, 
1989), or falsely collecting disability allowance when healthy. In one example, a 
woman claimed housing benefit for her council flat which she was sub-letting while 
living a comfortably in another part of London (Johnson, 1995). In the UK the 
Government admitted that there are 81 million National Insurance (NI) numbers 
(identity required for cheat the Department of Social Security) in circulation, against a 
population of only 60 million. This perhaps gives a picture of the extent of the 
problem (The Sunday Telegraph 25/02/01: 5). 
Credit cardfraud 
Credit card fraud describes a wide assortment of plastic cards (and non-plastic 
coupons) that are used to obtain credit, money, goods and services, either upon the 
direct presentation of the card or through an automated teller machine. Credit card 
fraud includes all fraudulent type of offences involving the use and/or theft of credit 
cards (Janhevich, 1998). In the Guardian of 23/09/00 it was reported that in the UK, 
figures from the Association for Payment Clearing Services (APACS) showed that 
credit and debit card fraud reached a total of ; E226 million by May in 2000. This had 
increased by 53% from the previous year. The major growth area was in counterfeit 
cards, fraud on mail order, telephone or Internet transactions where the card is not 
physically presented to the retailer. Another aspect of the fraud involves the 
counterfeit method called 'skimming' whereby genuine data from the magnetic strip 
on a card are copied to another card. This scam can occur where corrupt employees 
who have access to customer cards and information collude with organised criminals. 
In line with the credit system of consumption, goods and services are utilised upfront 
or in advance of any payment that will not be made. Because penalties for card crimes 
are substantially lower than for instance drug related crimes, this enhances their 
attractiveness to the would-be fraudster. A system already in place in The United 
States, Canada and France requires consumers to type in their special four-digit 
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personal pin numbers into keypads at the point of sale instead of or as well es signing 
a receipt. 
Insuranceftaud 
Insurance fraud includes a wide range of activities such as the presentation of bogus 
claims, exaggeration of genuine claims, and making false statements in application 
forms (Janhevich, 1998). Clarke (1990) notes that insurance contracts are written on 
terms of 'the utmost good faith'. Both parties are expected to make known all 
circumstances and elements of risks involved. For Clarke, this element of good faith 
also gives rise to fraud. Gabor (1994) observed that some members of the public take 
advantage of their miss-fortune to defraud insurance companies. In life insurance 
scam cases the insured suddenly or mysteriously 'disappears', thus, allowing for the 
policy beneficiaries to collect the claims. In the first place, large insurance policies are 
acquired; the fraudster would have prepared his 'death' in advance for example 
leaving clothes in strategic locations. Dependent relatives are usually involved in the 
scam, as they have to collect the payment from the insurance company. If successful, 
the 'dead' person is informed and in some cases both parties 'vanish', relocate to a 
different country with new identities (West, 1987). Upfront deposits/scams involving 
insurance activities would involve the collection of payments in advance for non- 
existent policies by the fraudster. 
Insider dealingfraud 
Insider dealing frauds concerns the release and use of privileged information in the 
securities market to gain undue advantage over others and to enrich the perpetrator. It 
can also be described as involving the deliberate exploitation of information by 
dealing in securities, or other property, to which the information relates, having 
obtained that information by virtue of some privileged relationship position (Rider 
and Ashe, 1993). Reuvid (1995) notes that share prices have a tendency to rise on 
demand or public bid. An investor with the knowledge that a bid is about to be made 
for a particular stock or that substantial dividend will be declared will simply go on a 
mopping up spree. Thus huge profits are made within a short period when the shares 
are re-sold. According to Rider and Ashe, traditionally, insider abuse has involved 
18 
people who have some connection with the management of companies. This 
connection could be on personal or professional basis. They also note that one of the 
most difficult issues in the insider dealing law is the nature of inside information that 
makes it an offence. In this case the crime or fraud is against the market, and the 
victims are members of the public and business community that are made to compete 
from a disadvantaged position. 
To sum up, a common pattern of fraud involves the use of false identities. Identity 
theft and fraud is a popular method used to obtain money goods and services by false 
pretences. Here, the fraudster can comfortably exploit the lack of physical contact. For 
instance, credit card transactions can be carried out without being physically present. 
Certain personal data such as Social Security number, bank and credit card details, 
telephone calling card number and other valuable identifying data can be used, if they 
fall into the hands of a 'con man' or 'confidence trickster'. Fraudsters could obtain 
people's personal data in public places. For example, by engaging in shoulder surfing, 
watching someone punch in his or her telephone calling card number or credit card 
number, or listen in on conversations. They could also go through garbage cans or 
trash bin to obtain copies of cheques, credit card or bank statements (dumpster 
diving). Recently, the Internet has become an appealing place for criminals to obtain 
identifying data, such as passwords or even banking information. This could happen 
when people respond to unsolicited e-mail that promises them some benefit but 
requests identifying data. 
1.1.2 Typical scams involving upfront payments 
Loanfrauds 
This often involve people and businesses seeking loans from banks, credit unions, and 
other financial institutions, but have bad credit or credit problems. They are the likely 
victims of this scam (advance fee loans). Legitimate credit agencies are reluctant to 
guarantee loans for those with bad credit histories, but illicit advance fee loan 
companies will either promise or strongly suggest that the loan will be provided in 
exchange for an up front fee. The client is told that the deposit will enable them have 
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an edge over other candidates. Having collected fees upfront, the fraudster eventually 
rejects the loan applications on frivolous grounds. In reality, there was no money to 
lend in the first place. Fraudsters also register their outfits in Chambers of Commerce 
where membership is based solely on payment of a fee. This adds some element of 
credibility, trust and confidence to the unsuspecting victim. Physical contact is not 
necessary as forms can be completed via the Internet or sent by post. 
Long-firmfraud 
In this scam, fraudsters engage in business transactions often with foreign partners, at 
first honouring their obligations (e. g. settlement of credits) and securing the trust of 
their partners, until they are able to obtain goods on credit. At this stage or when the 
maximum credit obtainable is achieved, the fraudster quickly disposes the goods 
locally and 'disappears' with the proceeds or 'liquidates' his business. Physical 
contact is avoided in view of possible pro secution/identification. Generally, the goods 
are ordered from distant companies to guard against unexpected visits from the 
suppliers. It is common practice for large businesses to engage in trade based on credit 
to secure sustained patronage. Unknown to the exporter this creates opportunities for 
long-firm fraud (West, 1987). In this fraud, capital and a legitimate company are 
required to make initial purchases. A physical building, working stafL fin-nished 
office, a warehouse and other necessary documentation including letterheads are also 
used. 
Levi (198 1) notes that most long-firm frauds occur in the more plain or ordinary areas 
such as toiletries, fancy goods, canned foodstuffs and durable consumer products. 
These commodities are preferred because they are easy to dispose and are not 
generally marked for tracing purposes. Also long-firm frauds or 'business' are carried 
out jointly with legitimate business activity. In this case, the scam or fraud relates to 
the goods that are traded or given to the fraudster upfront, in anticipation of the 
payment. Levi carried out one of the earliest detailed studies of long-firm fraud in 
which he identified three principal sub-types. These are the: 
- pre-planned frauds, which involve businesses set up with the intention from the 
very begirming to defraud suppliers; 
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- intermediate frauds, which occur when people decide to turn a formerly legitimate 
business into one which defrauds suppliers; and 
- slippery-slope frauds, which occur when businessmen continue to trade and obtain 
goods on credit although there is a high risk that unless their business situation 
improves greatly, they will be unable to pay for the goods (Levi, 198 1). 
Pyramid scams 
In the Pyramid Scam or 'Ponzi' (named after the 'inventor' Charles Ponzi) scheme, it 
operates on the basis of 'robbing Peter to pay Paul' (Reuvid, 1995). Other related 
names or variations of this fraud are the 'get rich quick' scheme and 'chain-letters'. In 
this scam, the early investors are paid their promised profit from the deposits of the 
new investors. The duration of the deceit depends on the number of new entrants. 
When the operators can no longer meet their obligations or when they feel they have 
collected enough money they simply take to their heels. 
Telemarketing Fraud 
Telemarketing Fraud or the use of telephones for fraud has become notorious in recent 
years. Telemarketing fraud involves the professional and planned use of telephones to 
advertise, sell products and services and other 'business' transactions. According to 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1994), businesses have become more efficient 
with boundaries no longer limited. The use of telecommunication is the major 
medium of transaction for the credit card industry. Certain telemarketing schemes are 
organised to defraud consumers through misrepresentations, thereby making the 
victim make financial payments or commitment over the telephone (Janhevich, 1998). 
Victims especially the elderly are often targeted. The voice and mannerism of the 
caller or fraudster is capable of convincing somebody to send a cheque by post or give 
details of his or her credit card to the criminal. After the deposit or payment is 
collected, no further contact is made with the victim. This is a typical example 
committing fraud without face-to-face or physical contact. 
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Work-at-homefrauds 
Newspapers and magazines often carry advertisements reading: Earn hundreds of cash 
each week at home in your free time. The prospective investor is required to send 
some deposit usually to a postal box address. Sometimes the victim is never paid for 
work done. The most common work-at-home schemes include envelope stuffing and 
product assembly or craftwork. In the envelope scheme, you either receive nothing in 
return for your money or a notice telling you the only way to earn money at home is 
by placing an advert Eke the one you answered and defraud other people with get- 
rich-quick dreams. In the product assembly or craftwork scheme, the company often 
charges you for extra costs for supplies, and equipment. For instance after you have 
performed the work the company rejects them as not meeting their quality standards. 
In reality, no product ever meets their quality standard because they never intended to 
pay anyone. At this stage they would have already banked the deposit. 
Investmentlsecuritiesfraud 
Trading in worthless securities is obviously profitable for the fraudster. Reuvid (1995) 
notes that this undermines the very basis of the securities market. Reuvid cites the 
example of the Wall Street crash in the United States in 1929. About 20 million 
Americans scrambled for the post-war business boom buy investing in stock. Between 
1918 and 1929, $50 billion worth of new securities were sold to the public. Half of all 
these were later discovered to be worthless. Today ailing firms are known submit 
deceptive reports to attract investors. The Internet has also created fraudulent 
opportunities in this area. An example is the online scam from would-be brokers 
selling the 'opportunity' to pre-book for Internet Company listings or sale of 
worthless dot. corn shares. The advance fee fraud fraudster can comfortably collect 
payment upfront for worthless advice, and could miss-represent information to clients 
thereby making them pay for useless investment deals. 
To sum up, all the examples above show that the fraud of obtaining by false pretences 
involving upfront payments or advance fees occurs in numerous arenas. It is possible 
for the fraudster to adopt any method of deception or scam to obtain money or service 
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from victims whether they are individuals or organisations. The list above is far from 
being exhaustive, as unexplored and existing areas are adopted/adapted and used for 
scams regularly. With these examples it is possible to have an idea of the dimensions 
of fraud and invariably the extent to which damage can be inflicted. Victims of all 
categories (individuals, groups, businesses etc. ) are targeted in various settings using 
varying methods. In scams of this sort, the issue at stake for the firaudster is to provide 
a convincing story, scheme, project, investment etc, that is sufficient to convince the 
victim to pay him some money before receiving the service or product in question. 
Below is a discussion of early occurrences of scams and its trend over the years. 
1.2 Historical and contemporary practice of upfront payments and fraud 
The practice of obtaining by false pretences is not new. As the title implies, the 
fraudster basically sets out to get in his possession property (cash or whatever) 
belonging to the victim. Services can also be acquired through deceit, thus avoiding 
payment for what has been utilised. A typical aim of obtaining by false pretences is 
via the collection of advance fees. We have already seen that this type of fraud 
appears in different variations and methods. The essence of this review is to buttress 
our understanding of the importance, nature, pattern and extent of fraud from a 
historical perspective using some examples. 
Historically, central to successful advance fee frauds is the 'confidence trick' (the 
concept 'confidence' is discussed in Chapter 5.2.1) exhibited by the fraudster. This 
encourages the victim to trust the criminal. In the words of Schur, (195 8) another term 
associated with confidence is 'confidence game' or 'con game' or trick. The term con 
trick probably originated with the situations in which a swindler would lead his victim 
into playing in a 'game of chance', having carefully eliminated the chance element 
(Schur, 1958). In a 'sociological analysis of confidence swindling', Schur observed 
that from a sociological view almost all frýud can be seen to involve some confidence 
trick: a procedure that entails the creation or portrayal through whatever means a 
relation of confidence, through which a swindle is carried out. 
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For Schur, all types of con tricks fall into a general pattern described as follows: The 
swindler or swindlers or 'con mob' selects a person who is thought to be a good 
(sucker' or in their language a 'mark'. Rapport is established with the mark to the 
extent that trust is developed. The swindler discusses a dishonest scheme with the 
mark disclosing impressive profits to be made. The mark gives the swindler money as 
an investment in the scheme. The mark then vanishes. The mark does not realise on 
time that he is the object of the swindle rather than a partner or co-perpetrator of the 
scam. The con man is usually his own boss even where several swindlers "gang-up'; 
and unlike the 'heavy rackets' the swindle involves little or no violence. It is 
important to mention that, the swindler or fraudster also sells legitimate schemes or 
ideas to the victim. The goal is to convince the victim to part with money, goods or 
services in anticipation of some reward (investment wise) or payment for services 
being obtained. 
Tracing the history of English Criminal Law and its administration from 1750 
Radzinowicz and Hood (1986) made certain observations. Between 1860 and the First 
World War, several new crimes were created relating to fraud, embezzlement, 
larceny, bribery and corruption, the use of explosives, peýury, trade unions, public 
order, and a wide range of other offences against what was then described as 'good 
morals'. In one of their observations, they note that with regard to the Victorian era, 
the nature and extent of crime should be assessed against the ever increasing 
population, high rate of urbanisation, and its antecedent social inequalities or socio- 
economic disparities. This is in addition to a visible class of the affluent or wealthy 
individuals who are seen to be 'having a better life'. Levi (1987) also notes that 
obtaining of goods and money by false pretences has been prohibited under Anglo- 
Saxon Common Law and Statute since at least the Middle Ages. 
In his study of long-firm fraud, which is a pattern, or method of obtaining goods by 
false pretence, Levi (1981) identified early literature and occurrences of this practice. 
Levi was able to trace the term 'long-firm fraud' to a periodical called The Orchestra 
dated 2 January 1869. The article referred to "the doings of the 'long-firm', a body of 
phantom capitalists who issue large orders to supply an infinite variety of goods". 
Levi (1981: 12) also mentions that in The Slang Dictionary (1874), Hotten defines the 
long firm as "a gang of swindlers who obtain goods by false pretences. They generally 
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advertise or answer advertisements". Levi notes that documentation shows that the 
term 'long firm' has been around since the late 1860s, and adds that at the time, it was 
defined as a class of individuals rather than as a class of activity. Levi states that the 
activity of obtaining goods by false pretence can be traced to the time of Henry VIII, 
during which an Act concerning this practice was passed in 1543. 
Levi also identified law cases relating to obtaining by false pretences, one of which 
was that of R. v. Revey, Beatty and McCarthy (1782), 168 ER 218. In this case the 
individuals set up two business houses, one of which was a counting house, like what 
is today known as a discount house or an early form of a bank. The second outfit, their 
'company', printed 500 bills of exchange. Hevey offered these bills in payment for the 
goods he purchased, thus suggesting to sellers that they should verify the instrument 
with 'their' counting house. When the sellers or vendors took the bills for verification 
Beatty (one of the culprits) was seen working as a clerk in the office. Beatty confirms 
and assures the vendor that the transaction was okay. Eventually, before the bills of 
exchange matured, they would have absconded. These offenders were convicted after 
investigations showed that they had obtained reasonable quantities of rum, brandy, 
watches and other products. Levi notes that more frauds similar to this can be found in 
the archives. 
An indication of the extent of fraud during he 19'h century is captured by Levi's 
(1981) study in which he cites several examples of early occurrence of long-firm 
fraud, their distinctive patterns, techniques and organisation from early nineteenth 
century to the Second World War. One of Levi's observations is that there is no 
evidence that suggests that a particular organisational format exists for long-firm 
frauds. He notes that the statistics do not reflect an accurate picture of the situation. It 
is likely that many frauds involving false pretence must have gone undetected or 
unprosecuted. Further, the records showed that most of the cons were short-cons such 
as a servant collecting goods on 'behalf of his master and having it pawned. Further, 
before 1850, out of 3,475 cases tried at the Old Bailey during 1836, only two were 
long firms. After 1850, prosecutions for long firm fraud became more common. For 
instance, Levi's study of the transcripts of all cases tried at the Old Bailey between 
1850-1872 revealed that 80 people were convicted of involvement in long firm frauds. 
During this period, 19 people were acquitted. Levi also notes that prosecutors with 
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regard to the False -Pretences Act of 1757 experienced difficulties. All this goes to 
show that this particular type of offence or fraud is over a century old. 
In America, the scam was first recorded around 1820 (Morton, 1992). In a case 
involving a Spanish prisoner who had $3million in Latin America, Morton notes that 
six people were employed full time to write hundreds of letters of offer. Later the 
Spanish prisoner had become a Mexican one. By 1900, postal authorities had seized 
over 1,400 letters - most likely a small fraction of the total number of letters sent out. 
Finally, Morton states this type of scam is operating perfectly well in Britain today, 
albeit in a slightly different form. Today, businesses receive letters explaining how the 
writer has come across an unaudited amount of money in the bank or government 
department where he works. The addressee must send details of his bank accounts so 
that the money can be transferred. Morton remarks: "who dares say that history does 
not repeat itself' (Morton, 1992: 115). 
In another example which shows certain characteristics of a typical fraudster, 
Vallance (1955) talks about 'The Splendid Bankrupt': This began in the spring of 
1896 when a 37 year old man Ernest Terah Hooley arrived in London from the 
Midlands. It was said that Hooley had a presence and was a born showman going by 
his actions. According to his boastful statements, he claimed to have leased an eight- 
room suite in the Midland Grand Hotel at St. Pancras at f. 200 a week (the truth was 
probably L60). From this base, he launched a series of company and investment 
schemes that he never intended to run. Vallance notes that Hooley was a confidence 
trickster. His extravagance got his private accounts 'into the red'. Lloyds bank warned 
him not to draw any cheques and in June 1898 he filed for bankruptcy. By this time he 
had promoted companies with capital totalling L18 million. His liabilities were 
; E1,403,000 in claims. His total assets realised after meeting mortgages etc. was about 
E145,000. According to Vallance, the bankruptcy was also a fraudulent affair as 
Hooley had previously transferred ownership of his country houses (which he still 
lived in) to his wife. In sum, in his confession or admission after he filed his petition, 
he was worth the better part of E200,000 in funds 'salted away". 
Morton (1992) describes a case from 1905, when a gentleman named Paul Webb, a 
shopkeeper received several letters from a 'brother in-law'. The first letter informed 
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him that if he sent E59 to a Spanish priest he would receive a share of 07,000 
deposited in an English bank. The letter said one Louis Ramos was supposed to be 
serving 16 years in the Military Fortress in Barcelona. While asking for Mr Webb's 
complete discretion, he went on to describe how he had fallen into this situation. He 
said he was the private secretary and treasurer to General Martinez Campos in the last 
Cuban War and, as such was able to maintain his motherless daughter. He deserted 
after General Weyler who decamped with E37,000 placed in an English bank replaced 
Campos. Unfortunately, he was recognised, arrested for desertion and jailed for 16 
years. The letter stated that there was problem: his luggage which contained a secret 
drawer with the bank details of his account had been impounded and requires only 
E59 for its release. Webb went to Scotland Yard and as such narrowly avoided being 
another victim of a classic instance of the Spanish Prisoner Swindle which operated 
successfully from 1905 to 1915 in Great Britain and on the continent (Morton, 1992: 
112-115). 
Police files show that the trick was used in other areas in Britain and that some 
recipients of these letters either paid up and were ashamed to confess their greed or 
discarded the correspondence (Morton, 1992). Also, if an initial offer was refused, the 
motto of the tricksters seemed to be to try again. Morton adds that instances of this 
scam dates back to the Spanish Armanda in 1588. At this time the money was needed 
as ransom for prisoners captured in the unsuccessful invasion. Other instances 
include; that of a Belgian, during the First World War, who in the death of his master 
supposedly fled to Spain with L20,000 of Bank of England notes; and in the 1930's it 
was Jewish prisoners in Germany who were seeking a way out. 
People have always practised fraud for material gain, and early records of the Middle 
ages tell of coin-clippers, forgers cases of impersonation, false promises made under 
contract, sale of other people's land, and exploitation of charity through fraudulent 
begging were among tricks used (Vallance, 1955). A typical example of an advance 
fee fraud is highlighted by Vallance in the 19th century 'Turf fraud' (whose label in 
the Rogue's Gallery is 'Benson and the Scotland Yard detectives'). In this fraud, in 
league with a fraudulent bookmaker by name Kurr, Benson established a bogus 
French Weekly Journal, Le Sport. In its columns, reference was made to a great 
English racing expert - 'the bookmakers nightmare', Mr. Yonge of Shanklin, Isle of 
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Wight. Mr. Yonge having 'established' his reputation wrote to various wealthy French 
people using the addresses picked from provincial directories. Mme Goncort received 
one of such letters. She was asked to place a bet with an English bookmaker. The 
money was to be supplied by Mr. Yonge (who could not otherwise get the true odds). 
Mme Goncourt would receive a 5% commission for her trouble. She fell for this 
attractive and seemingly risk-free offer. Mr. Yonge sent the money; the horse won; 
and the bookmaker (Mr. Yonge under another alias) paid promptly. To perfect this 
type of advance fee fraud, Mr Yonge, on behalf of Mme Goncourt supposedly used 
his money for the first bet, which was 'successful'. This now paved the way for Mme 
Goncourt to pay for more bets up-front. Mme Goncourt added money of her own to 
the bets she placed for Mr. Yonge in larger and larger amounts. This got up to 
E10,000 without any success. Eventually, Mme Goncourt's lawyer went to the police 
and the conspiracy was exposed. 
Finally, a discussion about the history of scams will not be complete without 
mentioning the role of one of the 'masters', Charles Ponzi, an accomplished swindler, 
reputed as being the originator of the pyramid scheme and other methods of obtaining 
money by false pretences. Knutson, (1996) has developed a website titled - Charles K. 
Ponzi. According to Knutson, in the summer of 1920, Charles Ponzi and his Boston- 
based postal coupon enterprise was the talk of the East Coast. Before his investment 
scam was exposed Ponzi had collected $9,500,000 from 10,000 investors by selling 
promissory notes paying '50% profit in forty-five days'. Ponzi claimed he was giving 
investors just a portion of the 400% profit he was earning through trade in postal reply 
coupons. As Ponzi paid the matured notes held by early investors, word of enormous 
profits spread through the community, whipping greedy and credulous investors into 
frenzy. Investigations later revealed that there were no coupons or profits. The truth 
was that earlier notes were paid at maturity from the proceeds of later ones. It was 
another instance of robbing 'Peter to pay Paul'. The simplicity and grand scale of his 
scheme linked Ponzi's name with this particular form of fraud. A swindle of this 
nature, once a 'bubble', is now referred to as a Tonzi Scheme'. . 
Ponzi's operation expanded dramatically. As satisfied investors spread 'the good 
news', people flocked to his offices. After a few months he was taking in about 
$1,000,000 a week. He then expanded to several other cities. Federal, state, and 
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county officials, suspected Ponzi's business but could not identify concrete evidence 
of illegality. Apparently, all investors were fully paid promptly. Thus, without any 
substantial case against PonzL the Massachusetts District Attorney began meeting 
with him to discuss his postal coupon business. Using some combination of 
intimidation and charm. The attorney convinced Ponzi to quit accepting deposits from 
new investors until an auditor could verify the soundness of his operation. Despite this 
development, hundreds of eager investors were turned away with money in their 
hands. It was estimated that Ponzi had been taking in $200,000 a day of new 
investments prior to the halt. 
During the run on Ponzi's scheme, he had hot dogs and coffee served to the thousands 
crowding outside his office to get their money back. Some were so impressed with 
this gesture that they had a change of heart and went home. He assured nervous 
investors, claiming that he had $12 million in assets, $4 million in America, and $8 
million overseas. Speculators were known to have milled through the crowd 
purchasing notes from nervous investors at a premium, hoping to redeem them at the 
full 50% profit when they matured. It is said that Ponzi warned against such predatory 
practices and repeated his intentions to pay all notes in full. Knutson notes that 
normally in a scheme of this sort, it is the perpetrator's objective to abscond with the 
funds as the scheme is at its peak. Though, authorities eventually had Ponzi watched 
to prevent his premature exit, his failure to flee in late July remains inexplicable. After 
about three weeks Ponzi ended up in jail. It was said that he was able to project an 
appearance of respectability right up to the last few days of freedom. 
To sum up, historically, fraudsters have been observed to possess certain attributes 
especially that of confidence. We have already seen some examples above especially 
that of Ponzi. Discussing the 'craft' of the long-f= fraudster, Levi (1981) 
emphasises that these skills entail two principal categories. First, to obtain goods on 
credit and second, to avoid conviction and imprisonment. The highly rated fraudster 
succeeds on both; the middle-range crook succeeds on the first and fails in the second. 
The incompetent fraudster fails on both. Further, the concept of 'competence' is put to 
test by skilful investigators or regulators, as well as co-operative victims. Further, 
fraudsters employ various strategies to avoid arrest and conviction. This can be 
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regarded as the ultimate test of the fraudster's skills. Ways of handling this include 
providing appropriate inducements to front men to deter them from squealing to the 
police (LevL 1981). Another approach is to travel to a different continent or country 
adopting new identities if necessary. 
Levi notes that favoured locations include Eire, Canada, Australia, Zimbabwe, and 
South Africa. Important factors that determine movement include language and 
extradition laws. Other reasons include police corruption. Complicated transactions 
could be adopted to make the proof of guilt difficult. Arson, organised robberies, and 
other forms of planned catastrophe are other relatively common practices. Levi 
mentions the technique of voluntary liquidation of the business to 'con' or deceive 
creditors. Since liquidation is an 'accepted' risk or outcome in normal business 
practice, it is hoped that this will divert attention from the real cause of it. 
In conclusion, the discussion so far shows that obtaining by false pretences as a form 
of fraud has existed over many years. In fact, different varieties have emerged over 
the years depending on the modus operandi of the fraudsters which is partly dictated 
by the nature of events (social, economic and political) of society at a given time. The 
lesson from this is that fraud is an adaptive crime. The disposition of victims is pretty 
much the same, as fraudsters approach them from different perspectives. 'Proposals' 
revolve around the offer of 'too good to be true' deals. It might not be out of place to 
suggest that contemporary fraudsters developed and perfected some of their scams 
from studying similar events from the archives. Despite the dates of some of the 
examples highlighted the majority of the public at the time were not aware of the 
scams. The same situation also applies today. 
The next chapter examines the extent of fraud by looking at statistical information. In 
addition, a case study using a selected country, Nigeria, is also included. 
i 
Chapter Two 
Extent and significance of the fraud of obtaining by false pretences 
Various parts of this thesis draw attention to the significance of fraud from various 
perspectives. First, from the victim's perspective, the fraud has no limit with numbers 
(as exemplified by the examples of cases in this thesis) of people that fall prey. All 
age groups and gender are equally involved. The data supports this. It has been shown 
that financial fraud is capable of inflicting severe emotional and financial ruin upon 
individuals within and across national boundaries at the same time. In severe cases, 
victims part with their life savings and their source of livelihood is lost. As a 
consequence, the resultant breakdown of trust and confidence in conventional 
business and human relations cannot be overemphasised. Institutions and businesses 
are equally affected. Preventive strategies and verification procedures have generally 
increased the cost of commercial activities. As mentioned in the discussion on trust 
(Chapter 5), the cost of not trusting is enormous (cost of agreements, legal fees, 
litigation etc. ). The criminal justice system and other regulatory bodies are not left out 
in this array of consequences. The police in particular have to cope with the cost of 
local and international investigation of scams and prosecution. 
Finally, among others is the impact of frauds on national development. Countries or 
projects that have been duped have ultimately slowed down developmental activities 
or have had them grounded. This situation still exists as most firms usually insist on 
sum mobilisation fees or advance fees in order for them to commence the execution of 
a contract. On the contractor's part, this is a form of guarantee or security that the 
whole deal will be honoured. If the contractor is dishonest or is a fraudster, the 
advance fee is collected and the business abandoned. Fraudulent activities are capable 
of affecting the image of countries and citizens from countries that have been strongly 
associated with the activity - the case of Nigeria is an example. The same can be said 
of drug-related crimes and money laundering. The resultant effect of negative 
publicity include reduced trust and confidence that subsequently affects 
developmental investments especially in developing countries that would have helped 
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to provide basic infrastructure. 
The following sections are concerned with issues that throw more light on the 
significance or importance of fraud with particular attention on scams involving 
confidence tricks, upfront payments in cash or kind and other forms of obtaining by 
false pretences. The extent of fraud is examined, drawing from the umbrella of fraud 
in general. Other issues discussed include the problems of statistical computations 
using the UK as a case study. The impact fraud or scams is illustrated using a 
developing country that has been associated with this activity by newspaper and 
television reports, websites on the Internet and police reports. 
2.1 The extent of fraud 
The intention of this section is to highlight studies and research into crime especially 
those associated with fraud/obtaining by false pretences using information and data 
from some jurisdictions. This is an attempt to identify the differences and similarities 
that exist (if any) and to show that it is a global activity. It is important to reiterate that 
specific studies on frauds related to those of interest to this research are highlighted. 
In most cases studies are based on crime or fraud in general. 
The world today is seen and is actually a 'global village'. In the global village, 
criminal organisations exploit opportunities for cross-border crime, especially those 
generated by continental trading or trading blocs (Edwards and Gill, 2002, 
forthcoming). This ftu-ther compounds the statistical determination of the extent of 
fraud and crime. Crimes known to the police is the best available index, since it 
represents crimes 'reported to the police' by citizens or crimes discovered by them 
and noted in their records (Clinard and Abbot, 1973). The police also hold 
discretionary powers to arrest or dismiss suspects. A situation that could affect the 
number of recorded cases. Certain factors influence police decisions. Some of these 
include the appearance and the social status of the suspect or offender. Clinard and 
Abbot also note that prison statistics are totally dependent on the form of punishment 
decided by the court. It has also been observed that some people fail to report crimes 
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police inefficient. Thus, there is a need to restore police efficiency in order to increaso 
the reportage rate. In the long run, this would make police statistics more reliable 
(Box, 1983), and would also give us a better idea of the extent of crimes in general 
and fraud in particular. Problems associated with official statistics are discussed in the 
next section. 
According to LevL (1987) the 20th century has witnessed increases in the number of 
recorded fraud and offenders. He notes that certain attributes could account for this 
trend. These include the fact that there have been actual increases in the amount of 
law breaking. Second, the growing enthusiasm of state bureaucracies to claim 
competency at finding 'professional solutions' to crime, and the increased willingnes-s 
of victims of all social classes to use the police to deal with their conflicts have all 
contributed to this trend. Levi also notes that different crimes have different reporting 
and recording rates. The same can also be said about variations of fraud. Frauds 
resulting in the liquidation of a company, and anomalies by company directors usually 
feature prominently in official statistics. Levi notes that in assessing these 
computations one should be aware that varied definitions of 'economic crime' which 
makes the compilation of the statistics problematic. Further, the dimension of fraud is 
difficult to quantify especially as it affects social and economic values. 
In an attempt to understand the nature and extent of crime, various studies have been 
carried out. Some research that shed light on problems and conditions that are capable 
of encouragmg fraud are discussed below. 
With regard to developing countries, Clinard and Abbot (1973) examined conditions 
prevalent in developing countries that contribute to the crime problem. First, they note 
that the pattern of economic growth (e. g. inadequate social and economic amenities) 
create opportunities for crime (e. g. property offences). Also, corruption in government 
and business in addition to limited resources to tackle criminological problems, 
compounds the problem. Also, in more traditional communities, except for 'serious', 
offences such as homicide, criminal offences are rather settled within the community 
or group without the involvement of law enforcement agents. This may affect the 
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number of offences known or reported to the police, but at the same time help in 
reducing the burden for law enforcement agencies. 
Examining cross-cultural comparisons of fraud, the practice of 'money doubling' -a 
type of confidence trick, and which in the long run could result in advance fee or 
upfront payment fraud, Jahoda (1957) made several observations. He notes that data 
on confidence tricks in a British city reveal that: the offenders were mostly 
professional criminals; their mean age was 46 with a range from 32 to 62; the majority 
of them had a variety ofjobs; and most of them only had elementary schooling. With 
regard to the victims, Jahoda divided them into two categories: the naive and the 
opportunist. The naive victims consisted of mainly Irish immigrant labourers, who 
were thrifty (saving money to go back home), and some who carried their savings 
around with them. When they came across a chance of making quick money they 
easily fell for the confidence tricksters. 
In a typical example, the confidence man pretends he has some 'inside dope' on the 
outcome of a horse race. Thus a significant contributory factor was the widespread 
practice of betting, coupled with the idea that certain people have special access to 
information that can eliminate risk. On the other hand, the 'opportunists' were mainly 
small shopkeepers, usually foreign nationals who kept large sums of money with 
them, and were ready to cash in on cheap goods for re-sale. In situations like this the 
confidence man usually sells non-existent goods to the victim. 
In addition, Jahoda examined money doubling in the Gold Coast (now Ghana). The 
expression 'money doubling' denotes a form of confidence trick (or magical skill for 
the believer) in which the victim is induced to provide a sum of money for it to be 
increased by the doubler (Jahoda, 1957). First, Jahoda notes that socially, there was a 
gradual disintegration of a relatively stable traditional culture (norms, supernatural 
sanctions etc. ). Typically, the chief and the elders occupied the prestige positions, and 
wealth was relatively of minor importance in determining social status. He notes that 
various influences altered all this. These include education, the introduction of cocoa 
as a cash crop, political developments, rural-urban migration, and 'urban' problems 
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such as prostitution and crime. As a consequence, social status increasingly became 
dependent upon education and wealth or income, and consumption patterns involving 
expensive tastes became fashionable. 
Using the events of twelve cases between 1951 and the middle of 1955 in Ghana, 
Jahoda observed that the 'doublers' were mainly self-employed (e. g. small traders, 
and lorry owners). They had elementary education or sufficient education to achieve 
their tricks, but not enough to secure a remunerative position. Most were young men 
of illiterate parentage, who have drifted into the cities. It was discovered that some of 
them practised 'herbalism' after dropping out of an 'ordinary' occupation. At the 
time, the sums involved in the doubling scams ranged from E3 to E1,200. The 
tricksters or money 'doublers' to confuse their victims also used technological gadgets 
(such as machines, and electric toasters - for producing bank notes). This was in 
addition to magical means 'medicine' and incantations supposedly used. Money was 
demanded in exchange for the purported money making apparatus, the medicine, and 
blank currency paper. In some cases it was observed that fraudsters adopted the title 
of 'professor' to command respect, authority and confidence. 
In Jahoda's conclusions and findings based on his comparative study of certain 
tricksters in Britain and the Gold Coast (Ghana), he states that "the outstanding fact 
remains that the cultural setting determines to a large extent the type of person who 
becomes a confidence trickster, those who are liable to become their victims and the 
kinds of method employed" (1957: 276). In other words the type and modus operandi 
of fraud used depends on several factors prevalent in the society or cornmunity in 
question - culture, level of education, socio-economic situation and other variables. 
Other countries that have encountered advance fee scams include Canada, the United 
States and Russia. With regard to Canada, as far back as 1970, under the auspices of 
the Canadian Consumer Council, Frederick H. R. Rowell carried out a study on the 
deceptive and unethical selling practices in Canada. He notes that it is common 
knowledge that misleading advertisements is essential in most deceptive selling. A 
pattern of certain scams involve the 'selling' of products or services in order to obtain 
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upfront payment for the 'fake' transaction. The essence of Rowell's study was to 
examine the nature and extent of deceptive selling practices with a view to effecting 
appropriate legislation. The study included an examination of consumer protection 
authorities. Among the suggestions and recommendations put forward in Rowell's 
report (some of which were in legislation already and are covered by relevant statutes) 
include the use of the complaints box established by the department of corporate 
affairs from where complaints are promptly channelled to the appropriate agency. The 
mandatory cooling-off period is also important and consumers should be aware of it. 
Sufficient time should be given for this purpose. 
Rowell also points out the need to rationalise the criminal prosecution of certain 
violations against the victim. This goes a long way in ensuring that money is refunded 
or the victim compensated. It was observed that criminal investigations were 
cumbersome, expensive, burden of proof was high and it was geared towards getting a 
conviction rather than returning the victim's lost possession. The victim is then forced 
to seek action in a civil court. The possibility of a 'class action' is also an effective 
deterrent as the fraudster is compelled to reimburse all other victims affected by his 
scam. Thus, Rowell notes that the use of criminal statutes to regulate trading offences 
is singularly inappropriate and consumer protection should not necessarily depend 
upon the guilty intentions of the seller. Further, non-governmental organisations can 
also be helpful especially in assisting the consumer. The role of the mass media was 
highlighted as drawing attention to various fraudulent schemes have put some 
fraudsters out of business. The threat of publicity has also forced swindlers to 
compensate their victims. Rowell concluded that there is a need to curtail deceptive 
practices at its inception rather than wait for the tedious process of legislative reform. 
In Russia fraudulent activities are also widespread. According to the Financial Times 
(03/11/95), in an article by John Thornhill, Mr Victor Chernomyrdin, Russia's then 
prime minister, proposed that assets of fraudulent investment companies should be 
seized in order to compensate millions of swindled victims. He suggested the setting 
up of a state compensation fund with formidable powers to identify and seize assets. 
According to this article, the Federal Securities Commission estimates that 30 million 
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Russians have lost money in over 800 financial pyramid schemes over the past few 
years. The schemes typically collected money from shareholders by guaranteeing a 
constantly rising share price and big dividends. In reality, the schemes could only pay 
existing shareholders with the money raised from new investors. In one example, a 
fraudulent scheme that drew millions of investors before it collapsed had a leader 
described as an 'unrepentant head' Mr Sergei Mavrodi, who was subsequently elected 
to parliament where he was immune from prosecution. This shows how fraudsters can 
avoid prosecution in certain jurisdictions. 
Further, it was noted that the Russian government's previous reluctance to fight 
fraudulent investment schemes led to some individuals launching private initiatives to 
recover lost funds. According to the Financial Times, one Mr Konstantin BorovoL a 
well-known businessman and leader of a free market political grouping, launched the 
All-Russia Movement of Depositors to pursue fraudsters in courts. The movement is 
said to have about 700,000 members. The Russian government has also attempted to 
establish legitimate savings schemes in an attempt to encourage savings and to boost 
the economy. 
Finally, information from the United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
publication on the World Wide Web show how significant this fraud is and the extent 
of its impact (number of victims and amount involved). Under the 'Most Wanted' 
section, con men or fraudsters can be identified. In the US, population size, cultural 
diversity, intense social and economic activities are favourable conditions exploited 
by fraudsters and other business criminals. Examples of wanted fraudsters from the 
FBI publication are highlighted below. 
- In one example, the fraudster was a 43-year-old licensed pilot. He designed a huge 
scheme involving the purchase of pay telephones. 2,200 investors across the US 
mainly the elderly made upfront payments for the telephones. The telephones 
were never delivered and the scam netted over $43 million. 
- It was reported that a husband (57-years-old) and wife (60-years-old) partnership 
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designed an energy-related scheme that duped people. They built a $12 million 
facility, which they claimed was producing biodiesel fuel used for cooking oil. To 
raise capital, they sold over $20 million worth of unregistered securities between 
January 1991 and July1997. After a plea agreement, they fled when they realised 
they would face jail. Over 3000 victims, mainly the elderly contacted through the 
mailed prospectus, telephone and the Internet lost about $20 million. 
- In another fraud, the 47-year-old fraudster presented himself as a medical doctor. 
He was a licensed pilot and was known for his extravagant lifestyle. Between 
1995-1997 he claimed to be a 'world renown' medical doctor, and operated a 
clinic in the Dominican Republic. He told investors in North Carolina that he had 
developed medicine to effectively treat cancer, AIDS, and other ailments. He said 
he required fmancial support for research. In reality, he was not a medical doctor 
and had no license to practice medicine. He was convicted in absentia. Victims 
gave him money to support his 'projects'. Over $2 million was realised from the 
scam 
-A 61-year-old telemarketer is still wanted for allegedly defrauding about 210 
investors out of $4 million through the operation of a telemarketing company 
between July 1995 and Augustl997. He offered opportunities in the area of pre- 
paid telephone cards. He had offices in the major cities. Victims paid for 
subscription and fianchises that never materialised (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), 2001). 
To sum up, it is evident that the extent of fraud is widespread, especially those 
involving the manipulation of trust by the fraudster. Due to the nature of assessing the 
value of loss, the police or authorities rely on information from victims and data from 
their investigations. On the other hand, victims also weigh the benefits and costs of 
reporting the crime. Questions asked include - Will their money be recovered? The 
amount of time and resources used to pursue the matter are important considerations. 
Another obstacle is that the particular incident might have them ridiculed by family 
and friends. All the above indicate that the pattern of trust and deception in various 
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countries are similar. Fraud can affect thousands of victims at the same time. While 
the bulk of victims part with small sums of money, others incur heavy losses. 
The extent of fraud can be observed from other avenues. Apart from documented 
occurrences of fraud and other crimes, criminal statistics have always provided useful 
avenues for the understanding of various forms of criminal activities. The extent of 
their usefulness in understanding crime and fraud in particular is the main focus of the 
next section. 
2.2 Official crime and fraud statistics - the case of the United Kingdom 
Crime statistics have played a major role in the analyses of crime over the years. The 
first annual publication of criminal statistics was in 1827 in France. Other European 
countries soon began theirs. In the UK, the first regular publication for England and 
Wales was in 1837. The present series of Criminal Statistics, England and Wales 
started in 1857 (Walsh and Poole, 1983). 
The official statistics of crime are an important determinant of how policy is directed 
and prioritised within the criminal justice system. This is so because it is seen as the 
empirical evidence on a large scale that there are certain problem areas. It is important 
to mention that though the UK figures form the main source of the data, issues 
concerning the use of official statistics are applicable to other countries engaged in 
similar practices. In the Home Office's statistical analyses (Criminal Statistics, 
England and Wales) only a few forms of fraud are categorised (see Tables 2.1,2.2 
and 2.3). Thus, attention is placed on fraud and areas of fraud itemised that are closely 
associated with upfront payments for tz-ansactions, goods or services and the 
manipulation of trust. In the next section, relevant excerpts from the Police Fraud 
Survey 2000 (Flanary, 2000) are discussed with some of the statistical representations 
of other types of fraud which were categorised separately. 
For analytical and comparative purposes, the offence of burglary in particular and 
other property related offences are compared with fraud. The selection of burglary 
stems from its reputation as one of the most prevalent types of property crimes. 
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Suffice to say that compared to fraud, the financial lcfs of a large fraud far outweighs 
that of several burglaries. The modus operandi of burglars is also different. Other 
issues emanating from this compilation include the nature of official sanctions 
discussed in Chapter 3- Fraud and the criminal justice process. 
First, in the UK, according to The Law Commission Consultation Paper on Fraud and 
Deception (1999, No. 155), the Association for Payment Clearing Services revealed 
that in 1997 fraud involving the abuse of payments with plastic cards reached E122 
million. The Benefit Agency also suffered an estimated level of fraud of fl. 4 billion 
for income support with 9.7% of claims conformed or highly suspected to be 
fraudulent. Further, in the spring of 1998, fraud emanating from fraudulent 
prescriptions was estimated to be within the range of E70 million and flOO million a 
year. In the insurance industry, bogus claims were costing the British motor sector 
00 million a year. It was also noted that in a paper issued by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in 1992 losses from reported frauds totalled E8.5 billion, 
compared to ; E500 million or under for reported burglaries, E560 million for retail 
crime and E700 million for vehicle crime. In the preceding sections fraud statistics are 
highlighted. 
The statistics discussed in this section are those of recorded crimes. The term 
6recorded crime' refers to notifiable offences, which are also known as offences 
recorded by the police. The recording process starts when an individual, group or 
organisation reports an incident or crime to the police. It can also begin when the 
police observe or discover an offence. Statistics of notifiable offences recorded by the 
police relate to the offence as initially recorded. The recorded offence may be 
different from that which a suspect is later charged with or proceeded against 
(Criminal Statistics, England and Wales 1998). 
Generally offences like burglary, robbery, deception, shop lifting, appropriation, 
poaching, conveyance, dishonesty, fraud, etc fall under the umbrella of theft. In sum, 
Theft can be defined as "the dishonest appropriation of property belonging to 
someone else with the intention of keeping it permanently" (see Martin, (ed. ) 
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1994: 398). 'Appropriation' is also, closely associated with theft as it involves the 
acquisition of property even if it is not stolen, but retained by the individual (already 
discussed under the law on fraud). Theft involving the use of force physically on the 
victim may amount to burglary or robbery (see Martin, (ed. ) 1994). In Britain, the 
relevant statute is the Theft Act of 1968. 
In the Criminal Statistics of England and Wales, a list of Notifiable Offences recorded 
by the police form the guideline for the categorisation of the various types of offences. 
The courts for their proceedings and sentences use a more detailed classification. 
From the official list of offences fraud and forgery are categorised together. Advance 
fee fraud, as a separate category does not exist. A look at the classification by the 
courts includes one of the main methods of advance fee fraud, which is obtaining 
money or property by false pretence (Criminal Statistics of England and Wales, 
1998: 262). 
Before we look at some tables, it is important to make additional points concerning 
factors that affect the reporting and recording of crime. It is not possible for crime 
statistics to reflect the complete picture of crime. Figures from the 2000 British Crime 
Survey suggest that less than half of all offences are reported to the police and less 
than a quarter are recorded. Reporting and recording rates vary considerably between 
offences (Criminal Statistics England and Wales, 1999). In a comparison of figures 
from the British Crime Survey (BCS) 2000 of offences committed in 1999 it was 
observed that: 
- over three times as many domestic burglaries were recorded; 
- over three times as many woundings; 
- three times as many thefts from vehicles; 
- nearly four times as many bicycle thefts; 
- nearly six times as many offences of vandalism; and 
- seven times as many robberies and thefts from the person. 
The offence of 'fraud' was not iternised, but it is likely to be similar. It should be 
noted that victim surveys have their shortcomings. They are subject to sample error 
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and estimates of changes in the less common offences are imprecise. Respondent's 
interpretation of offences and other victimisation issues can also influence results. 
Others include public attitudes or disposition toward the type of offence committed, 
thus their willingness to report crime. Not all crimes committed are reported to the 
police, and not all 'crimes' or offences reported to the police are recorded as such. 
Police discretion in the investigation and recordings of offences are also crucial. 
With regard to recorded crime, the new Home Office rules for counting and 
classifying crime, were implemented in April 1998. Under the new rules, the 
statistics wherever possible measure one crime per victim. This is broadly similar to 
the old rules, particularly for violent crimes, although in some property crimes, an 
incident comprising a series of offences against different victims (e. g. in a secure car 
park) is recorded as one offence. The main specific change in the rules has been in 
fraud, where all victims are counted under the new rules, whereas only those reporting 
the offence to the police were counted under the old rules. This has had a substantial 
effect on cheque and credit card fraud, involving multiple usage of a stolen card or 
cheques. A police investigation may reveal victims (i. e. the owners of goods and 
services defrauded) who had not reported this to the police. These appear as new 
offences under the new rules but not under the old rules (Criminal Statistics of 
England and Wales, 1998/1999: 232, Appendix 2, No. 6). 
Further, it is important to note that there is no change in the rule that states that only 
the most serious offence is counted where several offences involving the same 
offender and victim are committed in one incident. This is known as the 'principal 
offence rule'. The most serious offence is determined where appropriate by maximum 
sentence, although the new rules state that a violent offence (i. e. violence against the 
person, sexual offences, robbery) should be deemed more serious than a non-violent 
one. If offences involving the same offender and victim are reported at different times, 
they should be counted separately. This is known as the 'finished incident rule', using 
the premise that for recording purposes an incident is regarded as finished when it 
comes to the notice of the police. 
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On fraud, burglary and other related offences, some figures from the 1988 to 1999 
Criminal Statistics of England and Wales are shown below. 
Table 2.1 
Selected notiriable offence types (numbers) 1988-1999 
Offence Type 
Year Total violent 
crime 
Burglary Theft and handling 
stolen goods 
Fraud and 
forgery 
Total of all 
Offence 
types(3) 
1988 216,214 817,792 1,931,274 133,873 3,715,767 
1989 239,858 825,930 2,012,760 134,490 3,870,748 
1990 249,904 1,006,813 2,3174,409 147,909 4,543,611 
1991 265,085 1,219,464 2,761,119 174,742 5,276,173 
1992 284,199 1,355,274 2,851,683) 168,600 5,591,717 
1993 294,23 1 1,369,584 2,751,901 162,836 5,526,255 
1994 310,3332 1,256,682 2,564,608 145,289 5,252,980 
1995 310,936 1,23 )9,484 2,452,109 133,016 5,100,241 
1996 344,766 1,164,583_ 2,383,946 136,225 5,036,552 
1997 347,064 1,015,075 2,164,952 134,398 4,598,327 
1997/8(l) 352,873 988,432 2,144,973 136.232 4,545,337 
1998/9(2) 331,843 951,878 2.126,718 173,728 4,481,817 
1998/9(2) 605,797 953,184 2,191,439 279,503 5,109,089 
1999/0(2) 703,105 906,468 2,223,620 334,773 5,301,185 
(1) The number of crimes recorded in that financial year using the coverage and rules until 
31 March 1998 
(2) The number of crimes recorded in that financial year using the expanded offence coverage and revised 
counting rules which came into effect on I April 1998. 
(3) The Total of all offence types includes the complete list of offence categories. 
Source: Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1998 and 1999. Table 2.21; 2.22 London: Home 0 
Comments 
In Table 2.1, in all categories of offences highlighted, the increasing trends are similar 
between 1988 and 1993, and declines can be noticed from 1994 to 2000. Later in this 
section it is noted that the new counting rules using the expanded offence coverage 
must have contributed to this. Over the years, fraud and forgery have consistently 
accounted for about 3-6%, burglary for about 22%, and theft and handling stolen 
goods for about 45-50% of total recorded crimes. 
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With regard to offences of fraud and forgery, crimes rose by 28% to 280,000 in 
1998/9. This large rise was attributed to the change in counting rules and to improved 
recording of such incidents in certain police forces. With the new rules, unreported 
offences that have been discovered in further investigations such as the multiple usage 
of a stolen credit card were recorded for the first time from April 1998. Thus, total 
recorded fraud and forgery was raised from an estimated 174,000 that would have 
been recorded under the old rules to 280,000 under the new rules. This trend has also 
affected the clear-up rate for frauds and forgeries. Increased number of offences 
caused a downward pressure on cleared-up rates. The statistics reveal that only 36% 
of all offences were cleared up in 1998/9, compared with 48% under the old rules in 
1997/8. 
With regard to burglary, overall recorded burglary fell by 4% in 1998/9 to 953000 
offences. This accounted for 19% of total recorded crime in 1998/9. It is noted that the 
effect of the new counting system was minimal, amounting to about 1,000 offences. 
Out of the 953,000 burglaries, 473,000 were domestic burglaries (i. e. in the dwelling), 
while others accounted for 480,000. Only 19% of all recorded burglaries were cleared 
up in 1998/9. 
Let us examine the trend of recorded fraud/forgeries in England and Wales from 
1988-1998 according to the recording categories used. The degree of information on 
fraud is shown in the breakdown of the offence into types. Overleaf, the statistics 
reveal the following: 
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Comments 
Table 2.2 shows that certain types of fraud have been prevalent. Cheque and credit 
card fraud has been dominant since 1988. Unfortunately, the specific offence of 
advance fee fraud is not one of the categories. Further, between 1990-1993 there was 
a sharp increase in fraud and forgery. Then, betweenI 994-1997 a reduction occurred. 
1997-1998 figures show increases. In general, recorded fraud has been on the 
increase, a situation ftirther enhanced by the new counting rules of recording fraud not 
directly reported by all victims. The rise in or prevalence of opportunities for fraud is 
also a likely factor for this trend. In particular, plastic cards are frequently used in 
most commercial transactions in shops and on the Internet. 
With regard to this thesis or research, official statistics do not provide enough 
information on the various types of fraud involving the manipulation of trust such as 
advance fee fraud. This is the result of the nature categories adopted by the Home 
Office. In Section 2.3 of this chapter a detailed statistical presentation on types of 
fraud culled from the Police Fraud Survey (Flanary, 2000) is discussed. 
Offences Cleared-Up 
The clear-up rate or detection rate is the ratio of offences cleared up in a year to 
offences recorded in the year. It is important to note that some offences cleared up in 
one year will have been recorded in the previous year. According to the Criminal 
Statistics report, an offence is cleared up if the person has been charged or 
summonsed, has been cautioned, or if the offence is admitted and could be taken into 
consideration by the court. 
The cIear-up rate varies widely according to type of offence. It is usually highest for 
violent crimes (two-thirds are cleared up). Further, offences with high clear-up rates 
are those cases that have a high likelihood of the victim being able to identify the 
offender. For example in most sexual offences and in cases where the knowledge of 
the offence directly identifies the offender (e. g. handling of stolen goods, going 
equipped for stealing and certain drug offences). 
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Generally, at present and as in previous years, the number of offences cleared up has 
not kept pace with the increase in recorded crime. In 1998/9,29% of recorded crimes 
were cleared up. Two-thirds of violent crime were cleared up, compared with less 
than one fifth of burglaries and criminal damage. The table below shows the trend of 
clear-ups in percentages over the years. 
Table 2.3 
Selected recorded crimes which were cleared up by offence group 
Offence Types 
Year Total violent crime 
against the person, 
sexual and robbery 
Burglary Theft and 
handling of stolen 
goods 
Fraud 
and 
forgery 
Total cleared 
up of all 
offences 
1988 68 29 34 71 35 
1989 70 27 31 66 3 
1990 69 25 30 61 32 
1991 68 23 28 55 29 
1992 66 20 24 53 26 
1993 65 19 2-3 51 25 
1994 66 21 24 52 26 
1995 65 21 23 50 26 
1996 66 21 2-3 49 26 
1997 69 23) 24 48 28 
1997/8(l) 69 23 24 47 28 
1998/9(2) 66 19 22 36 29 
1999/0(2) 59 13 18 30 25 
(1) The number of crimes recorded in that financial year using the coverage and rules until 31 march 1998. 
(2) The number of crimes recorded in that financial year using the expanded offence coverage and revised 
counting rules which came into effect on I April 1998. 
Source: Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1998,1999 Table 2.7; 2.8 London: Home Office 
Comments 
The table above shows that the clear up rate for fraud has been on the decline over the 
years. From its peak at 71% in 1988 the clear up rate reached an all time low in 1998. 
This might be attributed to the increased number of offences, its complicated nature 
and time allocated for investigation by the various police forces. Logically, violent 
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off6ices are given priority due to policy and public interest. Also, in most company 
frauds, offences are usually investigated in-house or by private firms. Fraudulent 
cases that involve more 'serious' offences such as homicide will definitely attract 
police attention. The victim's willingness to pursue fraud and forgery cases affecting 
them may have contributed to this trend. More so, if the victim feels the amount in 
question can be written off or there is little chance of recovering their loss from the 
fraudster, the desire to pursue the matter is diminished. 
The clear-up rate for burglary has also been on the decline. It is clear that the police 
cannot keep up with the rate of incidents and their investigation. On the other hand 
burglary as an offence is becoming more sophisticated. The availability of lighter or 
portable goods (e. g. lap top computers, and mobile phones) with good value may have 
contributed to this trend. 
The next section examines in more detail, statistical information on fraud - The Police 
Fraud Survey (Flanary, 2000). 
2.3 The Police Fraud Survey 2000 
Unlike the general official statistics on crime, a report that has attempted to show the 
extent and diversity of fraud in general in the UK as recorded and investigated by the 
police is the Police Fraud Survey (Flanary, 2000). Flanary notes that the Unit for the 
study of White Collar Crime at the Liverpool Business School, Liverpool John 
Moores University, originally carried out the police fraud management survey in 
1998. In the 1998 survey, questionnaires were distributed to all police forces and 
interviews conducted with selected forces. Similarly, in the updated 2000 survey, a 
total of 52 questionnaires were sent out and 43 of them were returned -a response rate 
of 83%. The responses were divided into two classes: England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland and Scotland. Findings from this survey that are relevant to this thesis are 
discussed below. 
The Police Fraud Survey 2000 can be regarded as the most detailed statistical 
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inforrnation on the distribution, extent and cost of fraud across various police forces. 
The practices and opinions of the different police forces concerning issues such as 
logistics, policy, costing, intelligence, confiscation and forfeiture etc were highlighted 
in the report. They have been mentioned and discussed in relevant areas of this thesis. 
The table below is the value of current cases, and the methods used to calculate value. 
For confidentiality and anonymity numbers represents the various police forces. Thus, 
one can not associate the figures with a particular force. 
Table 2.4 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland - the value of current cases, and the 
methods used to calculate value for the year 2000 
Force No. of 
cases 
Value of 
cases 
Method of valuation 
1 37 E34 million 'Actual loss' calculated at the completion of case. Also 
considered is money restrained. 
2 9 Unknown N/A 
4 15 E65 million Value of fraud committed as assessed by the loser (s) 
.5 
17 L15 million Actual loss 
6 317 E634,134,652 Actual loss (obtained-El36,135,517; attempted - 
E441,385,927; recovered- E56,613,208) 
9 26 E47,714,486 Both actual value if known, and amount at risk. 
10 19 E6.1 million Alle ed actual loss- complainant detail. 
11 12 E5 million Actual loss as reflected by charges and estimated loss 
as calculated by auditors. 
12 26 Unknown Value was not measured. 
13 15 L65 million Generally actual loss. Value at risk was used for cases 
investigated with SFO can be value at risk. 
15 24 L8 million Actual loss. 
16 25 f. 4.7 million Actual loss reported at time of complaint. 
17 27 E9 million Estimated value at time of reporting. 
19 48 L12,500,000 Amount known to be stolen and/or estimated value at 
risk at time of reporting, plus calculation of potential 
value after initial assessment. 
20 221 E15-33,413,000 No calculation of value of crimes under investigation. 
Assets protected/ recovered/confiscated not recorded. 
23 15 E4,2 10,000 Methods vary: In bankruptcies it tends to be total sum 
of insolvency (i. e. total owed to creditors). In Theft 
Act frauds it is the value of monies obtained. In 
corruption value of contract and bribes are highlighted 
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NB: Continued roin previous pag 
Force No. of 
cases 
Value of 
cases 
Method of valuation 
24 9 E3.52 million Actual loss 
25 1 10 14 million Actual loss 
26 10 E25 million Actual loss 
27 14 E3.5 million Actual loss 
28 40 E15 million Actual loss 
30 56 E59 million Actual loss 
32 15 E3 million In the case of fraudulent trading, it is the value of the 
loss to creditors. In all other cases, it is the actual loss 
to victim/gain to offenders. 
35 25 E9 million Loss to victim only! 
36 26 05 million Actual loss 
37 17 L85 million Actual loss 
38 201 fl-30 million Assessment by investigating officer of the amount at 
risk 
39 25 E2.2 million Reported loss 
40 185 E50 million Actual loss 
41 68 E50 million Value not used as it gives no indication of 
complexity of case. Value based on reported loss. 
42 56 E5 million Value at risk 
44 20 E15 in plus Not stated 
45 21 E53 million Value at risk 
47 29 E3 million Value of loss, as calculated by evidence 
49 15 Unknown N/A 
50 15 E12,500,000 Value placed by the insured party 
52 10 E25m plus Actual loss 
53 5 E46.6 million Varies: where SFO are involved, amount of loss; 
internal enquiries either direct amount lost or 
extrapolated figures provided by victim. 
Source: Flanary (2000: 33)) The Police Fraud Survey 2000, Centre for Fraud 
_Management 
Liverpool: Liverpool John Moores University 
With regard to the table above, Flanary (2000) notes that some of the figures could 
change in the course of further investigations. The table clearly indicates that the 
occurrence of fraud and its value is unevenly distributed. Further, one can infer that 
the police forces in the heavy commercial or economic centres would have more cases 
of fraud with great value. The table also reveals the problems associated with arriving 
at a particular figure for a given fraud. The police can provide to a large extent, 0 
money lost by victims as reported or claimed, and that recovered or traced to the 
fraudster. The actual money at risk is difficult to ascertain. The larger perspective 
would involve the impact of the fraud as it concerns monetary value, loss of jobs, 
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emotional anguish, loss of confidence in the market etc. These factors can not be 
easily or adequately computed - an indication of the serious nature of fraud. 
Finally, from the value of fraud figures indicated above (for known cases), they all 
add up to fl, 171,792,138 (over a billion). From this compilation, the cost of different 
types of fraud can not be ascertained. For instance Advance Fee Fraud estimates are 
not indicated separately. The occurrences of different types of fraud are highlighted in 
sections/tables below. Taking into consideration that most crimes are not reported, 
and this is even more pronounced in cases of fraud, one can infer that the value of 
fraud in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland can be conservatively put at about D 
billion per annum (three times the documented estimate). It is important to also note 
that organisations deal with most of their fraud cases internally, either by dismissing 
the staff involved or writing off the loss. Estimating or valuing fraud is made more 
difficult especially in situations where victims exaggerate losses. The next heading 
takes a brief look at the issue of categorisation from the police fraud survey. 
2.3.1 Categorisation of fraud types - Police Fraud Survey 
With regard to the types of current cases, based on the number of responses received, 
the police fraud survey revealed that only one force stated that it was unable to 
catcgorise its current case load, thus fraud statistics were not categorised according to 
type. Another force "pointed out that breaking down cases according to type is 
misleading as a large number of cases do not fall into one particular category and 
cases often contain several elements or 'types' either from the outset, or as the case 
develops" (Flanary, 2000: 40). 
At this juncture it is important to note that cases from this thesis show that frauds 
involving upfront payments or advance fees can be carried out in virtually all arenas 
or spheres of life. It is likely that the categories adopted by a police force lay emphasis 
on activities that inform how the fraud in question is recorded such as the principal 
offence in a particular case, nature of victims, nature of reporting by victims and the 
characteristics of the fraudster. Hence, each category or type of fraud may include 
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several types of fraudulent offenzes, which has not been noted as the major offence. 
As with other crimes, offences deemed as the most serious are recorded as the main 
crime. For example, in cases involving murder and theft, the crime is likely to be 
recorded as a murder. In fraud cases, a given type of fraud may receive priority 
recording compared to others. Flanary (2000) also notes that the breakdown is flawed, 
as it is common for multiple offences to arise in each case. 
The table below is the breakdown of fraud cases. 
Table 2.5 
Type of fraud cases according to number of cases 1998 and 2000 (Police Survey) 
Type of Fraud Number of Cases 
1998 2000 
Advance fee/ Investment fraud 256 155 
Mortgage fraud 53 48 
Public Sector fraud 97 89 
Corruption 64 54 
Long firm fraud 80 71 
Embezzlement 65 36 
Insolvency legislation offences 36 28 
Company fraud/ fraudulent trading 149 94 
Forgery/ counterfeiting 40 32 
Deception 238 241 
Computer fraud 58 52 
Factoring/ leasing fraud 20 16 
Procurement contmcts frauds 17 15 
Bank/ building society fraud 166 148 
Soficitor 52 63 
Doctor/ pharmacy 19 2L 
Source: Flanary (2000) The Police FraDSurvey 2000, Centre for Fraud Management 
Liverpool: Liverpool John Moores University 
The table above shows that deception and advance fee/ investment fraud are the most 
common types of cases. The police survey also reveals that advance fee/ investment 
fraud is the most common in terms of the number of forces investigating such cases. 
A break down of the types of fraud in relation to forces investigating them (Flanary, 
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2000: 41) shows that virtually all forces recorded one or more cases of advance fee/ 
investment fraud. As mentioned earlier, the tables do not indicate which forces 
account for various cases. 
In Scotland the pattern is different. The police survey revealed that only one force did 
not categorise caseload type by type of offences. The Table below is the breakdown. 
Table 2.6 
Type of case and number of cases 1998 and 2000 - Scotland 
Type of Fraud Number of Cases 
1998 2000 
Advance fee/ Investment fraud 6 4 
Mortgage fraud 3 6 
Public Sector fraud 7 13 
Corruption 2 3 
Long firm fraud 13 12 
Embezzlement 22 27 
Insolvency legislation offences 3 4 
Company fraud/ fraudulent trading 12 9 
Forgery/ counterfeiting 10 23 
Deception 25 
Computer fraud 34 4 
Factoring/ leasing fraud 3 1 
Procurement contracts frauds 
Bank/ building society fraud 5 8 
Solicitor 1 6 
Doctor/ pharmacy 1 2 
Source: Flanary (2000) The Police Fraud Survey 2000, Centre for Fraud Management 
Liverpool: Liverpool John Moores University 
In Scotland, embezzlement, deception and forgery/counterfeiting are the most 
common types of fraud. The least common are procurement contract frauds, 
factoring/leasing fraud and corruption. It is noted that the forces listed 'other' types of 
cases currently being investigated that were not included in the survey's 
categorisation. These are bankruptcy offences (had the highest number of cases - over 
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20 cases) in both years, insurance fraud (one case in 1998 and two in 2000) and 
timeshare fraud (one in 1998 and two in 2000). 
In the UK, police forces also indicated that certain types of frauds were not included 
in the categories contained in the survey. The table below is the list of types of fraud 
'not indicated' in the survey but identified by some police forces. 
Table 2.7 
Other types of fraud 
Type of Case Number of Cases 
1998 2000 
Charity 6 1 
Computer Hacking 1 2 
False Accounting 7 5 
Financial Investigations - 13 
Forensic Computing - 16 
Insurance fraud 20 13 
Internet I I 
Investment fraud 2 8 
Money-laundering 8 10 
NCIS enquiry - I 
Nigerian fraud - 2 
Non-investment 51 77 
Perjury 
---- 
I I 
Proceeds of crime 147 147 
Shipping 2 1 
Stock-nwket 4 8 
Theft 2 9 
NB: Additional 'other' cases reported in 1998, which did not appear in the 2000 fraud management 
survey included: benefit fraud; dentist; fi-anchise; fraudulent conversion; information brokering; land 
registry; local authority grants; optical; perverting the course ofjustice; probate; Representation of the 
People Act; d timeshare. 
Source: Flanary (2000) The Police Fraud Survey 2000, Centre for Fraud Management 
Liverpool: Liverpool John Moores University 
Finally, the interpretation of the results with regard to why certain forces or areas 
experience certain types of fraud would be interesting. This is beyond the scope of 
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this thesis and will probably be investigated in the future. On the other hand, the 
general conditions exploited by advance fee fraudsters have been addressed in the 
relevant areas of this research. The typology of cases is another area that needs to be 
looked into for a standardised or consistent recording code/categories. The police 
fraud su rvey revealed researchers and police officers have different views on how 
fraud are itemised or grouped. This research has attempted to categorise the fraud of 
obtaining money, goods and services upfront into the arenas in which they occur. The 
reasoning behind this is that in reality, the various types of fraud are to numerous to 
tabulate. The police fraud survey revealed that most police forces stated that statistics 
were only held centrally within HQ statistical departments, and categorisation was 
usually in accordance with Home Office counting rules. Some forces used their own 
system of categorising cases alongside this system 
The next section discusses the implications of statistics - the extent to which 
information can be deduced from them. 
2.4 Implications of fraud and crime statistics 
It has been noted that in this thesis crime statistics as a measure of determining the 
extent and nature of crime in general and fraud in particular have limitations. At this 
stage it is necessary to take a general look at certain issues associated with crime and 
fraud statistics. With regard to fraud, Levi (1988) notes that in a good number of cases 
it is not always clear if a loss or attempted loss is a fraud. Some people may feel they 
have been defrauded, but this may turn out to be contrary to the criminal law or rather, 
the act is a civil deceit. Sometimes it could even be lawful. Further, because of the 
complicated nature of certain frauds, the police are inclined to refer some cases for 
further investigation and may not record them as frauds immediately. On the other, a 
fraud investigation may reveal a different type of fraud other than that reported and 
recorded. Thus Levi is of the view that unlike the categories of certain crimes, a grey 
area exist with regard to the criminal offence of fraud. 
Certain methodological problems exist in the use of official statistics. Coleman and 
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Moynihan, (1996) note that problems include that of the 'dark- figure' (i. e. unreported 
crime). They also state that the statistics cover mainly notifiable offences and very 
limited information is given about the nature of offences and the circumstances in 
which they were committed. Furthermore, little information on offender 
characteristics except their sex and ages groups are given. In addition, not all 'un- 
orthodox' agencies contribute data. For Farrington and Dowds (1985), geographical 
differences in the statistics may be as a result of divergent reporting and recording 
practices. 
Bottomley and Coleman (198 1) note the problem of procedure referred to as 'cuffing' 
(i. e. undocumented crime that could be the result of administrative and personal 
factors or reasons). They also mentioned that biases in law enforcement, police 
strategy (for example 'proactive' and 'reactive' policing) could influence or affect 
collated figures. With regard to the 'dark figure' this can reduce the validity of the 
statistics (Jupp, 1989). For Jupp, to a certain degree, this can be corrected. Whether 
produced by the police, victim survey, self-report study or whatever, statistics are 
produced by the interaction of a number of certain elements (Bottomley and Coleman, 
1981). T1-. ese include a concept of crime, an operational definition of the concept, 
discovery methods, classification rules, validity checks, counting rules, together with 
a further set of procedures for linking an offender with the offence. The decisions 
about such definitions and procedures usually differ according to the objectives of the 
exercise. 
To sum up, crime statistics have merits and demerits. In criminology, the traditional 
realists say the intention of statistical data is to discover the 'real' amount of crime. 
The institutionalists believe the data is a social construction influenced by structures 
and processes. While the radical perspective show concern for the ideological 
implications portrayed by the data (see Coleman and Moynihan, 1996: 133). The 
implication of all this is that one cannot say that the statistics provide a true and 
&conclusive' or 'complete' picture of the extent and nature of fraud or crime in 
general. Coleman and Moynihan note that statistics of this sort provide useful data for 
triangulation purposes. They can also inform further research and policies/planning. 
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Further, because of the complex nature of 'crime', and the role of several factors and 
variables involved in criminal activity such as fraud, it is important to develop a 
format for recording specific crimes in detail for analytical purposes. The statistics on 
fraud gives us an idea of the trend, nature and extent of the offence at the 'police 
level'. Thus, we have to rely on reports from other fraud investigation agencies, 
auditors and even non-governmental bodies to get a more realistic picture of the 
offence. At any rate, statistics from specialised organisations may not cover all 
categories of fraud, they may concentrate on the areas of interest to them. For 
example auditing firms and accounting or bank frauds. 
In conclusion, several problems are associated with official statistics especially those 
concerning fraud and organised crime. It is often practically difficult to have exact 
figures. Edwards (2001) notes that estimates collated by different agencies are used to 
make the case for new law enforcement strategies and for increasing the investment in 
these strategies. Edwards states that questions over the veracity of the measures used 
have been raised by critical commentators such as Van Duyne (2000) who have 
challenged the tendency of authorities to 'dogmatically' multiply seizures of illicit 
goods by 10 per cent to estimate their 'true' volume and value. It is not unlikely that 
the same situation applies to cases of fraud. With regard to the more general official 
statistics, information it provides is limited. For instance, Beck and Willis (1995: 35) 
note that the "annual Criminal Statistics tend not to provide information about crime 
by location, making it difficult or impossible to work out whether an offence took 
place at the victim's home, place of work or in a public place". Further, an attempt to 
make up for this limitation through the British Crime Survey (BSC) has not solved the 
problem. The effort to uncover the 'real' extent of crime through the BSC or 
victimisation surveys as they are also called, still concentrates almost exclusively on 
property crime and crimes against the person in and around the respondents household 
(Beck and Willis, 1995). 
Finally, on the value of crime or fraud reported to the police, the police can generally 
do little or nothing about the accuracy of the figures. In the first instance, reports from 
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victims could be exaggerated, and in the course of a fraud investigation, figures 11) 
usually rise, as the true extent of the crime is unravelled. For instance, in the UK 
police fraud survey, Flanary (2000) observed that police forces used different criteria. 
These include actual loss as a method for calculating the value of cases, reported loss, 
value of money at risk, or as some forces stated, the nature and complexity of the case 
determined which method was used. Further, another area without general consensus 
is that of the costing of enquiries, which eventually adds up to the total cost of the 
crime at the prosecution level. Flanary's report notes that costing usually included 
some measurement of man-hours, at the very least, and in some cases all included 
amount spent on expenses, transportation, accommodation etc. Despite all these 
shortcomings, statistics are still a useful starting point in crime analysis and 
interpretation. 
The impact/implications of fraud or the activities of fraudsters are examined in the 
next section. A developing country Nigeria is used as a case study. 
2.5 The impact of fraud - the case of Nigeria b 
The use of Nigeria as a case study stems from several factors. Some of which include 
that it is a developing country, and has been associated with various scams especially 
those involving advance fees by the print media, the police and Intelligence especially 
in the UK and the United States. As a consequence, the Nigerian government and 
citizens have embarked on deliberate image building programmes and activities to 
show that this negative publicity is the result of a negligible number of people. It is 
not unusual for stereotypes to develop where certain citizens or countries have been 
associated with particular types of criminal activities. It is not possible to measure or 
quantify in precise terms the impact of such negative publicity. Stories of personal 
experiences and the attitude of the business and tourist communities are pointers to 
this development. On the other hand, the historical development of Nigeria, which is 
similar to that of other developing countries show signs or characteristics that are 
capable of inducing certain individuals to engage in fraud and criminal activity. 
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Developed countries also experience various forms of fraud including advance fee 
fraud perpetrated by its citizens. Though other crimes such as grand corruption and 
embezzlement have created the bulk of the social, political and economic problems 
experienced in developing countries. Advance Fee Scam is the type of fraud 
associated with Nigerians going by various reports. 
The impact of the 'image' problem can be seen in a speech by the National President 
of the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce (1998), in which he stated that 
Advance Fee Fraud (ahas 4-1-9) "419 has so badly dented our national image that 
Nigerians travelling abroad to transact business cannot but recall with palpable 
consternation at the cynicism and spite with which this nation and its nationals are 
regarded particularly in Europe and America7. Further, going by the campaign of 
calumny, the word Nigerian is regarded as synonymous with criminality in some parts 
of the world. 
The fact that Transparency International (TI) has placed Nigeria as one of the most 
corrupt countries in the world best describes the image problem in the light of their 
'survey'. This is supposed to be the collective opinions of the 'business' and 'tourist' 
community some of whom it is argued resort to illegal activities for their business 
interests. TI notes that fraud is an integral part of corruption. They acknowledge that 0 
corruption can be found in virtually all countries of the world. The agency's 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 ranked 91 countries. The 2001 Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) is said to reflect the degree to which corruption is perceived 
to exist among public officials and politicians 
(http: //iv-ww. g-, vdg. de/-uwv-, v/icr. htm - 13/07/01). 
The impact of 'corruption' analysis cannot be overemphasised. The Nigerian 
government's Special Adviser on Drugs and Financial Crimes (1998) remarked that 
some countries have found some International Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) useful instruments of Foreign policy. While acknowledging the constructive I 
contributions of most of these organisations, the role of the NGO Transparency 
International (TI) in 'blackmail' was stressed. He also noted that the officials of TI 
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have never visited Nigeria, thus, the "criteria adopted in their assessment are 
questionable, unjustified and dishonest". 
Nigeria is located in the western part of Africa, with a population of about 127 
million, the 10th most populous country in the world, according to the 2001 worlds 
Population Data Sheet (The Guardian Online - http: //www. ngrguardiannews. com, 
13/08/01). The 1996 population was estimated to be 115 million, with a GNP per 
capita of US$240. It is also one of the most ethnically diverse countries comprising of 
about 250 ethnic groups and over 200 languages. In general employment and 
unemployment figures are said to be erratic. Basic infrastructure is not adequate and 
where they exist are not properly maintained (The Commonwealth Yearbook, 1999). 
Nigeria has other natural resources, but a substantial part of its income is from oil 
production (The World Economic Factbook, 1998/9). Nigeria gained its independence 
from the Britain in October 1960 and the Federal Republic was proclaimed in 1963. 
The country survived a civil war between 1967 and 1970. Since independence, the 
country has experienced political and economic instability, with successive military 
dictatorships. From May 1999 to present, a democratically elected government has 
been governing the country. 
In the course of its turbulent history, crime has been on the increase. Especially after 
the civil war (1967-1970), the spate of property and violent crimes increased. On the 
political side, corruption, mismanagement and nepotism were prevalent. These are 
some of the conditions that are capable of creating fraudulent activities, and advance 
fee fraud in particular. Certain dishonest individuals have decided to take advantage 
of the global business environment to carry out all sorts of fraud. 
Examining the historical background of advance fee fraud in particular, the Nigerian 
government's Special Adviser on Drugs and Financial Crimes (1998) notes that 
before the introduction of stringent economic measures such as the Structural 
Adjustment and Deregulatory programmes in the 1980's, trust and confidence in 
business internationally and locally was common. In addition the national currency 
was strong and stable compared to those of other countries. Liberalisation of the 
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economy was a pre-condition for the successful implementation of the programmes. 
With privatisation and commercialisation government subsides were withdrawn from 
certain essential services such as petroleum pump price and electricity. This created 
difficulties for citizens. Unfortunately, these changes did not result in increased 
productivity, and as one of the consequences, the national currency (the Naira) 
depreciated in value against other currencies. The economic advantage of possessing 
foreign currencies within the country became evident. This probably led to the 
exploitation of would-be foreign investors by criminals who demanded advance fees 
for business and other commercial arrangements. 
In a study of crime from the Nigerian perspective, Marenin and Reisig (1995) 
assessed the validity of the General Theory of Crime proposed by Goitfredson and 
Hirschi (1990). They argued that cultural variability is not important in the causation 
of crime and that we need to look for consistent causes of crime. Further, one theory 
of crime can adequately explain cross-cultural differences in crime rates. These 
include the concepts of pain, pleasure and self-interest calculations as important 
considerations for the offender. Also, individuals who commit crimes including frauds 
are characterised by low levels of individual restraint or self-control that ought to have 
been implanted during childhood or during the socialisation process of the individual. 
In addition, low levels of self-control alone do not explain crime. Opportunity and 
situational conditions (e. g. vulnerability of the victim) are significant factors. Thus, 
developed and developing countries have similar causal explanations for fraud and 
crime. 
For Marenin and Reisig, in Nigeria crime is committed within specific contexts. 
Factors that are contributory to crime include the presence of a large and growing 
population, a small and declining per capita income, the development of glaring 
differences in wealth and lifestyles, which create possibilities for large-scale 
corruption. Others are political instability, ethnic distrust and uncertainty among the 
public about the future. Little trust in government, it's leadership and with much of 
public and private life consumed by the struggle to 'survive' further compounds the 
problem. Property offences constitute about one-half of all reported crimes. The 
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dependence on importation opens the doors for con-uption and fraud: ranging from 
white-collar crimes carried out by Nigerians and foreigners (e. g. importation of 
second hand and shoddy goods). Government contracts are very lucrative and 
performance standards are seldom enforced. Other economic crimes include the sale 
of foreign currencies in the black market and smuggling in and out of the country. 
With regard to the occurrence of crime and fraud in particular, the key findings from 
Nigerian based research are threefold (Marenin and Reisig, 1995: 508): 
- Oloruntimehin (1992) explained trends in crime rates by citing the social 
dislocation and economic pressures brought on by political instability, uneven 
development, high unemployment, white-collar fraud and corruption, rapid 
migration to the cities with a consequent lack of amenities, and high degrees of 
anonymity in urban areas. 
Odekunle, (1978,1986) noted that the causes of crimes cannot be found in 
peculiarities of individual character or general normlessness, and that the (corrupt) 
norms are quite clear and enforced in favour of those in power, and 
AdeyemL (1990) concluded that only a systematic and integrated effort to 
understand, and react to all the problems mentioned above will be able to prevent 
crime. 
It was adduced that the reasons for elite corruption and political-economic crimes in 
Nigeria are associated with individual traits such as greed, selfishness and lack of 
moral integrity. Other explanations or probable reasons given for crime in Nigeria 
include the attractiveness of quick financial gains. This occurs "within general 
conditions of poverty, uncertainty, social and political instability, a pervasive belief 
that everyone else is doing it; and a capitalist economic system that values 
individualism, competition, acquisition, and wea1th7' (views also noted by Abba et al., 
1993; Achebe, 1983; Adamolekun, 1985; Watts, 1985) (Marenin and Reisig, 1995: 
508). In addition, in the absence of support from the state, the extended family system 
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whereby the more successful and employed family members are culturally bound to 
take responsibility for the general wellbeing of their kin are also contributory. 
In addition, certain problems experienced in developing countries tend to have an 
impact on crime control. For instance, in Nigeria police/public co-operation is poor. 
Public attitudes exhibited are that of distrust, n-dsunderstanding, fear, and fear of arrest 
after police questioning. Police studies in Nigeria show that police officers living in 
barracks (an offshoot of the Colonial era) puts them in a particular class and reduces 
their social status. This obviously affects interaction and good relationship with the 
public (Clinard and Abbot, 1973). 
Jones, (1993) researched into the activities of Nigerian crime networks in the United 
States. While noting that it is difficult to assess the quantity of crime committed by 
Nigerians, he states that certain patterns seem to have emerged. He mentions Senator 
Roth's subcommittee report, which identified elements of the 'Nigerian' crime 
network. The most common element is the individual who learns how to commit 
fraud from another Nigerian, sometimes for a fee and puts the information into 
practice for a living. In a Secret Service raid conducted in Atlanta, agents recovered =1 
what they named a 'Nigerian Handbook'. The document is said to be "a well-crafted 
instruction guide explaining how to commit various types of fraud". There was no 
confirmation that Nigerians prepared the document, but they suggest that it is 
distributed to Nigerians entering the country (Jones, 1993: 63). 
The easy flow of paper or stationery, the relative ease in obtaining credit, bank loans, 
insurance policies etc., the laxity on the part of institutions that administer these 
services, in addition to their profit making interests, all contributes to and facilitates 
these activities (Jones, 1993). With reference to the stained business image of 
Nigerians, Jones observes Imasa's (1991) remark that Nigerian government should 
make it compulsory for her businesses to belong to a government-sanctioned 
organisation. For Jones, (1993) the problem of Nigerian crime networks in the United 
States must be addressed at its source - Nigeria (through the enactment and 
implementation of relevant policies). 
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Apart from reports about Nigeria's previous military dictatorships, in the area of 
crime or advance fee fraud in particular, the objectivity of media reports and other 
publications are questionable. For instance, on the Internet certain websites are 
dedicated to 'Nigerian' crime. A website, 'Nigeria - The 419 Coalition Website: We 
Fight the Nigerian Scam' (http: //home. rica. net/alphae/419coal/) is devoted to this as 
their name implies. In this site, various pages contain advisory information on the 
scam. Samples of scam letters are also made available (see Appendix for some 
samples of these letters). In a nutshell, the coalition group claim that the Nigerian 
government officials are directly involved in Advance Fee Fraud Scams. The Nigerian 
government is also accused of doing little to address the problem, rather, they 
apportion blame to victims. On the other hand, Nigerian readers responding to this 
website blame the situation on greedy individuals who are ready to earn huge profits 
from illegitimate transactions. 
According to this website, on May 20 1998 in Washington, D. C. - U. S. 
Representative Edward I Markey (D-MA) introduced the Nigerian Advance Fee 
Fraud Prevention Act of 1998 (the Representative has his own website). Markey noted 
that according to the data provided by the U. S. Secret Service, Americans have lost 
over $100 million in 1997 and 15 foreign businessmen including two U. S. citizens 
were murdered while in Nigeria in connection with a 4-1-9 scam. For Markey, 
perpetrators of these scams are rarely prosecuted or jailed by the Nigerian 
government, "who is also suspected in playing a role in these schemes. " 
Looking at the print media in the UK, certain articles have been written and responded 
to by Nigerians on the subject of 'Nigerian' crime. For instance, in a front-page article 
in the Independent newspaper (02/02/98) titled 'Nigerian crime poses serious threat in 
Britain', it was stated that: 
Criminals mainly Nigerians have been discovered working inside government 
departments... The level of the crime is so serious that the National Crime 
Intelligence Service is drawing up a plan to address this problem The cost of 
the fraud alone is 0.5 billion a year, says the NCIS... The fraudsters 
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concentrate on con-tricks and benefit fraud, drug-trafficking, mainly cocaine, 
and illegal immigration. 
The article then cites examples of Nigerians sacked from certain offices for fraudulent 
activities. It also states that "an estimated 500,000 advance fee fraud or 4-1-9 letters 
attempting to con people by promising risk-free cash are sent by West Africans, 
mainly from Lagos around the world every year". With the state of technology today, 
it is possible for a few individuals to generate all these letters. Unsolicited mails have 
always been used by con men all over the world. 
Similarly, in an article in the Times (20/08/99) titled 'Letters from Lagos promise 
false riches for the gullible'. The article states that the money from these scams is 
laundered through Lebanon and sent to Thailand where it is used to buy heroin for the 
American market. The Americans trade it for cocaine, which is then smuggled into the 
UK and sold to the Yardies. The Nigerian connection is said to have been unravelled 
in Jeffrey Robinson's book about organised crime - The Merger (1999). It was also 
mentioned that in Hong Kong, up to 95% of all the mail from Nigeria are scams. Also, 
that during the 1998 Olympics in Atlanta, hotels were stripped of telephone 
directories, and within three months, the city was bombarded with scam letters. It was 
alleged that supporters of the Nigerian team filled their suitcases before heading 
home. Also, with more exposure of the scam, UK citizens are being recruited as 
fronts. 
On the other hand, in the Observer (13/09/98) an article titled "Nigerians fight 'crook' 
image: They're pushers, charlatans and swindlers ... aren't they? " Cal McCrystal 
debunked the stereotype. McCrystal noted that the image of Nigerians has never been 
worse. "In Britain they are regularly depicted as swindlers, drug traffickers, 
impostors, quacks and charlatans". In this article, Professor Muhammed Anwar of 
Warwick University's Centre for Research into Ethnic Relations is quoted to have 
said "the Nigerian image thing has been created mainly through the media - that 
people from Nigeria are always doing something wrong. This process is getting 
worse". 
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McCrystal traces this negative stereotype to several reasons notably to a publication 
Nigeria, Economy and Society published 22 years ago in London which contained 
remarks such as - "in Nigeria, as elsewhere, politics is a matter of competing for the 
spoils of office. It is the business of politicians. Poor people see it as a matter of 
stealing public resources". A Nigerian, Ayodeji is quoted as saying the crucial phrase 
here is 'as elsewhere'. Further, "some people think corruption is a Nigerian national 
trait, but a lot of corruption you find there is also found in the United States, Britain 
and other countries". According to McCrystal, nevertheless, among government 
agencies in London, the Nigerian profile is murky and the following points are 
information from some government agencies. 
* An internal Customs and Excise memo stereotypes Nigerians as likely drug 
nmners. 
e The Inland Revenue has warned about Nigerian cheque forgery, saying that the 
very words 'Inland Revenue' were easily altered to appear as a Nigerian name. 
e For years, Nigerians have swelled the ranks of illegal immigrants (the official 
census figures place 87,000 Nigerians in London, but the Nigerian High 
Commission believes the real figure could be 500,000). 
9 The Foreign Office has put Nigeria at the top of a league table of countries 
abusing diplomatic immunity. 
The National Criminal Intelligence Service has estimated that Nigerian fraud in 
this country amounts to as much as 0.5 billion a year. 
For Ayodeji certain statistics on 'Nigerian crime' are laughable. He believes that some 
are the result of "ridiculous guesswork. " He notes that Nick Leeson closed down 
Barings with a L700 million fraud, and wonders why major financial institutions have 
not folded up due to Nigerian scams. Further, if the figure were true, the Serious 
Fraud office (SFO) will be tied up with cases involving Nigerians". He checked with 
the SFO, and discovered that their "cases are almost never Nigerian" (The Observer, 
13/09/98) 
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McCrystal notes that a Nigerian solicitor Tunji Fahm in an article in 1995, in the 
Nigerian News said "we are not helping ourselves by failing to acknowledge that there 
is a problem". This is one of the responses to articles such as that carried in an issue of 
the Journal of Nigerian Affairs "Why are we so fraudulentT', which suggested that 
Nigerians are merely taking back what was stolen by the British centuries ago. 
Another Nigerian Ferni Osinoba, a civil servant in London recalled his observation of 
discriminatory treatment of Nigerians by the US police in a recent visit to the States. 
He also noted that good deeds in the UK by Nigerians are not given prominence in the 
news, and that it would be wise to form a national organisation to defend Nigerian 
reputation (The Observer, 13/09/98). 
Nigeria is not the only country or community that has been labelled with a given type 
of criminal activity. Though exaggerations are commonplace, this is probably an 
outcome of the ethnic origins of the offenders. In turn, media reports are capable of 
creating stereotypes through emphasis on the offender's background. For instance, in 
Ae Independent and Guardian (03/08/00), an article titled "Organised crime costs 
UK E50bn in a year" discussed the impact of various crime groups. This information 
was culled from The Threatfrom Serious and Organised Crime -a National Criminal 
Intelligence Service (NCIS) report. It can be observed in certain NCIS publications, 
some crimes are strongly associated with certain nationalities (http: www. ncis. gov. uk/ 
-19/10/2001). 
With regard to the Independent's (03/08/00) summary of the NCIS report concerning 
the variety of nationalities based gangs, it was noted that the 'British Caucasian' 
criminal - white working class - make up by far the majority of organised crime 
groups in the UK. Colombians and West Indians were more involved in drug crimes; 
the Turkish and the Former Soviet Union in money laundering, prostitution, excise 
fraud of cigarettes and vehicle smuggling. The Albanians and Chinese are noted for 
smuggling involving organised immigration crime, trafficking in women prostitutes, 
heroin and arms trafficking. West Africans mainly engage in fraud crimes, for 
example benefit, mortgage, credit card fraud, and cocaine smuggling via couriers. For 
South Asians, wholesale drug dealing particularly heroin; cocaine and cannabis; 
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immigration smuggling; counterfeit clothing and credit card forgery; large-scale 
mortgage fraud and cloning of mobile telephones are common crimes. Finally, crimes 
involving the use of firearms were associated to British Caucasians and Motor Cycle 
Gangs (e. g. drugs, armed robbery, fraud and bootlegging, some of which involved 
families and associates). 
The idea of labelling certain activities, as 'Nigerian crime' or crimes of other 
countries is an issue that needs to be examined closely. This is probably due to the 
tendency of looking for a scapegoat in explaining societal evils or simply associating 
countries with criminal activities of a few citizens. Obviously, the effects of 
generalisations are taken for granted. In The Times (10/01/97) a Detective Inspector 
David Crinnion of the Metropolitan Police Fraud Squad stated that in relation to non- 
existent money, scam letters could readily be translated as follows: 
Dear Sir or Madam, I am a thief who has stolen a lot of money from the 
Goveniment and would like your help to get it out of Nigeria. 
In a response to the article regarding letters from Lagos in the Times (20/08/99), Dele 
Ogun a Nigerian lawyer based in London challenged the accuracy of the publication. 
He also notes that the article was misleading in the sense that it did not explain the 
origins of the scam industry. For Ogun, this practice can be traced back to the early 
1980s when Nigeria was "awash with oil boom money". At this time crooked 
Nigerians, especially politicians colluded with fraudulent western business contractors 
and inflated tender prices for government contracts. It became the practice for 
contractors to demand for upfront fees or 'mobilisation fees' to cover initial costs of 
the project. Usually, the contracts were not executed and the advance fee retained or 
shared by the politician and his foreign partner. Ogun concludes that westerners 
became the victims of 'Nigerian' fraudsters when the economy collapsed. 
Finally, the Nigerian goverrunent and citizens have consistently made efforts to 
address crime/fraud. For instance, the law referred to as the Advance Fee Fraud and 
Other Related Offences Decree No. 13 of 1995, which criminalised any attempt to 
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obtain any benefit under false pret-. nces was created to intensify this fight. In 1998, an 
international seminar was organised by the Nigerian-American Chamber of 
Commerce in conjunction with the Nigerian Police Force on Advance Fee Fraud and 
other financial crimes. The Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (1998) 
highlighted that an International Financial Transactions Surveillance Office in the 
Foreign Operations Department of the CBN was established in 1997 to target advance 
fee fraud at the global level by routinely verifying and replying to enquiries relating to 
scam letters, telefax, etc. The CBN also carries out extensive publicity campaigns 
through seminars, workshops and press statements. A Money Laundering Surveillance 
Unit was established in the Examination Department of the bank in 1994, which helps 
to implement guidelines in the Money Laundering Decree of 1995. 
Further, since 1990, the CBN has placed advisory advertisements in over 80 
newspapers and magazines in twelve languages in thirty-six countries. The 
publications usually stress that the CBN and the Nigerian government cannot and 
should not be held responsible for bogus and shady deals transacted with criminal 
intentions, and that there are no contract payments trapped in the bank's vaults. 
Documents presented by the fraudsters are all forgeries, bogus and fraudulent (CBN, 
1999). This is all in addition to co-operative efforts with investigative, fmancial and 
regulatory establishments in various countries. Other developments include the 
creation of a National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) which was 
established with powers to address issues associated with drug trafficking and money 
laundering. 
Recently, a preliminary report of advance fee fraud investigators led to the creation of 
a National Committee on Advance Fee Fraud (NCAFF). NCAFF is expected to 
formulate an effective strategy against fraudsters locally and internationally. In other 
words, work towards the prevention, investigation and prosecution of advance fee 
fraud cases. Setting up a comprehensive database for the storage and analysis of 
information concerning the offence(s) and offenders is also an objective. Its 
membership is drawn from related security (the police and security services) and 
associated agencies such as the justice departments, the central bank, postal services 
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and Internet service providers. Also, in a similar development, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria issued fresh directives to check the activities of fraudsters such as the 
'Customer Identification Procedure' - aimed at ascertaining the status of customers 
(The Guardian Online -http: //www. ngr2uardiannews. co 05/12/01 and 20/12/01). 
Some researches have addressed issues of public image and crime. Hills (197 1) noted 
that in general, public perceptions and definitions of crime or what the crime problem 
is could affect the enactment and enforcement of criminal laws. He points out that the 
content of media reports conveying these feelings are not well researched. He notes 
that the media plays an important role in shaping views. Television, radio, magazines 
and newspapers have become major public forums for information on crime events, 
sanctions and policies. Thus it is common for various interest groups to manoeuvre 
these communication outlets to mobilise political support for their conception of the 
crime problem. Methods in which this can be achieved include selective coverage, 
emphasis, omission, and mode of presentation. It is common to find highly dramatic, 
publicly visible and violent crimes receiving greater media coverage. Hills notes that 
in the US certain studies showed that people's estimates of how much crime increase 
had occurred were related to the rise in newspaper coverage of crime news rather than 
with the actual rise in the amount of crime. 
For Hills, other non-visible violent crimes such as fraud, embezzlement and other 
forms of white-collar crime especially by corporate offenders represent far greater 
economic losses but are not general pursued with great zeal by the media. A probable 
explanation would link this trend to social class, celebrity status, control of the media 
etc. 
Quinney (1974) looked at the public opinion/crime issue from an ideological 
perspective. He notes that in order to control crime and its perception by the public, 
the government applies criminal sanctions at times needed to convince the public that 
its own interests are being endangered. In every society, the official ideology accepted 
by the public stresses and rationalises the concerns and reactive policies of the ruling 
class in a given society. With this, the public is prevented from developing critiques 
70 
class in a given society. With this, the public is prevented from developing critiques 
and solutions that can threaten the existing order. Then public consciousness is 
avoided. Quinney states that with the appropriate public opinion, official policies can 
be instituted without the appearance of exploiting the public and serving the narrow 
interests of the ruling class. For Quinney, the media are not explicitly engaged in the 
transmission of an official ideology. This may not be the same for all countries. It is 
important for there to be an understanding between government and the media, though 
this does not have to be overtly expressed in addressing the crime problem. 
'Inappropriate' crime stories are capable of creating 'crime panics' which will not be 
helpful to social and business life. 
According to Edwards and Gill (2001) it is common in the literature to find that 
organised criminals are regarded as external threats to western economies as indicated 
in the National Cime Intelligence Service publications (NCIS, 1993,1999). It is also 
common to find assertions made about the impact of these groups on national 
economies. For instance, three Chinese organisations are said to pose the most potent 
threat to global security (Myers, 1996). For Jamieson (1995), by the mid-1990s there 
could be few regions of the world untouched by Italian Mafia pressure or influence. 
Voronin (1996) estimates that 40-50% of the Russian economy is controlled by 
organised crime. Thus, the notion of security from these perspectives is defined in 
opposition to external, alien, actors, cultures and organisations (Edwards and Gill, 
2001). 
With regard to the above, Edwards and Gill (2001), Block (1991), Hobbs (1998) and 
Rawlinson (1998) have challenged this image and its consequent reduction of the 
complexity of organised crime to a crude conception of alien conspiracy. Further, 
"from this perspective, organised crime is understood in one sense as a response to the 
demand in western societies for illicit services and, in another, as an indication of the 
limits encountered by nation-states in exercising sovereign authority over their 
domestic populations. The common theme here is that the source of organised crime 
is endogenous" (Edwards and Gill, 2001). An example of the interdependencies 
between legitimate and illegitimate entrepreneurs from Edwards and Gill's paper is 
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that noted by Block (1991) who identified the services provided by criminal 
organisations to 'upperworld' businesses in dumping toxic waste. In another example 
observed by Ruggiero (1998: 121) "money laundering can be regarded as a service 
provided by the financial sector to conventional organised crime". 
In addition, the use of 'alien conspiracy' theories has been identified as excuses for 
the crime problem in general. Hobbs and Dunnighan (1999: 69) note that "the 
persistence of 'alien conspiracy' theories has not been limited to academic debate. 
Tbreat assessments contrived by NCIS have concentrated upon a range of exotic 
criminal organisations (NCIS, 1993 and 1997), and the identification of aliens as the 
principal organised crime threat to British society, is a device that conveniently 
excuses British society from taking responsibility for its own maladies... Identifying 
aliens as the principal organised crime threat to the state, however, constitutes rather 
than the mere scapegoating of minorities". They also note that central to their research 
findings is the new criminal market, common with its legitimate counterpart, is 
structured within small flexible firms that feature short-term contracts and lack of 
tenure - the typical nature of advance fee frauds. In most cases, crime networks are 
locally constituted, and it is possible to find similarities between local and 
international crimes in areas such as immigration, emigration, employment and work 
in leisure cultures. 
It is important to add that Hobbs and Dunnighan rightly state that certain crime 
networks have some kind of international connection, and provide evidence of the 
impact of foreign cultures on indigenous markets, or new trading arrangements that do 
not ignore, but utilise national boundaries. For the criminal or fraudster, there are 
advantages of global activity such as avoiding prompt detection and prosecution. 
More so, it makes the computation of the extent of crime more difficult. At any rate, 
examples of known cases are indications that the economic impact is considerable in 
all areas with some connection to the activity. 
In conclusion all the probable causes or explanations for the so-called 'Nigerian 
crime' can be regarded as possible criminogenic conditions which could also be 
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applicable to other settings. With regard to theory, it is proffered that fraudulent 
activity in Nigeria perpetrated by citizens and foreigners operating independently or 
collaborating with one another can be understood in terms certain criminological 
theories. These are the theories of rationality or rational choice (with a strong bias for 
economics/cost/benefit analysis of the offence vis-A-vis sanctions); culture (as it 
concerns the image of corruption in business especially in developing countries and 
the role of material possessions in personal status); and opportunity (as presented by 
the nature of trust and risks in human relations and commerce - the central elements 
required for this form of fraud). 
However, to the extent that the majority of citizens are law abiding, the explanation 
for criminal activity is located within the individual and his 'rational'/economic 
responses to socio-economic, and probably political conditions. The prestige attached 
to material possessions as in all other parts of the world is also a contributory factor. 
More so, the fact the government has not been able to satisfy and meet the basic needs 
of citizens, some people resort to crime/fraud thereby tarnishing the image of 
responsible citizens and the country at large. Reports show that the use of upfront fees 
in fraud is nothing new, as they occurred before the last century (Levi, 1981; 
Vallance, 1955); and Morton, 1992). Dishonest individuals would always device ways 
of committing fraud and other crimes for their selfish interests. It is important to avoid 
the use of generalisations and stereotyping in examining issues. 
On the other hand, it is the responsibility of a country to address its crime problems, 
and in the final analysis, the cause of whatever social, economic and political 
problems lies within the polity. For instance, since gaining independence, developing 
countries are in positions to take and make good judgements on behalf of its citizens. 
Where the contrary is the case, then the policy makers and administrators are to blame 
for unpatriotic decisions especially as they concern developmental projects, 
investments and the provision of basic needs. The implications of crimes and financial 
crimes in particular are grave. Apart from the reducing the level of confidence, trust 
and credibility internally and internationally, the continued activity could and has 
undermined respectability, social, political and economic development. 
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The next chapter is concerned with fraud and the criminal justice process. The 
reaction of agencies and individuals involved in the administration of criminal justice 
could have far reaching effects especially in the areas of deterrence, and punishments 
or sanctions. 
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Chapter Three 
Fraud and the Criminal Justice Process (CJP) * 
The attributes of fraud, especially those relating to the definition of what can be 
regarded as fraudulent and its modus operandi makes the offence unique within the 
criminal justice process. The fact that most fraudulent practices are intertwined with 
legitimate activities also makes the proof of guilt cumbersome, especially with regard 
to some types of scams such as religious and investment schemes. The voluntary 
action of the victim gives the fraudster some defence. The complicated nature of 
certain offences is also burdensome to the police. Hence specialised agencies have 
been established to handle such frauds. Due to manpower and resources, it is often 
preferred that corporate and business establishments deal with frauds, if possible 
internally, thus treating them outside the ambit of the criminal justice process and 
system. In addition, some regulatory bodies such as the Department of Trade and 
Industries (DTI) are responsible for certain business offences or 'crimes' which they 
could prosecute in court or have them transferred to the police if necessary. They also 
have powers to impose sanctions such as fines and to recommend liquidation or 
closures through the courts. 
In the UK the criminal justice process involves several actors and institutions. The 
police are expected to prevent, detect and investigate crime, while the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) is responsible for the prosecution of cases. The role of the 
CPS includes reviewing the evidence to see whether a case is worth pursuing, 
deciding on the appropriate charge, and making decisions primarily on the basis of an 
'evidential test' and 'in the public interest' (Gibson and Cavadino, 1995). Other law 
enforcement agencies include the Serious Fraud Office (SFO); Customs and Excise; 
Department of Social Security; the Health and Safety Executive; 'Trading Standards'; 
and the TV Licence Records Office. 
This chapter examines various areas of the criminal justice process as it concerns 
fraud. The criminal justice process can be divided into the investigation, prosecution 
and sentencing stages, unlike the criminal justice system that is more encompassing 
(includes courts, prisons etc. ). As with all offences, especially those heard by a jury, 
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the role of the jury is important. Thus one of the sections in this chapter looks at 
issues concerning jurors in fraud cases. 
3.1 Investigation 
The investigation and proof of fraud has always presented difficulties for police 
agencies all over the world, especially in the UK and the United States (LevL 1981). 
Historically, the police in Britain have made attempts to address the situation. Levi 
notes that though the investigation of frauds by the police has always been part of 
their duty, during the 1930s, Scotland Yard set up a small Share Pushing and 
Confidence Trickster Squad. This outfit combined with the Metropolitan Police and 
City of London Police Fraud Squad dealt with cases of fraud. This development 
improved co-ordination of efforts in the areas of prevention and investigation of 
company frauds. Second, it helped to create a pool of experts in the subject, in 
addition to sensitising the police to view fraud as a 'police problem'. 
In the course of developing a fraud investigation culture, certain events such as 
activities of long-firm fraudsters helped in shaping the structure of police response to 
the expanding nature of fraud. This culminated in the formation, in 1971, of a Long- 
firm Fraud Squad within the Fraud Squad in London. Due to the expansion of its 
functions, it was then suggested that a Commercial Crime Index be compiled (Levi, 
1981). Further, in March 1968, a Commercial Intelligence Bureau was set up, to 
collate information on all commercial frauds within the Metropolitan and City Police 
districts. Since fraudulent operations tend to transcend police boundaries, this index 
was soon extended to cover the whole country, and became a resource for police 
forces throughout the country. From 1965, the Commercial Crime Intelligence 
Officers maintained a basic card and computerised index, information on commercial 
enterprises convicted, suspected, or under investigation for crime and associated 
commercial offences; and persons concerned in. the directorship, management or 
administration of such commercial enterprises. Information came from several 
sources such as trade protection agencies, underworld informants, suppliers, other 
police squads or divisional CID (LevL 1981). 
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Other attempts have been made by governments internally and internationally to 
curtail the prevalence of fraud. An important organisation concerned with fraud with 
particular interest in international fraud is the Interpol (International Police) which 
was set up in 1911 (Bose and Gunn, 1989). During the First World War its activities 
were suspended and restarted in 1922. After the Second World War during which its 
activities were also suspended, it reopened in 1945. The Interpol's Headquarters is in 
Paris. There are 141 member countries and each country has to provide or identify 
their own National Central Bureau. 
Bose and Gunn outlined some of the activities and functions of the Interpol. Operating 
from the Secretariat, these include: the provision of a radio network which allows 
officers investigating a case to be put into contact with any officer in another country 
investigating the same people, or aspect of the same crime. Thus avoiding having to 
go through the normal diplomatic channels. Interpol is primarily a co-ordinating 
operation. It does not take active part in investigations. It has a number of divisions 
specialised in linking up certain types of criminal investigations. Interpol keeps an 
index of all those whom it knows are being investigated everywhere in the world. This 
serves as a good data resource. Interpol also makes recommendations to the United 
Nations and other bodies, but does not participate in the politics of drafting the 
international treaties that may follow. To assist in fraud and criminal investigations, it 
has compiled a useful compendium: a Financial Assets Encyclopaedia, which lists all 
member states who have notified it of their laws and procedures for seizing criminal 
assets. 
In the United Kingdom before 1985, the traditional method of investigating any fraud 
was carried out by officers of the British Police Fraud Squad or the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) (LevL 1985). The revenue department (or any combination 
of those bodies) was also involved. These organisations conducted investigations that 
could go on for several years. They prepared reports for (in less serious cases) their 
in-house lawyers or for (in major police and DTI cases) the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP). After the investigation was concluded, an off icer of the DPP 
would decide if there was a better than 50 percent chance of producing a conviction 
and, if it seemed that there was, would pass it on to outside counsel to draft charges. 
Levi notes that in certain cases, counsel observed that most of the police efforts have 
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been wasted and that the police should really have focussed on issues they did not 
examine properly. This would normally lead to the case being dropped or the police 
would be told to carry out further investigation. This might prove difficult for the 
police since they have no official access to bank account information prior to a 
suspect being charged and sometimes, such information would be needed to justify 
the institution of proceedings in the first place. To address these short comings the 
DPP established in 1985 the Fraud Investigation Group, which was intended to work 
in an interdisciplinary way to provide early consultation for the police and other 
agencies (LevL 1987). 
Problems associated with fraud investigation and their prosecution led to the 
establishment of a specialised agency - the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) established by 
the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Its brief is to deal with 'serious' and/or 'complex' 
fraud, loosely defined as frauds involving at least El million 'at risk' and/or of 
considerable public interest and/or where the details are 'complex' (Levi, 1999). Levi 
notes that the minimum cost fluctuates between El million and E5 million, but that 
costs of fraud often are a term of art. Following a Treasury review, which decided that 
it should continue to exist and expand its role, it has since increased its caseload. The 
Director of the SFO (2000) states that it is likely to investigate cases based on the 
following criteria: cases in the order of at least EI million. Those likely to give rise to 
national publicity and widespread public concern; cases requiring a highly specialist 
knowledge of, for example, Stock Exchange practices or Regulated Markets, cases in 
which there is a significant international dimension (other investigative/regulatory 
bodies also do the same depending on the magnitude). Also, cases where legal, 
accountancy and investigative skills need to be brought together. Those which appear 
to be complex and in which the use of Section 2 powers (to obtain information under 
compulsion) might be appropriate are given priority. 
Further, the SFO was formed as a multi-disciplinary organisation, with lawyers, 
accountants/fmancial investigators from various backgrounds, including former fraud 
police officers, regulators, investigators from other government departments and 
graduates who are trained in-house. The SFO investigates major financial fraud cases 
of all types, with the exception of tax fraud. The SFO receives most of its cases from 
the police. Regulatory authorities and other government departments such as the 
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Oepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the general public working with their 
legal advisers also refer cases. In contrast with typical police functions (of 
investigations) and the Crown Prosecution Service (prosecutions), the SFO investigate 
and prosecute its cases. 
During the first few years of the SFO's existence, according to Levi no data was 
collected on the value of frauds it investigated, but in 1990 their aggregate value was 
E1.3 billion, while subsequently, it has fluctuated to a maximum of E6 billion 'at risk', 
not necessarily stolen. In 1996-97, the estimated value of alleged frauds in its caseload 
was E3 billion at the beginning and E2 billion at the end, the difference being 
accounted for by the completion of two cases: the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, and the Maxwell pensions fund fraud cases (Levi, 1999). 
With regard to the powers of the SFO, under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1987, when authorised by the Director, and without the need to go to court for a 
Production Order from a circuit judge, legal and accountancy staff at the SFO are 
given major powers. Anyone connected to a serious fraud case can be required, if the 
SFO wishes, to produce documents and/or to answer questions, even if the answers to 
the questions might incriminate them. Lying to the SFO is also a criminal offence 
(Levi, 1999). Levi observes that on the other hand, in most fraud investigations the 
police have no power to require answers to their questions, though with relative ease, 
prior to arrest or summons, they can obtain Production Orders from circuit judges for 
documents required in their investigations. The SFO's statutory powers in addition to 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 provides a separate but slower 
procedure with regard to breaking banking obligations of confidentiality. 
The Director of the SFO (2000) notes that serious fraud has international dimensions, 
and most SFO cases involve professional and organised criminals. Opportunist and 
some dishonest businessmen, who are relatively conversant with the value of 
spreading their activities across a number of different countries and jurisdictions, are 
also involved. It was revealed that the fraudsters are aware of problems associated 
with cross-border investigation and their prosecution. Also, that there are still 
jurisdictions, even within Europe, where assistance on fraud cases are not as readily 
forthcoming as one would expect. Letters seeking information are said to go 
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unanswered. This delays the judicial process. Sometimes information is received after 
a trial is over. Liechtenstein was cited as an example where there are no fewer than 
17 avenues of appeal which the account holder can use to delay access to his bank 
account or details of his secret deposits. Furthermore, she mentions that in England 
and Wales there is no single offence of 'fraud'. Thus prosecutors have to rely on a 
number of relevant statutory offences. She notes that the SFO is not allowed to 
associate several offences in a single charge. 
The Director mentioned that the SFO has established a special unit for assisting 
foreign authorities. The Director noted that that the only person who benefits from a 
lack of co-operation in mutual legal assistance is the criminal. Thus the situation 
should be avoided. In addition, as at September 2000, the organisation was 
investigating or prosecuting 85 cases, the largest number they have ever bad, where 
the sums at risk in the frauds involved was over E2 billion. With regard to 
performance, the Director of the SFO mentions that in about 13 years of experience 
they have had conviction rates averaging over 65% during the whole period. Further, 
in the past two years convictions have been recorded in over 85% of cases. 
The SFO introduced a unique approach to the investigation and prosecution of large 
frauds. Levi (1993) observed that the SFO brought financial irregularities otherwise 
dealt with privately or within organisations concerned and specialised regulatory 
bodies into the arena of criminal courts and the public in general. Though the SFO has 
the highest profile, it is not the only body, which deals with serious frauds. The Fraud 
Divisions of Headquarters Casework of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and 
branch CPS officials in the regions handle most fraud cases. Other bodies that deal 
with serious frauds include the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the 
Securities and Investments Board (SIB), the Bank of England (in respect of 
unauthorised deposit taking), the Stock Exchange, and the Revenue Departments. 
For instance, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) plays an important role in 
the control of fraud. Their powers include those relating to companies before 
liquidation, and those, which arise during and after liquidation. Various statutes have 
been enacted to take care of the different aspects of their operations and regulatory 
activities (Levi, 1981). Levi notes that certain constraining factors could affect the 
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proactive policing of firms by the Department of Trade. These include the negative 
trading effect and reduced confidence on the part of clients and investors if 
information goes out that the authorities are investigating the company. Thus, the 
Department of Trade needs to take into account the risk that 'labelling' may cause, 
which may eventually lead to the failure of the firm concerned. The other major 
constraint concerns that of manpower. The ever expanding or the proliferation of 
private enterprises generally makes detailed surveillance difficult. 
Investigating fraud is not an easy task to accomplish. In order to establish that a fraud 
has occurred, certain conditions need to be fulfilled. "The act has to be prohibited, 
either by the judiciary alone (in common law) or in the case of statute law by both the 
established law making-bodies and the judiciary. A definition or confirmation by the 
victim that the incident was a 'rip-off and was an illegal act are required, and an 
official report or complaint must be made to the police or the appropriate regulatory 
agency who will then investigate and refute or confirm the offence. " Further, for 
someone to become a convicted fraudster, there has to be a police investigation, a 
decision to prosecute and a conviction (LevL 1987: 111). 
Especially in cases of fraud, it has been observed that technological changes can 
facilitate certain crimes. This could further complicate or make their investigation 
difficult. Examples include fraud involving the use of computers, international direct- 
dialling telephones, telexes, computer-aided despatch systems and facsimile senders, 
which all enable fraudsters to distance themselves geographically from their targets. 
The spread of offshore banking and investment schemes has been of benefit to 
multinational corporations and fraudsters (Levi, 1987). These facilities assist them to 
conceal and launder their loot. Business/economic activities have played their role in 
altering the pattern/method of fraud. For instance, in the mid-1980's, documentary 
fraud became more popular than insurance claims for 'lost' cargo and claims for 
'sunk' vessels. "The reason being that due to the excess of supply and demand in the 
market, ships themselves- became so cheap that they were worth less than their 
cargoes" (LevL 1987: 3). It is important that investigating officers are aware of all 
these circumstances and methods of deceit. 
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Finally, other organisations, involved in fraud control/investigations include the 
Commonwealth Secretariat's Commercial Crime Unit, which was established to 
enhance international co-operation on fraud, drugs and other economic crimes. 
According to Bose and Gunn, (1989) since 1986 it has made efforts to investigate 
organised crime such as those involving the Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza and the 
Chinese Triads in Taiwan. They monitor suspected fraudsters, alert potential victims, 
render advice and information on fraud and help run financial checks for governments 
among other duties. Bose and Gunn note that in 1982, which was their first full year 
of operation, it unmasked attempted fraud of about El I billion. Further, the unit is 
also expected to train people from Commonwealth countries on techniques of 
combating commercial crime. In recognition of this, every year symposia on aspects 
of commercial crime and law enforcement are held in Cambridge in association with 
the university, the Centre for Commercial Law Studies of London University, Queen 
Mary College and the Secretariat of the International Chamber of Commerce. Law 
ministers, attorney generals, high-ranking policemen, bankers, accountants, trade 
officials etc., usually attend these conferences. 
For over 20 years, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) based in Paris 
France with specialised offices in the UK, USA and Asia have been involved in the 
fight against various forms of fraud. The organisation has different units specialising 
in various crimes, all with their own Internet sub-sites. According to the Commercial 
Crime Services (CCS) website, they have saved companies and individual investors 
from losing money in potential fraud and theft through its ability to identify scams. 
These include bureaux within CCS (Commercial Crime Services) that deals with 
maritime and trading crime, product counterfeiting, financial malpractice, and all 
other forms of commercial crime. A special cybercrime unit tackles crimes affecting 
electronic commerce and keeps companies informed about changes or new 
dimensions in crime. It also co-operates with customs authorities under a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the World Customs Organisation. Services are 
membership based (http: //www. iccwbo. org/index. asp). 
To sum up, with regard to other approaches to fraud investigation and prevention, 
Nicholson (1996) is of the opinion that phone tapping and other interception 
techniques need to be used more widely to tackle fraud and other serious crimes. 
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Nicholson observes that, it is unfortunate that the bulk of evidence including that 
obtained from telephone tapping cannot be directly used in any prosecution. In 
addition, issues of jurisdiction and covert intelligence should be addressed for the 
increasing rate of international fraud to be reduced. 
Among other suggestions, Bose and Gunn, (1989) recognise the need for private 
investigators to be involved in fraud investigations. According to them, they take a lot 
of strain off the police. This takes into consideration the fact that the police need more 
money and extra manpower to cope with the growing incidences of fraud. Qualified 
private investigators are likely to be well trained and be experienced in handling 
particular types or complicated frauds. 
Fkally, the police are the major players in the investigation of fraud as with other 
cases. They usually receive initial reports of illegalities that are supposedly criminal. 
Using their discretion, cases are dealt with or referred elsewhere. As for illegal 
activities or markets, Edwards and Gill (2001) note that what is likely to increase 
police intervention in a competitive illicit market is the use of violence. This implies 
that certain criteria determine the nature and extent of police involvement in fraud and 
other crimes. It is important for the police in particular to be well equipped to fight 
fraud. Appropriate legislation should also be enacted in their favour. 
3.2 Prosecution 
The prosecution of offenders is another problematic area within the criminal justice 
process. Certain characteristics are peculiar to fraud cases. Schur (1958) attributes the 
ineffective control and prosecution of fraud cases to certain factors such as the 
minimal reporting rate of offences; complicated and varied statutes; and the difficulty 
in the general rule of criminal law that for a false pretence or representation to be 
indictable, there must be an untrue statement regarding a past or present fact. Further, 
achieving the high levels of evidentiary requirements under specific statutes can be 
strenuous. Where sanctions are imposed in swindling cases, they are rarely stringent. 
In the courts, during the early 1980's serious problems arose with regard to the, 
number of lengthy trials. Levi notes that some defendants were acquitted at the 
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direction ofjudges who accepted their arguments that the conduct complained of was 
normal market practice and that those accused were therefore not dishonest. Some 
others involved injury verdicts felt that outcomes were regarded as 'perverse' by the 
police and prosecutors. These were not the only difficulties encountered in the 
prosecuting cases (Levi, 1999). In one example, Levi mentions that in being fair to 
those accused, a judge ordered a retrial in a multi-defendant case that had lasted over 
100 days and cost over El million in legal fees. This occurred after a newspaper 
reported that some of the accused had been convicted previously and in the retrial 
they were all acquitted. In another fraud trial, a retrial was ordered after 137 days 
when someone believed to be connected with defendants approached jurors: after this 
retrial the principals were convicted. For LevL the political perception was that 'the 
system' was not working, that is, was not delivering convictions reliably or quickly 
enough. 
These events led to various actions by the government. The government responded by 
setting up a committee under a senior judge, Lord Roskill, which focused initially on 
the inadequacy of trial by jury, but developed into a broad-ranging review of the 
investigation, prosecution and trial processes. It concluded that what was needed was 
a new, unified body that could investigate and prosecute 'serious or complex' fraud 
simultaneously. This led to the establishment of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) 
headed by a Director (Levi, 1999). 
In the prosecution and trial of fraud, the SFO has proven to be an important political 
institution. According to Levi, the SFO is the first agency in Britain to have a 
bureaucratic interest in prosecuting fraud. Further, its title gives a sense of power and 
prestige and the announcement by the Attorney General that 'the SFO is investigating 
company X' triggers the perception that this case is being taken seriously' (Levi, 
1999). Levi notes that although many trial verdicts result from judicial and jury 
decisions that may be unforeseeable, and even capricious, the SFO has taken a severe 
media and political battering during the 1990's. He notes that labels such as 'Serious 
Farce Office' and 'Seriously Flawed Office' have accompanied this. For Levi, this 
can be traced to two reasons. First, is the fact that several high-profile prosecutions - 
the later Guinness trials, brokers UBS Phillips & Drew and merchant bankers County 
NatWest, ex-boxer George Walker, Roger Levitt, and the Maxwell brothers, did not 
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end in conviction. Or, in Levitt's case, an alleged E37 million fraud resulted in a 
derisory 240 hours' (legal maximum) community service sentence following a 
controversial plea bargain. Second is the fact that some of the prosecutions above 
were proceeded with in the first place. This offended the sentiments of some business 
and media people who were of the view that the criminal law had gone too far to 
cover what was either tolerated behaviour or behaviour that could be 'more 
appropriately' dealt with by regulators. 
Among other criticisms of the SFO, it has been alleged by some defendants and media 
commentators that the SFO is too prosecutorially aggressive or, in the alternative, that 
the SFO is too timid in taking on those whose prosecution might embarrass the 
government (Levi, 1999: 151). He also notes that "corporate criminal liability is 
notoriously difficult to prove in England, even more so in the United States". 
It is generally agreed that during the 1990s, as in all decades post-1960 and even 
before, that highly publicised fraud trials take too long and that their results are unfair 
on everyone like the defendants, jurors, judges, and when considered, victims and 
taxpayers (Levi, 1999). Levi notes that in Britain, unlike Canada, New Zealand, the 
United States and parts of Australia, the defendant cannot chose trial without jury. 
Also, middle-class persons in employment cannot afford to lend themselves to serve 
as jurors for trials that take between three and seventeen months. As a consequence, 
this destroys the concept of representative juries. 
In accordance with the views of other researchers, Box (1983) observed that the 
criminal justice administration is relatively adequate in principle, but faulty in 
practice. The police abuse their discretionary powers, they also engage in differential 
deployment such as targeting known criminals. The use of plea-bargaining strategies 
and inconsistent judicial decisions, are also prevalent. For Box, all these have negative 
consequences for the investigation and prosecution of fraud. 
Another observation linked to the efficiency of prosecutions is the geographical 
dimensions of some frauds. Levi notes that 80% of cases investigated by the London 
police in 1991 had some cross-border aspects. Without mutual legal assistance, many 
investigations would fail. Further, policing powers are influenced not just by law but 
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by the visibility of particular police actions and the tolerance of the courts. Thus, 
coping with overseas jurisdictions can be problematic. This is in addition to the 
difficulty of informal as well as formal action, patterns of pressure, friendship, etc, 
which make for fewer and less powerful trade-offs and for greater uncertainty about 
responses in different cultures (LevL 1999). Moreover, secrecy statutes also present 
legal obstacles to the conveying of information. Evidentiary rules also present major 
problems. For example, Levi observes that for something to be admissible in the US 
courts, witnesses have to be given the same rights that they would have had if the 
evidence had been collected in America. 
Other problems associated with the Criminal Justice Process and fraud include that 
certain offenders managed to escape justice by weaving complicated international 
webs around their activities -a point also noted by the Director of the SFO. An issue 
which Levi (1999) observes that has not been addressed by media focus on the 
Serious Fraud Office is the range of frauds that are very costly but do not pose serious 
risks to the commercial reputation of the country or involve major public figures. He 
notes that in Britain, Fraud Squad officers are tied up in dealing with major 
international frauds and property swindles involving professional lawyers and real 
estate agents. There are few resources left to deal with the frauds under E2 million 
which either individually or collectively may cost businesspeople, consumers, or 
taxpayers a great deal more, financially or emotionally. Likewise, only a tiny number 
of persons are prosecuted annually for tax evasion or for other corporate offences. 
Levi (1999: 158) cites the ironic examples of "the enormous cost and risks of 
prosecuting complex frauds - defence costs in the prosecution for misleading the 
market in the take-over of American Blue Arrow by the British Manpower 
corporation were estimated at E30 million, though the prosecution 'only' cost L2 
million. The 'failed' Maxwell prosecution cost about E25 million7. 
This leads us to the role of the jury in all fraud trials discussed in the next section. 
Jurors play a key role in the prosecution of fraudsters because the extent to which they 
understand cases, their general disposition and subsequent interpretation of the 
criminal act are important determining factors for a verdict. 
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Final? y, the investigation and prosecution of fraud also has its limitations. Those who 
take commercial fraud seriously have found that its inaccessibility to normal crime 
intelligence networks, and the cumbersome quality of fraud investigations and trials, 
make it both difficult and expensive to 'bring fraudsters to justice' (LevL 1981). 
Despite the growth of official interest in fraud control, its claims for increased 
resources have met with very limited success in societies such as Britain where the 
costs of dealing with crime are escalating continuously. For LevL the perceived 
seriousness of any given crime determines the nature of societal reaction to it, and this 
in turn determines both the internal and external constraints, which influence the 
decision to act in a criminal manner. 
3.3 T he jury in fraud triaIs 
In the UK, jurors are drawn from a broad, though not complete cross-section of the 
population. Everyone aged 18 to 70, who is registered as a parliamentary or local 
government elector is eligible for jury service, provided he has been ordinarily 
resident in the UK for any period of at least five years since attaining the age of 13. 
The residential qualification is a rough and ready way of ensuring that jurors have 
adequate grasp of the English language and way of life (Emmins, 1990). Certain 
categories of people are excluded from jury service. Some of which include offices 
within the judiciary and those involved in the administration of justice. Others are the 
clergy, the mentally ill, and those who have received a custodial sentence of five years 
or more. 
Emmins also notes that the Lord Chancellor, through officers of the Crown Court is 
responsible for summoning jurors to attend for jury service in the Crown Court. The 
summons is always in writing and may be sent by post. If a lengthy case is., 
anticipated, it is normal to ask jurors whether they have any objection to being 
involved. Jurors are entitled to payment in respect of travelling and subsistence 
expenses and loss of earnings, but the rates of payment may not provide full 
compensation for the losses incurred. There are certain penalties for non-attendance 
when summoned. Details of this, the restrictions and information on how to be 
excused are included in the initial summons. Finally, once a jury has been 
empanelled, the twelve men and women selected after hearing the entire case are 
87 
expected to return a verdict. The judge may discharge up to three jurors and allow the 
trial to continue, or in certain circumstances, may discharge the entire jury from 
giving a verdict - for example, due to allegations of misconduct. Thus, the judge 
leaves the possibility of a fresh jury being sworn in to try the accused at a later date 
(Emmins, 1990). It is not uncommon for villains to look for loopholes within the jury 
system or manipulate jurors if possible with a view to extending or collapsing trials. 
The role of the jury in fraud trials has attracted some attention. With regard to 
problems associated with the prosecution of offenders, Levi (1987) gives a review of 
certain assertions made about juries involved in fraud trials. These are that they are 
prone to be corrupt; could be tolerant of fraud; and they may find it difficult to 
understand complex frauds. Further, the duration of fraud trials could be lengthy and 
costly. For example, according to Levi, Roskill's report showed that a sample of 10 
cases lasting more than 20 days in which verdicts were reached between 1981-1984 
cost L500,000 and the average fraud trial lasted 46 days (Fraud Trials committee, 
1986: 174). Moreover many fraudsters have been acquitted in the past. For example, 
in fraud prosecutions undertaken by the Director of Public Prosecutions Office in 
1983,180 out of 637 charges (not persons) proceeded with at crown courts ended in 
aquital (a rate of 28%). In 1984, the equivalent data were 61 aquitals and ' 
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convictions for obtaining property by deception, 26 acquitals and 71 convictions 
under Forgery and Counterfeiting Acts, 43 acquitals and 131 convictions for 
corruption, and 9 acquitals and 2 convictions for conspiracy to defraud. The overall 
aquital rate was thus 30% (LevL 1987: 204). 
For Levi the non-seclusion (for example in Britain) of jurists does not make them 
more vulnerable to pressures. He states that rather than concentrate on the legal, rules 
of a case they spend time on activities such as stating their views about the conduct in 
question. On the duration and cost, whether trials are 'too long' or 'too expensive' is a 
value judgement. Further, factors contributing to the aquital of fraudsters include the 
Attorney General's guideline on the need to have a 50% chance of conviction before 
embarking on prosecution and instances of plea bargaining that result in some cases 
being dropped (LevL 1987). Page (1997: 322) also notes that the fact that jurors 
cannot understand complex frauds may lead to aquital decisions since they "would be 
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too confused to be sure of guilt beyond reasonable doubt"., Thus, proper jury selection 
or training as required was therefore highly recommended. , 
In a recent article, the Director of the SFO reiterated her favour for non-jury trials in 
major fraud cases, especially in cases of very complex fraud. Noting that it is cruet to 
subject people to lengthy trials as they get tortured and bored. Where frauds involve 
well-known people or celebrities, it can be harder to obtain a conviction. The celebrity 
factor, as well as hurnour, or sympathy may sway juries. She also favours defendants 
being given the option of a non-jury trial, which many might go for if they have a 
technical defence that a jury might not understand. She would also like to see judges 
embrace Information Technology (IT) much more eagerly to save cost and time. She 
notes that under the present jury system a high-pro file jury trial could still see the SFO 
"with 'egg on its face' - you can't guarantee the result. These people (fraudsters) have 
often spent their lives being confidence tricksters - why shouldn't they trick a jury" 
(The Times Newspaper, 06/03/0 1). 
Concerns have often been expressed about the use of jury trial for complex frauds. In 
his study, Levi (1993) observed that jurors have been! subjects of criticisms from 
virtually all quarters. Some jurors he interviewed complained about the slowness and 
apparent irrelevance of much of the evidence presented. He notes that this fault can 
either be attributed to the prosecution or the defence. Section 8 of the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981 states that it is "contempt of court to obtain, disclose, or solicit any 
particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced, or votes cast 
by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal proceedings". 
For LevL this stipulation creates obstacles to valid jury research in England. He also 
notes that the SFO supports the idea of a more systematic study. 
Unsystematic interviews in non-random cases carried out by Levi suggest that jurors 
take their job seriously. They absorb a lot of information during a trial, which has 
sometimes led to a change of attitude or position (Levi, 1993). Further, some jurors 
especially in serious fraud cases see the event as important and a chance for them to 
sit in judgement over their 'social superiors'. Jurors also resent obvious attempts by 
judges to 'tell us what to do', 'I appreciating that it is their decision. Jurors have also 
observed certain situations where people with clearly relevant evidence did not give 
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the evidence in court. Jurors also observed the tactics of lawyers looking for legal 
loopholes to save their clients. These issues concern the moral aspects of the system in 
general (Levi, 1993). 
Levi's interviews with jurors also acknowledged that 'charismatic factors' played a 
part in their decisions. For instance, a 'dull' counsel made them 'switch-off, and in 
some cases they were later impressed by an initially 'dull' counsels thoroughness and 
closing remarks. They believe vigorous interrogations brightened up a case. Levi 
notes that it is uncertain that the length of the trial makes it unintelligible as the longer 
the trial goes on the mores it can be properly absorbed. Jury research also suggests 
that jurors do search for apparent inconsistencies (Levi, 1993). Overall, Levi notes 
that despite all the comments above, the evidence on jury understanding of complex 
cases from America is not encouraging. He cites an example of a hung jury in the US 
based on a 10-2 vote, a situation that would result in a conviction in the UK. Similar 
other examples exist. 
An incident that occurred in 1995 supports the views of the director of the SFO and 
other researchers. According to the Times (23/03/95), a six-month trial costing an 
estimated E2 million collapsed when the judge ruled that the evidence was too 
difficult for the jury to understand. The judge discharged the jury of seven men and 
five women. In this case, the defence barrister had argued that the amount of evidence 
had become 'oppressive and unmanageable'. The judge directed the jury to ring in 
not-guilty verdicts on the financier and surveyor, charged with obtaining money by 
deception from a building society. Other defendants were discharged of conspiracy. 
The article revealed that Crown Court trials cost an average of L37,500 a day. 
Fraud cases are tried in court the same way as other criminal cases based on 
indictment. In other words, this is before a judge and jury in the Crown CourL The 
Director of the SFO (2000) points out that the nature of the jury has always been a 
source of concern. The jury is selected at random from the electoral register and there 
are no educational or other qualifications required of jurors in fraud trials. The 
procedure can be a lengthy one, with many fraud trials lasting well over three months 
and in some cases, up to a year. She notes that the government has taken steps to 
review issues concerning the criminal trial process. Other problems include instances 
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of witnesses caHed to court only to fmd that their evidence is not needed and cases. of 
unnecessary delays caused by irrelevant banking or financial details other than the 
crux of the matter which is dishonesty. 
So what are the possible alternatives? Levi (1993) discussed four likely alternatives 
that are reasonable. First is the trial by judge(s) alone. He notes that judges are known 
to sit alone in long civil trials, but in complex and long criminal trials this task will be 
too burdensome and stressful. Some of the advantages in single led trials include that 
it has a more business like approach and is heard in a more communicative 
atmosphere. For Levi the major disadvantage is that if the moral standards of ordinary 
people are the baseline, it is not possible for the judge to know what they are. The 
judge can also be easily accused of being biased socially and politically. 
The second approach suggested is the trial by judge with assessors. For Lev4 this 
appears to take care of accusations of bias and could inject some expertise into the 
judgement process. The maJor concern would involve how the assessors are chosen 
and who they are. Objections to certain or all members of the assessing team by either 
the prosecution or the defence would certainly create problems. Levi notes that more 
hands do not necessarily mean that trial times will be reduced. On the contrary, it may 
lead to unending technical debates etc., and arguments on which views should be 
eventually adopted. More so, the defendants and the general public may not be 
satisfied with the level of objectivity of assessors. To address this, Levi's states that 
two or more ordinary people drawn as jurors could substitute the assessors. 
The third alternative suggested is trial by a special jury. According to Levi the 
problems here are similar to that of assessors and special jurors may be no more 
inclined than present jurors to follow the judge's legal direction. More so, allegations 
of bias or 'class' collaboration may be made against 'peer' judgements. 
The fourth approach involves other alterations to trial by jury. Levi states that this 
could be a possible 'mixed' system that would have a tribunal composed of a judge, 
two assessors, and two lay persons. He suggests that the requirement should be that 
one of each of them would have to agree before someone could be convicted or 
perhaps the judge must also be in agreement. He notes that a major problem with 
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regard to fmancial or fraud trials concern difficulties of getting people with relevant 
cormnercial knowledge or expertise and who also live within the catchment area of 
the major fraud trial centres. This would not eliminate all problems associated with 
trials in general, but will go a long way in ensuring fair play. 
A further possibility would be to give defendants the right to elect trial without a jury 
as practice in North America and New Zealand and some parts of Australia. This 
decision especially where there are multiple defendants, has to be mutually agreed by 
aU (LevL 1993). 
Finally, from all the arguments above, it appears that jury trials are not generally 
favoured for fraud cases especially those that are complex. The 'bone' of contention 
concerns the quality of jurors. It is important that those selected are competent to 
understand fraud cases and pass verdicts accordingly. Going by the existing methods 
of selecting members of the jury who are 'ordinary citizens', a more systematic or 
criteria based selection process is likely to raise discontent among some members of 
the public. Conspiracy theories are likely to emerge for high profile cases in 
particular. Thus, it is the view of the writer that Levi's mixed jury system may be 
ideal where all interests are adequately represented, and lay jurist can interact. with 
experts to improve their understanding of the issues at stake. Hopefully,, the 
professional's interpretations would not and should not be biased. 
3.4 Sentencing 
The Old Testament concept of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth no 
longer plays any part in our criminal law. There is, however, another aspect of 
retribution which is frequently overlooked: it is that society, through the 
courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime, and the only way 
the courts can do this is by the sentences they pass. The courts do not have to 
reflect public opinion. On the other hand, courts must not disregard it. Perhaps 
the main duty of the court is to lead public opinion - Lord Lawton (Emmins, 
1985: 262). 
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The sentencing of fraudsters is an area of interest to all (the government, criminal 
justice administrators, fraudsters, victims and members of the public). From the 
'deterrence' perspective, it can be argued that the type of sanctions or sentence 
fraudsters receive determines how serious the offence is viewed by the system and 
society at large. On the other hand, in fraud cases, especially those involving deposits 
paid, the victims are more concerned with the recovery of their deposits, after which 
the offenders can be dealt with as deemed fit by the authorities. Researches in the 
field of organised crime, transnational economic crime and other forms of economic 
crime are unanimous in the view that it is important for the proceeds of crime to be 
taken away from the fraudster. The relevant legislation is that of the confiscation of 
assets, which needs to be carried out more efficiently. The international dimension of 
most huge frauds creates difficulties as it could involve the laws of other countries. 
The concepts of sentencing and deterrence can be traced to early philosophical 
writings. They are associated with classical theorists such as Cesare Beccaria (1764, 
1963) and Jeremy Bentham (1780,1973) from the late 18th century. According to 
Beccaria and Bentham, criminals are free, rational and hedonistic, they choose among 
alternative courses of action according to their perceptions of the risks and gains 
associated with it, seeking to maximise gain (or pleasure) and minimise risk (or pain). 
Further, men commit crime because the pleasure anticipated from the criminal act was 
greater than the subsequent pain expected. Men have free will and can decide whether 
or not it is profitable t6 commit crime. With regard to fraud like in other forms of 
crime, from the above, the fraudster is also confronted with various alternatives 
including that of avoiding the act, but are compelled to go ahead because of the 
anticipated pleasure or gain. Thus, for Beccaria punishment should be severe to the 
extent that it can deter offenders. In sum, "criminal justice should be subject to strict 
rule of law (due process) and punishments should be known, fixed and just severe 
enough to deter. Discretion of judges should be n-dnimised as far as possible in 
sentencing" (Coleman and Norris, 2000: 19). 
Young (1994) notes that for the classicist their central focus is the criminal act itself. 
The purpose of punishment is not to inflict unnecessary pain, hence punishment must 
be made proportional to the actual social harm it causes, and limited to only that 
required in deterring finiher criminal acts. Previous convictions should not be relevant 
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in arriving at a decision. Further, according to the principles of legal equality, a jury 
of one's peers should judge crimes, which should be other rational and equal 
individuals. Judges should be guided by a clear and systematic legal code. In addition, 
sentencing should be guided by certain agreed Rxed tariffs, which allow for 
discretionary decisions based on 'mitigating circumstances' as adjudged by those 
concerned. In classical theory, the law should be seen and used as an instrument for 
control and education. In this regard unjust practices including weak detection of 
crime within the criminal justice process are capable of encouraging crime. 
The efficacy of the deterrence theory is still a subject of debate. Most of the criticisms 
are concerned with anomalies within the different arms of the criminal justice system 
that are responsible for the apprehension, sanctioning and the correction or treatment 
of offenders. In other words how efficient or effective is the criminal justice system, 
the sanctions, and what impact do they have on the citizens are important 
considerations. In addition, the opposing view to the classical position emphasises the 
importance of social factors (which may be beyond their control) on the behaviour of 
individuals rather than the notion of free will (Haskell and Yablonsky, 1978). Another 
example of the social aspect of the argument is that of the 'pyramid of crime' (Young, 
1994), where the non-random incidence of criminal irrationalities are visible. For 
instance, with the pyramid of crime, which is consistent with most societies, the poor 
form the bulk of offenders (who are at the bottom) especially in violent property 
crimes. 
On the impact of criminal sanctions and deterrence, Hills (1971: 44) highlight the 
following suggestions by Sykes (1967: 118) which should be present in any criminal 
justice system. 
- First, punishment must be commensurate with the crime - otherwise it breeds a 
sense of martyrdom and resentment that encourages new illegal acts. More so if 
similar offences receive different sanctions or in cases where nothing is done. The 
declining use of sanctions is capable of diminishing its deterrent value. 
- Second, punishment must be quick and certain, if it is to serve as a realistic 
potential consequence of criminal behaviour. Using the USA as an example, 
Sykes notes that offenders do not expect to be caught, and due to selective law 
enforcement and administration, punishment is seldom certain or quick. Sykes 
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cite3 the example of swift action and the severity of punishment against drink 
drivers in Scandinavian countries has contributed to the decline of the offence. 
- Third, punishment must symbolise the ethical condemnation of legitimate society; 
for if this element is lacking, the police, courts, and prisons are reduced to the 
level of opponents instead of maintaining their position as dispensers of impartial 
justice. An example of negative influence can be found in bias implementation of 
rules or sanctions. 
- Fourth, punishments imposed by the larger society must be in accord with the 
values of the groups with which the individual identifies himself; otherwise a 
conflict of allegiance is created that once again may breed resentment rather than 
conformity. Criminal laws that are seen to favour certain interest groups are not 
helpful in this regard, and 
- Fifth, the psychology of the criminal act must be such that the threat of 
punishment has an opportunity to enter into the individual's motivational 
structure. It is noted that certain crimes such as crimes of passion may not benefit 
much from this approach. 
A document to look at concerning the sentencing of fraudsters is official statistics. In 
the UK, the Criminal Statistics of England and Wales published annually includes 
figures on sentences from the courts. The official statistics do not state the exact 
sentences given to specific types of fraud. Rather it reveals the numbers/percentages 
of offenders that were given certain sanctions. The figures for non-custodial sentences 
show that the most common penalty is the fine. In fraud cases in particular, fines are 
commonly used as sanctions. In other words custodial sentences do not appear to be 
attractive. Reasons for this are not unconnected with prison congestion, the notion that 
community treatment offers more rehabilitative opportunities and prospects for the 
offender, and the perception of fraud being mostly non-violent is not as serious as 
other property and violent offences. Further, it has been observed that with particular 
reference to the UK fraudsters normally face modest prison sentences even after 
contested trials. In addition, open prisons and early parole are usually given to 'high 
profile' fraudsters (LevL 1999). 
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To buttress the arguments above, below are some tables showing the types and pattern 
of sentences given to fraudsters and other offenders including their gender 
distributiom 
Table 3.1 
Offenders sentenced for all offences by type of sentence or order, adjusted for 
shortfalls in data 1994-1999 in thousands (Selected orders) (England and Wales) 
Type of sentence 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Absolute discharge 22.8 21.2 20.1 18.3 17.8 15.9 
Conditional discharge 110.1 106.2 104.8 109.7 114.7 114.1 
Fine 1,069.5 1,070.1 1.075.5 998.7 1,060.7 993.3 
Probation order 50.9 49.4 50.9 54.1 58.2 58.4 
Supervision order 9.5 10.1 10.9 11.2 12.4 12.7 
Community service 
Order 
49.7 4 8.3 45.9 47.1 48.6 49.6 
Imprisonment: 
Fully suspended 
Unsuspended 
3.2 
52.6 
3.2 
60.3 
3.4 
64.0 
3.5 
71.0 
3.4 
76.3 
3.2 
79.7 
Otherwise dealt with(l) 18.9 19.3 18.8 20.7 22.4 25.6 
All sentence orders 
(including those not in 
table) 
1,424.1 
I 
1,429.4 
I 
1,440.6 
I 
1,384.7 
I 
1,468.9 
I 
1,409.2 
I 
(1) Includes cases, where the result of the court proceedings was incorrectly recorded. 
Source: Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1999: 152, Table 7A London; Home office 
Comments 
From the table above, fines were used for 70% of offenders. It is noted that the 
gradual decline over the years in the use of the discharge and fine with a 
compensatingg, increase in the use of custody continued for indictable offences in 1999 
reflecting a general shift upwards in sentencing tariffs. The next table centres on the 
offences of fraud and forgery, violence against the person, burglary, and theft and 
handling stolen goods: 
96 
Gn 0 - ýý tA Z (Z Z 'Z'-. 
0> 
,ý 
z u Z eb Z E', Z 
eb Z' 
!! m. < =r ei, 3 - C) 
rb r_ & 5ý eb Z Er - = g= eb = 
('3 
0Z fc, -. - 
"- (1) (7* =p 
0, c = = ei . (, 0 n UQ = = = Z; CD 2q = C -. 
0 yq C= 
UQ 
= 
= 
= «11 j s 
-- = 
"M 
4» rD 0 
Co cl. =u0. - ;; = - = ,Z 
ý cä -. = - K< -i --. - 
= 
ý 
Q. CD . . 
- 
< 
" =0 3Q = . . Z00 z3 s: . 
M < CD. = 2 2. --n 
u= z3 0 
'2. g* rD 
- fD t< - ; j* 
= '2. fu, '2. P s* 
,= -o eb p 
g p CD p c:. (1) l» CD GO 
9c 
Ci. 
2 
:U 
0 C) 
0 ri 
QQ r» 0 ýIL 0 --3 
0 
W 0 
=Z c2. -. Gn m t» fb Cb 
Cb 
% .4 
W 
(D CD - P "-*3 9 :> ýi ý- c2. LI - 
. 
< : P. 0% oo Z. O (D -4 
t eb 
m 0 %0 n r- (3 
LL ý; a3 ro ' QQ tA = = cr 0 rb 
Z: = f"b 
0 
c2 
ZD 
.0 rD 
tu 0 
Z=- Cm. "0 U. ) =3 0r 
; p- 0% 
eD 
CD. 
(A fD 
Z. 
Co 
0 
Ei in 
Ch t^ t^ -3 
t t^ w 0% w -4- w w IC w (> - Co 
»o 
eb 
10 
l» JQ 
,p ,M3 
Z: rA 
rA 
23 
cm 
C7 
I-C 
*3 
Comments (Table 3.2) 
It is noted that in recent years, the Crown Court has shown similar trends to those in 
magistrates' courts for indictable offences. It has shown a slow decline in the use of 
fmes and discharges, and stability in the use of community sentences. Of males aged 
21 or over who pleaded not guilty to an indictable offence but were convicted, 75% 
were given immediate custody compared to 62% for those pleading guilty. The 
average length was 40 months for a not guilty plea, compared to 24 months for a 
guilty plea. The report reveals that the difference in custody rates tends to be smaller 
for offences such as burglary and theft where a high proportion plead guilty and in 
offences such as rape where a non-custodial sentence is very unlikely. 
The table on the next page is that of offenders sentenced by sex, type of offence and 
type of sentence order for selected offences. 
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Table 3.3 shows that male offenders dominate all areas of crime/sentences including 
fraud and forgery. Second, certain orders were used in greater number than others 
depending on the offence. In the case of fraud, fmes, community service orders, 
unsuspended imprisonment, total immediate custody and total community sentences 
are the dominant sanctions. Compared to burglary, as with the general crime statistics, 
burglary offences out number fraud and forgery offences. However, in the case of 
burglaries from the table above, young offender institution, unsuspended 
imprisonment, total immediate custody, and total community service are common 
sanctions. This also reflects the varied offender age groups, as younger offenders are 
more involved in burglaries. Other offence types also show varied degrees and pattern 
of orders or sentences. 
To stun up, at present custodial sentences are applied if necessary. This is a result of 
several factors including concerns about the efficacy of custodial sentences. Hence the 
use/growth of 'alternatives to custody'. 'Alternatives to custody' are those penalties 
which, following conviction and sentence, allow an offender to spend part of his or 
her sentence in the community and outside prison establishments (Vass, 1990: 2). For 
Vass, punishment in the community is seen as a means of keeping prison places 
available for more serious crimes and alleviating overcrowding. Also, punishment 
administered in the community helps in 're-integration'. In reality, for Bottomley and 
Pease (1986: 95-96), the word imprisonment is equivocal, and is difficult to measure 
both in quantity and quality. For instance, an order such as 'curfew' in the community 
is a different kind of imprisonment. They note that 'prison is near one end of a 
continuum from total restriction to total liberty'. The literature suggests that the 
effectiveness of community measures has not been conclusive but is promising. A 
discussion on this is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a more detailed discussion on 
this and related issues see Bottoms, Gelsthorpe, and Rex (eds. ) (2001). 
Finally, the only factor that should count in the detennination of whether one is 
convicted or acquitted are the facts of the case, though the economic means of the 
accused plays a major role at the conviction and sentencing stages of the legal process 
(Gabor 1994). Poorer defendants that cannot afford bail are likely to remain in 
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custody until the end of the trial. It is also likely that privately retained counsels are 
ready to fight a case to the end with all zeal. Innocent defendants have been known to 
plead guilty, feeling they have little chance to win a case with the resources available 
to them and fearing that they will incur the full wrath of the court if they are found 
guilty after a full trial. For Gabor economic power therefore plays a major role in 
one's susceptibility to conviction, irrespective of one's guilt or innocence. Also, the 
sentencing stage, tends to be more favourable to those of higher social standing. 
Further, the fact that certain levels of discretion are used at various levels of the 
criminal justice process, whatever biases prevailing at the police and prosecutorial 
levels are bound to have profound effects on the selection of People for prison terms. 
Variations can be found in sentences given to fraudsters. Levi's (1981) computation 
revealed that in England and Wales, during 1989, only five persons were imprisoned 
for more than five years for fraud, and only 59 people got more than three years. In 
1995, the numbers were five and 48 respectively, despite the large number of heavy 
sentences for violent and drug 'trafficking' offenders. Levi's study long-firm 
fraudsters indicated that two principal factors explain their reluctance to plead guilty. 
First, their belief that they have a good fighting chance of acquittal (approximately 
17% of those charged at the Old Bailey between 1948 and 1972 were acquitted), and 
second, their belief that in any event, they are unlikely to receive a very long sentence. 
Further, degrees of sentences depend on certain factors. In Levi's (1981: Table 10.6) 
study "Sentencing of principals in highly organised long-firm frauds at the Central 
Criminal Court, London, 1962-72, " the length of years given varied with the amount 
involved in most cases. Some of his analyses revealed that based on the total sum of 
money lost from the sample of cases, a mean figure of E26,601, and a median of 
E16,000 was observed. Taking-, all the sentences together, he found that the average 
sentence was 2.82 years. Also 50% of principals were sentenced to no more than two 
years. The most commonly occurring sentence was eighteen months. He notes that 
these figures are well below the 'tariff norm' found in Court of Appeal cases. For 
Lev4 his data indicates that although the principals of organised conspiracies are 
sentenced more harshly than their co-defendants and 'non-conspirators', they are not 
sentenced on the basis that they re 'professional thieves'. Levi's analysis showed that 
the highest sentence for 9 years was for fraud of E200,000,2.5 years for E14,000- 
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L85,000,1.5 years for ; E2,500440,000, and the least, a year for ; E8,000-LI6,000. A 
similar trend was observed from the examples of cases in this thesis. 
With regard to the above, Levi broke down 'the tariff into three major components: 
- The 'seriousness' of the offence and the degree of responsibility/culpability of the 
offender; 
- Mitigating factors relating to the previous record of the offender; and 
- Mitigating factors of a different nature (e. g. violence, victim carelessness etc. ) 
In cases where offenders had fraudulent previous records, the sentence imposed 
seldom exceeded the working maximum of five years' imprisonment. Thus Levi 
(1981) concluded that it appears that long-firm fraudsters are sentenced on the basis 
that they have committed 'white-collar' offences rather than 'traditional theft'. 
The way fraud is dealt with depends on many factors. These are: 
- whether the victim considers that there is any point in reporting the offence; 
- how busy the police are and whether they are willing to record it; 
- whether it comes to the attention of the authorities in any other way, for example 
via proactive audits; 
whether the 'offender' is a live company that has a regulatable future; 
how moraRy bad the offender is perceived to be (with organised crime 
connections increasing substantially the seriousness score); 
- and how expensive and how successful a prosecution is estimated to be (Levi, 
1999). 
3.5 Fraud and the Criminal Justice Process: Conclusions 
At every stage of the criminal justice or law enforcement process, legal agents 
exercise their discretion. Apart from reported incidents of crime, police officers 
decide on what is 'suspicious' and follow it up accordingly. Judges take decisions 
based on their 'judgement' on what is appropriate. Jurors also take decisions based on 
the interpretation and perceptions about the case and defendants in question. The 
initial decisions affect or are capable of influencing the preceding ones (Hills, 1971). 
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Individual(s) involved and the magnitude of the fraud to a large extent influence the 
zeal in which the offence is investigated and prosecuted (Levi, 1981). For instance, 
previous criminal record of the offender could attract more media and police attention, 
and could also determine the possibility of an acquittal for a first offender. Second, 
judges appear to take the view that it is less heinous to deceive a man into parting 
voluntarily with his property than to take goods violently or by force. They also tend 
to treat those who have run their business legitimately (or apparently so) for a number 
of years prior to the offence for which they have been convicted more leniently than 
they treat other, 'pre-planned' offenders (LevL 1981). Also, the concentration of 
routine police work on street crimes generally helps to shield the commercial 
criminal. 
Certain factors could influence the type and degree of sanctions imposed. Gabor 
(1994: 304) fists key elements that increase the likelihood that an offender will face 
criminal sanctions. These elements are applicable to the conman or fraudster. Thus the 
more of these elements in a case, the greater the likelihood that sanctions will be 
imposed. These include that: 
- The offender has little political influence and few economic resources. 
- The offender is unattractive and defiant, and has poor interpersonal skills. 
- The offender is a member of a minority group. 
- The offender has a known history of criminal behaviour. 
- The offender is a person rather than an organisation. 
- Victims or witnesses evaluate the act as a crime. 
- The crime is not easily hidden. 
- The crime cannot be dealt with internally by an affected organisation. 
- The offender and victim (be the victim a person or organisation) have not been 
acquainted or affiliated prior to the act. 
The offence is not trivial. 
There is a tangible victirm 
- The victim is displaying visible suffering. 
- The victim, police, prosecutor, or some other relevant party has something to gain 
by pursuing the case (e. g., insurance, revenge, or protection for the victim, public 
confidence for the police, reputation for the prosecutor). 
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- The victim feels no shame or need to protect the offender 
- Observers and other relevant parties do not regard the behaviour as justifiable or 
acceptable. 
It has been observed that victims also play an important part in determining the 
likelihood and severity of punishment for different types of white-collar crime 
(including fraud) offences (Coleman, 1987). For Coleman, pressure from the victims, 
and the general public's concern about a particular offence at that time it is uncovered 
could have an effect on the intensity of police investigation and judicial decisions. If 
crimes or frauds no matter how small were not reported, the criminals would 
definitely get away with it. The approach of the typical fraudster collecting small 
sums of money from thousands of victims is a deliberate act to avoid prosecution by 
aggrieved victims who are likely to forgo and forget their loss. 
An aspect of sanctioning that could have an effect on deterrence and punishment as 
the case may be concerns the time or period of incarceration. In one of Levi's (1981) 
conclusions on long-firm fraudsters, he observed that with regard to the social control 
of long-firm fi-aud, the amount of time that 'professionals' spend in prison is 
remarkably small in relation to the amount of money they obtain from long-firm 
frauds. Thus, the probability of conviction and the sentences that are imposed when 
one is convicted may make long-firm frauds a fairly good gamble in comparison with 
traditional forms of property crime. Findings in this thesis support this, and show that 
the sentences for fraud offences involving both large and small sums of money are 
relatively mild (Chapter 6.5). 
This argument is buttressed by Mitchell (1995) who states that criminals commit 
financial crime for the money and it is important that the criminal legal system 
deprive criminals of the fruit of their crime for punishment and deterrence. According 
to Mitchell, in Britain, The Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, which applies to all types of 
crime, will go a long way to achieving this objective. This legislation amends and 
strengthens the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and implies that other types of crime 
should be treated in the same way as drug trafficking. For instance, in the case of drug 
trafficking in order to calculate the 'other' trafficking, the court usually relies on 
assumptions. If the defendant has unexplained assets (whether existing at the time that 
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confiscation is considered or passing through his hands in the previous six years) the 
court can treat them as being derived from drug trafficking and can make a 
confiscation to their value (Mitchell, 1995). In sum, the new Act permits the Crown 
Court to make a confiscation order if the prosecution requires it. It allows the Crown 
Court to make assumptions on how the defendant's assets were acquired, and can 
introduce and enforce new investigation powers to obtain evidence. It also allows the 
Crown Court to force the defendant to provide information for confiscation purposes. 
Finally, the need to deter and punish offenders is not in contention. Appropriate 
sanctions and practices within the criminal justice system determine how effective and 
efficient these objectives are. With regard to economic crimes such as fraud, denying 
the offender the benefits of fraud irrespective of whatever punishment is given is 
central to future offending and the public perception of such activity. It is important 
for policy makers to ensure that agencies involved in the investigation, prosecution 
and sentencing of fraudsters are given all the resources required to cope with the 
problem. Also, whether regulatory sanctions (or formal monitoring) really deter 
fraudsters depends on what 'sort of people' they are. Fraudsters tend to show some 
dislike for certain actions or events. For instance, Levi (1999) observed that even the 
most hard-nosed businessmen accused of white-collar crime dislike bad publicity, for 
they generally want others to think well of them. Looking at the issues morally, he 
reflects on whether it would be ethically right to send a few thousand shoplifters a 
year to jail while leaving a director who stole more than all of them put together to be 
disqualified? 
The next chapter considers theory. Attempts will be made to explain fraud from a 
causal perspective and by its modus operandi. Thus, Chapter Four is concerned with 
causal criminlogical explanations and Chapter Five deals with the modus operandi or 
explanations related to the execution of deceit/the manipulation of trust. 
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, Chapter Four 
Criminological and causal explanations for fraud 
In an attempt to offer causal explanations, certain factors should be taken into 
consideration. These include the nature of the offence, characteristics or attributes of 
the fraudster/victim and the modus operandi. In the case of fraud especially those 
involving the manipulation of trust, a universally applicable explanation will be 
appropriate. The same types of fraud are perpetrated in all geographical locations. 
Several jurisdictions could be involved in the same offence. Fraudsters are highly 
mobile, and generally prefer to operate from a distance - away from the would-be 
victims. Furthermore, fraudsters are found in all walks of life, age groups, gender, 
social, economic, and political affiliations/backgrounds. Hence, with regard to the 
fraud of obtaining money, goods or services by false pretences, any theory or 
explanation should take this diversity into consideration. In this chapter, macro- 
theoretical explanations closest and relevant to fraud are discussed. 
Using criminological theories can be problematic (Young, 1994). For instance, it is 
common for theories of crime to adopt different explanations for different types of 
crime and the offender. Thus according to Young, white-collar crime is theorised 
differently from working-class petty property crime. More so, on a wider definitional 
perspective, what is considered to be crime differs between and within societies over 
time. In Bottoms' (2000) conclusion on theory and research in criminology he 
reiterates' Glaser and Strauss' (1967: 32) comment that theory "is an ever-developing 
entity, not ... a perfect product". For Bottoms, one of the reasons for this 
is that there is 
a continuing dialectical relationship between emergent theories and changes in the 
social world. Since we live in a rapidly changing social world, one should expect 
these changes and the incorporation of new materials in the future. 
Criminologists have theorised and attempted to theorise on different aspects of crime. 
Plausible explanations for virtually all crimes can be found in certain theories or a 
combination of different aspects of particular theories. Generally, criminological 
theories can be grouped into those that are mainly concerned with the cause of crime, 
the process(es) or modus operandi and the control or prevention, or all of the above. 
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Theories are important in criminological research, as they assist in directing the 
researcher to the relevant areas for criminological investigation into a given 
phenomenon. Appropriate methods of inquiry, data collection, analyses (inductive and 
deductive) etc, are usually informed by theory. 
We need to examine theoretical perspectives in order to identify the plausible causal 
explanations for fraud and to examine the key modus operandi - the manipulation of 
trust by the. confidence trickster. The execution of deceit and the eventual scam 
largely depends on the fraudster's ability to use trust and confidence, and to make the 
victim part with valuables voluntarily. Thus, an ideal theory of obtaining by false 
pretences or advance fee fraud should attempt to explain and identify the following: 
the causal factors - what factors or conditions contributes or creates the enabling 
environment for this type of fraud; the criterion or criteria (if any), used for the 
selection of victims (target selection); and how other variables such as business and 
cultural factors or diversity affect this type of fraud. 
In this thesis the explanation for fraud has been categorised into the likely causal 
explanations and those concerned with the execution of deceit (Chapter 5). Below is a 
discussion on explanatory or causal theories. It is important to note that most of these 
the causal and preventive theories for fraud emanate from broader theoretical 
perspectives on crime in general and fmancial crimes in particular such as that of 
white-collar and corporate crimes. 
4.1 Human nature and Rational Choice explanations 
Why do people commit fraud? The answer is relatively straightforward. Most frauds 
especially Advance Fee Fraud being a form of financial crime, economic gain is the 
major aim of the fraudster. Other 'advantages' of economic prosperity such as social 
status and power are not unconnected with this economic factor. An appropriate 
explanation for this is that of the 'Culture of Competition Theory' (Coleman, 1987). 
According to Coleman, the idea that wealth and success are central goals of human 
endeavour is part of a larger complex of beliefs that may be termed the 'culture of 
competition'. 
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Coleman traces the foundations of this worldview to the 17th century and in the works 
of Hobbes, Locke and other social thinkers of that era who formulated what 
MacPherson (1962) called the 'Theory of Possessive Individualism'. Competition 
happens to be a builder of character, a test of personal worth, and a powerful stimulus 
to individual achievement that ultimately produces the maximum economic value for 
society as a whole. In contrast to the stigmatisation of the poor, 'winners' are admired 
for their ability and drive that made them successful (Coleman, 1987). Thus, people 
are likely to use various means including fraud to arrive at the respected fmancial 
status in their society. It has been noted that the state of 'anomie' (see Section 4.2) 
could lead to an individual adopting illegal strategy in the quest for success or 
financial success in particular. 
In addition, the classical school of criminology provided certain explanations that are 
relevant to the understanding of fraud, though some of the theorists were more 
concerned with criminal law and punishment. One the probable explanations for crime 
was that people were seen as self interested and rational creatures, who are able to 
weigh up courses of action based on their preferred choices (what is described as 'free 
will'). If let alone people will pursue their selfish interests, hence the need for laws in 
exchange for protection of life and property from the state or government as the case 
may be. This is what led to the social contract, a basis for social order, with sanctions 
for violators. Thus crime is caused by irrational decisions based on several factors (e. g. 
a failed or failing legal and educational system, or personal greed etc. ) that eventually 
lead the individual to commit criminal acts (Coleman and Norris, 2000). 
A relevant explanation for fraud can be found in the 'Rational Choice Theory' or 
perspective. From the classical perspective, Bentham believed that the motivation to 
commit or not to commit a crime for personal advantage could. -be so weighted - 
provided punishment was sufficiently severe and certain. Also, that 'choosing to obey 
the law' would come to be seen as the most rational of the available choices. 
Punishment - or as Bentham called it, the 'science of pain' - should be so severe that 
the 'benefits' of crime were far outweighed by its 'costs' (Young, 1994). Thus, in the 
classicist paradigm, the whole conception of the causes of crime is associated with the 
question of rational motivation as defted by the majority or legal authority. 
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Further, the rational choice perspectives are said to be cognitive in the sense that they 
focus upon the decisions people make in different situations of opportunity and in 
relation to particular types of crime (Coleman and Norris, 2000). For Coleman and 
Norris, these theories grew out of the concern for situational crime prevention, which 
attempts to reduce crime by altering aspects of the situations in which crime occurs. 
Thus, the theory of rational choice is based on the following assumptions: that the 
offender seeks to benefit from their criminal behaviour. This involves the making of 
decisions and choices, however rudimentary on occasions these processes might be. 
These processes exhibit a measure of rationality, albeit constrained by limits of time 
and ability and the availability of relevant information (Clarke and Cornish, 1985). 
The rational choice theory is of particular significance to fraud, as fraud involves 
varying degrees of planning and decision making. The identification of potential 
targets or victims and the initiation of correspondence, establishment of 'credibility', 
use of all forms of confidence tricks etc., require a measure of information and 
planning for a fraud or advance fee fraud to be successful. In Nettler's (1982) 
observation, cheating ., 
is likely to occur when it is the means to a goal and when other 
avenues to achieving that goal are limited. Hence the need for rationality. 
The rationality argument is buttressed in Levi's (1981) study of long-firm fraud. In 
explaining the 'causes' of long-firm fraud, unlike the unplanned frauds (by the 
'slippery-slope' and 'intermediate' fraudsters), it was discovered that the criminal 
motivation of the 'pre-planned' long-firm businessman precede the formation of his 
business. In Levi's study, fraudsters did not see anything morally wrong with their 
actions. For them, they are no different from 'legitimate business' or successful self- 
made men, all of who committed crimes in the course of their 'careers. Having 
acquired enough wealth, they can afford to concentrate on legitimate business 
activities. The pre-planned fraudster also makes use of the denial of injury 
justification as noted by Sykes and Matza (1957) - for example, "the big companies 
can afford the loss". Levi notes that there is more to it such as the expansion of 
secrecy (information about business dealings - supplier and 'buyer'), supply 
(availability of initial capital to begin the trade). 
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Lilce with all other criminlogical theories, the rational choice explanation is not devoid 
of criticisms. Coleman and Norris (2000) highlighted some of these criticisms, which 
include that it is said to be limited because offenders rarely act in a rational way. They 
note that studies of active burglars for example, reveal that they engage in some 
rationalisation of decisions even though it is hurriedly done and could be rudimentary. 
The same could apply to other property and expressive crimes such as rape and some 
murders. They also note that the dominance of policy relevance and situational factors 
leads to a neglect of wider social, economic and political contexts, which may be 
crucial in understanding crime and crime rates. Closely associated to the rational 
choice perspective are the opportunity and economic explanations discussed later. 
4.2 Anomie, Strain, and Control theories 
One of the classical explanations for crime/fraud is the 'Anomie' theory. Durkheirn 
(1897/195 1), who pioneered the concept, viewed inequality as a natural and inevitable 
human condition that is not associated with social problems such as crime unless there 
is a breakdown of social norms or rules (anomie). Such a breakdown occurs in a 
society as result of rapid social changes accompanying the modernisation process. In 
addition, human beings can not be happy or exist if needs are not sufficiently met. 
Further, society limits the means available to the individual, and society also sets the 
goals appropriate to each category of people. Durkheim's theory of crime is in the 
context of an overall theory of modernisation (the progression of societies from the 
mechanical to the organic form). This explanation influenced other criminological 
theories such as the ecological, strain, and control theories of crime (Vold and 
Bernard, 1986). 
Merton, (1938) proposed the first 'Strain' theory as a revision of Durkheim's theory 
of anomie, which to some extent ignored social factors in its explanation. The strain 
theory does not limit itself to mere economic crime as it can be applied to other 
crimes such as vandalism, truancy, drug addiction, mental illness, suicide and 
homicide (Young, 1994). Strain theory views crime as the result of certain socially 
generated pressures or forces that drive people to commit the acts, and claims that 
these so called strains are not evenly distributed in the society. Rather, they are 
prevalent amongst groups with high crime rates. For Merton, the culture of any 
110 
society stipulates certain goals that it deems 'worth striving for', as for example, in 
America, the prominent cultural goal is to acquire wealth. Wealth is generally equated 
with personal value, prestige and social status. Those without money may be degraded 
even if they have personal characteristics such as age and spiritual discipline that 
other cultures may value. 
Furthermore, cultures specify the approved norms, goals and institutionalised means 
individuals or groups are expected to follow to achieve these ideals (e. g. hard work, 
honesty, education, and deferred gratification). For instance, Messner and Rosenfeld 
(1994) argued that institutionalised expectations have an important role to play in the 
concept of 'anomie'. Hence, they introduced the notion of the 'American Dream' 
theory. The American dream is a broad, cultural ethos that entails a commitment to 
the goal of material success, to be pursued by everyone. Their argument is that 
economics has come to dominate American culture. For example, the educational 
system appears to be driven by the job market (college education is for an economic 
purpose). Politicians get elected on the strength of the economy. At present, in our 
society, goals other than material success (such as parenting, teaching, and serving the 
community) are no longer overtly praised and acknowledged by the community 
(O'Connor, 2001). 
Thus in a broad sense, anomie is a set of social conditions and beliefs that could 
facilitate the use of illegitimate means to achieve the 'desirable' societal goals. 
Merton identified the various individual responses to 'anomic' social structures: 
9 'Conformity' - accepting the culture goals and the institutionalised means. 
e 'Innovation' - accepting the culture's goals but pursuing them through unapproved 
means such as through crime and fraud. 
'Ritualism' - rejecting societal goals, but retaining the allegiance to the norms 
(e. g. hard work and honesty). 
e 'Retreatism' - rejecting both goals and means (examples of such individuals are 
the drug addicts and tramps), and 
9 'Rebellion' ý the individual or group rejects and replaces existing societal values 
with new ones (e. g. political revolution). 
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Most frauds of obtaining by false pretences in this context can be categorised under 
'innovation' as a response to societal goals - for instance with regard to the 
importance of material possessions to the individuals social status. 
In rejecting the notion of an innate human nature, strain theory moves towards a 
position which emphasises the social nature of a person's individuality (Young, 
1994). Thus, human nature is created by the particular society within which the 
individual lives. In other words, the self is a product of social order. For Young, the 
determined 'givens', which include the individuals level in the social structure, are the 
framework within which rational people make choices and decisions in order to 
attempt to solve their 'problems' or achieve their ambition. For the maintenance of 
social order, people are socialised into a consensus of values, which corresponds to 
the needs of the social system. 
Some researchers have approached the subject from different perspectives. Cloward 
and Ohlin's (1960) version of the Strain theory is centred on the theory of 
'Differential Opportunity Systems'. This is seen as one of the intervening variables 
that can account for particular forms of crime and deviance. An illegitimate 
opportunity is more than simply the chance to get away with a criminal or deviant act 
- it involves learning and expressing the beliefs necessary for subcultural. support. 
Further, when certain individuals resent the push for social mobility but are led to 
believe that money is the means for success, the gap they experience would be 
predictive of more serious criminal involvement. These beliefs constitute the main 
intervening variables in Cloward and Ohlin's strain theory. 
The influence of 'goals' can be observed in Box's study. In his study of corporate 
crime, Box observed that most establishments set out certain goals, for their corporate 
success. This goal-seeking objective makes them inherently criminogenic, for it 
necessarily operates in an uncertain and unpredictable environment such that its 
purely legitimate opportunities for goal achievements are sometimes limited and 
constrained (Box, 1983). Hence they may resort to fraudulent activities or look for 
loopholes within the legal or corporate environment to finiher their objectives. 
Furthermore, corporations could engage in advance fee fraud such as refusing to 
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supply goods to customers that have already paid or supplying thein with defective 
items in an attempt to increase their revenue/sustain their organisation. 
A major criticism of strain theories by Nettler (1978) states that they are difficult to 
verify or falsify as scientific explanations. This is so because of the difficulty in 
assessing levels of strain in various individuals or organisations that could prompt 
them to engage in crime (Vold and Bernard, 1986). For Box, (1983) anornie offers a 
plausible account of deviant motivation if cultural goals are 'unidimensional' (i. e. are 
similar in breath and depth) and if individuals pursuing these goals experience 
blocked opportunities. Further, research has shown that the plurality-of industrialised 
societies (in terms of cultural goals), social class/status, opportunities etc., makes 
Merton's analysis limited at least as a motivational account of why lower class 
persons might commit crimes (Box, 1983). With regard to fraud, the fact that 
individuals from similar or worse social conditions as the fraudsters, exposed to the 
same opportunities for committing fraud, who also have similar cultural goals, do not 
resort to illegitimate means are pointers that further explanations are required. Some 
theories such as the control theory attempts to address these issues. , 
In addition, contrary to the notion of 'deprivation', people do not have to be 
absolutely deprived to suffer from feelings of frustration. They may be relatively 
deprived in terms of their aspirations and opportunities (Young, 1994). For Young, 
what remains to be explained is why the powerful who make the laws find it 
necessary to break them. Second, is the monolithic and unquestioned nature of values 
which the strain theory suggest form part of the stress problem. In other words, the 
capability of the individual, group and society to re-interpret goals, re-negotiate access 
etc, to avoid 'rebellion' is underestimated. Finally, is that which concerns the 
provision of opportunities. Young notes that the theory does not show how far 
opportunities can be provided to lessen 'strain' without having to change the system. 
For instance, it is known that severe economic and social limits to particular 
adaptations are abound, and sometimes the short term approach might be an attempt 
to adapt the individual to the prevailing status quo rather than making sure that there 
are fundamental changes. 
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43 Opportunity, crime and fraud , 
The role of 'opportunity' in crime and fraud is important. Hence, the 'Opportunity' 
theory explanation. Opportunity in this regard refers to offenders that exploit their 
positions in various fields of endeavour such as in the banking and financial industry, 
day-to-day human relations, business etc., making use of information, and the relevant 
infrastructure (technology etc. ) to commit crimes and fraud. The theory of rational 
choice (i. e. offender decision making), and the learning theory as it concerns the 
acquisition of information and techniques to enable the offender take advantage of 
opportunities to successfully execute various types of fraud have been associated with 
the concept of opportunity. It is possible for a 'school of fraudsters' (clique of friends, 
not 'gangs' as exemplified in the subcultural theory of delinquents) to be established 
over time. 
Opportunity theory can be traced to anomie theorists such as Merton, (1968) Cloward, 
(1959) and Cloward and Ohlin, (1960). Cloward points out that people often have 
very broad access to illegal means that exist in their neighbourhoods. Though the 
mere presence of an opportunity is not enough unless you have been introduced to the 
ways of taking advantage of it (this -remark has some bearing on the differential 
association explanation or learning theories). Ohlin (1971) used the concept of 
opportunity to refer to socio-economic opportunities of certain social groups (Bennett 
and Wright, 1984). Mayhew et. al. (1976) distinguished between opportunities 
attached to people (age, sex, occupation etc. ) and opportunities attached to crime 
(abundance of goods, physical security of targets, surveillance, other internal/external 
controls etc. ). 
One of the claims of the differential opportunity theory of criminality is that "the 
poverty of the lower class prevents them from using legitimate means, such as 
education to acquire valued goods, thus giving them the no alternative but to engage 
in illegitimate activities" (Clinard and Abbot, 1973: 187). Clinard and Abbot note that 
whether crimes are actually committed depends on the access to the structures of 
illegitimate opportunity. In other words, the offender is in a position to exploit 
avenues or loop holes within the system, an organisation or in the course of human 
dealings to carry out crime. This can be as a result of the offender being a member of 
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the organisation, being acquainted with the victim or making use of 
researchlinformation for the intended act. More so, the offender may not have 
acquired the training and skills to enable him compete successfully. In this regard, the 
logical conclusion for a solution would be to open up educational/economic 
opportunities to reduce crime. On the contrary, according to Clinard and Abbot 
studies have shown that a good number of crimes are committed by economically 
successful middle and upper income individuals or groups. These individuals happen 
to be those strategically located within the system to commit fraud. Thus, they note 
that the form of deviance adopted is an outcome of the illegitimate opportunity 
structure available within the society or community in question. 
Adopting the hypothesis that criminal behaviour result from a coincidence of 
appropriate motivation and opportunity, Coleman, (1987) embarked on an integration 
of social-psychological and structural research on the causes of white-collar crime. 
According to Coleman, unlike crimes of passion, white-collar crimes are rational and 
involve calculations, with the goal of the criminal being economic gain or 
occupational success that should more or less lead to economic gain. Further, 
motivation consists of symbolic constructions and definitions favourable to certain 
'deviant' activities, while opportunities are sets of social conditions embedded into 
the individuals behavioural possibilities. An opportunity may be perceived as 
attractive or unattractive depending on the individual and the prevailing situation. A 
potential course of action becomes an opportunity only when someone is aware of it. 
Especially for white-collar crimes, the availability of opportunities determine the 
extent of crime irrespective of the individuals motivation (Coleman, 1987). Thus, 
Coleman notes Hollinger and Clarke's (1983a, 1983b) observation of factors that 
determine an opportunity's attractiveness, which includes the actor's perception of the 
level of gain or profit and the potential risks (such as detection apprehension and 
prosecution). Other factors include the justifications or rationalisations adduced by the 
offender; previous beliefs; and general cost benefit analysis (which may not be 
detailed) especially as they concern other known avenues or opportunities (Coleman, 
1987). For Nettler (1982) an individual is more likely to steal or cheat when an 
available opportunity is evident and especially when the likelihood of punishment is 
low. Burglary is the crime most often described (implicitly or explicitly) by 
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opportunity theorists. This is attributed to the nature of offence - requires a target and 
physical activity to commit etc (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). At present, fraud is 
also an opportunist crime, the fraudster having secured the trust and confidence of the 
victim. 
Box's (1983) discussion of corporate crime throws some more light. He highlights 
Durkheim's (1951) focus on the top social stratum of society being the primary 
location of anomie (contrary to earlier belief that deviance was greatest amongst the 
working class). For Box, Durkheim. observed that it was power ('Power theory') not 
poverty that facilitated the personal achievement of socially identified cultural 
ambitions. Once achieved, these targets no longer constrain individual aspirations. 
Rather, successful individuals experience a release from moral and social binds. In a 
condition of pure individuation, the successful experience the sensation that anything 
and everything is possible. As such, they (successful individuals) "find it easy to slip 
into endless string and pursuit of whatever is, at that moment, desired" (Box, 1983: 
40). Those with power in the society invariably create the appropriate atmosphere or 
opportunities for their 'success'. 
In other words, the criminal justice system, government, business etc., that are 
managed and controlled by the 'elite' are manipulated to protect a privileged class of 
people. Some of these individuals may be engaged in various forms of crime 
including fraud, and they readily make use of the bureaucratic structures and legal 
loopholes to avoid detection and prosecution. The fraudster also attempts to fit into 
the 'appropriate' level in a given society by all means possible. 
The existence of anomic conditions in the society (in both developed and developing 
countries) introduces the concept of control (Tontrol theory') - another dominant 
perspective in criminological explanations for crime and deviance that can also be 
applied to fraud. In other words, why is it that the majority of citizens are law 
abiding? It has been argued that it is the result of self control created or developed and 
conditioned by several factors. For the social control theorists, individuals commit 
crimes because of the weakness of forces restraining them from engaging in the act 
(Reiss, 195 1; Reckless, 196 1; Hirschi, 1969). 
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Haskell and Yablonsky, (1978) Reckless (1961) offered the 'Containment' theory in 
an attempt to explain the influence of a variety of factors on human control. These 
factors include social pressures such as poor living and economic conditions minority 
group status, lack of opportunities, family conflicts, a prevalence of criminal or 
deviant subcultures, inner tensions, hostility, aggressiveness etc. These factors among 
others draw or pull the individual away from the accepted societal norms. Thus, a 
solution would involve effective family living and supportive groups. 
Vold and Bernard, (1986) note the containment theory attempts a fusion of the 
psychological and the sociological views of criminality. In sum', control theories 
assume that: all individuals are subject to many temptations to engage in rewarding 
criminal behaviour; and human beings will seek the rewards of crim. - unless they are 
held in check, or somehow controlled (Braithwaite, 1989). 
Hirschi, (1969) identified four aspects of social bonding that could control deviance or 
crime ('Control theory'). These are: attachments (emotional, feelings etc. towards 
other individuals or group); commitment (e. g. the stake in conformity such as in 
marriage); involvement (level of participation in societal activities such as 
employment or work); and belief (acceptance of laws, rules etc. ) (Braithwaite, 1989). 
To buttress this argument, whenever the deceiver does not share social values with the 
victim, odds are there will not be much deception guilt. People are said to feel less 
guilty about lying to those they think are wrongdoers (Lewis and Saarni, 1993). In 
other words, shared social values such as honesty and integrity are attributes that 
enhance self-control against various forms of deception and fraud. 
The level of strain or pressures as well as personal control experienced by an 
individual or organisation could lead them to commit fraud. This can be viewed from 
the perspectives of the victim or fraudster. Thus, for Gottfredson and-Hirschi (1990), 
the elements of self-control were identified as follows: 
- Criminal acts tend to provide immediate gratification or desires. In this regard, 
people with high self-control tend to defer gratification unlike those with low self- 
control. 
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- Criminal acts provide easy or simple gratification and desires. So people lacking 
self-control tend to lack diligence, tenacity, or persistence in a course of action. 
- Criminal acts are exciting, risky, or thrilling. They involve stealth, danger, speed, 
agility, deception, or power. People lacking self-control therefore tend to be 
adventuresome, active, and physical. Those with high levels of self-control tend to 
be cautious, cognitive, and verbal. 
- Crimes provide few or meagre long-term benefits. They are not equivalent to a job 
or a career. On the contrary, crimes interfere with long-term commitments to jobs, 
marriages, family, or friends. People with low self-control thus tend to have 
unstable marriages, friendships, and job profiles. They tend to be little interested 
in and unprepared for long-term occupational pursuits. 
- Crimes are said to require little skill or planning. The cognitive requirements are 
minimal. Thus those will little self-control would need mainly manual skills and 
apprenticeship to succeed. It can be added that this same analogy does not apply to 
most frauds, where knowledge on the law, and extortion without violence etc are 
important. These require some degree of intelligence and planning. 
- Crimes often result in pain or discomfort for the victim. Property is lost, bodies 
are injured, privacy violated, and trust is broken. People with low self-control tend 
to be self-centred, indifferent, or insensitive to the suffering and needs of others. 
They point out that it does not follow that people with low self-control are 
routinely unkind or antisocial. On the contrary, they may discover the immediate 
and easy rewards of charm and generosity. 
- Recalling that crime involves the pursuit of immediate pleasure. It follows that 
people with low self-control will tend to gamble, do drugs and engage in intense 
entertainment activities or pleasurable activities that are not criminal. 
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We shall now look at other explanations; that are intertwined with theories discussed 
above. The role of economics or economic determinants could affect 
individual/societal levels of anomie, strain and control and how they respond to these 
pressures. Discussed below are theories related to 'economics'. 
4.4 Economics, crime and fraud 
Another relevant explanation for fraud is the 'Economic' theory of crime. There are 
two major ways in which economic theory has been used to analyse crime and 
punishment. The first involves the decision to commit an offence. The second 
involves the design of policy towards crime - for instance types and nature of 
sanctions and the allocation of resources to the criminal justice system (Walsh and 
Poole, (ed. ) (1983). Economic models of explaining crime generally portray the 
individual as making choices on how to act (rationality). This decision depends on the 
likely consequences of the act and on the alternatives or opportunities that are 
available. According to Walsh and Poole (ed. ) (1983: 78), Becker (1968) prepared one 
of the first formal mathematical models of this theory. The model is expected to assist 
in determining the likely influence or effects on crime of factors such as poverty, 
unemployment etc. In Becker's model: 
The individual perceives a probability of apprehension, p, if he commits an 
offence, the level of punishment, f if caught, and the gains if he is not caught. 
He offends if the expected utility from committing the offence exceeds the 
utility of not offending. The expected utility is calculated by forming the 
weighted sum of utilities for the events that he is caught or not caught, where 
the weights are the probabilities of the two events. Thus for the individual, 
and, if aggregated across individuals, and society as a whole, the level of 
offending is a function ofp andf. 
In the real world, offenders do not necessarily engage in detailed mathematical 
calculations or risk assessment. Depending on the level of the individual's investment 
or commitment, some elements of scale of preferences, opportunity costs and other 
considerations, which could be unique to the person and the act or scam concerned, 
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are considered before a fmal decision is reached. For example, Levi (1981: 264) 
concluded that: 
long-firm fraudsters are not impelled into crime by personality defects or by 
stigmatising activities of social control agencies... even if they are not caught, 
persistent long-firm merchants know that they are violating the criminal law. 
Given the potential to commit long-firm frauds, continued involvement in 
them at any given time is determined by the reasoned calculation of costs and 
benefits, as defined subjectively by each individual in terms of the things he 
values or fears. 
With regard to policies and sanctions, Becker's model assumes that resources to the 
various arms of the criminal justice system and even within departments reflect, and 
are attempts to minimise some 'social loss function', which is made up from the 
damage done by offences and the costs of apprehension and punishment. A reflection 
of this can be found with the creation and funding of specialised agencies aimed at 
tackling various types of fraud and crime. 
Further, research has shown that crime or fraud could be the result of several 
independent or individual factors. Worthy of mention is the 'economic determinism' 
approach emphasised by William Bonger (1916) a Marxist, and a proponent of a 
theory of economic causation of crime. A common view was that poverty itself causes 
crime. Some of the studies attempting to test this view focus on variations in 
economic conditions vis-a-vis variations in crime rates. 
Bonger attributed criminal acts, particularly crimes against property, directly to the 
poverty of the proletariat in a competitive capitalistic system. Poverty, a result of 
unsuccessful economic competition leads to personal disorganisation, an attribute 
inherent in a capitalist society. Thus the solution would be to work towards a classless 
society. The major criticism of this approach is that poverty alone does not cause 
crime and most poor people are not criminals (Vold and Bernard, 1986). More so, 
certain Western or 'capitalist' societies operate what can be described as the welfare 
systen-4 where deliberate steps are taken to address issues such as unemployment and 
other basic needs of life. Thus, contemporary definitions of poverty extend beyond 
120 
economic deprivation to all unaccomplished or derived spheres of human life and 
endeavour. 
It has been noted that poverty and inequality are different. Poverty is generally 
regarded as absolute deprivation, and inequality is seen as relative deprivation. 
Poverty is regarded as the lack of some fixed level of material goods necessary for 
survival and minimal well-being whilst inequality refers to a comparison between the 
material level of those who have the least in a society and the material level of other 
groups in that society (O'Connor, 2001). Poverty and inequality could be measured in 
different ways (e. g., unemployment, high rates of divorce, single-parent households, 
high population density, dilapidated housing, poor schools, residential mobility, 
population turnover, concentration of minorities, etc. ). These factors could also be 
correlated with each other. 
Theoretically, the relationship between inequality and crime is believed to operate 
through a person's individual assessment of the equity of a particular distribution of 
resources, which are not necessarily economic. The socio-cultural environment 
usually shapes their assessment. Thus, if inequity is perceived, the causal mechanism 
is referred to as relative deprivation, and some individuals respond by resorting to 
property crime to address their grievances. In certain cases people may develop deep 
anger which could be expressed in violent ways. Not all those who perceive inequality 
as unfair resort to crime. To address the situation, some people go into business 
activities or political action. 
Of relevance here is the discussion by Hall and Scraton (1994) on 'Law, crime and 
class'. One of the ways in which they examined the subject was through the relation 
of crime to 'surplus' and 'marginal' populations. They note that the vast majority of 
those processed in the criminal justice system are drawn from the working class. Also 
studies revealing information of this sort are drawn from court convictions, which do 
not indicate the real class of convicts. Second, on the extent of white-collar crime, 
given the relatively vague nature of the definition, much of what is said to be criminal 
may not be regarded as 'crime'. They also note that police stereotype of the 'criminal' 
is that of a working class individual. 
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A more developed theoretical argument, that attempts to explain how poor social 
conditions may precipitate crime can be found in the theory of 'Relative Surplus 
Population' which was defined by Karl Marx in his Daskapital as 'the reserve army 
of labour' (Hall and Scraton, 1994). The theory states that capitalism by its nature and 
operations is subject to fluctuations and cannot maintain a permanent labour force in 
full employment. Technological innovation and other economic antecedents 'deskills' 
certain sections of the work force, some of whom are thrown into temporary or 
permanent unemployment. Marx noted that this also creates the movements of 
workers between trades. Also, during periods of recession, the 'surplus population' 
sinks into destitution, as living standards decline. Relating this to fraud and other 
crimes, this insecurity of employment for instance could serve as an inducement for 
fraud - 'saving for the rainy day' or crime by the unemployed. 
The links between unemployment, destitution, and crime have provided starting point 
for various researches. For instance, recent studies of crime in the Third World have 
highlighted the way in which movements of world trade and foreign investment have 
tended to improve the conditions of that small sector of local labour linked to exports 
and metropolitan capital. At the same time, it may be responsible for 'marginalising' 
large sectors of the indigenous population, especially the rural and urban poor (Hall 
and Scraton, 1994). Further, the theory of surplus population class been used to 
explain crime by 'out cast' groups who are forced to survive outside regular 
employment in the illegal economies (petty theft, illegal dealing and hustling etc. ) of 
the cities. 
Criticisms against this position include that it does not provide sufficient explanation 
for crime and provides only some possible explanations or precipitating conditions of 
certain crimes among some sectors of the poor. Also, the theory does not distinguish 
between what can be called 'survival' and 'professioml' crime. For instance crimes 
that occur outside the parameters of the marginalised such as career crimes, crimes of 
the powerful and work-based crimes. Thus, apart from work place fiddling which is 
regarded as part of the perks of the job, syndicated illegality by big business through 
for example tax fraud is not seen as a crime but a method of exploiting 'existing 
loopholes' in the law. This is informed by the need to enhance ones business 
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advantage (Hall and Scraton, 1994). They note that in the final analysis, a 
comprehensive class theory of crime appears untenable. 
Finally, taking into consideration the criminological explanations offered. With regard 
to the offence of fraud, especially that which involves the manipulation of trust, the 
offender must be relatively skilful and 'smart' to take advantage or create 
opportunities for his/her scam. Even in situations where the individual can not cope 
with the stress and pressures of 'life', skills (in varying degrees) are necessary for 
crime and for fraud in particular. Hence, the Tearning' explanation discussed below. 
4.5 Learning theories 
How do fraudsters learn their tricks? The acquisition of skills and information could 
be done through association and learning. This led to the 'Differential Association' or 
'Learning' theories. Tarde, (1912) was among the first to state that patterns of 
delinquency and crime are learned in much the same manner as any other occupation 
(Haskell and Yablonsky, 1978). Sutherland, (1924,1947) and later Sutherland and 
Cressey, (1970) ý developed this theory. The key positions of this theory are namelv: 
that learning includes the techniques of committing the offence; and that motives, 
drives, and attitudes are rationalised mainly through definitions favourable to 
deviance. With regard to fraud, because of the level of information required, the 
individual is either creative (arriving at unique techniques through research or by 
chance), is taught the tricks or learns them in the course of their legitimate occupation. 
As with other criminological theories, this explanation has also been accused of not 
taking into account significant individual differences and the dynamics of human 
associations with each other (Vold and Bernard, 1986). For instance, not all 
individuals exposed to criminal groups or networks end up committing crimes. In 
other words, in general, learning theories particularly differential association give an 
over-simplistic view of human nature and the learning process, thus making the 
individual a passive receptor of that process (Coleman and Norris, 2000). Coleman 
and Norris also note that this has led to an increasing focus upon cognitive processes 
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within psychology and the study of learning in an attempt to understand human 
behaviour. 
Another explanation or theory closely associated with differential association is that 
of 'Subculture'. For the subcultural theory or theorists, criminality is seen as one of 
the products of 'membership' of groups or association with 'significant others' who 
engage or defme deviant activities favourably. Adapting subcultural theory to the 
model 'criminal association', Braithwaite, (1989: 2 1) highlights suggestions by Sykes 
and Matza, (1957) on mechanisms which make drift possible. Sykes and Matza call 
them techniques of neutralisation such as denial of responsibility (e. g. 'I was drunk'). 
Denial of injury ('Victims can afford it'). Denial of victim (e. g. 'We weren't hurting 
anyone'). Condemnation of the conderners (e. g. 'They're crooks themselves'), and 
appeal to higher loyalties (e. g. 'I had to stick with my mate') - situations mentioned 
earlier as identified in Levi's (1981) study. Circumstances of advance fee fraud or 
scams in general are not far removed from the instances above. 
Finally, of relevance here is Akerstr6m's, (1993: 2) study. She notes that the 'crooks' 
interviewed told her that they are champions of the ideology of individualism. 
Achievement of economic success is considered a sign of moral worth. As a 
consequence, some laws are to be violated as a matter of principle. Further, the fact 
that lifestyles are shared gave rise to shared vocabularies of meaning, values, norms 
and perspectives and thus to subcultures. For Akerstr6m's 'lifestyle' as a concept is 
useful since it allows for an understanding of how actions and norms are situationally 
motivated (i. e., an actor's way of life limits certain options while it allows for others). 
We shall now attempt to draw conclusions from our discussion on 
criminological/causal explanations with regard to fraud. Below is the concluding 
section. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
From our discussion, it can be deduced that certain factors or situations are important 
preconditions/prerequisites for fraud or advance fee fraud to occur. Individuals react 
differently to circumstances and opportunities conducive for fraud. Societal or cultural 
expectations (in varying degrees) with regard to material success are important 
reference points for the criminal. Those with weak social controls and bonds who at 
the same time may be experiencing some strains or pressures are likely to rely on 
illegal activities to achieve their goals. In the process their crimes are rationalised or 
justified. In fraud cases, the individual has to be aware of the opportunities (by 
chance, learning or exposure through work) and exploit it accordingly. The motivation 
is usually economic (the extent depends on the greed or need of the fraudster). The 
extent to which societal conditions or pressures affect a fraudster is difficult to 
measure, more so, when different individuals exhibit various levels self control. 
Adverse socio-economic conditions could lead to some individuals committing fraud 
due to greed, dissatisfaction and to enhance their social status. 
With regard to the data from this research, the most plausible explanation for fraud 
(obtaining by false pretences) is that of rational choice, with a strong bias for 
economic rationality. The concept of rational choice is central as decisions are based 
on a variety of factors including - opportunities, risks, benefits, probability of 
apprehension, and sanctions if convicted. The modus, operandi of most scams which is 
mainly concerned with the building of trust and confidence suggests that varying 
degrees of planning are involved, and that the fraudster is aware of the implications of 
his deception. On the other hand, it is very likely that the offending individual has 
very weak self and social control as opposed to the majority of law-abiding citizens. 
Certain frauds such as embezzlement are more closely related to 'control', 'strain' and 
opportunity explanations. In the final analysis, the validity of all the theories are 
limited to the extent that non-criminal or non-fraudulent behaviour exist within the 
same criminogenic conditions or circumstances that may be or are attributed to the 
crime or deviance. 
With the behavioural sciences, there is no complete explanation or understanding of 
human action. Several factors and variables affect criminals/fraudsters and would-be 
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victims/victims in different ways. One or a combination of certain theories can 
explain each individual's fraud or fraudulent tendency. Relevant causal factors 
revealed from these theories revolve around the economic rationality of the fraudster. 
Central to all the related theories is the role of economics in terms of the cost/benefit 
of the criminal activity and the value derived from the act. More so, it is important for 
the opportunity to present itself, or it is craftily created through the process of 
manipulating/creating trust via lies, deceit and confidence tricks. 
In explaining fraud or advance fee fraud in particular, Gabor's categorisations of 
factors contributing to widespread criminality are central. For Gabor (1994: 248, 
Figure 7) two groups of factors could lead to the decision or the criminal act. The first 
is the degree of readiness to commit crime. Under this heading, susceptibility to crime 
may be shaped by: 
a) Natural criminogenic factors such as innate antisocial and aggressive tendencies 
(people vary here); natural pursuit of self-interest; and criminalization of 
inevitable human diversity and 
b) Learning of criminal behaviour which include criminogenic aspects of one, s 
immediate milieu and surrounding culture; scandals and other events that 
desensitize and disinhibit behaviour; and habituation to crime. 
The second aspect is that of situational/instigating factors. In this category, the 
following factors could facilitate criminality or crime: incentives/expected profits; low 
risks; provocation; anonymity of offender; stress/pressures; altered responsibility; 
victim depersonalisation; criminogenic social ties; and justifications. 
Thus, drawing from the two groupings above, one's decision or action and the choice 
of crime is influenced by 
a) Personal goals and anticipated success of achieving them through crime 
b) Legitimate versus illegitimate means available to achieve goals 
c) Appraisal of situation (meaning, profit-risk ratio, suitable targets) 
d) Moral repugnance of act contemplated, and 
e) Commitment to conformity (Gabor, 1994: 248) 
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Finally, Wilson and Hermstein (1985) put forward a general theory of criminal 
behaviour, which involves elements such as choice (rationality), conditioning 
(psychological, conscience etc. ), impulsiveness (rewards/costs of crime not 
adequately appraised), and equity and equality (people differ in their assessment of 
what is fair, right, gains others receive in relation to their efforts etc. ) (Coleman and 
Norris, 2000). Their theory can be surnmarised as follows: 
The larger the ratio of the rewards (material and non-material) of non-crime to 
the rewards (material and non-material) of crime, the weaker the tendency to 
commit crimes. The bite of conscience, the approval of peers, and any sense of 
inequity will increase or decrease the total value of crime; the opinions of 
family, friends, and employers are important benefits of non-crime, as is the 
desire to avoid the penalties that can be imposed by the criminal justice 
system. The strength of any reward declines with time, but people differ in the 
rate at which they discount the future. The strength of any reward is also 
affected by the total supply of reinforcers (Wilson and Hemistein, 1985: 61). 
The remark above is a good summary of factors and conditions involved in fraud. It is 
also an attempt to explain the fraudsters' rationale. Important issues highlighted or 
that can be deduced in this statement include that of 'rewards' 'conscience' 'values' 
(individual and collective/societal), 'significant others' and 'sanctions'. It is important 
to add that certain theories have identified 'criminogenic' conditions that encourages 
or could cause crime/fraud, however, most individuals exposed to the same 
factors/conditions do not adopt fraudulent activities. This situation lays credence to 
the complicated task of identifying causal factors or explaining each individual's 
fraudulent actions. 
Ile next chapter looks at explanations concerning the execution of deceit or advance 
fee fraud as the case may be. This part of the fraud is crucial because given all the 
plausible causal explanations, the offender must make physical moves. Hence the 
interplay of lies, deception, trust, confidence and risks. 
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Chapter Five 
Deceit and Trust 
In this chapter the relationship between lies, trust and confidence will be identified. 
First, an attempt will be made to understand human behaviour with regard to 
deception and lies from a philosophical perspective. Issues discussed are relevant to 
the extent that it explains the build up to fraud, which can be said to be one of the 
extremes of a He. Having a lie or truth accepted by which ever party concerned, 
depends on the level of trust at the stage or stages of interaction. The interplay of all 
that is what generally perfects the confidence trick, which in turn enables the fraud to 
be successful. 
Also discussed is the nature of trust and its dynamics - the main theoretical theme of 
this thesis. It is important to note that the sequence of discussion is not intended to 
prioritise any topic as this research reveals that trust is an embodiment of truth or lies, 
confidence and risks. These issues all fall under the umbrella of the use of deceit in a 
broad sense to manipulate trust - the ultimate goal of the advance fee fraud fraudster 
and others that depend on upfront payments. In addition, all scams involve deception 
in varying degrees. For a scam to be successfully executed, the victim must trust the 
fraudster to the extent that he or she is willing to hand over some payment or renders 
services voluntarily in lieu or in anticipation of a contract or obligation. 
5.1 Lying 
A lie is defined as "any intentionally deceptive message, which is stated. Such 
statements are most often made verbally or in writing" (Bok, 1978: 13). This 
information or response may be communicated through gestures,: various forms of 
disguise, action or inaction or even through silence. Bok notes that most of the 
statements are made verbally or in writing and can be conveyed via signals and other 
forms of communication. Further, self-deception is a usual influential factor in 
deceptive messages, whether or not they are lies. This can be achieved through 
various forms of deliberately distorting the facts. For example, the biases and 
ignorance held by an individual can be manipulated in the direction of the xleceiver's 
goals. 
The definition above shows that the concept of the 'lie' is closely associated with that 
of deception. What is regarded as deceptive can de defined in many ways - the legal 
interpretation has been mentioned under the law on fraud in Chapter One. Mitchell 
(1986) defines deception as a false communication that tends to benefit the 
communicator. Mitchell's definition also implies that animals and plants could He to 
protect themselves and to prey on others as well as to mate. For Vrij, Mitchell's 
definition is controversial in the sense that it assumes that unconsciously and 
mistakenly misleading someone should also be classified as deception. It is bommonly 
agreed that deception is an act of deliberately not telling the truth. 
Thus, Vrij (2000: 6) defined deception as "a successful or unsuccessful: deliberate 
attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator 
considers to be untrue". From the above, all forms of fraud involve deceptive 
practices, as victims including the dishonest ones do not expect to be swindled. In the 
same vein, all frauds involve lies in some form. Deception is the larger category, and 
lying forms part of it (Bok, 1978). An interesting dimension identified by Bok is that 
since knowledge is known to give power, lies could alter the distribution of power as 
the lies add to the power of the liar, and reduce that of the deceived. The lies can 
create various alternatives for the liar and at the same time distort the victim's sense 
of judgement. This remark typifies the kind of situation created by the advance fee 
fraudster or a con man who has to deceive the victim to part with cash or goods. 
In the course of human relations, certain types of lies or deception are tolerated. The 
intention and nature of a lie determines whether it is morally right or wrong, criminal 
or fraudulent. With regard to this thesis, lies are part of the grand plan to obtain 
money, goods and services by false pretences. The type of lie employed will depend 
on the nature and modus operandi of the scarn. Resýarchers have investigated this 
phenomenon from different perspectives such as philosophy, psychology,, medicine 
and economics. In all approaches there is a limit to what is considered harmful in any 
form. This limit varies according to circumstances and the issue at stake. 'As pointed 
out earlier, lies constitute the foundations of all frauds. 
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Bok (1978) embarked on an analogy and philosophical approach to lying in public 
and private life from a moral perspective (not criminal). Bok notes that Augustine 
identified certain types of lies, which include religious doctrine (that which is uttered 
in the teaching of religion); lies that profits no one and injures someone; and lies that 
profits one party and injures another. Others are lies told out of mere decision to lie 
deceive, or told out of a desire to please others, and lie that injures no one but profits 
someone, for instance in saving the person's life or money. 
People are known to give several reasons for lying. Some claim that there was no lie 
or it was a joke or an exaggeration. Others disclaim responsibility based on their 
incompetence on the subject or other 'influential' physical or mental conditions (Bok, 
1978). For instance, an example of 'noble lies' described by Bok, has serious roles in 
fraud especially religious scams that require followers to deposit part or all their 
savings. This is highlighted in the remark below: 
Rulers, both temporal and spiritual, have seen their deceits in the benign light 
of such social purposes. They have propagated and maintained myths, played 
on the gullibility of the ignorant and sought stability in shared beliefs. They 
have seen themselves as high-minded and well-bred - whether by birth or by 
training - and as superior to those they deceive. Some have gone so far as to 
claim that those who govern have a right to lie. The powerful tell lies believing 
that they have greater than ordinary understanding of what is at stake; very 
often, they regard their dupes as having inadequate judgement, or as likely to 
respond in the wrong way to truthful information (Bok, 1978: 167). 
On truthfulness, deceit and trust, Bok notes that all our choices depend on our 
estimates of the situation. These estimates are in turn often reliant on information 
from others. In confidence tricks, the victim especially the na7fve and dishonest ones 
rely on the information from the fraudster. Lies distort this information and therefore 
our situation, as it is perceived. This also affects our choices. To the extent that 
knowledge gives power, to that extent do lies affect the distribution of power; they 
add to that of the liar, and diminish that of the deceived, altering his choices at 
different levels. Thus, Bok notes that lies misinform so as to obscure an objective 
especially in a situation where the liar wants to obtain something. It can also make the 
objective appear unattainable or undesirable. Lies can also eliminate available 
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alternatives or course of action. They could also distort the real picture of risks, costs, 
and benefits involved. 
From the perspective of the deceived, some types of deception can be coercive. If this 
succeeds it gives power to the liar. From the perspective of the Ear or would-be liar, 
the ideal that one should not be deceived is shared. As a result, their choice to lie is 
one they would like to reserve for themselves (or selected acquaintance) while 
insisting that others be honest. This is what Bok describes as the 'free rider status' 
(1978). The Ear views his victim with caution after his encounter knowing that the 
relationship will chahge if and when the deception is discovered. 
Bok concludes that, people have the power and choice to influence the amount of 
deception in their lives especially as it concerns their speech and action. Individuals 
differ in their ability to handle deception in themselves and in others. Further, the 
stress on individualism, on competition, and achieving material success in our society 
has generated pressures to seek short cuts such as via fraud. Thus social incentives to 
deceive are great compared to the controls. For Bok, governments have an important 
role to play by being honest and straightforward in their words and action. The 
professions including educational institutions are equally responsible in setting 
standards. 
In self-deception, the person is both the liar and the dupe. The self-deceiver's goal is 
to protect his or her view of self at all costs. Biased reasoning is usually adopted as 
people often conclude with what they wanted to believe. People also tend to search for 
evidence that confirms their belief (Baumeister, 1993). Baumeister notes that it may 
be necessary to deceive oneself in order to have a realistic chance of ones endeavours. 
An important process relevant to this is the self-fulfilling prophecy - believing that 
something is true helps make it materialise. Also, self-deception is here to stay as it 
helps people feel good, recover from trauma, and sustain confidence for tackling 
difficult problems and succeeding among other activities. On the negative side, self- 
confidence or overconfidence could cloud one's judgement and lead people to take on 
projects or make commitments at which they have little chance of success. Baumeister 
notes that in America self-deception is big business. Advertisers encourage people to 
believe that purchasing various products will make them acquire attributes such as 
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being attractive, sexy and glamorous, reduce or gain weight and make them rich. 
Fraudsters have adequately hijacked the 'confidence' industry (i. e. in products, goods, 
services, business or investments etc. ), demanding upfront payments for fake, 
substandard products or withholding money for requested products. 
Deliberately deceiving others is an essential part of everyday social interaction (Vrij, 
2000). Some examples include that of a man who says that he is pleased with his 
birthday presents, although in fact he does not really appreciate them or the host who 
receives compliments about his cooking, although the food was not really that good. 
He notes that research has indicated that lying is a daily life event. Further an 
interesting revelation is that lying is an important phenomenon in social relationships 
and people tend to like the company of people who lie frequently. 
Vrij reveals that in general, people are good at lying, but are not very good at 
detecting lies. Reasons for the poor detection of lies include that they have poor 
knowledge about how to catch a Ear. Second, the observer is usually not motivated to 
catch the liar. A third reason is that some people are so good at telling lies, which 
makes their detection more difficult. With regard to motivation to detect lies, people 
deliberately do not want to know the truth. It is not in their best interest (for example 
wanting to know how they really look, or about an affair that could eventually ruin a 
marriage). Further, not knowing what action to take if the truth is discovered could 
sustain the lack of motivation (for example parents and teenage children involved in 
all sorts of vice). Vrij states that in certain situations the truth is demanded such as in 
the purchase of a second-hand car, recruiting staff and custom declarations. 
Of relevance to the understanding of the fraudster or liar is Vrij's categorisation of 
personality traits according to how people deal with deception. Four types are 
mentioned - manipulators, actors, sociable people and adaptors. 
With regard to manipulators, the stereotypical view of liars is that they are selfish, 
crafty and manipulative. Those in this category frequently tell self-oriented lies. They 
tend to persist in lying when challenged to tell the truth. They do not feel 
uncomfortable when they lie, and do not find lying cognitively too complicated. They 
also view others cynically, show little concern for conventional morality, and openly 
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admit that they lie, cheat and manipulate others in order to get what they want (Vrij, 
2000). Also, manipulators are usually schemers but are not stupid. They are selective 
of those they exploit to safe guard against retaliation, and avoid cheating if they are 
sure they will be caught. They tend to dominate in conversations and appear relaxed, 
talented and confident. In general, people see them as 'good' or interesting company 
and are preferred as partners. The swindler typically falls into this category. 
As for actors, certain people are skilled in regulating their verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour than others. Vrij identifies four constructs of control in explaining this. 
These are emotional control, which refers to the ability to manage ones emotional 
communication and non-verbal displays. Social control, which includes role-playing, 
managing verbal behaviour and self-presentation skills. Acting also refers to the 
individual's role-playing skills while social expressivity includes skills in iverbal 
expression, and diction. All these skills are helpful in the art of deception and lying. 
Sociable people exploit social interactions that occur in everyday life. Thus for Vrii, it 
is possible to suggest that people who enjoy more social interactions are particularly 
good at lying. Extroverts and sociable people are attracted to social life, they are not 
shy always appear and act confident. People could also be reserved in a social context. 
The difference in social involvement has an impact on deception skills. Sociable 
people lie more often than socially withdrawn people, they feel more comfortable 
while lying, and persist longer when they are lying (Vrij, 2000). For Vrij sociable 
people are considered socially skilled though they lie often. On the other hand, 
socially withdrawn people are considered awkward, probably because they are honest. 
Adaptors are those that assess every situation and act accordingly. They are highly 
motivated to make a positive impression on others. One way of making this 
impression is by telling lies. In general, for adaptors, in the course of their actions 
they appear relaxed and comfortable. 
Vrij's research does not suggest that all people raise their voices or show fewer 
movements when lying than when they are telling the truth. It is important to note that 
honest people may also display similar traits. It only suggests that the majority of liars 
do this. For instance, the non-verbal characteristics consistent with stereotypical 
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beliefs (gaze aversion, smiling, shifting positions mid blinking of the eyes) have 
shown that they are not reliable indicators of lying or deception. The police and 
custom officials for example have recorded some successes based on these 
'traditional' beliefs. Tbus Vrij concludes that it is not possible to provide an answer 
on how people behave when they lie. The main problem being that there is no typical 
non-verbal behaviour associated with deception. Behaviours; differ across deceptive 
situations and the personality trait of the individual concerned is significant. Finally, 
people's ability to detect lies depends on the circumstances. In situations where the 
consequence of lie is minor, a physical examination of the 'offender' will reveal little 
or nothing. 
The following constitute, Viý's characterisation. of the liar and significant factors that 
can influence the liar and probably have an impact on the recipients and the detection 
of the lies. This analogy is particularly useful when confronted face-to-face with a 
fraudster. 
- First is the familiarity with the liar - in this situation it is safe or reasonable to 
suggest that it should be easier to detect lies in people we know than in strangers 
especially if we are familiar with the truthful behaviour of the person in question. 
But there is no support for this assumption. It has been observed that over time, 
especially in intimate associations, partners develop a tendency to judge the other 
as truthfid. According to Vrij, this is the so-called 'relational truth-bias heuristic' 
as described by Levine, McCornack and Park (1999). This is important to advance 
fee frauds and similar scams especially those perpetrated across national 
boundaries. 
- Second is the familiarity with the topic or scam in the case of fraud. For example 
with regard to He detectors, it is easier to detect lies when the investigator is 
familiar with the topic. It is also noted that liars are aware of this situation. The 
intention of the He also determines its nature. For example, lies told to spouses are 
in the form of concealment in case the truth is eventually revealed. The liar can 
then blame his memory. 
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- Familiarity with the style of communication is known to facilitate detection of 
deceit. For example, people have a more open communication style when they are 
speaking to attractive people than when they are speaking to unattractive people. 
Findings reveal that attractive observers were better at detecting truths and lies, 
which were told to attractive people. A similar pattern emerges when different or 
similar cultures are involved. In other words, the ethnic origin of the liar is 
relevant. With reference to various patterns of fraud, it is not uncommon to find 
fraudsters targeting those from their ethnic background, especially if they are 
resident outside their home countries. The intention is to generally prey on the 
notion of ethnic or cultural solidarity for the benefit of themselves (e. g. seller - 
buyer or investor). 
- Another factor is the liar's age. It is easier to detect lies in younger children than 
in older children. The same applies to the elderly. Lie detectors have more 
difficulty in detecting Hes told by 79-year-olds than in youths. It is possible for the 
older liars to be conscious of cues that could get them exposed. In this thesis it is 
revealed that fraudsters are more often middle-aged or older men, and in some 
cases women. This can be attributed to the experiences of the liar over the years 
having come across various circumstances. In this regard, the elderly fraudster is 
ready to exploit the societal norm that treats the elderly with more respect and 
trust based on their age 'physical restrictions' and 'wisdom'. Also, this is seen as a 
kind gesture to their contributions (whether or not they have done so) to the 
community. 
- Finally, the personality of the Har may affect the detection of lies. With regard to 
non-verbal behaviour certain individuals possess an honest demeanour, whereas 
others' natural behaviour leaves the impression that they are lying. According to 
Vrij, this has been described as 'honest demeanour bias' and 'dishonest 
demeanour bias'. The expressive, public self-conscious and sociable individuals 
tend to make credible impressions. This is not the same for the introverts and 
socially anxious people. 
Vrij identifies three ways of detecting lies. These are by observation, analysis, and 
physiological responses. Observing the liars' non-verbal behaviour, such as their body 
135 
movements, whether or not they smile or show gaze aversion, the pitch of their voice, 
speech rate, whether or not they stutter etc, are useful guides. When telling a 
complicated lie, the Har tends to speak more slowly, with possible pauses in their 
speech. They may also stutter. Emotions may also lead to emotional facial 
expressions. In most cases the observer needs to be skilled to detect correctly, as 
individuals differ in many ways. 
The second way is by analysing what is being said. This is referred to as verbal cues. 
Thus speech content is a significant factor. Untruthful remarks are usually negative 
and indirect, structured, sound implausible, and lack descriptions of personal 
experiences. On the other hand, for truth-tellers, especially if they are emotional, 
narration tends to be unstructured unlike the chronological nature of the liars' account. 
Liars are also known to include fewer details in their statements than one telling the 
truth. However, in some instances, negative emotions may result in negative 
statements, and being upset may result in unstructured statements by the liar. 
The third way is by the examination of physiological responses. For example blood 
pressure, heart rate, palmar sweating, etc. Increases in these areas are associated with 
the fear of being caught, guilty feeling when lying and general excitement. A 
polygraph is able to measure these physiological changes. Limitations of this method 
have also been documented. Vrij notes that individual differences in physiological 
reactions during polygraph tests have not yet been found. 
To sum up, the successful fraudster has to be a good Ear. The lying skills of the 
fraudster are utilised if the scam involves physical contact with the victim. If other 
modes of communication are used such as letters, lying is still involved. As with 
social lies, in criminal lies, the monetary gain reinforces the offender's motive and 
zeal to see it through. Unfortunately, it is not always possible for the untrained eye oý 
victim to locate certain 'everyday' gestures or cues in the context of deception in 
routine or business interactions. The bases of lies have been explored in this section tý 
shed light on the rudiments of the fraudster's scam. This often depends on the type 
and nature of scam or fraud. 
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5.2 The concept of Trust 
Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of the community. Those norms can be about deep 'value' questions 
like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms like 
professional standards and codes of behaviour. That is, we trust a doctor not to 
do us deliberate injury because we expect him or her to live by the Hippocratic 
oath and the standards of the medical profession (Fukuyama, 1995: 26). 
The literature on frauds and the data in this thesis show that an important ingredient 
for most successful frauds is the manipulation of trust. Trust can be exploited if it 
exists already or can be created for the purposes of deceit. Central to the philosophical 
approach to the subject of trust can be found in the works of classical theorists 
especially the work of the 18th century writer Cesare Beccaria of the classical school 
of crime studies. For instance, an example is the concept of individual responsibility 
in English law. Some fundamental premises of the classicist school include the 
'natural independence' and sovereignty of the individual. The binding together in 
society under the 'social contract', which yield power to the monarch or state only in 
return for the protection of rights, security of persons and property. There is also the 
need for law to prevent the pursuit of naked self-interest (Young, 1994). 
The first substantive definition of 'trust' in the Oxford English Dictionary is 
"confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or thing, or the 
truth of a statement" (Good, 1988: 33). A later variant, which stresses the economic 
usage of the term, defines it as "confidence in the ability and intention of a buyer to 
pay at a future time for goods supplied without present payment". For Good, under 
each of these definitions, trust is generally based on an individual theory as to how 
another person will perform on some future occasion, as a, function of that target 
person's current and previous claims, either explicit or implicit, tas to how they will 
behave. These arise from an individual's co-operative behaviour, which is a major 
source of information in our construction of our views of other persons. 
The definition adopted by many writers on the subject of trust is that trust is involved 
if faith (and not just hope) is placed in a person or institution where something serious 
is at stake (Nelken, 1994). Establishing trust with regard to a particular transaction, 
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scam or scheme is the fraudster's key strategy and this enables him to obtain money, 
goods or services from the victim. The concept of trust has been the subject of debate 
in philosophy, psychology, sociology, law, economics and other disciplines. In all 
these areas of interest, 'trust' has its definitional attributes and can be measured in 
terms of degree and how it is utilised for whatever purpose. This depends on many 
factors including the nature and circumstances of the individuals or groups concerned. 
Nelken (1994) points out that an investigation into the structure of trust and distrust is 
appropriate for explaining fraud since the act as implied by definition, is the result of 
misplaced trust. In theorising about trust he notes that the purposes and functions 
ascribed to trust vary with the theoretical position of the writer. Thus, for example, 
positions could be as result of approaches that examine the matter from the point of 
view of the individual or group, and or the social system. Further, various disciplines 
tend to interpret trust in certain ways. The focus of inquiry on the issue of trust 
revolve around the different types of trust that exist, whether trust is a limited 
resource, and how trust can be increased. 
Furthermore, responses to these questions depend on and lead back to wider 
discussions of social, economic and political structure of culture. For instance drawing 
from Luhmann (1979), from the point of view of the social system, trust serves like 
money, as a generalised means of exchange. In the analysis of trust, we need to 
understand the complex interrelationships between the economic and political fabric 
of society, and the individuals who constitute that society. Also its role in the creation 
of that web, taking into consideration the psychological impact on the individual 
(Good, 1988). For Good, in the first instance, trust at a basic level is psychologically 
rewarding. 
Various writers have contributed to the discussion on the dynamics of trust. We shall 
look at those that are of interest-, to this thesis. For example, Cressey (1953) 
approached the subject from the perspective of those entrusted with responsibility, 
and the reasons why they 'violate' their 'privileged' positions. The resultant effect of 
their breech of trust could result in crime/fraud - embezzlement. Cressey carried out a 
social psychological study of embezzlers/embezzlement or the 'criminal violation of 
fmancial trust'. He argues that from the legal perspective, the word 'embezzlement' 
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refers to the behaviour of one convicted of forgery or some other offence. He notes 
that this is erroneous. Thus he used two definitional criteria. First, the person must 
have accepted a position in good faith (this agrees with all legal definitions). Second, 
the person must have violated that trust by committing a crime. One of Cresseys's 
(1953: 3 0) hypotheses that was not rejected after his study is that: 
Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of themselves as 
having a fmancial problem which is non-shareable, are aware that this problem 
can be secretly resolved by violation of the position of fmancial trust, and are 
able to apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations which enable 
them to adjust their conceptions of themselves as trusted persons with their 
conceptions of themselves as users of the entrusted funds or property. 
Cressey states that in all the cases of trust violation he encountered, the violator 
considered that a financial problem which confronted him could not be shared with 
other persons, even though, looking at the situation objectively, those not intimated 
could have aided in the solution of the problem. Further, the nature of the degree of 
'shareability' differs culturally, and depends on the situation and organisation 
concerned. Hence, the individual may resort to embezzlement. For instance, in a 
situation where a confidence trickster swindles a trusted person, the victim is likely to 
adopt the 'non-shareability' approach (especially if money lost belongs to his 
organisation). This may be done to avoid shame and embarrassment (Cressey, 1953). 
Furthermore, reasons or excuses given or deduced for 'non-shareability' include the 
legal, professional, and cultural/status implications of the violation of ones ascribed 
obligations- in the sense that trusted persons represent a threat to the status which 
holding the position of trust entails within and organisation or community. Cressey 
uses the term 'ascribed obligations' to refer to those obligations of a non-financial 
nature which are expected of persons in certain positions of financial trust. For 
example, most employers expect their high calibre staff to be honest, and law abiding 
in their official and private dealings. He notes that in certain 
organisations/professions, rules are stated explicitly. In addition, in most situations the 
non-shareability problem is related to status-gaining and status-maintaining. Problems 
resulting from employer-employee relations could also lead to non-shareability and 
embezzlement eventually. This may - take the form of feeling underpaid or 
overworked, or being 'unfairly' treated. 
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Cressey concludes that it is important for the trust violator to identify and exploit 
opportunities that exist for fraud or embezzlement. Thus, just being in a position of 
trust provides opportunities for its violation. The individual's general information and 
technical skills are traits acquired through on-the-job training or professional 
education, which are subsequently utilised for embezzlement. For example 
accountants are trained on how to detect and prevent fraud. The accountant-trust 
violator is therefore in a position to embezzle if pressed with non-shareable problems. 
For Cressey, preventive strategies should include the reorganisation of human values 
and social structures. Trusted persons could also be isolated from individuals sharing 
negative attributes. Our educational programmes should lay emphases on 
verbalisations (e. g. 'borrowing') used by trust violators, rather than the immoral 
nature of non-shareable problems. Also, convicted trust violators should be regarded 
as 'bad risk', since a non-shareable fmancial problem might be present from the 
beginning of employment, however, a conviction does not necessarily mean the 
individual will violate trust again. 
The relevance of Cressey's 'non-shareability' argument to this thesis is that non- 
shareable problems are capable of luring those with weak 'controls' and with 
'opportunities' for fraud to develop and execute scams. On the other hand, for the pre- 
planned fraudster that deliberately sets out to manipulate or violate trust, issues 
concerning shareable or non-shareable problems are irrelevant. It is the intention of 
the fraudster to seek economic gain through illegal or fraudulent activities. 
In Nock's (1993) discussion on how, in an anonymous society of strangers is trust 
produced? (e. g. How do people transact business, extend or receive credit, select their 
doctors, board aeroplanes and public transport driven by total strangers confident that 
their safety is not in jeopardy? ); and how it is possible to depend on or believe in other 
people when we have never met them. He notes that most people trust those who, they 
believe, accept and abide by the same moral rules they have accepted. Thus, people 
who are known to conform to those standards are held as important and are trusted. 
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Further, trust and the ability to take others at their word are basic ingredients in social 
order, and this binds people together. Therefore, the extent to which trust among 
people exists determines, in part, the degree of solidarity to be found in any society. In 
addition, trust depends on the faith we have in another person's truthfulness. It is 
reputatio n that earns trust and it is lack of reputation that produces doubt and 
scepticism. A common example is the willingness to trust a doctor. This has led to 
certain advance fee fraud fraudsters to use titles such as 'Dr' 'Professor' 'Chief 
'Engineer' 'Consultant' in some of their solicitation, verbally or in writing. 
Following from the above, an important criterion in trusting has to do with what Nock 
refers to as ones reputation. For Nock, reputation is a basic component of the trust that 
lies at the heart of social order. A reputation is defmed as a shared or collective 
perception about a person. It is the product of innumerable contacts among and 
between people. Through dealings with others, an image is developed of the degree to 
which standards that are generally accepted are adhered. Thus, when someone has no 
reputation, that person is a stranger. 
Nock notes that strangers are not trusted as much as people whose reputations are 
known. Strangers are suspect and must demonstrate that they are trusted. Strangers 
must earn other peoples' trust. To do that, they must somehow earn a good reputation. 
A bad reputation can also be earned if one does not abide by the rules in a given 
community. A bad reputation is usually the product of having been shamed. Also, 
there are powerful incentives to avoid shame because once shamed, there are few 
ways to absolve the bad reputation. Thus, conformity to standards is necessary to earn 
a good reputation. In the case of fraud especially advance fee fraud scams in 
particular, the fraudster takes deliberate steps such as forging a 'trusting' relationship, 
creating the enabling reputation to collect money upfront from the victim. 
Of relevance to the discussion on trust and fraud is the remark by Luhmann that all 
modem societies are similarly reliant on a system of trust. According to Nelken, 
Luhmann asserts - "trust remains vital in interpersonal relations, but participation in 
functional systems like the economy or politics is no longer a matter of personal 
relations. It requires confidence but not trust" (Luhmann, 1979: 102). Nelken argued 
that this is misleading when looking at trust in Italian public life. 
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Nelken (1994) examined the issue of trust with reference to trust, crime and criminal 
justice in Italy and the United Kingdom. His study though comparative could also 
have wider implications as he pointed out. For analytical purposes, he approached the 
different aspects of trust through questions - the decision to trust (whom can you 
trust? ); the manner of trusting (how, when and why do you trust? ); and the degree of 
trusting (how much can you trust? ). 
On the question - Whom can you trust? Nelken cites Barber's (1983) remark that in 
all societies certain individuals and groups are more trusted than others, for example 
professionals are usually trusted. For Nelken, trust may be self-reinforcing because it 
leads to fewer examples of misbehaviour becoming known such as when regulation 
has been delegated to the group concerned. Furtrher, "the opposite is also true; the 
more control that is exercised over less trusted groups or individuals the more this 
leads to the discovery of rule breaking which confmns initial suspicion! ' (Nelken, 
1994: 232). Further, it is also possible to find out that different societies do not 
necessarily view the same groups of individuals with the same level of trust. 
In Nelken's study, he observed that the British political and administrative system 
seeks to respond to its citizens on the basis of trust. This is contrary to the Italians, 
who respond on the basis of distrust. These dimensions in Britain and Italy and in 
other countries or societies can be observed in the treatment of offenders. It was also 
observed that offenders are not equal before the law. Nelken concludes that trust is a 
vital ingredient and provides the key to the relative success of criminals in their 
attempt to avoid sanctions. Trust is reinforced or acquired through bonds, incentives 
and threats. The importance of trust in crime is at play when corrupt politicians, 
administrators, professionals and law enforcement officials and agents collaborate. In 
most cases these connections could prove to be the weak link. ` 
Nelken addressed the question - How do You trust? He notes that the distribution and 
maintenance of power and authority in any society has a lot to do with the way trust is 
gained and lost. For instance in Italy and the UK as with other, countries, 'who you 
know' is more important than 'what you know'. In the UK, the 'old school tie' is a 
good example. In Italy, political, social and family groups appear to count more than 
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ties with institutions. In the UK, the use of power and the trading of favours tend to be 
hidden, indirect and camouflaged. Whereas in Italy, power is obvious and the 
exchange of favours and obligations in more or less formalised. 
With regard to the methods of controlling, monitoring and bestowing trust, in Italy, 
social trust depends on face-to-face contact and other forms of direct communication 
such as the telephone. Letters are seen to be too formal and to some extent indicate 
lack of trust or scepticism, and in official business, documents that could be quite 
cumbersome are used. This, Nelken suggests, helps to explain why inflated receipts 
and false documentation are common methods of most frauds in Italy. Here, 'paper 
work' or documents are presented to: satisfy the 'formal' control set up by the 
authorities. On the other hand, in the UK or the US, frauds are readily accomplished 
by the exploitation of the initial presumption of trust and the apparent initial lack of 
control in both private and public life. 
On the question - How much can you trust? - the levels of trust vary, and they depend 
on several factors such as the cultural patterns of disposition to trust as well as "any 
objective differences in the extent to which some individuals and groups can be 
trusted" (Nelken, 1994: 236). Authors such as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) have 
noted or claimed that risk is in the eye of the beholder, and that perceived levels of 
given threats depend on the 'cultural bias' of the group to which the observer belongs. 
Further, whether the level of trust in a society can be increased depends on the type of 
trust in question. For instance, personal trust is developed over years that may have 
involved the 'testing' of the trust. 
On the other hand, impersonal trust depends on experiences and willingness to trust in 
the universalistic operations of economic, financial, political, technical and probably 
social institutions. Comparatively, in Italy, there is more interpersonal trust but less 
impersonal trust. Tbus, in Italy friends, are expected to do more than in Britain 
(Nelken, 1994). Nelken notes that it is commonly argued that the way to increase trust 
in modem societies is to make it more impersonal. Similarly, the development of 
impersonal institutions and the rule of law to a large extent enables peoples to pursue 
all their activities without the stress and, worry of making sure alliances are stable and 
in line with public order. He states that one should remember that impersonal 
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structures of trust tend to benefit certain groups or interests than others. A fourteenth 
century Tuscan proverb was mentioned which states that "Trusting is good but not 
trusting is better". 
Another contributor to the discussion of trust is Fukuyama (1995). He examined trust 
from socio-economic, cultural and political perspectives. He notes that in any modem 
society, the economy constitutes one of the most fundamental and dynamic arenas of 
human sociability. Weber had remarked that the very essence of modem economic 
life is the rise and proliferation of rules and law. For Weber, the rise of the modem 
economic world was bound up with the rise of contract. Further, certain types of 
contract such as marriage has been in existence for thousands of years. Weber 
distinguishes between 'status' contracts (e. g. agreed relationship as in the cases of an 
apprentice where duties and obligations are not clearly spelt out) and 'purposive' 
contracts. Purposive contracts were entered into based on or for the sake of some 
economic exchange. This did not affect other forms of relationship outside the 
transaction in question (Fukuyama, 1995). 
All forms of economic activity involve some social collaboration of human beings. 
People by nature are selfish and they tend to pursue their selfish interests in a rational 
way, but at the same time they crave being part of larger communities. People engage 
in employment activities and other forms of endeavour some of which are legitimate 
or illegitimate in order to satisfy their individual needs, in addition to reaping the 
benefits of being drawn out of their private lives to a broader social world. For 
Fukuyama, an important arena for this development is the work place. To stretch this 
argument further, the satisfaction human beings derive from associating with others 
grows out of the innate desire for recognition. According to Fukuyama every human 
being seeks to have his or her dignity recognised (i. e., evaluated at its proper worth) 
by other human being. Thus, economic activity represents a crucial part of social life 
and is knit together by a wide variety of norms, rules, moral obligations and other 
habits that together shape society. 
The major theme in Fukuyama's Trust is that through the examination of economic 
life, "the well-being of a country, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a 
single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society" 
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(Fukuyania, 1995: 7). 'A good example can be seen in the way financial institutions 
support industrial and commercial development in their countries knowing that certain 
risks and uncertainties are involved. More so, industrial policies are known to work 
better in societies with long traditions of an honest and competent civil service. 
Dasgupta (1988: 49) states that "trust is central to all transactions and yet economists 
rarely discuss the notion7. For Dasgupta, certain issues are very important in the 
discussion: 
- First, if there are no suitable degrees of punishment for breaking agreements or 
contracts, individuals are likely not to have the appropriate incentives to meet the 
agreed conditions. A result of this may be that people may not be willing to enter 
into transactions with one another. Thus what could in principle be mutually 
beneficial relationships will not be initiated. Generally, the penalty (loss of 
money, honour, etc. ) for breaking verbal agreement is usually less than the penalty 
for breaking legal agreements as stated in contracts. 
- Second, the threat of punishment for improper behaviour must be credible, else 
the threat can be regarded as non-existent. Thus, the enforcement agencies must 
be trustworthy, efficient and unbiased in their actions. 
- Third, trust among persons and agencies are interconnected. This inter-connection 
is what makes trust such a fragile commodity. This is one of the reasons why 
certain professional bodies have strict codes of conduct. 
- Fourth, the proper approach for trust in others is that one is aware or knows the 
available options and their consequences, taking into consideration the person's 
ability to do what is promised. A promise must be credible. This is one of the 
reasons why it is commonly advised to distinguish 'trusting someone' from 
'trusting someone blindly'. 
- Fifth, before trusting anyone, it is important to examine the world or situation 
from his or her perspective especially as it concerns the fulfilment of his part of 
the agreement. Further, ones 'trustworthiness' depends on the individuals overall 
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disposition, his motivation, and the extent to which he awards importance to his 
own honesty. Being able to trust a person to do what he said he would, on the 
other hand, requires some knowledge about his disposition, but also something of 
the circumstances surrounding the occasion at hand. In addition, if the incentives 
are 'right', even a trustworthy person can be relied upon to be untrustworthy. Thus 
the saying that 'every man has his price'. 
- Sixth, the fact that there are no obvious units in which trust can be! measured, this 
is insignificant, because in any given context you can measure its value, and its 
'worthwhileness'. In this respect, trust is not different to commodities such as 
knowledge or information. 
- Seventh, the usage of 'trust' refers to "the sense of correct expectations about the 
actions of other people that have a bearing on one's own choice of action when 
that action must be chosen before one can monitor the actions of those others" 
(Dasgupta, 1988: 49). 
Furthermore, the condition of ignorance or uncertainty about other people's behaviour 
is central to the notion of trust. It is related to the limits of our capacity to attain full 
knowledge of others, their motives, and their responses to internal and external 
conditions (Gambetta, 1988). Thus, "trust is intrinsically fragile responses to our 
ignorance, a way of coping with 'the limits of our foresight" (Shklar 1984: 15 1). It is 
noted that if we were blessed with an unlimited computability to map out all possible 
contingencies in enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem. Trust is also 
related to the fact that agents have a degree of freedom to disappoint our expectations. 
Gambetta notes that for trust to be relevant there must be the possibility of exit, 
betrayal, and defection. Trust can be, and has been, more generally defined as a 
device for coping with the freedom of others. It is then implied that trusting a person 
means believing that when offered the chanw, heý or she is not likely to behave in a 
way that is damaging to us. Trust will typically be relevant when at least one party is 
free to disappoint the other, free enough to avoid a risky relationship, and constrained 
enough to consider that relationship an attractive option. In short, trust is implied in 
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most human endeavours with varying degrees and expectations. A situation the 
fraudster manipulates and exploits for economic gain. 
Further, Fukuyama uses the concepts of 'social capital' to refer to "a capability that 
arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it" (1995: 26). 
This can be found in all forms of human groups such as the family and the largest of 
organisations. Further, social capital differs from other forms of human capital in the 
senses that it is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like 
religion, tradition or habits over history. Fukuyama notes that economist argue that 
social groups are formed as a result of voluntary contracts by people, anticipating that 
it is in their best interest to do so. Thus, by this account, trust is not necessary for co- 
operation: enlightened self-interest, together with legal mechanisms like contracts, can 
compensate for an absence of trust and allow strangers jointly to create an 
organisation that will work for a common purpose. Groups can be formed at any time 
based on self-interest, and group formation is not culture-dependent. 
It is also important to note that social capital required to create a moral community 
cannot be acquired as with other forms of human capital such as college education 
and training. The acquisition of social capital requires the absorption of the moral 
norms of the community or society, and in this context, the acquisition of virtues like 
honesty, loyalty and dependability. Here, social virtues prevail over individual virtues. 
The degree of social capital varies among societies. 
Further, in the course of socio-economic development, a crucial forum for human 
relations is the 'community'. For Fukuyama the community in most cases is the 
cultural one, formed not on the basis of explicit rules and regulations but out of ethical 
habits and reciprocal moral obligations internalised by each of the community's 
members. These rules or habits give members of the community grounds for trusting 
one another. He notes that virtually successful economic societies are united by trust. 
For instance, historically the United States (US), as well as Japan and Germany have 
been high-trusting and group-oriented. In the United States the decline of sociability 
has subsequently led to the decline of trust. This can be noticed from the huge sums 
paid to its lawyers to enable citizens to sue one another. Rises in crime and litigation 
as a means of settling disputes are also signs of this trend. 
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Thus, people who do not trust each other will end up co-operating only under a 
system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated, agreed to, 
litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means. This legal apparatus, serving as 
a substitute for trust, entails what economists call 'transaction costs'. Widespread 
distrust in a society, in other words, imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic 
activity, a tax that high-trust societies do not have to pay (Fukuyama, 1995). Luhmann 
(1988) concludes that the lack of trust simply withdraws activities. It reduces the 
range of possibilities for rational action. It prevents, above all, capital investment 
under conditions of uncertainty and risk, and it may reduce public interest in 
innovative art, which is not- yet recognised and confirmed by the establishment of 
experts. I 
In emphasising the importance of trust, it is difficult to imagine any form of economic 
life that does not have a minimum level of informal trust. For instance, in a society 
without trust, one can expect to be involved in endless 'bullet-proofing' of documents 
and contracts that are very long attempting to spell out all possible contingencies and 
obligations. The use of the legal system for virtually all resolutions is better imagined. 
Fukuyama (1995) highlights the remarks of the economist and Nobel laureate 
Kenneth Arrow: 
Now trust has a very important pragmatic value, if nothing else. Trust is an 
important lubricant of social systen-L It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of 
trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word. Unfortunately 
this is not a commodity that can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, 
you already have some doubts about what you've bought. Trust and similar 
values is what economist would call 'externalities'. They are goods, they are 
commodities; they have practical economic value; they increase the efficiency 
of the system, enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever values 
you hold in high esteem. But they are not commodities for which trade on the 
open market is technically possible or even meaningful (Fukuyama, 1995: 
151) 
Rules and contracts have not eliminated the need for trust in all spheres of human 
endeavour. For example, professionals like doctors, lawyers, or university professors, 
having received the required training for accreditation and practice, are expected to 
use their judgement and initiative in practice. The nature of their judgement is too 
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compl-. x to have all the details spelt but in black and white. Thus, Fukuyama notes 
that professionals are in the position to go about their business relatively unsupervised 
and as such, are generally more trusted than non-professionals. The concept - 
'professional' is associated with integrity and good conduct. In this regard, it is 
possible for the professional to betray the trust placed in him or her. 
An important tool for the control of trust is coercion. Coercion, or at least the threat, 
has always been widely practised as a means to ensure co-operation, and in its 
extreme form, to ensure submission and compliance. But it falls short of being an 
adequate alternative to trust. Also, it limits the extent to which we worry about trust, 
but does not increase trust (Gambetta, 1988). Further, coercion does not have to be 
illegitimate, and may be employed for the purpose of enforcing rights which are 
commonly shared. Gambetta also notes that societies, which rely heavily on the use of 
force, are likely to be less efficient, more costly, and more unpleasant than those 
where trust is maintained by other means. In the former, resources tend to be diverted 
away from economic undertakings and spent in coercion, surveillance, and 
information gathering and less attention on co-operative activities. On the other hand 
contracts and promises represent weaker forms of pre-commitment, which do not 
altogether rule out certain actions, but simply make them more costly. The role of the 
contract is to shift the focus of trust on to the efficacy of sanctions especially with 
regard to the ability of the regulator to enforce them if they are broken. 
There is usually an inverse relationship between rules and trust: the more people 
depend on rules to regulate their interactions, the less they trust each other and vice 
versa (Fukuyama, 1995). Thus, just as the level of trust varies greatly among societies, 
it can also change over time as a result of specific events or conditions. These events 
could be political social or economic. For instance, people's endless accumulation of 
material possessions to satisfy their ever increasing wants and needs and the quest for 
recognition by others especially as it concerns one's worth are contributory factors to 
how trust is created and manipulated. When people are not recognised they become 
angry, and when they do not live up to the expectations of others they are ashamed. 
When they are evaluated appropriately they feel a sense of pride. Thus, with regard to 
work,, the motivation in working and earning money is more closely associated with 
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the recognition that comes from such activity. More so where money has become aý 
symbol not for material goods but for social status or recognition. 
On how we can monitor trust, for Nock, (1993) an individual's reputation determines 
the degree to which he or she will be trusted and privacy has a role to play in 
, judging' others. Thus he argues that historically, increasing numbers of strangers 
produced greater and more pervasive personal privacy. Privacy refers to relationships 
in which people retain possession of something that might otherwise be shared, and if 
shared, is shared on the initiative or with the consent of the 'possessor' (Taylor, 
1985). Nock notes that in modem America, people now enjoy a higher degree of 
privacy than was the case before, mainly because the increasing numbers of strangers 
in their lives are legitimately denied access to personal affairs. He notes that changes 
in familial living arrangements are largely responsible for these trends. Also, 
technological changes have contributed to greater privacy. Modem conveniences such 
as the telephone, television, washer, dryer, air conditioner, and VCR make it less 
necessary for individuals to leave their homes to venture into public. Hence, this 
reduces interaction/surveillance at those levels. Thus, privacy makes it difficult for 
people to form reliable opinions about each other. 
Further, historically the family has been the traditional source of reputation. The 
family is the source of a person's ascriptive status, one's initial location in society. In 
this regard, the most notorious criminals are usually described by the media as 
'loners', unknown by neighbours and unconnected to family, and in contemporary 
societies, to establish and maintain reputations in the face of privacy, social 
mechanisms of surveillance have been elaborated and developed (Nock, 1993). Thus, 
the two methods used to establish or maintain reputations among strangers or in urban 
settings are 'credentials' and 'ordeals'. 
For Nock, a 'credential' is something that gives a person access to credit or 
confidence. Credentials may certify many things such as competence, completion of a 
course of study, membership in formal or voluntary associations, or credit worthiness. 
Credentials announce to others that a person has established a claim to membership in 
a recognised group of similar individuals, and by definition, a credential certifies an 
individual as a recognisable type of person - one who accepts and abides by certain 
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principles. Seen this way, credentials are a part of an individual's public reputation. 
Successful performance in the economy may produce outward symbols that serve as 
credentials - conspicuous signs of success. 
In other fields of endeavour, ones occupational status or other visible signs of 
achievement could establish ones reputation. Heller (1985) argued that success is 
increasingly the basis of reputation - perhaps the doniinant basis in modem society. 
Lack of success, she argues, is the cause for shame. Conspicuous examples of 
credentials include educational and professional degrees, credit cards that permit 
validation of one's creditworthiness at the point of sale, and driver's licences an 
indication that the holder is competent to drive. Thus, 'credential(s)' is a form of 
surveillance, which in turn is one of the responses to the rising numbers of strangers 
or heterogeneous societies. 
On the other hand, an 'ordeal' is a ritual that determines whether an individual is 
telling the truth. It always begins with a presumption of guilt or unresolved doubt 
(Nock, 1985). Thus, ordeals are a form of surveillance and they establish or maintain 
reputations. As with credentials, the use of ordeals is a function of the extensiveness 
of strangers - those who lack reputations. For Nock, since privacy is a major factor in 
the increase in strangers, ordeals are a consequence of privacy. Usually, it is when a 
person's word is in doubt that ordeals are employed. Through an ordeal people are 
able to validate their reputation, to garner proof of the validity of their claims, or to 
establish their claim to innocence, membership, or competence. Common methods of 
ordeals include drug tests, lie-detector tests, and obligatory confessions in communes 
or churches. Nock notes that the main difference between ordeals of the Middle Ages 
and those of today is in who or what is called on to render the truthful decision. God 
was the source of truth for judges in medieval times whereas science or the 
appearance of it is now called to do the same thing. 
With regard to the above, the pre-planned fraudster is capable of ensuring that he 
passes the ordeals in a given. society. This is achieved through deliberate activities 
involving training, character and credit building. It has been noted that much of our 
lives lie beyond the legitimate scrutiny of others. Privacy grows as the number of 
strangers grows. People proclaim themselves trustworthy by presenting evidence that 
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is objectively maintained by 'third parties' (e. g. credit bureaux, educational 
institutions and certain arms of the state machinery) (Nock, 1993). Nock notes that the 
individual credentials alone are increasingly inadequate for this purpose. Virtually any 
type of credential is potentially subject to fraud (Taylor, 1985). Though, it is in the 
quest to augment the reliance on credentials that ordeals are necessary (Taylor, 1985). 
Hence the need to approach the offence of obtaining by false pretences via the 
blocking of opportunities and effective sanctions. 
In conclusion, we have seen that the availability of trust in varying degrees serves as 
the essential tool for extortion in the final analysis. The utilisation of existing trusting 
relationship, the creation of trust if non-existent, enables the victim to part with 
property voluntarily. It was noted that any attempt to spell out all rules or create laws 
to virtually all forms of social and business interaction is inconceivable. Hence, the 
major reliance is now on the authorities to deal with people who breach rules that 
better still can be found under the ambits of the law. Without trust it is impossible to 
engage in our daily social life and, the belief that is held about another person at the 
time of communication is a significant part of what the particular context amounts to 
(Good, 1988). For Good, confidence tricksters that know many superficial aspects of 
personal presentation can quickly lead to conclusions about the nature of another 
person's beliefs and sentiments. This helps them to execute fraud. Further, fraud is 
widespread in all the advanced economies, and is extremely costly to companies and 
individuals alike, but rarely does it lead to the conclusion that no one can be trusted. 
The conditions of familiarity have been dramatically changed over the ages by the 
invention of writing, by literacy, and in particular by the printing press. Now a huge 
amount of knowledge can be stored with which one may be and forever remain 
unfamiliar, although others may know and use it. These developments have in many 
ways led to increased social tension. For instance a speaker can readily be challenged 
because the audience can access his 'secret' knowledge and may even know more 
(Luhmann, 1988). In addition, the large functional systems depend not only on 
confidence but also on trust. Lack of confidence could lead to the diffusion of 
sentiments, dissatisfaction, alienation and possibly anomie. This may have no 
immediate impact on the system. If trust is lacking, however, this changes the way 
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people decide about important issues. Trust, as may be recalled, is an attitude, which 
allows for risk-taking decisions. The development of trust depends on local milieu and 
personal experience. Thus lack of confidence and the need for trust may form a 
vicious circle. A system-economic, legal, or political - requires trust as an input 
condition. Without trust it cannot stimulate supportive activities in situations of 
uncertainty or risk. 
Given that trust is more or less inevitable in human transactions, fraudsters abuse this 
situation. The cost of litigation and investigation are conditions that have favoured the 
fraudster that speciaHses in obtaining relatively small sums of money from thousands 
of victims. It'is clear from all the above that the concept or nature of trust makes the 
control of fraud problematic. The presence of confidence discussed in the preceding 
section is what signifies the existence or acceptance of trust among those involved in 
a given transaction. 
5.2.1 Confidence tricks 
The confidence trick is what practically sums up the modus operandi of virtually all 
frauds, especially those involving obtaining money, goods and services through the 
collection of upfront payments in cash or kind such as in the case of advance fee 
frauds. This is apart from frauds of direct-access theft such as embezzlement and 
other white-collar crimes. In fact, a typical scam is synonymous or can be referred to 
as the end product of a confidence trick. In the perfection of a confidence trick, the 
con man or fraudster has to exhibit his skills or follow certain 'guidelines'. In the 
course of this discussion the nature of the art is explored. First, the Oxford Reference 
Dictionary of English gives definitions of confidence, which is relevant to our 
discussion - fraud and the fraudster. For example, the dictionary defines 'confidence' 
as "firm trust (have confidence in his ability)", "feeling of reliance or certainty", "a 
sense of self reliance; boldness". "confidence man -a man who robs or swindles by 
means of a confidence trick". 'Confidence trick' is defined as "a swindle in which the 
victim is persuaded to trust the swindler in some way" or "a swindle worked by 
gaining a person's trust". 
153 
It is important to state that self-confidence refers to being confident in one's abilities. 
With regard to fraud especially where physical contact is used, having self-confidence 
is a desirable trait to possess. For those lacking confidence, deliberate efforts can be 
taken to acquire it - through learning, exposure or training. Would-be victims are 
likely to appraise the degree of risk positively based on the level of self-confidence 
exhibited by the fraudster. Also, gaining the confidence of victims is more important 
than the self-confidence of the fraudster. Akerstr6m's (1993: 4) notes that in her study 
of 'crooks', "the criminals impressed her with their self-confidence, resourcefulness 
and ability to describe their situation - often in a humorous way... " 
Confidence tricks, are said to have numerous forms and are all based on the greed and 
gullibility of the victim, who is 'often' also out to break the law (Walsh and Poole, 
1983). In practice, a confidence trick is either a promising looking gamble that the 
victim cannot win (e. g. the three-card trick or the three-pea trick). Or involves the 
criminal developing a trusting relationship - lending and borrowing money - with the 
victim, the trust being abruptly terminated when enough money is in the hand of the 
criminal. They note that it is not possible to determine actual numbers or incidents of 
this con mainly because victims rarely report them. With regard to the remarks above, 
the use of the word 'often' on the part of victims may be too assuming. This thesis 
reveals that majority of the cons are outright frauds. In other words, the fraudster 
deliberately sets out to dupe innocent citizens. In a few cases the victim could be a 
willing fraudulent partner who is eventually tricked. 
One of the early contributors to theories of crime in general and the concept of the 
'professional thief - the trained offender (a variant of the confidence trickster) is 
Edwin Sutherland. For Sutherland, skilled pickpockets, confidence men, shoplifters, 
check writers, and certain other offenders may be regarded as professional thieves. 
These professions have a complex of skilled techniques, status, consensus, 
organisation, and segregation in the underworld. They depend primarily on their wits, 
'front', and talking ability; they are differentiated from non-professional thieves, and 
also from professional criminals in other rackets. Also, people in legitimate 
occupations envy the earnings of some members of this profession (Sutherland, 1937). 
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For Sutherland certain reasons that make this pattern of fraud successful include the 
selection of criminal acts that have limited chances of conviction especially in cases 
where the victim is induced to be involved in the illegal act and as such will not be 
willing to report the scam. Second, the thieves perfect their act or technique by 
training and experience. This also involves methods of avoiding or dealing with 
prosecution. Third and last, the thief operates on the assumption that all cases against 
him can be settled in his favour. For instance, arrests are treated as a job hazard as 
with all other legitimate professions. Methods of bribery and torruption are 
commonly adopted (gifts, loans etc. ) in addition to exploiting 'weak links' or 
loopholes within the criminal justice system. 
It is difficult to accurately gauge the extent of criminal fraud through confidence 
tricks. This is so because victims of con tricks (who, themselves, sought to gain 
dishonestly) rarely report their losses. Many victims of related types. of fraud never 
fully realise they are 'taken in', and where the loss is small, the victim often prefers 
not to bother getting involved with the police (Schur, 1958). Further, confidence 
swindlers are generally recognised to be the elite of the underworld, and proceeds 
from such fraud can be very large. As at the time of Schur's study, in the United 
States, confidence swindling was predominantly a male offence. This was so because 
the usual roles of confidant adopted by the swindler were male dominated careers 
such as priest, lawyer, doctor or psychoanalyst. In some instances, women act as lures 
or accomplices in certain con tricks. The role of women is expected to rise as time 
goes on. 
The criminal skills of the advance fee fraud fraudster represent the epitome of the 
professional confidence trickster's abilities (Davies and Saltniarsh, ý 1995). In a 
common example they note that the fraudster represents himself as being able to 
access sources of investment funding, very often at highly attractive rates. The core of 
the deal involves the creation of a large quantity of official-looking documentation 
indicating the ternis of the loan which will require administrative expenses such as the 
negotiation fees, the 'goodwill' factoring facility; and other meaningless, but 
impressive-sounding jargon which the conman can dream up. The criminal and his 
accomplices disappear after receiving the advance fee. Sometimes the fraudster 
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cunningly acquires the legitimate letterheads and documents from banks to buttress 
their profile. 
It was noted that in the United States, victims lose hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
the perpetrators of confidence schemes every year. The exact number of victims and 
how much is lost is not known (Gasser, 1970). According to Gasser, a confidence man 
pointed out that there are at least two reasons for this. First, the victim may not realise 
that he or she has been duped and in certain circumstances, the victim's involvement 
may be so direct that he feels embarrassed if the deal is exposed. Gasser's findings are 
based on his study of swindlers involved in the confidence trick. 
Gasser also notes that it is dfffl'cult to distinguish between confidence tricks and other 
fraudulent practices, as they appear to blend; or graduate into each other. He notes 
that: I 
True confidence games always make use of the avarice and dishonesty of the 
victim. Their common element is showing the victim how to make money, or 
gain some other advantage, in a dishonest manner and then taking advantage 
of his dishonesty. A true confidence game leaves no innocent victim (Gasser, 
1970: 263). 
Further, acts of swindling and forgery and the perpetration of various deceptive 
schemes that prey upon the victim's innocence, ignorance, or gullibility are acts that 
involve the manipulation of confidence. Such schemes seek to take advantage of the 
person's ignorance or naivete. In some cases, the practice of confidence is the 
manipulation of the victim through non-violent or persuasive methods into a situation 
of dishonesty in order to exploit the victim's level of dishonesty. 
If one views the victim as an accomplice, among the tricksters it is believed that "you 
can't cheat an honest man7' (Gasser, 1970). Thus the professional con man ensures 
that the victim is willing to enter into a dishonest arrangement. This affords them a 
degree of protection and makes the victim ap artner in the proceedings. Gasser also 
notes the comments of a conman - "a thoroughly honest man doesn't expect to receive 
great profits at little cost". For Gasser in this regard, in certain frauds or swindles the 
victim can protest with impunity. In a true con'scheme, he cannot. In the examination 
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of the current law on fraud in this thesis, in the United Kingdom having a fraudulent 
intent does not affect the "victim's" right to compensation or redress (see Chapter 1). 
Gasser also examined types of con tricks, which he refers to as 'con games'. He came 
up with two categories - the short cons and the big cons. The time required for the con 
and the amount of money expected form the bases of the scam. Short con tricks 
require a short time to execute and usually are limited to the amount of money 
physically present with the victirrL With big con tricks the fraud could take weeks, 
months or more to accomplish and may involve the return of the victim to his home to 
retrieve more cash. 
On the rules of the 'game' or the pattern in which the scam is executed, the same 
approach is usually applied once. There is a need to modify or perfect each scheme to 
ensure that it is effective and in tune with whatever circumstances are prevalent at the 
time. It is also important for the con man to avoid the use of violence in carrying out 
the scheme, even if it means losing a 'score'. Also, it is generally felt that violence is 
beneath the dignity of the professional. Gasser notes that it does occur, occasionally, 
but is as an exception rather than a general practice, and bodily harm may be done to 
the victim under certain circumstances (Gasser, 1970). This practice is not 
unconnected with the notion that the police are likely to investigate in detail, any form 
of violence against citizens or to give violent incidents priority attention. Within a con 
group, techniques are concealed from each other, especially from those who are not 
yet partners. This is to avoid unapproved competition and for security reasons 
(avoiding detection by police and other agencies). It is also important for con men to 
assist themselves if required. This could take different forms such as money for legal 
fees, disposal and concealment property and evidence of the scam. 
Gasser's study also revealed that con men or teams sometimes have working 
agreements or relationship within the police and other law enforcement agents. 
Arrangements could be made directly with the police, but preferably are made through 
a lawyer or an influential person in the community. As a rule the con man should 
always be prepared to know what to do if he is caught. Further, it is not uncommon to 
find con men that have had short spells in prison in the course of their careers. 
Mention is also made about the characteristics of a con man. It was observed that con 
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men come from all works of life and become very active at any age. Retirement is not 
an issue as they could innovate or adapt to their situation at any time. It is also wise 
for them to first serve as an apprentice under a more experienced hand. Gasser 
suggests that most con men get recruited in prison, and a typical con man would 
prefer his children to pursue a better or legitimate lifestyle. 
Finally, in Gasser's conclusion, he notes that confidence tricks have always existed as 
a subculture in western societies. Further, for the activities of fraudsters to be 
checked they must be well understood by the public and law enforcers. He suggests 
that legislation against the dishonest aspects of the victim's actions may help to 
reduce the con's activities but doubts if such legislation will be possible to effect. The 
clever use of the confidence trick and 'trust' can be seen in my discussion on the 
literature from different parts of the world and in the analysis of my data. This 
technique also features prominently in examples of early occurrence of advance fee 
fraud. 
Below is a discussion on the concept of risk and how it relates to fraud. We shall see 
that it is the notion of risk prevalent in legitimate transactions and human endeavours 
in general that enables the fraudster to convince the victim that paying for something 
upfront is a procedure required for 'better things ahead'. More so, risk is part of the 
situation found in all legitimate enterprises or businesses. For instance, events in the 
past have shown that erstwhile legitimate and big banks have collapsed leaving 
responsible individual and corporate investors astonished. The stock market is another 
arena where legitimate activities could be unfruitful. 
53 Risk 
Closely associated with the concept of trust is risk. Risk is also a varied concept. The 
Oxford English Reference Dictionwy of Current English (1996) defines risk as "a 
chance or possibility of danger, loss, injury, or other adverse consequencee'. Among 
other meanings of the concept or word is that of 'risk capital', which is "money put 
for speculative business investment". The definition and interpretation of risk depends 
on the context in which it is used. In most of the literature, issues concerning risk are 
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often those associated with the enviromnent, technology, insurance, health, and 
accidents. With regard to fraud, our discussion and understanding of risk will centre 
upon its relevance to the dynamics of fraud, for example the notion of risk capital. 
The implication of the application of risk is so grave that even in the insurance 
industry, in some cases, re-insurance policies are carried out. This shows the extent of 
uncertainty. Unfortunately, this cannot be applied to all businesses especially those of 
interest to the advance fee fraud fraudster - where there is really no room or allowance 
for insurance cover. In this thesis, our interest in the concept of risk is limited to its 
role with trust as it concerns the victim or individuals decision to embark on a venture 
or transaction in which a deposit is required upfront. 
Decision-making involves the weighing of alternatives in terms of their likelihood 
(Kogan and Wallach, 1964). Thus, issues concerning the avoidance of risks in arriving 
at decisions are likely to be important ingredients in thinking processes. Also, a 
decision-making procedure introduces risk explicitly, in terms of the subject's 
assessment of probabilities of success and failure. The risk element is clearly explicit 
whether the decisions occur in a hypothetical success-failure context or in a situation 
involving direct gain-loss consequences. 
According to Johnston (1997), the dominant explanations for the recent attention with 
issues of risk can be traced to the sociology of modernity, with the work of Giddens 
(1990) and Beck (1992,1996) being notable references. Johnston notes that for 
Giddens, the reorganisation of risk is an important element in the dynamics of 
modernity (Waters, 1995). Further, with regard to risk and trust, in pre-modem times, 
risk was localised, and was derived from direct threats of personal violence. Trust was 
also localised - based on kinship, religion, culture and tradition. At the present time - 
period of 'high modernity', risk is global in nature, and personalised in the form of 
subjective concerns, interests and interpretation of personal safety (Johnston, 1997). 
Thus modem societies possess various structures, processes, and situations (social, 
economic, political, environmental etc) including crime and fraud that call for or 
requires the regular evaluation and control of elements of risk (e. g. victimisation). 
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Viscusi (1992) states that: 
Risk is an inherent part of almost everyday facet of our lives. We encounter 
risks in our food, transportation, employment, and recreation. Usually there is 
some probability less than one (1) that we will incur some adverse health 
outcome. In the case of extremely undesirable consequences, such as severe 
injury or death, the odds of occurrence are usually quite slim ... Nobody 
intentionally puts his or her life in danger unless there is a strong reason for 
doing so. In fact, there must be some trade-off - some offsetting advantage of 
the risky activity - that leads one to choose to engage in an activity despite its 
risks. These tradeoffs are inevitable since we cannot eliminate risk from our 
lives (ViscusL 1992: 1) 
The same situation applies to fraud, fraudsters and victims. For instance, people are 
bound to invest if they intend to reap profits in the short or long-term. This has 
automatically created avenues for bogus investment schemes. On the other hand 
fraudsters risk their reputation, freedom if convicted, for material success if their 
scams are successful. 
The nature of risk involves the possibility of random fate, whether it is on the 
individual or social level. The language of risk, however, is also full of interesting 
paradoxes (Culpit, 1999). Other remarks by Culpit include that risk is about individual 
fears and social rights. Risk is something chosen and something imposed. Risk is 
manageable and can be insured against or, alternatively is overwhelming and 
uncontrollable. Risk is about ensuring survival and avoiding contamination. Risk 
assessment involves the protection of assets and the maximisation of profit in 
complex market exchanges. Risk analysis has always been part of the strategic 
considerations of organisations, corporations, groups and nation-states. In the course 
of human endeavour, it is possible to insure some business, decisions or investments. 
Unfortunately, most of the scams carried out by the fraudster are those rarely given 
the necessary attention by the victim. The victim voluntarily decides to risk his or her 
money, property, services or even health (as in medical scams) by transacting with the 
fraudster, in most cases innocently. 
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From another perspective, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue that policing consists of 
the public police co-ordinatin& their activities with policing agents in all other 
institutions to provide a society-wide basis for risk management (governance) and 
security (guarantees against loss). They note that risk refers to external danger, such 
as natural disaster, technological catastrophe, or threatening behaviour by human 
beings. There are also dangerous 'manufactured risks' that result from scientific and 
technological intervention in the conditions and nature of social life. Pollution is an 
example of such a creation. 
Also, the system for communicating risk - its rules, formats, and technologies - is part 
of the social meaning of risk. The meaning of risk varies with the communication 
system used by the institutions responsible for managing it, and the police are 
therefore in a complex, ambiguous, shifting and contradictory field of risk 
management in relation to other institutions. With regard to fraud, this refers to the 
criminal law and organisational/regulatory practices in industry such as banking, 
trading and manufacturing. The police are an essential component of how institutions 
establish trust and efficiency -through their securities. In particular the police 
participate in inter-institutional knowledge co-ordination, risk profiling, and auditing, 
all to verify the integrity of securities data, products, and markets. For them, risk 
society is characterised by the perpetual refinement of rules governing how 
knowledge is communicated. In the case of fraud most cases are handled internally by 
organisations or regulatory bodies contacted through or by complaints. 
Further, in risk society, governance is directed at the provision of security. Security is 
a situation in which a specific set of dangers is counteracted or minimised. The 
experience of security usually rests on a balance of trust and acceptable risk as 
indicated by Giddens (1990). Institutions that provide security offer trust and 
acceptable risk in the form of guarantees (commitments and warranties to take some 
risk out of risk), for example insurance companies. Insurance involves properties that 
make it one of the dominant templates of governance in risk society. These include 
that insurance objectifies everything as an accident, thus classifying the world into 
degrees of chance of harm, which are then assigned their respective costs. Insurance 
make untoward eventualities calculable, through the production of concrete facts and 
the use of actuarial techniques to make probability statements. Insurance is collective, 
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as the reality of the risk is distributed to all those that contribute by way of premiums. 
Insurance is also legal, as it makes risk subject to contract and adjudication (Ericson 
and Haggerty, 1997). 
To sum up, it has been observed that people's increased awareness of risk has been 
accompanied by the emergence of specialists who are concerned with risk 
management and control (Johnston, 1997: 186). For example dieticians, ecologists, 
child minders, domestic violence units and counsellors, crime prevention consultants, 
and vetting agencies. Institutions try to make trust tangible, for example by offering 
written money-back 'guarantees', by having employees represented as respectable 
members of the community, and, in the case of financial institutions, even referring to 
themselves as 'trust' companies (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Fraudsters are also 
known to use 'trustworthy' names for their organisations. Trust is always based on a 
degree of faith and intangibility. Risks are also somewhat ephemeral or short-lived, 
always subject to political-cultural revision (Douglas, 1992). An example is in the 
information that buyers should be wary or cautious in their dealings. This is indicated 
in laws or rules related to transactions -a loophole regularly exploited by dishonest 
traders. Due to the burden and costs of doing so or securing against risk (insurance, 
consultations etc. ), people are willing to risk a fraction of their possessions for what 
they believe and expect would be fruitful. 
On the other hand, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) note that the police make it clear that 
security is the responsibility of all. More so, police commercial regulators are placed 
in a position of dependency on external institutions especially for their specialised 
knowledge. They respond to this by networking with representatives of external 
institutions. One of the key messages in the 'chat up lines' or correspondence 
employed by the fraudster is that the deal in question, service or product is risk free. 
Finally, Walsh (1978) notes that as in other aspects of social life, the criminal prefers 
to operate within a framework of predictability and constancy of expectations. He 
would rather not to think that the future puts him at a disadvantage or at risk of 
sanctions (formal and informal). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at fraud from a different explanatory perspective. The 
previous chapter made use of criminological theories. We have seen that the concepts 
and interpretation of deceit, trust, confidence and risk are interrelated especially as it 
concerns fraud and scams. Degrees of each of them are brought to bear in the 
execution of deceit from the victim's and the fraudsters' position. In modem times, 
individual reputation continues to guide social life and commerce. Over the years, 
what has changed is how our reputations are established and maintained. 
Modem commerce and human relations has led to greater anonymity, and the need to 
make commitments (emotional or financial) across geographical boundaries. This 
expedites transactions. Thus, those interacting depend on written and unwritten 
acceptable codes of conduct. The cohesive factor here is the nature and concept of 
trust given its multi-facet interpretation or definition. The data in this thesis suggests 
that the dynamics of trust have implications for crime, fraud, victims, offenders, law 
enforcement, criminal justice and virtually all spheres of human endeavour. 
Establishing a 'reputation' is central in trust building. For Nock (1985), reputation 
will become more prospective. It will predict the future as well as reflect the past. 
Reputations will always establish that the parties to a relationship may be trusted. 
Further, one of the consequences of greater privacy in our dealings is the difficulty it 
creates for the monitoring of ones reputation. Privacy makes it difficult to know 
others' reputations. A heterogeneous society is also a society with vast amounts of 
privacy. On the other hand, surveillance is the way society manages the reputation of 
strangers or 'unknown individuals'. The efficacy of surveillance strategies varies 
depending on the society, culture and enforcers. 
Trust permits people to enter into risky relationships and surveillance can be said to 
be a response to risks. The types of risks countered by surveillance are those inherent 
in relationships with strangers. Virtually any relationship may embody elements of 
potential harm. But relationships with strangers are the ones made easier by 
credentials and ordeals -a situation the fraudster exploits to his advantage. In most 
cases of fraud, relationships may be enhanced by the victims acceptance (trust and 
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confidence) of the fraudstrs' credentials. In sum, trust is the core around which all 
communities and societies are built. Surveillance may sustain or permit it in a 
complex society. The costs of privacy are then seen, as the costs of trust (Nock, 
1985). 
In all fields of human endeavour including fraud, and in the course of everyday life, it 
is possible to analyse or discover the answers to certain questions raised by Dasgupta 
(1988) on how trust is created, how it is perpetuated, why is it not present when it 
should? why it is present, why it breaks down when it does, and how it can be built up 
again when it has broken down? To reflect on all this, Dasgupta mentions Albert 
Hirschman's remark that trust, like other moral resources, grows with use and decays 
with disuse. For Luhmann (1988) trust presupposes a situation of risk. He notes that 
you can avoid taking the risk, but only if you are willing to waive the associated 
advantages. In addition, you do not depend on trusting relations the same way you 
depend on confidence, but trust too can be a matter of routine and normal behaviour. 
Further, trust is only required if in the given circumstance, a bad outcome would make 
you regret your action. In addition, familiarity, confidence and trust are different 
modes of asserting expectations and they use self-reference in different ways. With 
regard to fraud, the case of trust is very different and requires quite another type of 
self-reference. It depends not on inherent danger but on risk. Risks, however, emerge 
only as a component of decision and action. If you refrain from action you run no risk. 
It is a purely internal calculation of external conditions, which creates risk. 
Finally, this research reveals that in understanding fraud especially deception 
involving upfront payments, one must also understand the role of trust, confidence 
and risks in the whole process. Irrespective of attributes or characteristics of the 
victim and fraudster, how trust is built, and why this was successfully done, imparts 
on the degree of loss incurred (emotional, financial, social, market reputation, 
criminal justice etc. ). This could also direct or inform various preventive approaches 
some of which have been indicated in Chapter seven of this thesis. 
We have reviewed the issues concerning possible reasons why individuals commit 
fraud/advance fee fraud, the situational conditions that encourage it, and the modus 
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operandi or situational circumstances that encourages victims to voluntarily hand over 
material possessions in advance of a transaction. The next chapter is concerned with 
an empirical understanding of the use of upfront payments in cash or kind in fraud. 
Issues discussed include the method adopted in this research, data, and an analytical 
examination of deceit and trust based on certain occurrences of this type of fraud. 
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Chapter Six 
Understanding fraud and the manipulation of trust 
This chapter reveals that conducting research into fraud or advance fee fraud in 
particular has peculiar attributes. Thus, in the course of researching into fraud, the 
researcher has to adopt approaches suitable to circumstances encountered. In this 
chapter, similar research and their limitations are discussed with a view to 
understanding the nature of fraud or economic crime research. This is also an attempt 
to justify the validity of the method employed in this thesis. 
In most forms of research, the researcher begins with an issue or topic for 
investigation. This is usually filled with expectations and ambitions to arrive at new 
findings or explanations on the subject of inquiry or to validate previous research, 
thereby contributing to the subject. In a nut-shell, the aim of this thesis is to carry out 
an investigation into a particular type of financial crime which involves the payment 
of money, goods or services upfront for a given transaction or arrangement. The 
popular pattern of this fraud is also known as advanced fee fraud. In asserting the 
criminological nature of this topic Sutherland and Cressey (1974: 3) note that 
criminology can be defined as the study of the "processes of making laws, of breaking 
laws and of reacting towards the breaking laws". With regard to this remark, this 
thesis is concerned the process or processes involved in law breaking as it concerns 
fraud/the manipulation of trust. 
Below, examples of relevant methodological approaches are discussed from previous 
researclL In the course of the discussion the unique nature of fraud research can be 
identified. 
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6.1 Methodological issues in the study of fraud 
Specialised adult criminals, especially those involved in acquisitive crimes are 
difficult to access, particularly in their natural setting. For the criminals, the interest in 
co-operating to advance academic enterprise is minimal (Hobbs, 2000). Hobbs also 
notes that most criminological studies concerned with professional criminals involve 
or have involved interviews with incarcerated professional criminals. This is not 
unconnected with the difficulty in identifying active or retired professional criminals. 
Further, "engaging with professional criminals in their natural habitat is difficult, 
dangerous and often impractical for those wishing to avoid the vicious but tantalizing 
ambiguities of life amongst the visceral economies of cornmitted villains" (2000: 
164). He cites the example of an ethnographic study done by Ken Pryce (1979), about 
the West Indian culture in Bristol. Pryce was murdered when he turned his attention to 
organised crime. 
A 'popular' but demanding method of criminological enquiry is the ethnographic 
approach. Ethnography can be defined as a form of field research that involves 
observing and analysing real-life situations, of studying actions and activities as they 
occur, and the researcher relies upon learning firsthand about people, their activities, 
culture or whatever is the subject of study (Burgess, Ed. 1992). It has been argued that 
ethnographic criminological research offers avenues for better exploration of the 
subject of investigation. Examples of such studies about sub-cultures include Wolf s 
(1991) study of bikers in which he was completely absorbed in the group. In Alder's 
(1985) study of drug dealers and smugglers, she spent about six years with the 
sub ects. Bougois (1995) spent three years living with dealers in his study of the j 
cultural context of the crack business. William's (1990) study sought to understand 
the kids involved in drugs from their own perspectives. 
The research by Hobbs (1995) Bad Business is to some extent associated with the 
crime of fraud. Based in Britain, this was an- ethnographic study that used the overt 
participant observation technique. His subjects not only had histories of criminal 
activities, but were still engaged in crime during and presumably after the study. 
Hobbs set out to understand the personal -and social arrangements of professional 
crime, while seeking to establish motivational factors that influence criminals and 
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their actions. He discovered that 'professional' criminals deliberately engage in illegal 
activities mainly for financial and leisure benefits. Thus, crime to these criminals is 
fiwas way of life'. 
All approaches in social or criminological research have limitations. In ethnography, 
participant observation cannot show how meanings, definitions, actions and 
interactions have been shaped by wider historical forces or circumstances (Jupp, 
1989). For May, the observation of small-scale settings leaves it open to change; 
findings are local, specific, not generalisable beyond the sample, and lack external 
validity (May, 1993). Bulmer, (1982) also notes that covert participant observation is 
neither ethically justified, nor practically necessary, nor is it in the best interests of 
sociology as an academic endeavour. 
Ethical concerns/issues are usually involved in most forms of research. Ethics in 
research also involves issues of informed consent, privacy, harm, exploitation and the 
consequences for future research. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) observed that 
even when operating in an overt manner, ethnographers rarely tell all the people they 
are studying about the details of the research. For instance, in William's (1990) study 
for example, he states: "although the crew fully accepted me and my work, others - 
their customers, the hangers-on, cocaine groupies - were not necessarily informed 
about my role... " (William, 1990: 3). 
Internal validity can be a problem with the ethnographic method. This refers to 
biasing and distorting effects (e. g. before and after circumstances), confidentiality, 
and other situational changes (Denzin, 1970). The extent of this is difficult to 
establish. Similarly, external validity or triangulation (multiple data validating sources 
and techniques) is difficult to establish when studying illicit and deviant activities. 
This is so because externally validating sources may be absent, therefore, the "analyst 
may accept the reputation of the authoe' (Denzin, 1970: 252). In Hobbs' study, 
information was checked with informants, friends, families, colleagues, local 
newspapers, journalists and friendly police officers. This draws attention to the 
concept of 'triangulation' - process of using multiple methods cumulatively for data 
collection and analysis to compensate for the biases of the different or other methods 
(Denzin, 1978). Another example of triangulation can be seen in Klockar's (1974) 
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I Professional Fence where aspects of his validity included newspaper articles, 
orphanage records, probation records, miscellaneous documents, letters, photographs, 
bills, sales receipts, stock certificates, merchandise and money all belonging or 
connected to 'Vincent' (the subject). 
A study closely related to advance fee fraud or the crime of obtaining by false 
pretences is that of Levi (1981) concerning the organisation and control of long-firm 
fraud which, was the first of its kind in the UK. In brief, Levi carried out a 
criminological study of commercial credit fraudsters and the agencies that attempt to 
control them. Included in his investigation were the techniques, motivations, social 
and criminal networks of offenders. In long-firm fraud, credit and merchandise are 
obtained by false pretences. Levi discovered that long-firm fraud offenders were 
motivated by economic factors, but some mentioned the thrill of deceiving peoples 
with their verbal skills and charisma. Thus, he notes that one is not certain if money is 
their sole motive. Levi notes that information from his research "provides a somewhat 
stylised picture of the world of long-firm fraud, since it excludes both first-hand 
'appreciation' of those fraudsters who are 'known to the police' and also a knowledge 
of those 'fraudsters' not 'known to the police" (Levi, 1981: 326). Recalling Polsky's 
(1971: 115-147) remark that criminologists have failed to carry out ethnographic 
studies of criminals in their natural habitats, Levi explains that with his limited budget 
and the highly expensive natural habitats of long-firm fraudsters, this approach was an 
unlikely development. Further, unlike 'street crime' and their associated cultures, 
long-firm fraudsters do not 'hang out' in a specific place. 
On the value and reliability of interviewing in prison, for Levi, Polsky's (1971) 
comments on the suspicious nature of revelations from caught criminals raised the 
issue of the likelihood of sample bias in the first place. The data could also be heavily 
retrospective, and criminals may say what you expect to hear. Criminals may hope to 
use interview as a platform to help their case, and the fact that the criminal is not in 
his natural environment could influence behaviour and responses. In Levi's'(1981: 
328) response to this, he states that Polsky "underestimates the - difficulties of 
validating one's accounts of behaviour in a natural setting and overestimates the 
errors entailed intrinsically by prison interviews". For Levi, a neglected aspect of the 
benefits of institutionalised settings such as the prison in interviews is that though the 
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atmosphere may generate bitterness, it could or does present the opportunity or 
platform for serious soul-searching and frankness which may not arise, outside 
confinement. Hence the researcher may benefit from the criminal's 'introspective 
frame of mind'. Second, in certain instances critical questioning may offend the 
subject. Thus researchers should be aware of this as a deficiency. 
On the other hand, research into the activities of criminals outside prison have yielded 
results. For instance, the insightful work on professional crime by Chambliss (1972) 
called the Box Man, was conducted outside the walls of a prison and was based on 
retrospective narration of the offender- a safe breaker. Klockar's (1975) The 
Professional Fence revealed the life and activities of the observed who was still 
criminally active. However, though this observation was in the criminal's natural 
setting, one cannot know whether others shared views about himself and his activities 
(Levi, 1981). Thus, Levi (1981: 328) concludes - "access is not sufficient condition 
for validity of observation". Some of the techniques employed by Levi in addressing 
possible errors include: 
- assuring respondents of confidentiality, 
- avoiding the use of tape recorders to encourage trust, and 
- taking notes sparingly in the course of an interview. Also, 
- validating information with other criminals in other prisons or location if there 
happens to be a link. 
With regard to verbal information from criminals, Levi notes that in his study, 
verification of data was not one hundred percent since the original activities were 
done covertly. 
Narration by respondents could be disadvantageous because such 'stories' usually rely 
on people's account of their actions as representing something beyond the interview 
situation (May 1993). Accounts may simply be inaccurate, and may not take into 
consideratiop other circumstances or events which surround the event(s) or the 
respoildents actions (May, 1993). Thus, for Levi (1981: 328,330) he does not claim to 
"have uncovered the totality of motives for or routes into fraud", nor has he "produced 
a representative study of the distribution of motives among all long-f= fraudsters". 
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Further, "neither of these aims is fulfillable, even in principle, for one can never know 
that one has a representative sample of an unknowable population7'. 
On the other hand, the use of secondary data in criminological research has yielded 
results. Secondary data is available from other sources and comes in various forms. 
Also, to some extent it has been produced and processed before receiving the attention 
of the researcher (McNeill, 1990). In this thesis, apart from interviews (primary data) 
with academics, fraud investigation officers in the police and other agencies, the 
difficulty in obtaining other raw primary data led to the use of secondary information, 
some of which were validated from official court records. The main data source, the 
police, noted that the Data Protection Act does not give room for certain degrees of 
disclosure. 
In research, secondary analysis is simply a further analysis of information that has 
already been obtained. Such analysis may be related to the original purpose for which 
the data were collected, or may address different issues. It may also involve the 
integration of information from several sources or a reanalysis of the data of a single 
source (Stewart, 1984: 11). Thus, Stewart states that the term secondary information is 
"frequently used to refer to both secondary data (the raw data obtained in various 
studies) and secondary sources (the published summaries of these data)" (1984: 11). 
Secondary information consists of sources of data and other information collected by 
others and archived in some form. These sources include government reports, industry 
studies, and syndicated information services as well as the traditional books and 
journals found in libraries. Other sources of secondary information include experts 
and authorities (professionals, researchers, organisations etc. ), recorded data and 
records (letters, accounting and personal recO'rds etc. ), and from commercial 
information services (the media and specialised agencies). Stewart also notes that 
secondary information offers relatively quick and inexpensive answers to many 
questions and is almost always the point of departure for primary research. 
Documents/publications are common methods of secondary data collection. 
The systematic analysis of documentary accounts'starts with the assumption that the 
real world is being observed and reported (Hod§on, 1999). For Hodson, researchers 
should consider the analysis of documentary accounts if their primary research goals 
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are the testing of particul&x hypotheses and theory verification and development. 
Further, documentary accounts provide rich descriptions of social behaviours and 
surrounding contexts that allow a wealth of hypotheses and theories to be tested. 
Thus, it has the ability to make significant contributions to theoretical development. 
The growth of documentary accounts has produced rich, in-depth accounts of social 
life across a wide range of topics in the social sciences. Such accounts include 
ethnographies, newspaper; accounts, police reports, judicial records, political party 
platforms, biographies, and historic archives of various sorts (Hodson, 1999). Further, 
in some forms of documentary research, after a topic is selected and a set of relevant 
documents identified and assembled, the researcher specifies a set of themes of 
interest. Where coding is adopted, the documents are read and coded according to 
these themes. Hodson notes that the theoretical goals of the study play a leading role 
in determining the criteria for selecting cases. The substantive knowledge of the 
researcher contributes to case selection through an awareness of categories of 
documents that do and do not fit the criteria for selection (Stryker, 1996). For Hodson 
it is not possible to state precisely, how many documents are necessary to allow for 
analyses of the resulting data. Thus this eventually depends on the nature of the 
inquiry. 
An important aspect in the use of documents in research is that of their content and 
subsequent analysis. Content analysis is a widespread technique in the social sciences. 
The heart of content analysis is the coding of material from existing sources. Other 
areas that could provide materials for content analysis include speeches and press 
conferences, diaries, newspapers, television programmes or documentaries, 
advertisements, and song lyrics. Even fiction can be systematically analysed for 
content. For example, an analysis by Griswold (1992) of Nigerian popular fiction for 
its meanings and contexts demonstrates the range and versatility of content analysis 
(Hodson, 1999). 
With regard to public documents, McNeill (1990) observes that in modem societies 
written records are kept by all kinds of agencies, and some may be available to social 
researchers. In order to protect the privacy of those, whose lives are recorded, the 
material may be kept confidential for some years, or may be available in a form where 
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individuals cannot be identified. Such documents include school records, parish 
records, social work records, health records, police records, court records, and other 
records kept by government agencies. He notes that other possible sources of research 
data are the official handbooks and prospectus of organisations. Further, the mass 
media could provide research materials. For example, Pearson's (1983) historical 
study of changing public perceptions of the threat of hooliganism and street crime is 
an example of the use of press reports. Computer-aided/electronic data searches can 
be used in the compilation of a comprehensive list of documentary accounts on a 
topic. 
Given the nature of secondary/documented information, it is important for the 
researcher to take certain issues into consideration when evaluating the information. 
The researcher should be suspicious if answers are not available for the questions 
listed below. There are checks that address questions of reliability and validity. 
Stewart (1984: 23) identified six questions that must be answered. These are: 
" What was the purpose of the study or report? 
" Who collected the information? 
" What information was actually collected? 
" When was the information collected? 
" How was the information obtained? and 
* How consistent is the information with other sources? 
McNeill (1990: 111) also notes that the researcher should consider certain questions, 
which include: 
Is the material authentic? Is it in any way a forgery? 
Is the material factually accurate? Are any errors deliberate or accidental? 
Is the material reliable? Would it have been the same if it had been collected by 
anyone else? What personal biases are likely to be present? 
Is it systematic, providing a complete account of what it describes? What is 
lacking? 
Why was it collected? Was it a matter of routine, or was there some specific, 
possibly propagandist purpose? and 
e other questions such as 'representativeness' and its history. 
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There are certain limitations associated with secondary information and documentary 
analyses. First, data are often collected with a specific purpose in mind, this may 
produce deliberate or unintentional bias -a limitation also associated with primary 
methods (Stewart, 1984). Secondary data are, by definition, old data. The 'age' and 
relevance of the data depends on the nature of the researcher's inquiry. Hodson 
(1999) notes that the nature of the data and the available cases to be analysed can be 
problematic. For Levinson & Malone (1980) categorisation, coding, and 
quantification may result in the loss of some of the richness of the original 
observations or activities. Thus, the sacrifice in the depth and validity of indicators 
occurs as part of a trade-off to achieve increased 'generalisability' and the ability to 
sort between defensible and less defensible conclusions (Hudson, 1999). Also, the 
secondary user of documentary accounts has no control over the topics covered or 
omitted, and in some topics, substantial data may be omitted. Therefore, 
generalisations from the analysis must be made cautiously, taking into consideration 
that the set of cases is not generally a random sample of the population of interest. 
Thus, as noted by Marshallsay (1977: 261) "social scientists, no matter what their 
level of research, and almost no matter what field of study, cannot move far without 
coming into contact with official publications". 
Finally, secondary information has some distinctive advantages over primary data 
collection. An advantage is that of reduced time and cost. Secondary sources also 
provide reference points for additional research by suggesting problem formulations, 
research hypotheses and methods. They could also be useful as a comparative tool 
(Stewart, 1984). Further, the central contribution of documentary analyses is that it 
transforms rich bodies of descriptive accounts into data sets amenable to qualitative 
and quantitative analysis. Through systematic analysis, researches can control the 
effects of confounding factors, identify mediating variables, and establish patterns of 
causality. Within this framework, the selective use of quoted material to illustrate 
concepts and relationships can reintroduce the richness of observation found in the 
original data (Hodson, 1999). Further, the analysis of sets of documentary accounts 
also encourages greater objectivity in the analysis of these accounts. The result of the 
analysis can provide tentative answers to certain questions or behaviours. 
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Thus, no approach in crime studies is devoid of criticism. All methods of research 
provide some useful information/data from which deductions can be made. They also 
have their merits and demerits. For Hobbs (2000), most crime studies whether they 
required analysis of documents or interviews with offenders are retrospective and are 
therefore to an extent removed from the environment of the offence. However, Hobbs 
notes that direct engagement with criminals in their natural habitat is possible but rare. 
With particular reference to ethnographic studies, Hobbs (2000: 173) states that 
"serious criminals seldom offer themselves for examination unless there is a film deal 
involved, and once located, it must always be remembered that, by definition, they are 
hardly professionally obliged to tell the truth". 
In fraud research, in situations where offenders are apprehended, if the particular 
scam is ongoing (as is usually the case), it is always in the best interest of the 
fraudster to maintain the underworld code of conduct or espirit-de-corps by 
concealing vital information. In this regard, an understanding of a particular scam 
emanates from reported experiences from victims and legal or journalistic 
investigation into the scam. More so, it is common knowledge from research that the 
motive for fraud is economic, first and foremost. Economic power is then used to 
acquire status and other possessions. From the victim's perspective, reliving their 
experiences is discretionary. On the other hand, the Data Protection Act does not 
allow the police to release information about victims and fraudsters. 
In conclusion, "there is no necessary connection between types of theory and types of 
method" (Jupp, 1989: 84). This is due to the complex nature of 'crime' in general, and 
the role of several factors and variables involved before, during and probably after 
offending. Thus, "different methods vary in their appropriateness to uncovering the 
aspects of crime and criminal justice which are signalled by different theoretical 
approaches" (Jupp, 1989: 18). With regard to this research, 'gatekeepers' expressed 
reservations about granting direct contact to the offenders and victims. Thus, 
restrictive interviews (as dictated by the organisations concerned) were carried out - 
the primary data, in addition to secondary sources (documents and reports). The 
method adopted was based on the theoretical objectives, and the quality and quantity 
of information that could be retrieved from available sources. 
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Below is a brief description of the processes the researcher went through and the 
problems encountered. 
6.2 The research process and method of thesis 
Several strategies were adopted taking into consideration the nature of research into 
fraud or economic crime. Given that obtaining money goods and services by false 
pretences is a global problem or issue, a comparative approach to the subject would be 
illuminating. Observing the differences and similarities involved in the manipulation 
of trust and confidence as they concern. certain political and cultural settings is a way 
of assessing the influence. of various factors on fraud. Hence, the researcher sought to 
investigate deceptive crimes/fraud such as advance fee fraud - that involves upfront 
payments for goods, services/transactions, as they occurred in the United Kingdom 
(UK), Nigeria and Canada. In the UK, reports on the occurrence of all types of fraud 
are prevalent, and being a developed country, would shed some light on contemporary 
fraudulent activities, especially those involving the use of technology. Canada, a 
North American country 1would also show how this practice is carried out from a 
relatively different socio-cultural background. On the other hand, Nigeria, a 
developing country that has been associated with frauds of this nature is an ideal 
location to understand this phenomenon from a different political, social and 
economic perspective. 
The starting point was to identify agencies or organisations; that would be useful for 
this research. It is known that over the years, various countries have established 
agencies and organisations to deal with different forms of economic or financial 
crime. All over the world, the police are central to criminal investigations and to a 
large extent can not be avoided in criminal fraud research. Thus in the countries listed 
for research, police forces or units were contacted. In the UK, the organisations 
involved include a provincial police force, with reference to a division likely to have 
cases involving upfront payment scams or advance fee fraud and the Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) known for their high profile cases. A police force in Ontario, Canada 
was also short-listed - to also serve as a reference point to other agencies. In Nigeria, 
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the relevant departments within the police force were also earmarked for interviews 
and data collection. 
Further, the prosecution services were also contacted. In the UK, it was the Crown 
Prosecution Service of one of the regions. It was intended that contacts with the police 
made in the UK and other countries would be used for speedy access to their 
prosecuting organisations or departments. Court records or reports of fraudsters were 
necessary to verify and authenticate information, especially with regard to sentences 
and the amount involved. Finally, researchers (academics) and journalists 
interested/involved crime/fraud research/reporting were also pencilled down for 
interviews, as their experiences would enrich the research data. 
The review of literature and theories helped to determine questions to be used for 
open-ended in-depth interviews. Respondents earmarked to be interviewed include 
fraud investigating/regulatory officers, crown prosecutors, firaudsters and victims. The 
researcher's interest was on 'dead and buried' cases, i. e. cases that have been 
officially concluded including those that were not prosecuted. Generally, in fraud 
research, depending on the subject of interest, the degree of information gathered 
from any method is important if one is to make sense of the data. It is important for 
the technique used to be able to provide what can be analysed from a criminological 
perspective. For instance, since this is not an ethnographic research, the need to 
interact with offenders in particular over time was not necessary. We have also noted 
the difficulties involved in this approach, as frauds involving elaborate scams are 
usually ongoing. This is in addition to the difficulty in locating the subjects 
(fraudsters). Given the nature of fraud research, the methods adopted by the 
researcher were seen as appropriate taking into consideration the limited time frame 
and his budget. 
Finally, informal contacts were made regarding access especially from the, writer's 
supervisors and departmental staff. This was followed by formal requests in writing 
for access. With regard to Nigeria, in the course of the writer's previous employment 
as a banking inspector or investigator in Lagos, he had worked with some police 
officers/investigators who had always expressed interest in the need to curb frauds 
that have and continue to dent the image of the country. Thus, with the nature of the 
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topic and going by the publicity that advance fee fraud and other forms of obtaining 
by false pretences has received, full co-operation from all quarters was anticipated, 
some of which were promised informally. Going by the increasingly global nature of 
the offence, it was assumed that that the police and governments in other jurisdictions 
would be more than eager to support research on the subject. 
At this juncture, one would like to recall the aims and objectives of this thesis already 
highlighted in the Introduction, before talking about the outcome of the research 
endeavours or fieldwork. This would enable us assess the suitability of the approaches 
adopted. The objectives include: 
" To draw more attention to criminal fraud involving the obtaining of money, goods 
and services by false pretences, or to the significance of 'small' frauds (per 
victim), and to highlight the victim's circumstances in scams and criminal justice. 
" To offer plausible explanations, and to contribute to the literature and 
understanding of the use of advance fees, upfront payments in cash or kind in 
fraud internationally and locally from theoretical perspectives. 
" To examine the dynamics involved in the use of trust/deceit, confidence and risks 
in obtaining benefits by false pretences. The processes and structures that facilitate 
the use of this approach are examined. This would involve an analysis of the 
nature, trend and pattern of frauds of this nature. Making use of examples from the 
UK and other countries, previous research, reports of cases, court records and 
interviews to deduce traits that are peculiar to scams involving the manipulation of 
trust. 
Finally, to draw attention to possible policy implications with regard to preventive 
strategies, taking into consideration the victim, the law and the fraudster. 
Unfortunately, the outcomes of applications for access were not encouraging. An 
academic (name withheld) revealed that within 'the criminal justice system in 
particular, you rarely get an outright 'no' for an answer. People always Show 
enthusiasm to assist, but what is eventually achieved with them is a different matter. 
Another reason for restricted interest may be related to the sponsorship. For instance, 
government funded research elicits a much better degree of co-operation. As a 
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consequence, apart from in-depth interviews that formed the major part of the primary 
data, the researcher had to rely on secondary sources. Data collated came from 
documents regarded as being in the public domain (court reports), newspaper 
publications, television programmes and the World Wide Web. Certain cases or 
reports were triangulated with court records and interviews with fraud squad officers. 
The need to pursue this line of enquiry stems from the fact that this research has a 
time frame. The time spent waiting for approvals for access to the organisations 
contacted did not help matters. The cost involved in travelling and maintenance 
without a reasonable source of income created undue hardship. Thus, a deductive 
analytical approach of the data accumulated (discussed later in the next section 6.2.1) 
had to be embarked upon. 
In a nutshell, let us look at some of the problems encountered, beginning with the UK, 
Canada then Nigeria - the countries one had hoped to study comparatively. To a large 
extent, agencies in the United Kingdom proved to be much more co-operative 
compared with those of other countries visited. Informal contacts led to an informal 
meeting with a Detective Inspector (name withheld) of a Police Fraud Squad in the 
UK. The researcher was advised to forward a formal application for access to the 
Police Headquarters. The application was eventually granted - to conduct restricted 
interviews. The fraud officers interviewed at the police force concerned were very co- 
operative and helpful. In an interview with a detective it was revealed that: the current 
categorisation of fraud within the police organisation is limited with particular 
reference to statistical publications. For instance, identifying the number of advance 
fee frauds from figures available will have to be manually done. This would involve 
going through individual case files or getting hold of the officers that investigated the 
fraud(s) to pick them out. Second, in general the numbers of fraud cases were few and 
much less for those that involve advance fees. Out of about 10-50 reported cases of 
fraud, only about two or three might be advance fee frauds. The same situation 
applied to other forms of fraud involving the collection of upfront fees in cash or kind 
by fraudsters. One of the reasons for this is that usually, victims are reluctant to report 
frauds that they feel exposes their gullibility. Discussed in Chapter 2.3 is the recent 
Police Fraud Survey (Flanary, 2000) where the various forms of fraud were 
categorised separately from various police forces in the UK 
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The researcher also contacted the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in London who 
consented to the research - for restricted interviews and degree of information. The 
application was directed or referred to one of the case controllers (name withheld). A 
case controller in the SFO, a lawyer, explained that: staff including in the SFO are 
ever so busy and that having enough time for interviews is always difficult. Also, the 
questionnaire would rather not be completed and specific cases and names would not 
be mentioned for reasons of confidentiality. It was also advised that media coverage 
of SFO cases be examined, because they were usually extensive and properly 
summarised, unlike the lengthy court trial records that lasts for months, in addition to 
the cost of obtaining copies. In sum, the limited information from the SFO may not be 
unconnected with unfavourable media reports they have received over the years 
including the nature of findings by academic researchers. Attempts to talk to officers 
of the Crown Prosecution Service in the regional office contacted were not successful. 
A formal request was submitted. Though the research was accepted verbally, the 
researcher was never invited for a chat or interviews. 
With regard to the researcher's visit to Nigeria, the researcher's requests for 
interviews were not formally approved within the period the researcher spent in the 
country. As mentioned earlier, going by the reports of fraud (advance fee fraud in 
particular) associated with Nigerians (see Chapter 2.5), it was hoped that this factor 
would encourage an early response. After months of repeated calls and reminders no 
response or approval was received from the police, however, the researcher managed 
to conduct restricted informal interviews with some fraud officers (locations and 
names withheld). One of the officers interviewed revealed that over 100 cases 
involving the collection of advance fees have been handled. In an attempt to get some 
related materials and publications, the Police Library and Tribunal Offices were also 
visited, without any positive outcome. In sum, with a non-existent research culture 
and readily available database on crime and fraud, one could not gather reasonable 
information from the country. ý With reference to all organisations approached, it is not 
unlikely that establishments and staff are apprehensive in dealing with an 'unknown' 
researcher or investigator. 
In Toronto Canada, the introductory letter/research proposal was submitted by hand at 
the selected police force office. The letter included requests to conduct interviews and 
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examine cases involving the obtaining of money goods and services by false pretences 
that have been handled by the force. It was followed up closely and the researcher was 
informed that it had been forwarded to their fraud unit. After repeated calls, the 
officers responsible for the application (names withheld) both of the fraud department 
met with the researcher after a telephone call to the researcher's institution. After this 
phone call assurance was given that the requests will be looked into. The researcher 
never heard from them. At the time in Toronto, it was evident that the police had their 
fair share of criticism, a factor that might have been responsible for their attitude. 
In Toronto, the researcher conducted some literature search at the Centre for 
Criminology Library, University of Toronto. Official statistics on crime/frauds were 
examined. Attempts to interact with an academic with some affiliation to the study of 
economic crime were also not successful. The Graduate Co-ordinator made it clear 
that the "centre staff cannot spend quality time discussing with students that are not 
from or attached to the centre" but that the student or researcher was welcome to use 
the library and its facilities. 
To sum up, attempts to co-opt relevant agencies to the subject of investigation to the 
degree required was not successful. In fact, most of the officials the researcher 
discussed with spent more time trying to suggest other offices or people to approach 
rather than themselves. With post graduate research, where time is of the essence, 
long delays in getting approved access is problematic - approval in principle is likely 
not to be adhered to at the time of physical visits. On the other hand, depending on the 
nature of the topic, the organisation approached is in a position to determine how 
sensitive or risky granting you certain information would be. All these have 
implications especially as it concerns crime or fraud in particular. An academic 
interviewed revealed that in situations where access is agreed in principle, at the time 
of the actual research, attitudes change. With regard to crimes such as advance fee 
fraud, due to limited or non-existent request for access and research in the area, 
relevant bodies or agencies are yet to appreciate its significance or get used to -such 
demands. 
Despite aH the above, the research continued, and very constructive interviews were 
carried out with those involved in the investigation and the prosecution of frauds. The 
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researcher is optimistic that the approvals granted by the police and the SFO are 
positive developments for an academic relationship in the future. The next section 
discusses the types of data gathered and used in this research. 
6.2.1 Data 
In light of the problems of access experienced, in this thesis, the majority of the data 
used are from secondary sources or documents. Thus about 90% of cases were those 
reported in the United Kingdom. Other cases came from the United States Asia and 
Africa. It should be noted that a good number of reported frauds such as those in this 
thesis, have international dimensions - some were perpetrated from outside the UK 
against UK citizens, others were carried out from the UK within the country and 
abroad. The essence of having a wider geographical scope is to capture all facets -of 
upfront payments and fraud - e. g. socio-economic and cultural variables. 
Generally, data can be categorised into 'primary' and 'secondary'. The researcher 
collects primary data first hand, mainly through surveys, interviews, or participant 
observation. Primary data is that collected directly from source and reported or 
documented by the researcher. Primary or raw data could also be information or 
documentation in its unanalysed or unadulterated form. For instance computer 
databases could provide raw data, abstracts of published work and in some cases 
complete documents (Stewart, 1984; McNeill, 1990; Hodson, 1999). In this research, 
documents refer to any written materials that may be used as a source of information 
about human behaviour. The efficacy of this method especially as it concerns validity 
is discussed in Chapter 6. L 
First, taking into consideration the generic concept of fraud and the broad nature of its 
definition, in the search for cases, one had to be very selective in determining which 
cases contained relevant information that could be analysed deductively. In most 
frauds or scams, it is possible to identify various forms of frauds and crime in the 
same incident. In some fraud cases hon-dcide, kidnapping etc may have occurred. As 
mentioned earlier, in the recording of crime statistics, violent offences within a given 
case are usually given priority and recorded as such. In the selection of cases, the 
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researcher looked out for the degree of information or details, especially those that 
involved prosecutions, where information could be verified from court records. 
In total, for analytical purposes, eighty-two (82) cases were selected from different 
sources such as court records, newspaper reports and the Internet (see Appendix for 
the complete list of cases including their references or sources). As mentioned earlier 
most of the cases were from the M where they could be verified using court records 
and interviews. In the course of our discussions, some examples of fraud cases not in 
the sample are adequately referenced or cited. Reports of fraud matching the criteria - 
manipulation of trust, upfront payment and confidence, between 1994/1995 and 2001 
were categorised accordingly. In some instances earlier years on a particular case 
were looked into in order to have a firm grasp of the incident. The avenues and 
documents accessed for data include: 
* Court records from various criminal courts as indicated in the Appendix. 
e The Internet, through search engines and newspaper links. The information 
available on various forms of crime is huge. Its usefulness depends on the 
objectives of the user. Information varies from statistics, government publications, 
articles and books. Because the occurrence of obtaining by false pretences could 
have occurred in any case, aH the hits or stories had to be read to verify this. 
Below is an example showing number of 'hits' and search words. Information 
from here produced the relevant information such as names and dates required for 
retrieving court records, in addition to the journalistic narration of cases, and trials 
over the years. Examples of the search are shown below. 
Newspaper Occurrences from word search for 1999 
Fmud Scam Bogus Deception Swindle 
The Guardian 
and Observer 
880 198 303 204 34 
Financial Times 804 44 73 70 6 
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Newspaper/ Index Summaries of hits with the word 'fraud' 
The Guardian and Observer 1994-March 2000: 5872 
Financial Times 1994-March 2000: 5763 
British Newspaper Index 1995-1999: 8967 
9 British Newspaper Index on CD-ROM and microfilms for related articles, and the 
British Newspapers Library. 
* The examination of daily newspapers and magazines on articles relating to fraud. 
The newspapers used include the Daily Mirror; Daily Mail; the Express; Hull 
Daily Mail; The Times, Daily Telegraph, Guardian and Observer; and the 
Independent, and Financial Times Newspapers. The Economist, Time and Private 
Eye magazines were also consulted. 
Interviews with academics, and officers of Police Fraud Squad units, the 
Department of Trade (DTI) and the Serious Fraud Office. 
With regard to the sample of cases, the following categorisation emerged. For 
analytical purposes, the various forms of obtaining by false pretence were 
categorised into eight (8) groups. Thus, from the 82 cases selected one could have 
a picture of the distribution of areas or arenas where fraudsters manipulate trust 
and collect money upfront from victims, and the 'modus operandi' or system of 
deceit. The following groups were identified (Table 6.1): 
* See page 188 for the last buHet point 
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Table 6.1 
Distribution of areas in which trust is manipulated and upfront payments in cash 
or kind are collected 
Scams associated with: Number of cases % distribution from total 
cases 
1. Investment 22 26.8 
2. Medical Services/Products 4 5.0 
3. Religion 3 3.6 
4. Education and Training 4 5.0 
5. Charity 4 5.0 
6. Property 3 3.6 
7. Relationships 10 12.2 
8. General Services/Products 32 39.0 
Total 82 100.0 
This distribution is not exhaustive. However, based on the data they have been 
identified as popular arenas for scams. In a nutshell, a brief explanation of these 
identified areas are as follows (concrete examples are included in the analytical 
discussion of the general data in subsequent sections): 
- The collection of money upfront or the manipulation of trust in investment deals 
are those that involve deposits for 'profit-yielding' ventures. In these scams, the 
products advertised are either non-existent, grossly overvalued, or the business is 
deliberately mis-managed and liquidated. The fraudsters abscond after they have 
accumulated substantial deposits from victims. Examples include pyramid 
schemes and buying of shares in prospective ventures. AH categories of victims 
are targeted and the scams are usually pre-planned. 
- Fraud of this nature- associated with medical products and services include those 
carried out by fraudsters selling fake health products (e. g. fake potency creams 
and arthritis treatment gadgets). It also involves the running of bogus healtý 
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centres such as clinics. Victims are made to pay cash upfront for worthless 
treatment, services or products. The perpetrators also disappear with time. All 
categories of victims especially the elderly are targeted and those with an 
'ailment' they feel is embarrassing. 
- With regard to religion, converts or members of a 'church' or cult are encouraged 
to hand over their worldly possessions to the leader or 'management', who divert 
these proceeds for personal use. This is in return for salvation 'elsewhere' or in 
preparation for a particular event such as the end of humanity! In extreme cases, 
members are murdered in the form of mass suicide, however, it is important to 
note that in suicide cases where the leader of the congregation also takes his or her 
life, the element of fraud is eliminated. Victims from all walks of life including 
families believe that the organisation concerned is the avenue or solution to their 
problems. 
- Fraudsters use bogus educatioml and training courses and certificates to collect 
fees upfront from victims. In most cases the courses advertised are non-existent, 
and if available are useless to the 'graduate', as they are not recognised by the 
relevant authorities and government. The unemployed and those in search of new 
or 'lucrative' careers are the likely victims. 
- Fraudsters also exploit those willing to donate or contribute to charitable ventures. 
The nature of the practice is such that money, gifts etc have to be deposited first 
before they are forwarded or distributed to the needy. The charity fraudster simply 
retains the proceeds or gives out an insignificant fraction of the collection. In this 
fraud unless the donor takes steps to find out if contributions reach the intended 
sources, the victim may never realise that the con man is the intermediary or the 
'needy' fellow. 
- In the property business, the fraudsters collect payments in advance for a given 
transaction or purchase that will not niaterialise - or was never intended to 
materialise in the first place. Money is also collected to secure a property or for 
administrative costs for non-existent properties. The same property could also be 
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sold to different people. In legitimate property transactions the collection of 
deposits upfront is a conunon practice. 
- In relationships, the fraudster pretends to be affectionate, then collects fees in 
advance for imagined businesses or transactions from the lover or 'partner'. 
Marriage proposals could be part of the deal. Agencies involved in matchmaking 
also collect fees upfront for non-existent dates or dates that can been described as 
dishevelled when they show up. Marriages of convenience are also used as the 
excuse for advance fees or deposits. 
- Finally, the most common arena for scams is in the supply of general services and 
products. Through marketing and advertising strategies, victims are convinced to 
pay for goods and services they are yet to receive. In most cases the fraudster 
vanishes or sends worthless or sub-standard products. Common avenues include 
sales of products through door-to-door sales men, by post and the Internet. 
In this thesis, the first stage of the data analyses involved the identification of issues 
and pattern (s) in each fraud case or scam. Thus a data format or table was drawn up 
based on the questions that seek to understand fraud. Each case was broken down 
according to the tabulated sections. Second, summaries based on the tabulation were 
made for each of the eight categories. Issues concerning each occurrence of a 
particular fraud are broken down and tabulated accordingly. Below is the sample of 
the table used to analyse cases of fraud. 
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Table 6.2 
Sample of data analysis format 
Case No. TITLE 
Date Amount Modus Facilities used The 
involved operandi investigation 
Location Number of Characteristics Medium of Prosecution 
Victims of victims report 
Duration of Number of Characteristics Involvement Comments 
fraud Offenders of offenders in/of other 
Crimes 
Finally, for a deductive analysis of the dynamics of trust/fraud vis-A-vis the modus 
operandi of the manipulation of trust and confidence, six categories emerged. This 
is based on levels of disposition attributable to victims and the fraudsters approach 
to building trust -- face-to-face contacts or through distant communication. This 
analogy is represented in the next section (Table 6.3). 
The next section - the dyn=ics of fraud is based on the typology (Table 6.4). 
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63 Deceit and Trust - anaIytical discussion 
It has been noted that the manipulation of trust is central to all scams. The goal of the 
fraudster is to convince the would-be victim to hand over something to him. This is 
better achieved if this transfer is done voluntarily to avoid intense interest from law 
enforcement agents, and possible harsh reprisal from the victim. Ideally when people 
are faced with risks in the sense of committing material possessions, or services, they 
need to be assured or 'counselled'. One of the most efficient ways is by physical or 
face-to-face contact by the 'seller' of what is at stake. Businesses have long 
recognised this as can be seen in the level of investment in the area of more 
interactive marketing techniques. Tbus in both the face-to-face and distant contact 
methods of creating trust and confidence, the victim is faced with the decision of 
determining the degree of financial commitment or services that could be put at risk. 
The victim's decision is critically appraised depending on the skills or charisma of the 
seller and the evidence presented. The diagram below shows a pictorial view of this 
process. 
Diagram 6.3 
The process of a scam 
Basis for decision Outcome 
TRUST Dissatisfaction 
Physicallproxy + 
Risk ion/-- 
/Confidence Loss 
Scam 
In approaching this subject, the typology below (Table 6.4) attempts to summarise the 
trust/confidence dynamics vis-a-vis the disposition of the victim. 
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Table 6.4 
Typology of the modus operandi of fraud involving the manipulation of trust and 
the victim's disposition/attributes 
Characteristics of trust 
General 
disposition 
of the victim 
Honest and 
unsuspecting 
Face-to-face/ 
physical contact 
Distant contact or 
by proxy 
Selected frauds that 
appeal to sentiments 
and ignorance of the 
victim on what are the 
facts. For e. g. Charity 
frauds. Conventional 
soliciting methods are 
used such as fax, 
phone and letters. 
Trust developed by charismatic 
fraudster via avenues such as 
'psychological' marketing. 
Victims tend to avoid too good 
to be true deals. Thus fraudster 
presents conventional deals. 
Religious scams and little 
merchandise fraud are very 
common. Ignorance of victim is 
exploited. 
Newspaper adverts are 
Commonly used, and 
other methods of 
publicity. Glossy 
brochures & fmancial 
reports are used as in 
in conventional 
practices or situations 
Outcome for the 
fraudster 
Victims risk relatively 
Small sums of money 
comfortably. For 
certain scams in the 
medical field personal 
health and safety are 
put at risk. Relatively 
little sums involved 
per victim reduces 
official interest and 
prosecution. Turn over 
could be impressive. 
Victims commit 
reasonable sums of 
money or interests. 
Prosecution is likely 
to Mow if 
discovered or 
exposed. 
Usually requires some charisma. 
Emphasis is on mouth watering 
Probably not deals - huge profits within a 
dishonest, but short period of time. Visible 
naive and illusions are used - impressive 
adventurous offices property etc. Investment 
scams are common here. 
'Victim' who is very profit 
oriented will risk enormous 
sums to support illegitimate 
Dishonest activity, hoping to reap abnormal 
profits. Contract, money wash 
and transfer deals are common 
here, and arranged visits for 
victim welcome. 
'Highly confidential' 
documents are 
paraded via fax or 
electronic mail. 
Retums for the 
fraudster are very 
high. Here lies the 
biggest catch. 
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Table 6.4 shows that six major categories of victini/trust dynamics can be identified. 
These are the: 
- The honest and unsuspecting victim courted via face-to-face interaction 
- The honest and unsuspecting victim approached from a distance 
- The probably not dishonest but naYve victim/face-to-face contact 
- The probably not dishonest but nalive victim/distance 
- The dishonest victini/face-to-face contact, and 
- The dishonest victim/distance 
In the course of the discussion, situations or examples where any of the categories 
above exist are highlighted. Each type of 'relationship' occurs either through face-to 
face contacts or by proxy. Thus, based on the categorisation of arenas in which fraud 
occurs, it is revealed that trust and the eventual collection of deposits upfront is 
achieved through two methods which form the basis for our discussion: 
* Face-to face or physical contact, and 
9 from a distance or by proxy 
It is not unusual to find cases where both strategies are used. On the other hand, the 
end result of the method adopted depends to a large extent on the general disposition 
of the victim or would-be victim - the honest, the nallve, and the dishonest. 
6.3.1 Face-to-face or physical contact and fraud 
Obtaining by false pretences and the manipulation of trust using face-to-face contacts 
means that the fraudster physically interacts with the victim. This contact could be 
immediate or deferred after advertisements or solicitations from a distance. The use of 
this approach is usually informed by the nature of the scam. By meeting with the 
victim, the fraudster is prepared to risk identification, reprisal and subsequent 
apprehension if exposed. The fraudster's verbal skills are utilised in addition to his or 
her charisma and other natural or acquired attributes. 
191 
Another dimension to the physical contact approach is the creation of the necessary 
structures or environment for the scam. The office, location, building furniture, and 
staff that attend to the would-be victims have to be such that would create trust and 
confidence. Thus the environment in which the upfront fee is collected is important 
for the scam to be successful. There are numerous examples of how face-to-face 
contacts are used to create trust. It is also important to note that as indicated in the 
typology of scams above, the disposition of the victim is what may or may not make 
the scam successful. In the course of our discussion, areas in which honest, naYve and 
dishonest victims are courted by the fraudster will be identified. 
Investment scams 
In a typical example of the use of face-to-face contacts, this scam affected both honest 
and naive victims - the Bogus Bank in Torquay (Case No. 3). In 1993, a bogus 
financial establishment portrayed as a bank was set up in Torquay Devon in the UK 
The operators carried out their activities from the premises of a former bank Trustee 
Savings Bank (TSB) (to confuse would-be victims). The bank premises located in 
central Torquay was bought from TSB (a legitimate bank), and renovated to taste. 
This property was selected for its impressive appearance (as with most successful 
fmancial institutions) and the fact that it was located at the so-called English Rivera 
resort with a quiet and respectable environment. The 'bank' claimed to be worth 
billions in assets, with a huge bank account in New York, which it could use to make 
loans. 
Victims were mainly German nationals seeking to borrow money. They were offered 
loans at attractive rates, in return for an advance fee, based on a proportion of the loan 
offered. Once the investor has been persuaded to part with their fee, they were issued 
with worthless certificates by one of the syndicated companies which 'guaranteed' the 
right to draw the loan at an established bank. The deposits collected from victims 
were used to create their false images as respectable bankers. The Word 'bank' was 
cut in stone and placed above the front door of the building (a sign of legitimacy). In 
the 'banks' premises, a window advertised - the Central Forex Corp. Bureau de 
Change, with a display board stating - Commission Free Currency Rates. The word 
'free' was deliberately used to attract attention. The offices were also lavishly 
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fin-nished. The companies had and used impressive sounding titles such as Allgemeine 
Handels und Effectenbank AG. Colourful letterheads in addition to bogus bank 
certificates gave the appearance of legitimacy. The 'organisation' employed twelve 
female staff to complete the illusion. 
All these structural arrangements were put in place because customers or would-be 
victims were physically entertained in the premises. Thus to get their trust, confidence 
and for them to risk business proposals/commitments the environment and set-up had 
to be ideal and in line with conventional banking businesses. To take care of 
regulators, apart from the word bank outside the building to avoid immediate 
suspicion, other plans were carried out. The business was incorporated in Delaware , 
USA and in the Dutch Antilles in an attempt to shake off the Bank of England's 
attention. The location of the business in Torquay also helped to avoid the prying eyes 
of city regulators and the police. The selection of their targets or victims from abroad 
also served this purpose, though clients were allowed to visit the premises. 
With regard to victim selection, because most of the fraudsters were Germans, most 
victims were Germans, Austrians and German-speaking Canadians. The fraudsters 
chose their victims with care, choosing those who had little investing experience, 
were financially nalve or who faced severe cash flow problems (e. g. about-to-be 
bankrupts) and mainly foreign entrepreneurs. The fraudsters also used cunning and 
precision advertising in foreign newspapers such as the German Die Welt. Victims 
were told the Torquay office was the banks' European customer centre. Almost all 
those who lost money lived abroad. The jury was told that successful and often 
intelligent people were taken in by the 'elaborate appearance of substance' and 
allowed their judgement to be overruled by their enthusiasm. More so, people were 
easily fooled because the fraudsters ran a 'professional outfit'. They were eventually 
apprehended when police who had been monitoring them for several months swooped 
on them after a complaint from a woman who claimed to have handed over $450,000 
in return for a loan she never received. 
Though the investigators put the total sum involved at about E7 million, which was 
collected between January 1993, and July 1996, it was estimated that the figure could 
be much higher. Hundreds of investors lost relatively large sums of money. It was 
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reported that the three-year investigation cost about E1.75 million and the full 
attention of 35 detectives 
In this bogus bank's scam, the use of face-to-face or physical interaction is an 
attribute that contributed to the successful creation of trust. The fraudsters had an 
understanding of financial practices, made use of deceit, trust and confidence 
impressions to achieve their aims. Research has shown that certain professionals are 
accorded a higher level of trust in society (Bok, 1978; Nelken, 1994; Fukuyama, 
1995). Accountants are generally trusted partly because of their strong association 
with finance and the fact that they are expected to meet accreditation requirements. It 
is not unusual for people to assume that most people working in the finance industry 
are accountants. Apart from the expected integrity of the finance practitioners, people 
expect banking regulators such as the Central Banks and other government agencies 
to prevent bogus banks from operating, at least conspicuously. In other words if they 
were bogus, they ought to have been closed down immediately. The fraudsters 
definitely took advantage of the public's perception of the financial industry in 
general. With their confidence role-playing and series of articulated fies, the scam 
went according to plan until they were discovered. 
Further, normal banking practices were used. Normally, applicants in legitimate banks 
are expected to deposit a fraction of the value of an anticipated loan in advance. The 
premises of a once reputable bank were used to confuse new and old banking 
customers. Thus, the fraudsters operated out of the former TSB premises. This helped 
to develop and sustain confidence and trust of customers. The common practice in 
customer related sections of establishments are the use of female staff. Most of the 
employees were women who could probably calm down irked investors prompting 
them to behave courteously. 
In this case, the fraudsters use of distance was mainly to avoid prosecution, a common 
tactic of advance fee or confidence tricksters. With clients located abroad it would 
have been difficult for the victims to closely monitor the operators of the 'bank' and 
to seek redress immediately. Initial visits or periodic visits by 'clients' were 
encouraged, making best use of the physical contact strategy. Some victims came 
personally to make deposits (and to probably size-up the 'bank'). This also prevents 
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harassment by victims, which could create scenes and jeopardise their business at an 
early stage. The victims would then have to depend on documentation and 
technological contacts to keep informed on the status of their applications. Even in the 
UK, the location of the 'business' in Torquay was a method of avoiding direct 
scrutiny by city regulators. 
Finally, key factors that contributed to the success of the fraud include: societal trust 
and confidence in 'established' finance institutions, the use of appropriate aesthetics, 
staff and 'professionalism', location and normal financial practices (i. e. percentage 
deposits before a loan). Others are the marketing to foreign investors, grandiose 
names, and colourful letter headed documents. Their level of confidence is best 
explained by the overt operation/appearance of the 'bank' that must have helped to 
convince victims to trust the operators. The implication of this is that a general 
expectation exists whereby people expect 'capable guardians' in society (e. g. police 
and other regulators) to intervene efficiently when anomalies are noticed. 
Medical services and products 
Another arena for fraud that relies heavily on face-to-face contact is that of medical 
services and products. In most cases, the administration of medical services is usually 
through physical interaction. Medical products could also be marketed from a 
distance. Virtually all the fraudsters adopting this strategy are akin to the 'pre- 
planned' fraudster as described by Levi (1981). The decision to begin to defraud can 
arise at any stage of the business venture or medical practice or initiated from the 
onset. In the example of The Bogus Doctor (Case No. 24) in London, the fraudster 
managed to convince victims and patients to pay for his worthless services upfront - 
hence the notion of obtaining by false pretences. Due to the nature of diagnosis, it 
takes a long while to find out you have been conned. Victims would probably have to 
consult another doctor to confirm the true nature of their ailment. 
The 'doctor' made several false claims concerning qualifications and other 
achievements, some of which he backed with fake documents. Some of his claims 
include that he was a fellow of St. Thomas', member of the Royal College of 
Pathologists, and that his work was so acclaimed that a department was set up for him 
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at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. He claimed to have a 
doctorate from the Columbia Pacific University after a correspondence course, and 
masters and bachelor's degrees in science. All these were intended to impress and get 
the confidence and trust of clients. In reality, he changed failed examination papers to 
show he had gained good passes and faked references. His falsified A-levels got him 
into London University where he failed his exams and was told to leave. He then 
claimed that he had graduated. His 'medical expertise' consisted of a stint as a junior 
laboratory technician at a Hospital in London. Also, he regularly plagiarised research 
work for acknowledgement and certificates from universities abroad. With all these 
shortcomings, he knew what society expected to know and see about a medical 
practitioner, hence he went asserting his 'reputation'. In one of the references he 
supplied for himself he wrote, "Godwin is an enigma whose compeence we all 
admire and glorify". Thus, armed with all these 'credentials', he set up a Clinical 
Laboratory. 
Further, to gain the confidence and trust of his patients, he wore a white coat, carried a 
stethoscope, and surrounded himself with medical equipment. He also displayed 
university shields, and pictures of himself in academic robes receiving degrees. There 
was also an impressive array of books, supposedly written by him. For his 
consultations and drugs, he demanded to be paid in cash. It was revealed that many of 
his tests involved physical examinations over which he was charged with indecent 
assault. He also shared the information with partners of those he falsely told were 
suffering from gonorrhoea. This destroyed marriages and damaged scores of 
relationships. Most of his victims especially those 'alleged' to have sexually 
transmitted diseases never complained, perhaps because they were ashamed and 
would do anything for a cure. 
He also acted as a 'rent a witness' for drink drive offenders. In his attempts to help 
drink-drive motorist evade prosecution, one of his favourite diagnoses was that the 
driver was "an unwilling victim of his aberrant biochemistry". He used this bogus 
science to fool magistrates. The 57-year-old 'doctor' was sentenced to a five-year jail 
term having been found guilty of a series of charges including, indecent assault, and 
unlawful wounding (with regard to his injections). Obtaining money-by deception, 
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illegally supplying medical prescriptions and perverting the court of justice during 
M, o trials (when he faked illness). 
Finally, this scam is an example of the exploitation of trust accorded professionals in 
the medical field. This trust can also be extended to the general belief that appropriate 
regulatory bodies monitor the activities of people in sensitive professions. Thus 
members of the public do not independently verify the status of medical practitioners. 
It is likely that the authorities also fell prey to the stereotype of not expecting a 
criminal to dabble into medical practice/fraud in such an overt manner. Hence, the 
fraudster had the opportunity of operating for years before being stopped. Any 
rigorous investigation at any time during his fraud would have exposed him, even if it 
only involved an examination of his 'certificates'. Apart from the dishonest drink 
drivers that -A-anted a -Amy out, the victims were predominantly those from the 
immigrant community some honest and probably dishonest victims (those avoiding 
official documentation by the NHS - National Health Scheme). His age (over 50) and 
'charisma' or 'doctoral' carriage would have assisted him. His insistence on payment 
by cash also helped him financially (e. g. evading tax) and general extortion from 
victims. 
There are some other medical fiuuds that are not elaborately organisedL Some have to 
do with fraudulent sales men or women peddling useless medical products to honest 
and unsuspecting people, or the naive who expects a miracle cure. The scam involves 
the collection of payment in advance of delivery or payment for the ineffective 
product. For example, in the Arthritis Treatment Scam (Case No. 25), a woman used 
arthritis treatment gadgets to con victims. The "company' advertised a massage 
device, the Niagra Thermo Cyclopad. Using the face-to-face method, the fraudster 
visited the victims to demonstrate the product. One victim who paid 050 for the 
device did not notice any improvement in her situation. The fraudster finally 
responded to calls to retrieve the equipment, and promised to sell it to someone else 
before handing back any rcfundL 'Me fraudster never turned up again -a method 
applied to other victims. A court finally found her guilty of four counts of obtaining 
property by deception and one count of using false trade description. She was jailed 
for six months and ordered to pay E1,200 compensation. 
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Medical scams committed from a distance are discussed in the next section. 
ReUgion and fraud 
In recent years, the use of religion as the excuse to obtain money, goods and services 
from worshippers has been widespread. Face-to-face contact is crucial in the 
perpetration of religious scams. Though this type of fraud is unique in the sense that 
'victims' not only hand over their possessions voluntarily, they are deeply 
emotionally attached to their leader. This can be regarded as one of the ultimate forms 
of trust and confidence between fraudster and victim. In some cases religious or cult 
leadcrsloperators have been involved in serious crimes such as homicides and suicides 
within their organisation. An example of how confidence and trust is created and 
exploited -A-as seen in the Ho-no-Hana Fraud (Case No. 28) in Japan. A victim, an 
accountant in Tokyo, who narrated his experience, revealed the following. 
When he went to have the soles of his feet read in a room by a group of cult officials, 
the purpose was to find out about his destiny. The examination took about ten 
minutes, but he remarked that his feet revealed 'secrets' almost immediately. 
According to the chief foot examiner, his stomach was 'emitting a ycllow signal' - an 
obscr%-ation which -.,, -as true with him because he had been suffering from bellyache. 
On his lcft sole was a red spot, a sign according to the expert, that the 33-year-old 
would never enjoy happiness in marriage. Coincidentally, since he moved to Tokyo 
he had been searching in vain for a girlftiend. 
The foot readers appeared to know many things about the victim including his failing 
eyesight, and about his distant relative who hanged herself, in addition to other details 
to his disbelief, The foot readers had a solution to his problems. A few days after 
being thoroughly convinced he made a post office transfer of 2.25 million yen (about 
E13,0M) to the foot-reading organisation. The report states that in total, over 30,000 
victims were duped, with similar stories of cruel exploitation and displays of 
astonishing gullibility. It %,. -as noted that this type of predatory cult is not new in Japan 
where there are about 2, OW officially registered religious groups, many of them with 
bizarre practices, alarming beliefs and a large following. The founder of Ho-no-Hana 
Hogen Fukunaga appears to be unique in manymays. 
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Hogen Fukunaga is described as charismatic and his cult does not show the signs of a 
typical oriental religion. Another religious leader Shoko Asahara, the Aum. Shinri Kyo 
leader -A-as tried for multiple murder. Asahara had an archetypal beard and is partially 
sighted. Unlike Asahara, Fukunaga is six foot three, an electrical engineer, and wears 
expensive suits, with his hair greased back above his eyebrows. Ilius; presenting an 
image of a modem confident and successful Japanese businessman. This image 
helped him in attracting 'spiritually shipwrecked' young people. Before founding Ho- 
no-Hana, he founded his own electrical machinery company in the 1970s. Japanese 
newspapers revealed that this firm went bankrupt in 1979. Fukunaga was also 
expelled from a religious group after allegations of financial fraud, however, he was 
'lucky' to have received a revelation that he had been chosen as the 'envoy of 
heaven', a successor to Jesus Christ and the Buddha. In 1980, Ho-no-Hana was 
established. 
In Japan, the large number of religious groups are not unrelated to the country's tax 
laws. In principle, groups, which are registered as -reNgious corporations", pay no 
tax, a conducive situation for operators like Fukunaga. It was said that while 
Fukunaga's other business interests such as supermarkets and karaoke bars collapsed, 
he enjoyed a great deal of financial success. From his home in the expensive district 
of Shoto in Tokyo, he produced a series of books outlining his vision which involved 
a vague mixture of Christianity and Buddhism. For Fukunaga (the cult leader), "each 
one of us has a flow of energy which travels from the head down the spine, but in 
many people it has been interrupted, causing a range of troubles from bankruptcy, 
through broken fiunilies to cancer. The solution, he argues, is simple: people must 
learn how to 'take off their minds". His literature is sprinkled with photographs of 
meetings, which he engineered over the years with humanitarian celebrities, - such as 
Mother Teresa, Mikhail Gorbachev and the Indian Guru Sai Baba. All these are part 
of the trust/confidence building strategy. 
Ho-no-Hana followers targeted the elderly and the bereaved, people who -had recently 
divorced and those with delinquent children. They lingered outside hospitals and 
hospices and approached patients and their relatives. The targeted people recovering 
from cancer treatments and who were afraid of a recurrence. Others approached 
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include those who have contemplated suicide, those who believe they have 
personality problems and others who could not get along with other people or were- 
tired of life. In the case of the victim (the accountant) mentioned earlier, after an 
unsuccessful career in marketing, he used his inheritance to set up an accountancy 
firm Neither business nor his personal life flourished. One day a friend gave him one 
of Fukunaga's books characteristically titled How Can You Call Yourself Human If 
You Haven't Saved S. 5 Billion Yen? After reading it he felt his ways of thinking have 
been negative all along. It turned out that this acquaintance was a member of Ho-no- 
Hana, the man -who led hirn to the 'sole of the foot diagnosis' session. The accountant 
later realised that the personal details of his life revealed to him did not come from his 
feet but from conversations he had with his friend - the cult member. 
For the victims, after the foot diagnosis, the remedy was usually a training course to 
be carried out in FuJL where participants would learn how to 'take off their minds'. 
The money demanded varied to up to E 18,000. Victims were frightened by the tale of 
tragedy (suicides, deaths, increased debt, nervous breakdown etc. ) if they do not seize 
the opportunity of taking the course. Some were told if the money is not paid within 
48 hours it would be too late, and that they should not discuss the matter with any 
member of their fimily or friends. The training exercise involved three days of yelling, 
of slogans, without sleep or proper food. Participants were forbidden to talk to each 
other or make contact with the outside world. On the last day of the course, Fukunuga 
appeared in person to lay hands on the blindfolded subjects who at this stage are 
completely exhausted. The trainees are taken aside individually and offered "sacred 
scroll", and new and more specialised courses - for other anticipated problems, each 
course costing millions of yen to be paid upfront as usual. 
The report revealed that more than 1,100 people are known to have sued the cult for a 
total of E32 million. Taking into consideration unreported cases, it was estimated that: 
the fraud could have ne"ed about L400 million. It was noted that proving fraud of this 
nature might not be easy. In a television -interview the guru (Fukunaga) stressed that - 
"although we asked them to take part in our practices, they themselves actually made, 
the decision to do so% It %%-as reported that one of the possible explanations for the 
success of this scam especially with regard to wealthy victims was the notion that they 
are used to spending money to solve their troubles. Thus spending it makes them feel 
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better. This attitude makes religious frauds of this nature successful for the operators. 
In the case of Fukunaga's scarn, he took his time to build up his 'credibility', 
associating with celebrities and selecting his targets carefully. Tax laws also worked 
in his favour. A sociological and psychological understanding of the 'needs' of the 
people was also vital. 
Religious fraud that attract public concern and interest are those that involve other 
crimes such as homicide. An example is that of the Movement for the Restoration of 
the Ten Commandments of God -a group in Uganda (Case 29). The main leaders 
Kibwctere, a failed politician and Mwerinde, an ex-prostitute persuaded followers to 
sell their belongings and hand over their money in return for a place in heaven when 
the world ended, on the eve of the millennium. They lured the gullible and inadequate 
into the church with promises of salvation. When the world did not end, it is thought 
that the followers became suspicious and demanded restitution so they allegedly 
committed mass murder, making it appear like =s suicide. Followers believed their 
leader -. N-as in direct contact with Virgin Mary. About 1,000 cult members including 
children were burnt in a deliberate fire. It was discovered that this was a 'pre-planned' 
fraud - victims were defrauded and murdered. The operators who are 'supposedly 
dead' are on the run. It is important to note that if the leaders were confirmed dead, 
then the issue of fraud will not arise, as they would have all perished voluntarily 
according to their belieL 
To sum up, from the modus operandi of religious fraud especially in the extreme 
cases, one can point out certain factors that contributed to its success some of which 
may not be present in other cases. These include intense physical interaction between 
fraudsters; and the sub ects. Identifying an 'impending catastrophe', for instance, 
preaching heavily on the impending end of the world and assuring followers of their 
role and privileged position in the new dispensation plays or played an important role 
in religious scams. This is usually simultaneously timed with significant events or 
dates world wide such as the millennium or predicted dates or period the world is 
supposed to end. The leader usually a male, tends to be charismatic and exercises 
strict control over members. Communal living is adopted, and external association 
with non-members often prohibited. Members are told to avoid conventional medical 
treatment. This is not likely to apply to the leaders. Orthodox religious doctrines and 
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practices are manipulated to suit their needs. Victims are exploited physically, 
mentally and fmancially. In certain cases militant behavioural traits are cultivated to 
defend their beliefs. With regard to religious affiliations, legislation is avoided, as 
democracies believe it is the citizen's right to choose. Unfortunately it is often too late 
to save victims when the fraudster is exposed. 
Charity Scam 
Ile use of face-to-face contacts in frauds can be found in the area of charitable 
activities. Face-to-face interaction helps to get the most out of victims. The collection 
of donations and pretending to be involved in charitable activities are lucrative areas 
for the fraudster. In the most straightforward technique, the fraudster uses collection 
boxes in public places and then disappears with the collection. Goods or non- 
perishable items such as clothes are collected and diverted or sold in the open market 
for profit. Other methods also exist depending on the fraudster's plan. In most charity 
frauds, a combination of face-to-face contact and distant methods (e. g. through 
advertising) are often usedL Below is an example of the combination of both methods. 
The fraudster advertises his services using mail drops. He then goes around to collect 
donations, at this point physical contact could be made with victims. 
In the African Appeal Scam (Case No. 34), a bogus appeal for items to be despatched 
to the needy in certain African countries was the approach of this scam. Instead, when 
the donations were collected, they were sold in bundles to third-world countries and to 
other market stalls in the M The scam here is the collection of items ahead of its 
intended use. In the fraudster's message, he warns of the importance of time for the 
products to reach its destination. The flyer indicated the collection day for the listed 
items in addition to other information. An example of the wording of one of his advert 
is shown on the next page. 
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AFRICAN APPEAL 
WE NEED YOUR HELP URGENTLY 
TIME IS AGAINST US! 
0' NE BAG COULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE 
TO THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF AFRICA 
WHO CAN'T AFFORD TO BUY NEW CLOTHES 
We need your unA-anted 
Ladies, Gents, Childrenýs Clothes, 
Shoesý Bed linen and Curtains etc. 
Here's your reason to sort out those cupboards etc. 
Please leave your un%%ranted items, however small or old, 
and whatever the weather, outside from 9.00am 
Ready for our collectors on: 
FRIDAY 
In trying to keep our costs to a minimum. 
We politely ask if you could use any 
bag of your own and attach this leaflet 
MANY THANKS 
HELPLWE on 0660 272518 
The fraudster who is supposed to be a rag merchant also o%, vns a clothing company. 
The report notes that the fraud was exposed by genuine aid agencies, one of which 
noticed a drop in its income. One of the genuine agencies said clothes they received 
that were considered to old, old-fashioned or damaged were bagged and sold for L2 a 
time to this particular con man, because they knew he was a rag trader. IdeaUy, 
doorstep charity coNections can only be carried out if the organisation is licensed with 
the local council. This individual was not Ucensed thus making his case a police 
matter. 
In another variation of charity fraud involving direct physical contact between 
fraudster and victim - the Collection Racket Scam (Case No. 35), this netted about; E1 
milfion over five years. Both culprits were arrested when two police officers spotted 
their collectors outside a departmental store and became suspicious. One of them ran a 
homeless hostel from where about ten unemployed young people were recruited to 
rattle tins outside supermarkets and department stores. These collectors were paid a 
little fraction from their average of E4,000 a week coflections. They claimed that & 
donation would go to the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, the Motor Neurone Disease 
Association, the Elimination of Leukaemia Fund and other charities, but only El 1,000 
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got to these organisations. They ran the Oakdale Charitable Trust from a rundown 
office. They paid L60 for a charitable trust document, which allowed them to register 
with certain charities for a given period. Having legiti=dsed their charity, after the 
expiration of their license they continued to attract donations using the logos of the 
charities on their literature. In this pattern of fraud, the victims are not aware of the 
deceit and are in no position to ascertain the genuineness of the collectors. Charities 
depend on the goodwill and generosity of the public and people feel confident about 
the good faith and honesty of charity collectors. The ascribed trust accorded those 
involved in charity work was exploited by the firaudster. 
Finally, charity scams easily operate under the umbrella of legitimacy. Once 
registered, it is impossible to actually know how much was raised from the public or 
donors especially if they are cash donations. Charities rely on the honesty and 
integrity of the collectors - situation that could easily be abused. Donors practically 
have no choice than to give money upfront in lieu of a good course. Hence the 
fraudster is Provided with the opportunity to obtain by false pretences. The disposition 
of the victim (honest or dishonest) is not relevant here. The philosophy behind giving 
or helping the needed is guided by trust, thus donors do not usually take time to probe 
collectors especially with regard to street collections. If there is any doubt, they 
simply say no. Finally, the fact that it is difficult to ascertain the extent of fraud apart 
from in organised charities were accounts are rendered makes prosecution, 
sentencing, sanctioning or compensation problematic, however, this does no stop the 
application of sanctions based on the concept of deception to be effected. 
Property business and fraud 
In property businesses, transactions usually require physical contact. This may be due 
to the level of financial outlay required and the need for the buyer'to inspect what is 
being paid for. The element of advance fee fraud is still rife because the aim of the 
fraudster is to collect fees upfront using his charisma, documentation and the property 
in question. More so, it is common in conventional property transactions such as 
mortgages to leave a deposit pending when all matters are settled. The fraudster 
absconds with this initial deposit. For example, in the Land for Purchase Scam (Case 
No. 39), a husband and wife were the fraudsters. The report notes that they went 
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unnoticed by the police because their victims were often too embarrassed to admit that 
they have been duped. The woman claimed to be a Maori princess in New Zealand 
and a close relative of a British Earl. She and her partner claimed to have successful 
friends, moved in the best social circles - and even enjoyed tea with the Queen 
Mother. As proof of their wealth they boasted of their cash reserves and offered as 
evidence, a bogus 'Letter of Credit' for E500 million from a Russian bank. In reality, 
they were broke and jobless. 
Almost all their victims had one thing in common - they had advertised in farming 
magazines. One of their victims advertised a farm they had for sale in Farmers 
Weekly. The fraudsters responded to the advert, claiming they represented a religious 
group who set up their members in farms all over the world. According to the victim, 
the fraudsters became their friends or so they thought. Since they were in no great 
rush to sell the farm it did not worry them that the would-be buyers were taking their 
time with the purchase. The fraudsters stayed with the victim and signed a contract to 
buy the farm. In the meantime the victims (a couple) lent them money to tidy up the 
documentation (a typical excuse to collect moneyupfront). In all they lent them 
E12,000, believing that they would buy the farm and pay them back. They never saw 
them again. The victims said the fraudsters were convincing, and even introduced the 
fraudsters to other friends who also fell prey to their scam. 
The same fraudsters also used other strategies. One of which involved victims they 
met through an advert to buy a top class racing horse. The fraudsters promised to set 
up a business for them, spent about six months with the victims and ended up 
collecting thousands of pounds as 'loan' from a man and his elderly mother. Another 
individual who trusted the fraudsters -a London taxi driver lost E3,000 given to them 
to help set up an oil company-7his victim remarked that the male fraudster was 
convincing and appeared wealthy. At last one 78-year-old retired Colonel who had an 
estate for sale, eventually foiled their exploits (the fraudsters wanted to buy his 
estate). 'Me Colonel checked their -background and found that their words did not 
match up to reality. The disposition of victims exploited showed that they were 
ignorant or naYlve. They were eager. to sell their properties or do business, hence were 
easily led. 
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These property scams were successffil because the techniques of confidence swindling 
were adopted. The fraudsters while interacting with the victims presented an 
appearance of affluence, in addition to bogus documents used to court victims. Their 
main purpose was to build up enough trust with the victims in order to collect or take 
'loans' from them which they had no intention of repaying. By the time they began 
lodging comfortably with their hosts, the collection of deposits was then a question of 
time. 
Another example of a notorious face-to-face contact swindle via property deals is that 
involving time-share accommodation. In the Timeshare Scam (Case No. 40), a racket 
is known to have swindled holidaymakers, most of them elderly and retired couples, 
visiting Tenerife in the Canaries. The con was executed by a network of companies 
that pretended to be independent of each other, but in reality was owned by the same 
man. People were tricked into buying timeshare interests, believing they could be 
rented out every year 'at a wonderful rental'. This scam went on for years. The fraud 
involved about 17,000 couples who were systematically fleeced between 1990-1997. 
It was also estimated that more than E30 million was involved. Visiting tourists were 
approached by the salesmen in Tenerife, and tricked into viewing one of the resorts 
owned by the fraudster, and offered a deal to the timeshare apartments. They were 
told fies about the appreciation in value. Victims then paid a deposit usually taken 
from a credit card and the balance in form of a loan from a finance company. When 
the victims returned to their destinations or homes they discovered that the timeshares 
were not going to be sold at the promised prices. The major culprit of the Tenerife 
timeshare fraud a multimillionaire was jailed for eight years and is regarded as an 
organised criminal by the police. 
Scams associated with relationships 
Face-to-face scams are not limited to the above. Trust can be manipulated and fraud 
carried out both ways (face-to-face and via distance) in the arena of relationships. The 
face-to-face approach exposes the victim completely, and the cost often enormous. 
The exploitation of emotional ties is used to obtain upfront fees or money from 
victims. This relationship could, be through marriage, promise of marriage, affairs, 
family ties or in the business of arranging relationships. In any of these situations, the 
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fraudster takes advantage of the situation he or she is in. In a typical example - the 
Casanova (Case No. 42), a 56-year-old man conned victims out of over; E2 million. He 
was jailed for four and a half years for his offences. Compensation orders were issued 
for some victims. He admitted to II counts of theft and deception. When he was 
arrested, apart from the fact that he was engaged in bigamy, he was still married to 
wife number four. He was also having an affair with his secretary and was engaged to 
a woman deputy bank manager whom he led into a life of crime. 
It was revealed that this fraudster selected his victims systematically. He operated by 
using detailed information from private investigators hired to probe the victims' 
backgrounds, before he dazzled them with proclamations of love and his considerable 
wealth. It was reported that he once absconded with a E250,000 jewellery collection 
after telling a Swiss dealer he was engaged to the Greek shipping heiress Christina 
Onassis. Another female victim, a divorcee, handed over her life savings to him for a 
deal after he told her he was a classmate of King Constantine of Greece and once 
served in his cabinet. He persuaded a woman bank official he seduced, to defraud 
Midland Bank out of E133,000. When the bank became suspicious, he took her on 
trips around the world in an attempt to prevent her from talking. The woman was 
eventually arrested and jailed for three years. He also acquired luxurious properties 
such as expensive cruisers and boats and exotic cars which he effectively used to 
obtain overdraft facilities. In one case, he succeeded in getting mortgage advance of 
E790,000. This is an example were the fraudster used his silver-tongue charm and 
spectacular lies to swindle victims. He used false identities, posing as a high-powered 
businessman with a seven-figure fortune. He also claimed to have been injured by an 
IRA bomb probably to attract some 'sympathy' and portray a figure of bravery. 
In another relationship scam example - Lonely Heart Column Scam (Case No. 44), the 
initial contact was through correspondence. The advance fee was as a result of 
subsequent physical contacts. A divorced mother met a teacher, through the lonely- 
hearts column of a local newspaper. The teacher placed the advert in the paper. When 
the teacher proposed after their second meeting, the woman asked for proof that. his 
love was true and he handed over cheques totalling E 11,000 on the understanding that 
they would never be cashed. But the woman (the fraudster) was looking for fmance 
rather than romance, and withdrew her 'fiancd's' life savings. Then when the teacher 
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sought an explanation, she pretended she had never seen him before. The teacher 
reported the matter to the police. The woman was later found guilty of two charges of 
fraud jailed for six months. 
Finally, in what can be described as a perfect scam because of the criminal 
implications if the victims complained, the Marriages of Convenience Scam (Case 
No. 45), was based on face-to-face contacts. With regard to marriages, the use of 
distance is also known (e. g. letters, Internet etc. ). Upfront payments could be involved 
if money is deposited and the contract unfulfilled. In this example, the victims knew 
the marriage or marriages were not for real, and they can be classified as dishonest. 
During the court trial, the judge remarked that offences of this sort strike at the whole 
foundation of the immigration system. Three of the men involved married a31 -year- 
old lap dancer within 18 months of each other. Other arranged marriages within the 
ring resulted in ten bogus weddings. Each 'victim' paid up to E2,500 each for the 
marriages of convenience. The lap dancer was involved in a total of seven marriages. 
Her first and only legal marriage (though money exchanged hands) was to a31 -year- 
old-man, who was yet to be found. 
The court heard how she masterminded a bride-for-hire immigration racket so that her 
'husbands' could milk the benefits system. It was estimated that the scam cost the 
British taxpayer as much as L200,000. Investigations revealed that wedding 
photographs with the 'fraudster bride' altering her appearance were taken at the 
different occasions or 'wedddings'. These and other bogus documents were submitted 
to the Home Office to support applications for citizenship. It was also noted that some 
of the registrar's reports stated that the marriages appeared to be bogus, but the 
suspicions were not investigated. 
Fraud involving general goods and services 
With regard to general goods and services, confident fraudsters who take their time to 
present credible fronts sell certain products to all categories of victims. Thus they 
succeed in collecting advance fees for worthless products and services. Some 
examples include the following: 
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In the Manorial Titles Scam (Case No. 5 1), rich Americans and Arabs -were swindled 
out of about E54,000 for titles they believed would bring them close to royalty. Two 
men, a travel agent, and an unemployed forged and sold more than 20 certificates of 
manorial titles, sealed with wax and apparently signed by Lord Denning, a former 
Master of the Rolls. They were ordered to serve 160 hours' community service by the 
Judge in a south London court. The judge defended this mild sentence saying that 
their guilty pleas spared witnesses from travelling across the Atlantic, and that they 
co-operated with the police. 
To help to fool their victims, the fraudsters set up bogus companies, invented a non- 
existent establishment, the Institution of Heraldic Affairs and created a company of 
solicitors that wrote glowing references for them. They also 'formed' the Stamford 
Perry and Fitzgerald, a company supposedly established in 1835, dealing with 
overseas land registry. They promised victims that they would be given priority on 
Her Majesty's social list, and the right to ride in the 18 th carriage at the Queen 
Mother's birthday celebrations. One of the victims adopted the name - Lewis of 
Godington. Victims were assured that they would be addressed as Lord, their wives as 
Lady and their children as the Right Honourable. Owners were entitled to have their 
own coat of arms, which could be emblazoned on all correspondence. They also 
claimed that the titles could be resold at a profit. The certificates issued were written 
by a calligrapher on special paper. Many names of titles were genuine, selected from 
10,000 listed in the Domesday Book -a legitimate directory. 
It was also revealed that in the course of their activities they advertised in The Wall 
Street Journal, The Economist, and the main English language magazine of the United 
Arab Emirates. They were known to fly to the States to entertain clients and lavished 
meals at top hotels before handing over documents. In one occasion a sword was 
presented to a client. Out of the more than 20 victims, the biggest loss cam from a 
victim who paid 09,000 for three titles and a coat of arms. The use of psychology 
and impressions on victims can be observed-here. The type of victims involved are 
those who adore titles. This is not unconnected with the social status accorded to those 
with manorial titles. 
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Finally, in another typical advance fee fraud scam, the Debt Collection Fee Scam 
(Case No. 53), the fraudster obtained E60,000, (E94,000) from two Isle of Man 
residents. The money was intended to cover the costs of collecting $48 million, which 
the fraudster (a South African) claimed the Nigerian government owed him for 
armaments. He had promised his victims, a total of $1 million as commission. But the 
Nigerian government owed him nothing. It was revealed that he used the money 
obtained from victims to live at the Holiday Inn Hotel at Gatwick Airport near 
London, hiring female escorts at E400 per night. In one of the fraudster's visits to the 
island, he presented fake documents to back his claims. He subsequently asked his 
victims for a ffirther $25,000 for the trip to Nigeria to pick up his cheque of $48 
million. It is clear in this case that the victims were either nalve or dishonest to believe 
that money of that magnitude has to be spent to collect a debt. The value of the 
commission also appears 'too good to be true'. 
To conclude this section, it is not possible to exhaust all the patterns and arena in 
which frauds of this nature - the collection of upfront payments occurs, where the 
fraudster physically interacts with the victim. Certain attributes can be associated with 
fraud via face-to-face contacts. 'Me fraudster is usually very confident to approach the 
victim, risking physical identification. This probably facilitates trust and confidence 
because the victim is given the impression that there is nothing to hide. Familiarity 
with the victim also plays an important role. For example a financial adviser in a bank 
in the UK was jailed for fraudulently taking E145,000 from 18 customers of the bank. 
Because he was not working on behalf of the bank, the bank could not grant any 
refund to the victims. The fraudster's or 'bank's' clients trusted him because they had 
earlier bought legitimate investments from him (The Financial Times 24/02/010). 
Further, dishonest victims lost substantial sums of money compared to the naYve and 
innocent or honest victims. The important thing to note in our discussion is the way in 
which the fraudsters created trust and confidence. This is what gives the fraud 
involving the collection of money voluntarily from victims one of its unique 
attributes. Money was voluntarily paid upfront in anticipation of a deal, transaction or 
activity - an issue that -could make prosecution complicated in certain cases. If the 
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victim is not particu! arly vigilant, observant, and well informed he or she is likely to 
fall prey. 
Physical interaction is a bold way of building trust and confidence. At the end of the 
discussion on fraud from a distance, there is a tabular presentation on the key 
characteristics of the face-to-face and fraud by distance approaches (Table 6.6). This 
is an attempt to surnmarise our findings. 
6.3.2 Manipulation of trust for fraud from a distance 
Fraudsters communicate and obtain deposits from victims by false pretences from a 
distance or by proxy. This can be perpetrated in different arenas or areas of human 
endeavour. The fraudster's decision to adopt a given approach depends on the type of 
scam. Fraud from a distance is the most common form of advance fee fraud. Over the 
years, fraudsters have realised that it is possible to create confidence and trust without 
physical contact with the victim. Advances in communication technologies such as 
the telephone, fax and the Internet have helped to perfect such practices. More so the 
fraudster avoids the risk of physical identification. Scams can also be initiated from a 
distance then 'consumed' after a face-to-face encounter with the victim. In cases of 
this sort, the victim having been convinced of the deal decides or is invited to go and 
see things first hand. At this stage, the victim may be kidnapped, killed, or given the 
opportunity to hand over the funds voluntarily. In fact it is advance fee fraud from a 
distance that has popularised or exposed this pattern of fraud - obtaining money by 
false pretences. With this strategy it is possible to contact millions of victims at the 
same time over different continents. This creates problems for law enforcement and 
investigations especially if the victim does not report or co-operate with the 
authorities. To understand this practice, some examples are examined below. 
Investment Scams 
There are certain attributes peculiar to this mode of trust building. A good example is 
that of the exploitation of current or past events. The British beef scare and the 
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resultant alternatives supposedly found in the farming of ostrich meat created avenues 
for fraudsters who operated by proxy. The Ostrich Farming Corporation Scam (OFC) 
(Case No. 7) is one of the two examples in this thesis of fraud involving the marketing 
of ostrich meat to dupe investors. Ostrich farming was seen to be a trendy form of 
investment, partly because the meat is low in calories and cholesterol. The 'mad cow' 
scare also contributed to its popularity. It is noted that the ostrich meat market is not 
yet established. Glossy brochures billed 'the meat of the future' claimed the birds 
were being farmed in Belgium and that the company was represented in Malaysia, 
Cyprus and Bahrain. In addition to the advantages of ostrich farming, it claimed the 
meat was a healthy alternative to beef and schools were already experimenting on 
ostrich burgers. The feathers could also be sold for; E400 per pound and could be used 
for theatrical costumes, and non-static dusters, while the hide could be used for 
handbags. Subscribers to the company were promised memberships to the privileged 
'Ostrich Owners Club' - this was supposed to serve as a status symbol. 
The Ostrich Farming Corporation (OFC) ran an extremely effective marketing 
campaign. They promised minimum annual returns of 51.6% for 5 years or a return of 
up to 2,000% in 10 years (a claim that would readily appeal to the nallve victim). 
Television and newspaper advertisements were so convincing that most victims did 
not see the need to visit the farm (avoiding additional costs). Investors were invited to 
buy chicks for L500 or adult birds costing up to L14,000. By the end of December 
1995 the firm had raised more than E5 million and more cheques were still rolling in. 
The birds were kept at several locations in Belgium. Investors were told each bird 
would be electronically tagged or micro-chipped according to ownership, and will 
eventually be sold as meat. They actually sold the same bird to different people. It is 
estimated that about 3,000 investors were affected. 
It was revealed that investors with the OFC stand to lose everything because their 
money was used to buy ostriches not shares. Ostriches are not considered financial 
products; nor are the investors entitled to payment from the Investors Compensation 
Scheme, should the business collapse. The protective umbrella of the city regulators 
does not cover investments in animals. The SFO launched an investigation and the 
DTI asked the High Court to have the company closed and to appoint a provisional 
liquidator/official receiver. This was effectively done in April 1996. Directors of OFC 
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were said to have siphoned off investors' money through disadvantageous -contracts 
with suppliers and bogus companies. In Court it was heard that the five 'businessmen' 
netted about E22 million from investors in the scheme, and that only E25,000 was 
used to establish the company. 
In another ostrich farm deal similar in modus oPerandi to that above - the Ostrich 
Breeding Company later called Ostrich Centre Ltd (Case No. 19), a glossy brochure 
promised returns of up to 70% a year for 25 years. This also lured investors. They 
advertised in national newspapers with the slogan "Ostrich Nest Egg", and stressing 
the low-fat nature and other uses of ostrich meat. This was also timed at the height of 
the BSE scare in 1995. A couple set up and managed the business. A total of 115 
people invested an aggregate sum of f. 875,000 before the holding company was 
declared insolvent in July 1996. By then, E329,000 had been siphoned to offshore 
accounts in Jersey and the Bahamas. 
The cases above show that advertising and the mailing system can effectively be used 
to recruit victims. Due to distance, all the fraudsters had to do was to market their 
product via impressive brochures and the media. The confidence and trust generated is 
not unconnected with conventional business practices of attracting new shareholders 
to a viable business project. Unfortunately, unless the company or investors take 
adequate insurance measures, it is not uncommon for any business to experience 
unforeseen circumstances and eventually collapse. Thus, the pre-planned investment 
fraudster simply takes his time accumulating deposits from investors before claims of 
business setbacks are made public. The fraudster will always make a profit because 
sometimes certain compensation schemes may cover the victims. 
In another pattern of a scam from a distance, in the Prize Cheque Scam (Case No. 20), 
two pensioners (husband and wife) in their 70s thought they were lucky when they 
received a prize cheque in the mail for E7,500. They took it to their bank and it was 
credited to their account. Later the bank informed them that the cheque was bogus and 
had been returned costing then E140 in bank charges. The cheque came from New 
York-based Justin Grant Inc, with impressive documents designed to con the 
pensioners into sending them E6.99 as 'processing fee'. In scams similar to this, 
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worthless prizes are usually sent to the 'winner' if, anything is sent at all. Further, 
refunds never happen because the outfits hide behind PO boxes abroad. Many of the 
mailings are delivered in Royal Mail prepaid envelopes, which means the con men get 
cheap postal rates. It was revealed that research by the Royal Mail showed that one in 
five of Britain's II million pensioners admits to being conned. Data protection laws 
still stop them from telling who their prepaid customers are. The fraudster definitely 
exploits this situation. 
The disposition of victims is not always clear, because, genuine draws do exist. It is 
the responsibility of the 'player' to verify the status of the organisers. In the example 
above, E6.99 was demanded upfront, the fraudsters were mischievous the second time 
to have sent the cheque as this made things worse for the victim. If credit card 
transactions were involved, the victim would have probably released some more cash 
before physically cashing the cheque. The aim of the -fraudster in mail/prize scams has 
to do with little fees, large numbers of victims, less stress from victim because of 
value of loss and as such more profit. 
Medical Scams 
In medical frauds carried out from a distance, advertisement and false claims are 
common place. For example, the fraudster in The Potency Cream Scam (Case No. 26) 
sold creams, which were expected to 'reawaken one's sex drive'. Many men, who 
sent L27 for a tub of the cream, received nothing. Experts consulted said the cream 
was no more than any regular body cream. The use of the post helps to provide 
anonymity for the customer, at the same time, the seller cannot be physically 
identified. Men affected would also be shy, ashamed or embarrassed to pursue the 
matter. A situation the fraudster is aware off. In medical scams, target selection is 
crucial, because the product or service in question must have a unique market to sell 
effectively. Thus, a particular age group is targeted. Those that cannot be accessed 
through the acquired mailing lists can always be reached through advertisements in 
newspapers and Internet. Again the money demanded' is relatively small - this reduces 
the urge for the victim to Pursue the matter. 
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Education and Training 13cams 
Fraudsters also manipulate trust, execute fraud or collect payments upfront through 
educational and training programmes from a distance. Today, studying by 
correspondence is not unusual, and fees have to be paid for such services or training. 
Upfront fees are required for the student to receive the required materials. The fraud 
here concerns the validity of the certificates earned. It is important for the victims to 
pay for the courses upfront so that the fraudster can vanish with the proceeds before 
the scheduled date of the training or without forwarding any document. At any rate, in 
most cases training courses do not exist in the first place. This shows how fraudsters 
exploit the conventional use of correspondence for studies. In rare situations, the 
fraudsters may risk face-to-face contact by running the unaccredited programmes. The 
use of education such as school fees and other activities that require some finance to 
acquire some training is an ongoing event. Even children or young students probably 
claim extra expenses for social activities from their parents or sponsors on the 
pretence that it is for school. This is usually not viewed as fraud or 'crime', however, 
the definition may change depending on the amount involved and the effect it may 
have on the giver or victim. Victims are mainly unemployed youths and those who 
want to change or get into new careers. 
In a typical example of the use of distance to fleece victims, and how trust and 
confidence is sustained - the International School of Finance and Management Scam 
(Case No. 33) was supposedly based in California but in reality was the invention of 
people based at a Reading UK business centre. A Russian and a British couple carried 
out this scam. They claimed to organise courses. Reports revealed that hundreds of 
Russian businessmen paid, in total, about $2.4 million (fl. 5m) to enrol for the courses 
on western business management - only to discover that they were part of an 
international fraud. The Roosevelt Foundation in the US was said to be the sponsor of 
the 'School'. The court heard how almost 700 businesses responded to the 
advertisements and 1,450 people applied for the course. Envelopes containing 
brochures about the training programme were distributed to most professional 
companies in all fields indicating that the course was mainly for upper and middle 
management staff. The mailing centre was at Heathrow in London. 'Professors' from 
London School of Economics and Harvard were expected to deliver lectures. 
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ApIplicants were promised seminars in finance, management, marketing and 
technology, as well as flights and accommodation for two weeks. Participants were 
also promised fact-ffiding visits to American companies, the possibility of special 
study grants and even $500,000 (000,000) reward for particularly innovative 
companies. Victims were told a guide would meet them at the designated hotel in the 
United States. The fraudsters asked for payments to be sent to accounts in London and 
Geneva. 
From the above, certain practices enabled this fraud to succeed. The fraudsters took 
advantage of the 'new order' in Russia where corporations are now encouraged to 
diversify and imbibe new methods of economic management, especially from the 
successful countries in the west. This idea was bound to find favour with Russian 
companies. The USA appeared to be the ideal spot for this purpose going by their 
economic successes. The name-dropping of non-existent professors and the 
mentioning of Ivy League institutions and the Roosevelt Foundation as sponsors 
helped to paint the ideal picture of the 'class' of people involved in the whole 
arrangement. The international dimension of the programme implied that at that stage 
face-to-face contacts were not necessary - the course had to be paid for first. 
On the issue of trust, applicants including companies probably thought con men 
would not play pranks with the names of such reputable institutions. The enticing 
offer of a two-week 'holiday', visits and mouth watering anticipated prizes appeared 
to be a good deal for any enterprising organisation. Demanding for fees upfront is not 
unusual for this purpose, as the organisers may need funds to conclude certain 
arrangements and to plan ahead. On the other hand, it is not also unusual for reputable 
conference or seminar organisers to advice intended applicants to come to the venue 
armed with certified cheques for instance - this depends on the organisers. In the final 
analysis, the established system of conference organising and payment was exploited 
in - addition to the enthusiasm of applicants. The use of credible names and 
establishments created trust and confidence and victims saw no need to verify claims 
before acting. The odd few that made enquiries exposed the scam. Otherwise, people 
would have travelled down to the States. 
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Varieties of fraud involving education and training cannot be exhausted. The market 
is always there as young people and the working population needs to improve 
themselves at minimal cost. Fraudsters conversant with educational and training 
practices exploit the situation and sometimes charge 'forgettable' fees for the scam to 
go on 'peacefully'. Con men present the ideal structure or operational system in the 
legitimate industry. Prosecution in some cases can be difficult, if training is actually 
given (though worthless), and the fraudster is smart not to claim official accreditation 
for such in writing. 
Charity frauds 
Charity frauds can also be operated from a distance, though face-to-face contacts are 
preferred as noted in the previous section. With regard to distant communication and 
collection of money, technological equipment is used. For example, in the Fax Charity, 
Donor Fraud (Case No. 36), the fraudster made use of his fax machine to swindle. 
charity organisations directly by pretending he was interested in making a donation. 
The fraudster faxed charities telling them he wanted to make a donation, and asked 
their fundraising departments to respond to him via fax with their addresses. He gives 
them a premium-rate fax line that takes up to LIa minute in cost. 
When confronted by investigative journalists he boasted that he had made a fortune 
from his activities, and felt no remorse. The fraudster collects his 'fees' in advance of 
the anticipated donation via his facsimile. Charities respond to his request because 
such gestures are not common, so they are glad to co-operate. ICSTIS (premium rate 
line authorities) finally fined the fraudster fl, 500 and banned him from operating a 
premium rate line for three months. He was said to have breached four rules of the 
ICSTIS code of practice including obtaining revenue under false pretences and having 
misleading promotional material. The facsimile can also be used for other frauds not 
connected with charity. For example, certain con men send faxes to hotels asking for 
information via fax about their best room and a sample menu for special events such, 
as Valentine's Day. They conceal the information that the reply would cost El a 
minute. 
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General goods and services 
Fraud in the area of general products and services can also occur via the mail or from 
a distance. The fraudster avoids the risk of physical contact while receiving cheques 
for worthless items. For example, in the Good Restaurant Guide Scam (Case No. 57), 
worthless certificates of honour were sold to proprietors. In this scam, a con man 
fooled more than 10,000 restaurants across the country into parting with cash. He later 
left the country after the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decided not to press 
charges because he actually supplied certificates. He is thoughtlito have netted about 
E500,000 from his scam. He simply wrote to the restaurants, saying they had passed a 
secret inspection and were entitled to a special certificate and inclusion in the 
forthcoming '1998 Good Restaurant Guide' - all for just E19. Owners were 
unctuously congratulated and the cheques flowed in. In reality, the certificates were 
worth no more than the paper they were printed on and the guide never existed. The 
fraudster was aware of the enthusiasm this would generate. Most restaurants can 
comfortably forgo E20. Probably this was why the verification of his or the 
company's status was not carried out much earlier. In this case, the fraudster collected 
advance fees for the worthless certificates, which he supplied to keep the scam on. 
It is said that in the height of his scam he cashed up to L5,000 worth of cheques a 
week. When trading standard officials caught up with him, they found E80,000 
uncashed cheques and another E20,000 in that day's mailbag. He used a computer, 
and an expensive printer (to give the certificates the appearance of authenticity and 
class). Investigators revealed that the fraudster had devised similar schemes in the past 
targeting garages, florists, takeaways and hairdressers. The decision not to prosecute 
by the CPS was attributed to lack of enough evidence, and that the fraudster actually 
sent certificates to those who sent him money, however worthless they were. This 
outcome was said to have infuriated police and council officials. , 
Fraudsters are involved in dubious services,. of all kinds. In an example of fraud using 0 
unsolicited services, telephone lines are the major avenues for the scam. In cases of 
this sort, whether the victim goes ahead with the purchase of a product or service does 
not matter much, because the fraudster would have already obtained benefits from the 
first contact with him through a premium rate line. Certain scams that involve 
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embarrassing activities are commonly used. For instance, via the Internet, according 
to the Association of Payment Clearing Services (APCS) in Europe, for Mastercard, 
those who run 'adult' websites execute half of all electronic fraud (The Sunday Times 
11/02/01: 6). Their customers, the pom fans, are the least likely to complain out loud. 
It is generally accepted that online crime is rising with online commerce. The Sunday 
Times also revealed that statistics show that the most common form of Internet crime 
exploits online auctions, where goods paid for never arrive. And Internet Fraud Watch 
estimates that 8 out of 10 cases of all online fraud originate on auction sites. The 
average loss is about 000, mostly paid by money order or credit card. 
In the Fax Directory Scam (Case No. 64), the fraudster set up a business called 
Nationwide List Brokers. He then sent faxes congratulating would-be victims on the 
fact that they are going to be included in a fax mail directory. The implication of this 
was that they should expect to be bombarded with unsolicited 'bargains', which 
would render their fax machine inoperative for normal business. He then suggests two 
ways of avoiding this impending avalanche. The victim could either send him a E3 
"removal charge" by post or call his premium rate line, which cost the same amount. 
This amount appears little but is enormous considering the number of people 
contacted. The same fraudster is known to have been involved in a fake male sex drug 
for which he was convicted and given a 12 month suspended jail sentence. Here the 
fraudster was aware that serious businesses would rather spend 0 than be disrupted. 
The advance fee is affordable. 
Similarly, in the Free Holiday Offer Scam (Case No. 74) a firm calls people saying 
they have won a free holiday. But for it to be claimed, the would-be victim would 
have to call a premium rate number. The 'winners' are not told that the cost of the call 
is El a minute and that they are likely be kept on the line for almost five minutes. 
When the recorded message finishes, there is a very short space to leave your name 
and address, meaning that you have to call again. If you succeeded in leaving your 
details, a 'different' firm contacts you. They congratulate you, stating that your ticket 
and accommodation are completely -free, but you have to pay a processing fee of 
E39.50 per person - this is not mentioned in the original phone can (the second stage 
of the scam/fraud after paying for the premium rate phone line). You also learn that 
the holiday vouchers only applies to homeowners over 20 and under 65 years. You are 
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also expected to be married and living together with your partner for two years. The 
voucher provides hotel rooms for six, but only two free flights. Also, other flight 
tickets must be bought from a particular firn-4 which it was revealed had expensive 
rates. By the time the victim gets disgusted with all these requirements, money has 
already been lost. 
To conclude this section, generally, the fraudulent provision of goods and services is 
the most common method of many scams. In this thesis, it accounts for 39% of the 
sample of cases. The upfront fees are usually collected as processing fees, application 
fees, partial or full deposits for the item in question. Technology such as the Internet 
and telephones, facsimiles, plastic cards etc has facilitated this. This approach is 
convenient for the fraudster because of its wide geographical coverage and the little 
reliance on physical contacts, confidence and trusts building. The fraudster depends 
on elements of probability. Most people will not respond but the few that do respond 
are ready to spend some money. With millions of transactions and enquiries going on 
daily, it is not likely that victims will be patient to go through the details of validating 
dealers or businesses. Not all would-be victims may have the time to buy products 
from the shop by themselves. They would rather risk a partial sum of money, which 
collectively amounts to a tidy sum for the fraudster. Doing away with premium rate 
lines will not only reduces revenue generated by the telecom. industry, it would also 
increase postal pressure and would ultimately affect legitimate businesses. 
Let us now look at he characteristics of victims and fraudsters in the next section. 
6.4. Characteristics of victims and fraudsters 
In the course of our analytical discussion, certain traits of victims have been 
mentioned. From the data in this thesis, a tabulation of certain characteristics can be 
seen below. The average sanctions given to offenders are highlighted in this table. 
Issues concerning the sentencing of fraudsters are discussed in the next section. The 
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information used are those that were specifically mentioned in the particular cases 
from the samples of fraud in this thesis. 
Table 6.5 
Gender, age and sanctions distribution in data 
Offence Gender Average Average sanctions Estimated amount 
categories age involved 
Investment M- 18 47 Jail sentence - 56 months or 
(Total cases 22) F- 1 4.6 years in 14 instances fl. 5 billion 
Couples- 1 Disqualification - 5-10 
years, in 7 instances 
Fine/compensation- 3 cases 
Deportation- 2 instances 
On the run- 2 instances 
Medical M-1 50 Jail sentence - 90 months or 
Services/ F-2 2.5 years E600,000 
Products Fine -I instance 
(Total cases 4) Deportation -I instance 
Religion M-4 52 Jail sentence- 3 months 
(Total cases 3) F-I Litigation- 1 03 million 
Couples- I Others no litigation, leaders (over E400milllion 
on the run at risk) 
Education and M-3 36 Jail term - 28.5 months or 
Training F-1 2.3 years. f. 50,000 
(Total cases 4) Couples- I 
Charity M-4 36 Jail term 30 months or 
(Total cases 4) 2.5 years U million 
Fine -I instance 
Property M-7 46 Jail term 16 months or 
(Total cases 3) F-2 1.3 years E30 million 
Couples- I On the run -1 
Relationships M- 10 38 Jail term - 17 months or 1.4 
(Total cases 10) F-6 years 0 million 
Fine -2 instances 
Deportation -3 instances 
General M-31 40 Jail term - 21 months or 1.7 
Services/ F-4 years f. 10 million 
Products Couples- I Community service -I 
(Total cases 32) Fine -9 instances 
Liquidation -2 
Disqualification -2 
No litigation -9 
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Comments 
In general, the average age of offenders is about 43 years. As observed in other 
research this is within the average age of fraudsters. Male offenders are higher in 
number, and some fraudsters operate as couples. Given that this compilation is a very 
little proportion of the general picture, one can expect ideal representations of all 
categories using larger examples to be similar. It has been argued that sentences are 
generally mild for fraudsters compared to the amount of loss suffered by victims. 
Though the courts apply sanctions as stipulated by statues. It is suggested that 
fraudsters should be given the alternative of indefinite or life imprisonment which will 
be revoked once victims are compensated to a satisfactory degree. This approach 
would definitely create a dilemma for the fraudster who has initially calculated the 
cost/benefit of a few years or months in confinement and coming out to enjoy and 
reinvest the proceeds of crime. 
6.4.1 Victims 
This research has shown that a victim could be an individual, group or organisation. 
Victims are chosen from all walks of life especially the elderly that probably have 
'idle' funds and are in the need for some 'adventure'. Generally, studies on victims of 
fraud are few. In certain types of crime, according to Levi: 
It is an analytical truth that all victims bear some responsibility for their 
victimisation. In the case of long-form fraud, the degree of 'victim 
participation' is greater and more positive than it is in most types of property 
crime, because the victim parts with his property voluntarily to the offender 
(Levi, 1981: 126). 
The remark above does not imply that the victim is dishonest or is to be blamed for 
his victimisation. 
In Canada, the National Task Force on telemarketing fraud called Project 
Phonebusters; note that victims of fraud could be individuals, groups, corporations or 
all the above independently or jointly. Project Phonebusters (1997) reported that 
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between January and May 1997 over half (51%) of the victims of telemarketing scams 
that paid out money were over 60 years old and this age group represented 73% of 
those victimised for scams worth over $5,000 (Janhevich, 1998). 
Currently, issues concerning the victim's plight receive a lot of attention especially 
from the media. In Levi's (1985) study, he observed that fraud victims do not 
normally feature in crime victimisation surveys. Levi also notes Fattah's (1986) 
observation that most Victim Movements are concerned about personal victims of 
street and household crime and are not aware of the plight of fraud victims. The 
victim's perception about the degree of danger of a particular type of crime is also 
significant. According to Churchil, in cases of advance fee frauds, victims normally 
do not report the fraud to the police, rather they put aside the event as an experience. 
This is because the amount of money lost may be regarded as small or because they 
fear looking foolish for falling for the fraud. This situation is perfect for the fraudster, 
who is likely to repeat the scam (Churchil, 1997). 
Certain observations were made in a study that examined the impact of fraud and 
fraud victims' perception of the various parts of the criminal justice system 
irrespective of previous contacts with them. In this study, Levi (1985) also looked at 
the media's handling of fraud cases and the nature of victim/offender interactions. 
Court cases were sampled to review the types of victims and offenders. Interviews 
and questionnaires were given to some victims. In addition, some radio and television 
producers were interviewed and content analysis made of their programmes. In this 
study, it was revealed that most victims whose cases were prosecuted in the two 
courts used were organisations (15%. were private individuals). Large frauds typically 
involved more social interaction between victims and offenders and were mainly 
carried out by white-collar males. Family and (former) friends were the main culprits 
in cases of fraud on private individuals. Private victims had no insurance protection 
against loss. Further, 37% of all victims thought their fraud was a serious loss. Under 
half of all victims informed other organisations, friends, contact about the fraud, and 
majority of the victims felt the police responded appropriately to their complaint and 
received useful advice from them (Levi, 1985). 
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Also, with regard to sanctions, on views from the media, and public opinion about 
fraud, in Levi's study about half of all victims felt the sentences offenders got were 
lenient or very lenient. Others considered them to be adequate. Nobody felt the 
sentences were too severe. 40% of all victims considered that their rights had not been 
fully enforced, particularly in respect of compensation. Many frauds and alleged 
abuses of corporate or governmental power received considerable coverage by the 
media. The media also saw fraud as serious, but few fraudsters were seen as evil. 
Many victims were considered as greedy or careless - an attitude or situation that was 
said to have created the opportunity for the offence. 
Further, individuals who are not necessarily wealthy are more likely to be the victims 
of mail order and investment frauds (LevL 1988). Businesses are the prime victims of 
credit and computer frauds. With regard to the number of offences, the most common 
frauds involve the use of plastic money. This is attributable to the 'cashless' methods 
of economic transactions today. Going by these developments, Levi states that the 
financial sector (banks, building societies, and insurance companies) accounts for a 
substantial part of the costs of fraud recorded by Fraud Squads. 
In this research, most of the victims were the elderly. Interviews with investigating 
officers reveal that fraudsters target them because it is assumed that they have 
accumulated some savings over the years. Most are also retired and would probably 
pick up interest in 'new commercial' activities. In addition, unless the loss is 
extremely large, most elderly victims would rather forget the incident because of the 
anticipated stress and time involved in pursuing the matter. The total number of 
victims from a particular scam can be quite large and peculiar attributes depend on the 
type of scam or product involved. 
For instance, in scams involving emotional relationships, most of the victims are 
women who are either single or divorced and middle-aged or over. In some few cases 
men have also been exploited. The fraudster manipulates the vulnerability of the 
victim's circumstances or situation. In charity scams all categories of victims are 
exploited, especially those within the older age brackets who have and are willing to 
make donations in cash or kind. Victims of investment frauds are generally na1ve, and 
are quick to cash in on supposedly lucrative deals. 
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In some cases, honest victims are exploited especially when the scam in question has 
been created in line with conventional practices or where the victim is familiar with 
the fraudster. The highest number of victims are usually associated with investment 
scams and frauds involving general goods and services. Unemployed people are 
mainly the targets of educational training scams. Those already in industry also fall 
prey to fake courses. In religious scams, the victims selected from all walks of life 
especially via the family, and are so immersed in the 'cult' that the fraudsters milks 
them as much as possible. 
To sum up, it should be noted that victims of fraud involving the manipulation of trust 
come from all spheres of human endeavour, and are of different ages. With the 
Internet today, it is possible for children less than 10 years old to fall prey. In some 
cases the very educated have been conned. This is so because trust is an important 
ingredient in social interaction and the fraudsters exploit this fact. The victim's role in 
the prevention of fraud is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
6.4.2 The fraudster 
The usual fraudster or perpetrator of fraud within the commercial context or 
environment is privileged, of high status, well educated, male, and in a position of 
respect in society (Nightingale, 1996). For Janhevich (1998) fraud is not a 
homogeneous category of crime as it ranges from the simple to the complex. Exposed 
individuals will obviously carry out the more complicated frauds that also require 
reasonable investment. In other words, 'a typical offender' category will be difficult 
to substantiate. 
In Lcvi's (1985) study, most of the fraudsters were blue-collar, described as typical 
males and unemployed at the time of the offence, and in general, was without 
educational qualifications and likely to be unmarried. He was also likely to be a solo 
offender with very modest socio-economic status, who makes use of deception to 
obtain cash or goods from organisations such as banks, government agencies and 
employers. The blue-collar offenders were not likely to use their own business or 
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profession as a tool of fraud. On the other hand, the white-collar male fraudster was 
typically older, employed at the time of the offence, educated to a reasonable 
standard, and married with children. The white-collar fraudster typically used his 
organisation as one of his tools in manipulating the fraud. Levi's research revealed 
that 'blue-collar frauds' were dealt with far more rapidly than other frauds especially 
those that involved private victims. This can be attributed to their relatively simple or 
less complicated nature and the ease in which victims identified them. 
In the Guardian (08/02/99) it was reported that the typical fraudster is in middle 
management and works alone, according to a survey carried out by Nottingham 
Business School. The survey found that middle managers are the people with the most 
opportunities. The survey also discovered that the higher up an organisation, the more 
an individual could get away with it, and the less he or she is likely to come under 
suspicion. When the petty cash goes astray everyone is apt to blame the cleaners, not 
the partners. This survey did not specifically draw attention to the fraud of obtaining 
by false pretences or advance fee fraud. 
It is now known that solicitors in particular play important roles and could be directly 
involved in fraud. In a typical example, according to the Times (12/04/01), a solicitor 
was fined E25,000 at a disciplinary tribunal for frightening thousands of homeowners 
into paying high fees by claiming that their properties were in danger of being 
repossessed. He demanded upfront fees of more than E250 for standard letters about 
ground rent arrears, even for those that owed as little as E6.50. He was brought before 
the disciplinary panel of the Law Society after 42 homeowners complained. It was 
revealed that his activities went on for about seven years. 
Walters, (1995,1999) addressed the problem/implications of advance fee fraud from 
the perspective of the legal profession. According to Walters, (1995) advance fee 
fraud is becoming increasingly sophisticated and is still claiming victims who lose 
large sums of money which are rarely recovered. He notes that figures from the Office 
for the Supervision of Solicitors (OSS) suggest that they have discovered more than 
40 potential advance fee or investment type frauds in which solicitors are involved 
(Walters, 1999). The more problematic advance fee frauds are the 'investment' types. 
This may involve fraudsters offering victims the opportunity of investing in 
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complicated financial transactions such as 'prime bank instruments' or discounted 
stand-by letters of credit, a free or very low interest (self-liquidating) loan or the 
opportunity to win a lucrative contract. The fraudster requests for an advance payment 
as a precondition to their involvement. This fee is then stolen. 
For Walters, the legal profession is affected in some of the following ways: 
* In the case of 'Nigerian' letter type frauds, the risk is that the solicitors targeted by 
the fraudsters may be tempted to use the clients' money. This can be used to make 
any initial payment requested by the fraudsters to cover expenses such as airline 
tickets and hotel accommodation, or the solicitors may give details of the clients' 
bank account to the fraudsters. The intention is to steal any available money. 
Solicitors can be used as 'custodians'. The investor is told that the 'refundable' fee 
will be held for safety, by a lawyer in 'escrow' (a separate account independent of 
the transaction in question). The Solicitor can be in England or Wales so if 
necessary, the investor can make claims either on the solicitor's professional 
indemnity insurance, the Solicitor's Indemnity Fund, or the Law Society's 
Compensation Fund (all these may not be successful). If the solicitor is part of the 
scam, he or she has the opportunity to loot or divert the funds in this account. 
* Solicitors help to write letters, with the aim of persuading the victim and 
authenticating the proposed transaction. 
Solicitors are giving undertakings to third parties in relation to the holding and 
release of money in the likelihood of non-compliance with the terms of the 
agreement. 
Solicitors may be actively looking for investors to introduce to supposed 
investment schemes. 
Solicitors may themselves be the fraudsters, stealing advance fees from investors. 
Walters cites the example of Charles Deacon (Case No. 6 in this thesis) who 
obtained $19 million from investors, $14 million of which was never recovered. 
Walters concludes that the solicitors involved may be fraudsters. They may 
deliberately or negligently ignore the risks of the transactions and are ignorant of the 
risks and warnings on such practices given by the Law Society and the press at large. 
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They could also be exploiting the existence of the Compensation Fund and insurance 
cover as a means of encouraging the investors to deposit funds in escrows 
(independent accounts from the transaction in question). He notes that there is no 
excuse for the current failings of the legal profession and those of its regulators. Such 
malpractice or frauds damages the reputation of the legal profession and other 
professions associated with the transactions and the fmancial world in which it 
operates in general (Walters, 1995,1999). 
In support of the arguments above, Hoogenboom (2001) in his discussion on illegal 
financial services and the offshore industry notes that professional money laundering 
specialists sell high quality services, contacts, experience and knowledge of money 
movements. These services are supported by the latest electronic technology, and 
made available to the trafficker or criminal willing to pay their lucrative fees. Further, 
this practice makes enforcement more difficult, especially in cases where legitimate 
and illegitimate funds are deliberately combined from different sources. In the case of 
advance fee frauds, the criminal consultant diverts fees paid for certain services. Thus, 
it is possible for. legitimate and illegitimate business transactions to fall prey to the 
crooked professional. 
In an analogy of financial crimes, Hoogenboorn (2001) developed the concept 'market 
for illegal financial services'. In this market approach towards economic crime he 
notes that a distinction can be made between individuals or players in the supply, 
demand and product lines. On the supply side, the following groups or categories are 
involved: lawyers, accountants and other professional financial service providers; 
correspondent banking; offshore banking; private banking; insurance companies; 
onshore banking; fiscal advisors; and stockbrokers. He notes a prominent example of 
fraud by mainly accounting professionals - the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) fraud where a bank supposedly worth $20 billion became 
worthless despite the involvement of auditors over the years. 
On the demand side, Hoogenboorn notes that a large number of parties can be 
identified. These include individuals and corporations who enter the market for tax 
evasion purposes, money laundering and paying bribes around the world if necessary; 
organised criminals (drugs, weapon, women etc. ) for the purpose of money 
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laundering. For Hoogenboom, in some instances criminals exploit the statuses of these 
professionals to minimise suspicion. As in conventional business practice, a certain 
amount of credibility and ethical standards are presumed to be associated with the 
work of certain professions. 
Of relevance to the role of certain individuals or professionals is the nature of 
'contract' and its facilatators or 'custodians'. For Fukuyama (1995) rules and 
contracts have not eliminated the need for trust in all spheres of human endeavour. 
For example, professionals like doctors, lawyers, or university professors, having 
received the required training for accreditation and practice, are expected to use their 
judgement and initiative in practice. The nature of their judgement is to complex to 
have all the details spelt out in black and white. Thus, professionals are in the position 
to go about their business relatively unsupervised and as such, are generally more 
trusted than non-professionals. The concept of 'professional' is associated with 
integrity and good conduct. In this regard, it is possible for the professional to betray 
the trust placed in him or her. Unfortunately, all commercial activities are based on 
some financial risk either on the part of the seller or provider of a product or service 
or the consumer. 
In conclusion, in this thesis, it was observed that fraudsters are found in all areas of 
human endeavour. Few fraudsters operate within legitimate enterprises. The fraudster 
either has experience from industry or has developed certain skills to fleece victims. 
Depending on the trust-building requirement of a scam (face-to-face, or from a 
distance), the physical appearance and general charisma of the fraudster is vital. On 
the other hand, if physical contact is not necessary, the presentation of the product via 
various communication mediums is important. Thus creating certain structures (e. g. 
offices, equipment etc. ) that are all geared towards building trust and confidence. In 
general, most fraudsters are middle-aged males some of who have some experience in 
the industry associated with their scam. 
The objective of the fraudster is to present the victim with information and deals that 
are similar to those in legitimate enterprises, but with better returns on investment. 
This would encourage the victim to part with cash voluntarily. Compared to the 
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number of victims, fraudsters usually operate in a group or in the form of a company, 
though there is usually one or three principal figures - the originators, of the idea. 
Examples from this thesis show that fraudsters operate independently (the smaller the 
number the safer, and the more discreet the activities), but include others either as 
partners and staff to help handle the number or volume of victims/paper work. 
6.5 Sentencing the fraudster 
The sentencing of fraudsters is similar to those associated with other forms of white 
collar-crimes, though, courts do not deal with all cases involving scams. Regulatory 
bodies such as the Department of Trade and industries and the Telecom authorities 
use sanctions such as fines and withdrawal of licences from certain offenders as 
punitive measures. Depending on the scale of the offence, police interest and public 
concern, the scam in question might end up in a criminal court. On the other hand, 
nothing stops a victim of fraud from seeking redress in the court of law. In practice, 
the action of one victim draws attention and other victims usually decide to prosecute 
as a team or in a group. It has been argued that sentences for fraudsters are generally 
mild when the value of theft or fraud is taken into consideration, and the fact that the 
impact of the fraud on victims and society at large is not usually brought into focus. 
Below is a comparative discussion showing the degree of sentences advance fee fraud 
fraudsters get compared to burglars and the official tariff structure. 
Of relevance to our discussion is Sprack's presentation of the maximum terms of 
imprisonment for some common statutory offences. First, he notes that common law 
offences are prima facie punishable with imprisonment for life. The court can use its 
discretionary powers in this regard. At present, there are few remaining common law 
offences. For those that exist, certain statutes have altered the common law position 
with regard to penalty. Thus, the maximum sentence for the common law offence of 
common assault is now 6 months and for conspiracy to defraud it is 10 years. The 
penalty for murder is mandatory life, and that for manslaughter is a good example of 
discretionary life sentence (Sprack, 1995: 262). The relevant sentences of fraud and 
burglary offences are as follows: 
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OFFENCE PENALTY 
Child destruction, abortion, rape, intercourse with a girl under 13, causing grievous bodily Imprisonment 
harm with intent, possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life or carrying one with intent for life 
to commit an indictable offence, criminal damage committed with an intent to endanger life 
or by use of fire, aggravated burglary, robbery, importing or supplying controlled drugs in 
Class A 
Burglary of a dwelling, handling stolen goods, blackmail, obtaining or, communicating etc. 14 years 
information useful to an enemy contrary to s. I of the Official Secrets Act 1911, supplying 
controlled drugs in Class B. 
Obtaining property by deceptiog burglary (other than of a dwelling), non-aggravated 10 years 
criminal damage, indecent assault, and forgery and counterfeiting offences where the 
offender's intention in making, using etc. theforgerylcounterfelt was to pass it off as genuine 
to the prejudice ofanother, causing death by dangerous driving. 
Theft, perjury, bigamy, living on the earnings of prostitution, and having possession of a class 7 years 
a controlled drug. 
Going equippedfor hurglary, lheft or cheat. 3 years 
Dangerous driving, forgery and counterfeiting dffences where there was no intention to Pass 2 years 
off the article concerned as genuine, making off without payment, having an offensive 
weapon, unlawful sexual intercourse with girl aged 13,14 or 15, and having possession of a 
Class C controlled drug. 
Obstructing a police constable in the execution of his duty. I month 
In this thesis, some sentences given to fraudsters including the estimated cost of their 
crime are highlighted below. 
-A former lawyer involved in a fraud that cost L82,000 was given a two-year 
suspended jail sentence. 
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- In a bogus bank scam that cost victims over 17 million, the principal actor who 
was already disqualified from directorships, and other culprits were imprisoned 
for between 4-8 years and disqualified for between 10- 15 years. 
- In an upfront fee for loans scam that netted E13 million, offenders received jail 
terms between 7-9 years and disqualification from directorships for 7 years. 
- In one of the ostrich meat investment scams that netted E22 million from 2,800 
victims, the two offenders were jailed for 3.5 years each. 
- In a pyramid scheme that cost hundreds of victims fl. 5 million, the offender was 
jailed for 4.5 years. 
- An accountant who made EIA million from a swindle was jailed for 4.5 years. 
- In another ostrich meat investment scam, which cost 115 victims about El million, 
the principal actor absconded. His wife and partner were given a two-year 
suspended sentence and ordered to pay El (one pound) as compensation for her 
role in the fraud involving E275,000. The judge believed her husband used her and 
left her penniless. 
- In the a time-share property scam that cost 17,000 victims about E30 million, the 
main fraudster who is believed to be worth well over E300 million was jailed for 8 
years and ordered to pay E266,367 as costs. His partners were given between 2.5- 
4 years jail terms. Another partner/lover got a two-year suspended jail term and 
was ordered to pay costs of E50,000 because of the manipulative role of her lover. 
Confiscation procedures were to take effect immediately. The trials cost the 
taxpayer about; ElO million. 
- For selling bogus titles to over 20 victims valued at E80,000, two offenders got 
160 hours of community work and were ordered to pay costs of E7,500, partly 
because of their co-operation during investigations and the trial. 
-A fake informant who swindled L100,000 from victims over the years was jailed 
for 2 years for a E3,000 fraud for which he was charged. 
-A Food Guide con man netted E500,000 from restaurants but was not prosecuted 
by the CPS because he actuaBy issued certificates though they were worthless. 
-A bogus sheikh who's crime in hotels cost E24,000 was jailed for nine months. 
- In another case, bogus peers who cost victims ; E32,000 were given two-year 
probation due'to their ages and health. 
-A fake priest who cost victims L43,000 was jailed for 3 months. 
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-A fake medical doctor who made over E500,000 over 10 years was jailed for 5 
years. 
- Bogus charity box collectors made over El million in about 5 years. They both 
received three and two-year jail terms. The question of refunds was not possible 
because records did not exist. 
-A bigamist who swindled women out of E2 million in 6 years was jailed for 4.5 
years. 
- In a case of false promises of marriage, the offender made over E500,000. He was 
ordered to refund E450,000 or face a two-year-jail terrn. 
-A fraudster that duped his mother-in-law out of over El million, but accepted 
responsibility for only E60,000, was jailed for 5.8 years. 
- In this thesis, some cases of reported scams involved fmes and caution from 
regulatory bodies such as Trading Standards and Pren-ýiurn Rate Line authorities. 
The highlight above is an attempt to show the degree of sentences fraudsters receive. 
The cases of fraud reveal that on the average, a fraudster found guilty of theft of about 
E500,000 will probably get a two-year jail term. Next, it is important to understand 
that the official tariff structure and mitigating factors form part of the reasons for the 
type of sentence fraudsters receive. 
In sentencing, to some extent judgements take precedence from previous ones. 
Emmins (1985: 299) notes that "the only general guidance given by the Court of 
Appeal on sentencing levels for obtaining by deception etc., is that contained in Rv 
Bibi [ 1980] 1 WLR 1193 where Lord Lane CJ said that the shorter sentences would be 
appropriate for the more petty frauds where small amounts of money are involved". 
Further, if fraud is committed in a desperate attempt to keep an initially honest 
business afloat a more lenient penalty is favoured. Thus, according to Emmins in Rv 
Pal (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 343,4 years was cut by the Court of Appeal to 2.5 years in 
a case where P ordered f. 225,000 worth of goods, sold them, used about half the 
money to pay off earlier creditors, and did not account for the remainder of the 
money. The suppliers received nothing. The appeal was allowed because P had run his 
business honestly for several years, and the fraud had 'developed by robbing Peter to 
pay Paul, rather than by a deliberate attempt to amass money fraudulently. Emn-dns 
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states with examples where low sentences were given for cases involving deliberately 
planned, sophisticated and large-scale deception (Emmins, 1985: 299). 
With regard to burglary, the maximum penalty contrary to "Section. 9 of the Theft Act 
1968 is 14 years imprisonment. In giving guidance on sentencing for burglary the 
Court of Appeal draws a distinction between burglaries from dwellings and burglaries 
from commercial premisee' (Emmins, 1985: 292). Emmins also states that their 
Lordships consistently regard burglary from a dwelling as a serious matter which 
ought to result in a custodial sentence, even if the value of property stolen is small 
and/ or the offender is of previous good character and/or is young. He notes that 
reasons for this stem approach is that burglary in a house causes 'great stress' and 
'induces a feeling of insecurity', so that' when a house has been burgled it never 
seems the same again'. 
In burglary offences because of the 'non-complicated' nature and value of their 
crimes, magistrate courts handle most cases, however, more serious cases are 
committed to the Crown Court. In a survey involving 3,000 magistrates' court cases 
and 1,800 Crown Court cases and Justices Clerks in 12 areas, Flood-Page and Mackie 
(1998) examined sentencing practices. Some of their findings include the following: 
that the Magistrates' Association's guidelines give an entry point of custody for 
burglary of a dwelling but one of a community sentence for non-domestic burglary. 
Their study also revealed that burglary of a dwelling was much more likely to result in 
a custodial sentence. Factors mentioned in the Magistrates' Association guidelines as 
indicators of a more serious offence were that the offence was: 
- committed at night 
- committed by a group of offenders 
- executed in a professional manner 
- involved ransacking or soiling the property, and 
- where the occupants were deliberately frightened. 
In one example from their survey (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998), a 27-year-old 
offender was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for two offences of non-domestic 
burglary and one assault on a police officer. One offence involved breaking into a 
college room and stealing a television. The other theft was at a caf6 used by the 
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disabled. In another example, a 19-year-old man who stole property worth E420 from 
a neighbour was jailed for 4 months. He was a repeat offender. In general, Flood-Page 
and Mackie note that offenders in a quarter of cases involving loss or damage valued 
at more than E200 received a custodial sentence compared to just seven per cent of 
offenders where the loss was less than E200. 
On the other hand, concerning the offences of fraud and deception, the survey 
revealed that only 9% of those convicted of fraud or deception received a custodial 
sentence. Non-custodial sentences include fines, probation orders, supervision orders, 
suspended sentences and community service orders. In one example, a 29-year-old 
man who defrauded the Department of Social Security of E13,000 was jailed for 4 
months. In this case, the magistrate remarked that custody was inevitable because the 
offence was carried out over a long period. Another offender also got 4 months for 
stealing E5,000 from his employers. In general, all the offenders sentenced to custody 
were convicted of more than one offence. 
With regard to the decision to imprison, a custodial sentence was more likely, if the 
offender was seen to pose a risk to the public, if the offence was planned or 
unprovoked, if serious injury was inflicted or where the victim was especially 
vulnerable. Second, those with previous convictions, especially for a similar offence, 
were more likely to get custody. Also, an offender who was subject to a court order 
when they committed the current offence was more likely to receive a custodial 
sentence (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998). 
It was also discovered that in cases involving a breach of trust, magistrates' courts 
were particularly likely to impose a community penalty unlike Crown Courts who 
preferred a prison sentence. The use of fines was on the decline in both courts, and 
fines were mostly used for first offenders who are in work. Compensation orders were 
also reduced especially for its use as a sentence in its own right. Magistrate courts also 
used different methods to calculate the size of a fine. While some courts felt fines 
should be in proportion to the offender's income, others felt that it was wrong to 
penalise wealthy offenders. 
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In Crown courts, in general, offenders who pleaded guilty had their sentences 
reduced. In cases of fraud and forgery, most sentences were suspended. The 
commonest reasons for suspense were illness or caring responsibilities. Fines were 
also most likely for offenders in work. The amount repayable over time is small. For 
instance, the maximum amount generally seen as payable by a person on income 
support is E5 a week. Compensation orders were few, mainly because the offender did 
not have enough money to pay. Women were less likely than men to receive prison 
sentences when other factors are taken into account. 
Finally, from all the above, it is clear that the offence of fraud is not viewed as severe 
or 'life threatening' when compared to an offence such as burglary. Public perception 
is also similar to this. The official tariff also indicates that fraud and burglary fall 
under the same umbrella with regard to maximum sentences. As in virtually all trials, 
the discretion of the judge is important in sentences and the maximum punishment is 
always available to be used and it appears that violent offences are treated more 
severely. On the other hand, the degree of judicial discretion has been a subject of 
debate, as it is often argued that maximum discretion is likely to lead to injustice 
(Ashworth, 1995). Ashworth notes that it is wrong to present binding rules and 
absolute discretion as the alternatives, and discretion opens the way both to flexibility 
in response to the fact of cases and to unjustifiable differences in the personal or local 
approach of judges and magistrates. Generally, courts seem to treat fraud and 
deception as rather more serious than ordinary theft, because of the element of pre- 
planning in deceptive offences unlike the often spontaneous reaction to unexpected 
temptation exhibited by thieves (Emmins, 1985). Though actual sentences reveal a 
picture of milder sanctions. 
Further, one can assume that the rate at which fraud in particular advance fee fraud is 
committed with impunity shows that offenders are not deterred. Known offenders 
including those banned from holding positions as directors 'openly' disregard their 
restrictions. This are indications that they have not been reformed either while in 
custody or through other alternatives to custody or sanctions. The courts, for certain 
categories of fraudsters also favour non-custodial sentences especially if public 
interest in the matter is minimal. Non-custodial sentences include: probation orders, 
community service orders, combination orders, curfew orders, supervision orders, 
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attendance centre orders, fines, binding orders, various forms of disqualification 
orders, forfeiture orders, deportation, and hospital orders. These orders could be 
applied individually or jointly depending on the nature of the offence and the court's 
decision. 
It has been suggested that a great majority of offenders be dealt with by some means 
other than custody (Sprack, 1995). Reasons for this include doubts on the efficacy and 
relevance of custody and its costs. The researcher is of the view that fraudsters should 
be given 'indeterminate' imprisonment, which can be withdrawn once victims are 
compensated to a satisfactory degree. This approach would definitely create a 
dilemma for the fraudster who has initially calculated the costibenefit of a few years 
or months in 'solitary' confinement and coming out to enjoy and reinvest the proceeds 
of crime. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Using the technique of deductive analysis it has been possible to arrive at various 
attributes or characteristics of fraudsters who manipulate trust and confidence to 
obtain money, goods or services in cash or kind by false pretences. It is important to 
reiterate that varieties of fraud are numerous and cannot readily be exhausted in a 
4single survey of this kind'. With regard to the categorisation of scams adopted in this 
thesis, it is likely that all forms of fraud will fall under one or more of the categories 
identified. 
The table below is an attempt to highlight the major attributes of fraud or scams using 
the face-to-face approach and that committed from a distance. As shown in the 
examples, each variety or pattern of scam also plays on the disposition of the victim, 
with the dishonest victim losing more from a scam. 
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Table 6.5 
Attributes associated with the modes of trust building for fraud, and the victim's 
disposition 
Fraud via face-to-face contacts 
Fraud carried out in aU arenas 
Use of plausible story line, service or 
product. Honest/innocent victims and na7fve 
victims targeted. Some physical contact 
with certain dishonest 'victims' depending on 
the scam. 
Fraudster and victim physically interact, 
though the actual identity of fraudster is 
hidden or is not ascertained. 
All categories of victims are affected, but the 
elderly are preferred, and those who are 
thought to have savings. Deliberate target 
selection efforts are made. 
Charismatic attributes and verbal skills of the 
fraudster are necessary to attract victims and 
elucidate trust. One-to-one relationship with 
victim is emphasised. 
Elaborate operational structures may be 
required in case of visits by victims (e. g. 
office building, fin-niture, aesthetics etc. ) - 
and other professional impressions. 
The use of technology could be minimal. 
Distant methods could be used before 
physical visits or contact. 
Number of victims limited to those that 
can be reached physically. 
Fraud from a distance 
Fraud perpetrated in all arenas 
Plausible explanation including some fiction 
(too good to be true). Gullibility and 
greed/dishonesty of victim exploited. 
At a later stage, physical contact could occur. 
The fraudsters identity is limited to the 
correspondence with the victim. Hence 
anonymity. In letters, prefixes such as Dr, 
Engr. Barrister etc. are commonly used. 
All categories of victims that can be 
approached using public registers or mailing 
lists, and those who respond to advertisements 
are pursued vigorously. Mailings are often 
Victims are recruited through attractive 
correspondence such: as glossy brochures, TV 
and newspaper advertisements. The use of 
catch phrases such as 'free' 'savings' and 
4profit' are usually adopted. - The fraudster can operate comfortably from 
his home. Mail box address are required to 
collect payments if plastic cards are not used. 
Technological gadgets (fax, Internet, 
telephone, photocopier, credit card system, 
computers etc. ), and the postal system play an 
important role especially for multiple contacts 
over boundaries. 
No limit to number of would-be victims, as 
long 
as they can be reached via post, the Internet or 
through advertisements. 
For both methods of obtaining/eliciting trust, the goal is to collect money upfront for a product 
or service (this maybe provided bought substandard), hence the deception/fraud. 
Central to all types of fraud is the plot of the scam. This could be a manufactured 
event such as in education and training frauds or an excuse incorporated into previous 
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or up coming events. During the turn of the millennium, many frauds were executed 
using the calendar. From the 'world would end' theories as in the religious scams to 
service providers collecting upfront fees to cover preparations for unexpected 
blackouts, computer breakdowns etc. The would-be victim has to be convinced to 
trust the fraudster to the extent that he or she pays for a product or service upfront. In 
most cases to sustain the scam, some type of substandard services and products are 
supplied. Thus, the scam begins with an idea, the necessary structures put in place, the 
victims contacted and exploited, and then the fraudster vanishes or liquidates 
'legitimately'. 
An important aspect of fraud is its association with legitimate practices or enterprise. 
Certain legitimate business transactions thrive on generally accepted practices. A 
good example can be found in import and export trading from which certain frauds 
could emerge. For instance, Levi (1981: 126) notes that 
long-firm frauds arise within a broader political economy in which credit 
plays a central role. The importance of the credit mechanism occurs at all 
levels, for the acceptance by the people of a national currency as a medium of 
exchange is a form of credit. At a more prosaic level, there is a universal 
demand for credit to bridge the period between the obtaining of goods and 
their resale to 'fmal consumers'. Consequently, even those who are 
psychologically attuned to Victorian prudence are forced to accept credit as 
yet another commercial 'fact of life'... The classic 'theory of the firm' states 
that at any given price, subject to the supply capacity of the firm, the object of 
the firm is to maximise sales. 
In the real world, one has to introduce the concept of risk, and as a consequence, one 
has to place into proportion the problem of fraud (Levi, 1981). The risk of being 
defrauded is only one among many types of commercial risk and, compared with the 
risk of losing money from the supply of goods to an honest trader, it is a risk, which 
occurs with low frequency. It cannot be over-emphasised that credit is granted not 
only on the basis of a belief in the integrity of the debtor firm, but also on the basis of 
its predicted ability to pay for the goods supplied. Therefore, in a world characterised 
by economic uncertainty, caution would need to be exercised in the granting of credit 
even if there were no long-firm fraud. This principle also applies to investment 
transactions and other business activities that involve credit arrangements. Customers 
pursue goods and services with certain affiliations, likewise, entrepreneurs are often 
driven by routine and habitual preferences, prejudice and emotional attachments etc 
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(Bourdieu, 1990), in where they seek to invest their resources and how they conduct 
their business with other traders (Edwards and Gill, 2001). 
One of the fundamental prerequisites of the fraudster is that first and foremost the 
individual must be a 'good' Har. The fraudster should also be willing to take risks 
(arrest, prosecution, reputation, reprisal from victim, society etc. ) and be confident 
(charismatic or be sure and zealous). These attributes help to create the required trust 
for the scam, and risk taking on the part of the victims. To arrive at the required level 
of trust (for voluntary handing over of cash, goods or services by victim), certain 
conditions ought to be fulfilled. These conditions depend on several factors including 
the pattern of contact, face-to-face or via distance. Others include timing, type of 
scam or product, characteristics of victims etc. 
Finally, for any fraud involving upfront payments to be successful, the victim must 
make the financial commitment in advance of the transaction. The honest victim 
would fall prey to plausible deals and would not commit a huge sum unduly without 
passing through well-established and known channels or seeking proper advice. The 
nalve victim will jump at the slightest opportunity to make abnormal profit. The 
fraudsters 'dream' victim is the dishonest individual who is prepared to support 
illegality with all available resources. In a typical example a plausible explanation is 
given for the transfer of some money, and just for the provision of an account for this 
transfer, a staggering sum as commission is offered. When the victims send the 
advance fees, communication is severed or continued for more extortion. 
The fmal chapter addresses issues concerning the prevention of fraud involving the 
manipulation of trust and obtaining money, goods and services by false pretences. 
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Chapter Seven 
Preventing fraud 
It is not possible to have a crime free society, but certain practices can ensure that its 
occurrence is reduced. On the macro level, addressing social, economic and political 
factors positively, would subsequently eliminate or reduce criminogenic 
circumstances or situations. The nature of fraud is such that the word 'Prevention' 
could be substituted for 'reduction'. Most frauds result from the deliberate abuse of 
trust. Therefore, it is unlikely that everybody including businesses will act honestly at 
all times, especially in the process of competition for resources. It is not possible to 
engage in social and economic transactions or activities without believing that trust 
exists. Where the stakes are high, the need for contracts or agreements arises, but is 
still no guarantee that there will be no disputes and that trust will not be breached. 
The concept of risk is usually an important factor considered in preventive measures 
of all kinds (environmental, developmental, criminological etc). Johnston (1997: 192) 
notes that it is clear that police and criminal justice agencies make use of policies 
based on assumptions and techniques derived from risk management. He mentions 
Nalla and Newman's (1990) five defming principles of risk management, which are 
relevant for fraud prevention. These are: 
- to anticipate risks by proactive means; 
- to appraise the character of a given risk together with the probability of it being 
realised; 
- to calculate the anticipated losses or pathologies arising from a given risk; 
- to balance the probability of any risk occurring with the anticipated losses or 
pathologies arising from it; 
- and to control risks through direct intervention or to displace or transfer them 
elsewhere 
In a nutshell, "risk management is actuarial, proactive and anticipatory, its 
deployment requiring' the collation and analysis of information about and the 
systematic surveillance of those at risk or likely to cause risk! ' (Johnston: 192). 
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The principles of risk management are necessary in crime preventive strategies. With 
regard to fraud involving the manipulation of trust, for practical reasons such as space, 
at best we can only touch on key areas where this fraud can be prevented or reduced. 
The prevention of fraud can be approached from different perspectives based on the 
dynamics of deceit/trust/risk/face-to-face/distance as they relate to would-be victims, 
victims, would-be fraudsters and offenders. Thus, this discussion is categorised into 
the following: 
* Minimising risk to victims 
Victim enlightemnent strategies. 
Creating impediments against crime/fraud. 
Maximising risk to fraudsters 
- Proactive 'policing' and investigations 
- Appropriate sanctioning of offenders 
It is important to note that though these categories are discussed separately, they are 
complimentary in practice. 
7.1 Minimising risk to victims 
Addressing the victim's conception of trust in face-to-face and contacts from a 
distance is necessary to reduce or eliminate victimisation. The role of would-be 
victims and victims are important in this regard. The victim occupies the most 
important position in the process of any scam. Emsley, (1987) notes a remark by 
Parry which states that: 
Fraud is a more complicated offence than larceny, and defrauders sometimes 
get the better of the law. Cheating is not always a crime and successful 
cheating is a question of better education (Parry, 1914: 154). 
This statement buttresses the importance of information for fraud. Virtually all fraud 
cases especially advance fee frauds involves the manipulation of trust and confidence 
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and taking advantage of existing infrastructure and the ignorance or naivety (in some 
cases) of victims. In certain situations, the victims do not have to be ignorant or 
greedy, they could be the victim of distrust or lack of integrity in a legitimate business 
transaction or arrangement. 
Highlighting the role of the victim does not imply that all 'genuine' victims are 
responsible for their demise. This thesis revealed that victims could be categorised 
into the honest, the probably not dishonest but ndve, and the dishonest. Irrespective 
of these categories, all victims have a role to play in fraud prevention especially 
reporting unpublicised scams to forestall them from spreading. Co-operating with 
fraud investigators is also essential. 
Victims should be wary of potential fraudulent proposals. For instance in a typical 
advance fee fraud scam, a proposal by letter or mail will stress the urgency of the 
matter. The confidential nature of the transaction is emphasised. Claims are made that 
the writer has connections in high places and relevant bureaucratic authorities 
associated with the deal. Offers of physical visits are encouraged to confirm 
arrangements if necessary. Forged official-looking documents are presented with 
appropriate letterheads. Blank letterheads are also requested and bank details of the 
victim. Certain fees are demanded which must be paid in advance if one wants to reap 
the attractive dividend. Victims are advised not to ever provide personal information 
or documents to unknown business associates. If credible checks can not be carried 
out on the prospective business partner (even if the deal is legitimate), the best option 
is to forgo the transaction. In sum, it is important for victims to amend their behaviour 
positively - as it concerns trust and fraud. 
Certain reasons have been adduced why certain fraud victims do not pursue their 
cases with the relevant authorities. This includes the general notion of shame exposed 
by their conduct and the feeling that the criminal prosecution if eventually successful 
will not compensate them for their financial loss (Walsh and Schram, 1980). 
However, recent events especially from examples of cases in this thesis show that 
some victims report their plight to the media who assist them in recoveries and also 
help in preventing reoccurrence through publicity. On the other hand, victims also 
weigh the cost benefits of pursuing a fraudster. This depends on the value of what 
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they have lost. Legal fees, court appearances etc could also influence their decision. It 
is important for the police in particular to encourage victims to come forward, at least 
to ensure that a particular scam is made known and hopefully stopped. 
Finally, in scams, the success of any scam ultimately depends on the victim's 
reaction. Though this is not as simple as it appears. If people ignore unsolicited 
correspondence, and act very carefully in all their dealings, most scams could be 
avoided. Hence, the fraudster will be put out of business. This approach may not have 
any impact for the dishonest victim that intends to profit from some illegal activity, 
and is eventually conned. 
How can a rational decision be taken as to when trust is warranted? The cost of not 
trusting may be less acquisitions, no dividends for not investing in viable ventures, 
exorbitant legal fees, HI-feelings in human relations etc, but the cost of trusting could 
be grave in terms of financial loss and emotional ruin. Certain agencies or 
establishments can provide the necessary information and atmosphere for victims to 
protect themselves - for instance, it is likely that most people do not know that the list 
of disqualified directors is available at www. companieshouse. cyov. u . These 
organisations range from the media to outfits within the CJP (police, courts etc) and 
society at large as managed and controlled by the government. Private and non- 
governmental organisations can also serve as good reference points. Thus, this takes 
us to the other preventive approaches below. 
7.1.1 Creating impediments against fraud and crime 
Impediments could come in different forms. For instance, creating situational 
obstacles/difficulties for the criminal, which should include efforts of certain agencies 
and measures that are structural/ physical or attitudinal. The roles of certain agencies 
(e. g. the media, professional bodies and government agencies) are crucial in this 
approach. Some of these strategies are discussed below. 
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7.1.1.1 Individual and organisational status-assessment 
Of relevance is Nock's (1993) argument on the need and use of 'ordeals' and 
'credentials' as a means of generating trust. Nock notes that an important criterion in 
trusting has to do with ones reputation. He defines reputation as a shared or collective 
perception about a person. Conformity to standards is necessary to earn a good 
reputation. Though in the case of scams in particular, the fraudster takes deliberate 
steps such as forging a 'trusting' relationship, and creating the enabling reputation to 
collect upfront fees from the victim. However, as Nock argues, the increasing levels 
of privacy in modem societies, heterogeneous populations, technology, and change in 
familial living among other situations makes the monitoring/verification (referred to 
as surveillance) of strangers difficult. For Nock, to establish and maintain reputations 
in the face of privacy, social mechanisms of surveillance are elaborated and 
developed. In particular, various forms of credentials and status-verification 
procedures produce reputations that are widely accessible, impersonal, and portable 
from one location to another. Thus there are two methods used to establish or 
maintain reputations among modem strangers or in urban settings - credentials and 
'ordeals' or status assessments such as credit investigations. 
The point here is that credentials gives a person access to credit or confidence. For 
example references and credentials that certify competence include certificates 
showing completion of a course of study, membership in formal or voluntary 
associations, or credit worthiness should be made accessible for verification by 
members of the public that have been approached by people selling business 
proposals or other deals. Thus individuals soliciting for patronage should be willing to 
accept some degree of their privacy being eroded. On the other hand, an ordeal is a 
ritual that determines whether an individual is telling the truth. It always begins with a 
presumption of guilt or unresolved doubt (Nock, 1985: 15). Nock notes that common 
methods of ordeals include drug tests, lie-detector tests, and obligatory confessions in 
communes or churches. With regard to fraud, assessment for 'fraudsters' could entail 
character references and documented dossiers from verifiable sources. 
245 
On the other hand, with regard to the above, the pre-planned fraudster is capable of 
ensuring that he passes tests given in the community. This is achieved through 
deliberate activities involving training, and character and credit building. It has been 
noted that much of our lives lie beyond the legitimate scrutiny of others and 
organisations (Nock, 1985). Examples of fraud cases involving relatively small sums 
of money per victim show that the offenders did not encounter any reasonable degree 
of surveillance or assessment to ascertain their reputations. I 
Next, important agencies that could assist the public or victims with information about 
potential fraudsters, their techniques and preventive strategies are public 
enlightemnent organisations. 
7.1.1.2 The media 
The media have an important role to play in the whole process of preventing fraud. 
First, in certain cases, it is through the services of the media that the invitation to take 
part in a scam is transmitted or advertised. Authorities within the mass media can 
make extra efforts towards the vetting of commercials that are bogus, although in 
advertisement pages in newspapers, the public is advised to verify claims (usually in 
small prints). Warning or advisory signs should be conspicuous. However, fraudsters 
can conceal relevant information about themselves or business while placing 
advertisements. While acknowledging that the print media in particular regularly 
publicise the activities of fraudsters and the nature of scams, there is. still room for 
improvement. Thus, the more attention scams receive the more likely that most people 
will get to know about it especially in the 'too good to be true' deals. 
Media coverage plays its role in different aspects concerning crime. It is important to 
understand how they operate especially from a social and sociological perspective. 
With regard to frauds, media coverage of white-collar crime is important because it 
can influence public perception of harmfulness and of what 'the law and order 
problem' consists of, with consequent effects on enforcement resources (including 
police powers) (LevL 1999b). The decision-making of tribunals including jurors, 
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share prices of companies involved and occupational opportunities of those 
sanctioned can also be affected. The. media could also make people or the authorities 
re-frame policy. 
Levi notes that content analysis of media coverage of crime has shown that they tend 
to focus on the reporting of street crime, industrial confrontation, soccer hooliganism, 
and terrorism. These areas are obvious sites of ideological and political conflict. 
Further an examination of media coverage shows the way in which the print and 
electronic media, on the one hand, and 'authoritative figures' or 'primary definers' 
(the police, politicians, and interest groups granted credibility status by the media), on 
the other, interact to generate 'moral panics', or at least, promote the idea that the 
events have been taken seriously and that something is being done (LevL 1999b). 
Thus, the media are in a position to focus 'public' attention. For example according to 
LevL one could speculate that the extensive coverage of the Guinness case may have 
been as a result of the nature of the company (high-profile), and the fact that it was the 
SFO's first case. 
Furthermore, it has also been observed that the plight of the losers receive little 
prominence compared with that of the defendants (LevL 1999b). Where no famous 
names are involved as offenders or victims, and where the offence is highly technical, 
reports do not reach the tabloid papers at all, unless something dramatic happens. For 
example if there is an appeal by the Attorney General to the Court of Appeal against 
an allegedly over-lenient sentence. This gives it some spice. In the case of Barings 
Bank, the major culprit or 'rogue trader' Nick Leeson secured media interviews, and 
television, book and film offers became areas of interest. In some cases the criminal 
receives financial gratification from media establishments. Activities of close 
relations of the crook such as their spouse also attract media attention. For example, 
Levi notes that in Nick Leeson's case (Barings Bank), the Mail newspaper paid him 
E100,000 for his reflections in prison, though the payment contravened the Press 
Complaints Code. The newspaper defended this by saying his comments were of 
wider public interest and for his cancer treatment. 
An example of the notion that 'crime pays' or can result in some income after 
conviction is that of the fraud in Barings Bank. Recently in the Independent 
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newspaper (15/03/01), an article referring to Nick Leeson notes that "he may have 
brought down Barings Bank and lost E850 million, but Nick Leeson's financial advice 
is proving irresistible to British businesses. The man who spent four-and-half years in 
a Singapore jail has joined the celebrity ex-con speaking circuit in what promises to 
be a sell-out tour of the country". It was noted that Leeson donates part of his earnings 
to charity, and a portion also goes to Barings' liquidators. His talks are world-wide. 
For instance, it is reported that in Amsterdam his original fee was $ 100,000 (E68,000) 
for a two-hour question-and-answer session with 250 stockbrokers and an appearance 
on a television show. 
In another article in the Times Newspaper of 22/03/01 by Paul Lashmar, it was 
reported that "the attempt to turn the Krays' story into a television rating battle has 
laid the BBC open to allegations of shabby journalism and a serious loss of 
objectivity". For over 30 years, the Kray gang was known for their bloody crime 
careers in East London. The BBC is said to have paid about E280,000 to the makers of 
the documentary. In as much as the media do not intend to 'corrupt' society, they are 
running a business. They are inclined to publish stories that sell. At the same time the 
criminals are ever willing to get into a book or film deal for several reasons such as 
making 'history' and financial gratification. The usual defence is that they have paid 
their price to society by completing their prison term. All this leaves us with 
something to ponder -'does crime pay'? 
Further, on the negative side, the media may play a significant role in fostering 
antisocial behaviour. The electronic media are often criticised for their glorification of 
violence and sexual exploitation. They may also be accused of promoting the values 
and lifestyles of a marginal group. Media celebrities frequently flaunt their 
unconventional, self-indulgent behaviour, glorify the use of illicit drugs, make light of 
their marital problems, and lay emphases on material possessions (Gabor, 1994). 
Thus, Gabor concludes that society cannot eradicate all unscrupulous and criminal 
behaviour, but through placing a strong emphasis on honesty and integrity at all levels 
- in the home, school, business, professions, and political circles - we will all be more 
inclined to pause when confronted with specific opportunities to exploit others. 
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To sum up on issues concerning the media, the above include instances where media 
interest has raised revenue for fraudsters one way or another. The implication of all 
this is that criminals can plan ahead of their apprehension. They could sell their stories 
for profit though certain laws guard against this. On the other hand, events have 
shown that the media is the primary mechanism through which awareness about crime 
is raised. For instance, a particular Friday column in the Mirror newspaper called 
Sorted is involved in investigative journalism, and reports on scams and improper 
business activities. In a good number of cases they have helped victims retrieve 
deposits, and have drawn the attention of the relevant authorities to fraudsters who 
have been subsequently dealt with. Other print media are engaged in this type of 
activity but in varying degrees. Television and Radio can be useful and need to be 
used more often. The concerted efforts of all will definitely keep the victim better 
informed on activities of fraudsters. Examples of Television programmes that are 
concerned with crime issues include Inside the Criminal Min4 Scenes of Crime, 
Crime Watch (Channel 5), Crime Watch Daily on BBC 1, and The Art of Crime 
shown on Channel 4 Television on 13/03/0 1. 
7.1.1.3 The role of financial institutions and service providers 
Another arena where fraud commonly occurs is in the area of financial services. 
Prevention mechanisms against guilty company directors and persons selling financial 
services are limited (LevL 1999). Financial service providers have to be vetted as 'fit 
and proper' persons before they can be licensed to operate. Levi notes that there is no 
law preventing anyone setting up in business, however ill-qualified they may be by 
competence and/or morality, and no bar upon their trading at the risk of others, 
provided that customers are willing to offer people investment opportunities. In the 
exwnple of the Ostrich Farming Corporation Scam (Case No. 7), the Times newspaper 
(11/05/96) noted that one of the grounds for the DTI's (Department of Trade and 
Industry) wish to wind up the company was that one of its directors had shown 
himself to be unfit in the past. He notes that if this was the case, why was the 
individual allowed to become a director of the OFC in the first place? Financial and 
business regulators ought to be more efficient in the vetting of businesses and their 
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proprietors. Other agencies such as charity control bodies, professional organisations 
etc, need to increase their efforts. 
7.1.1.4 The use of situational measures 
The situational measures that can be used to prevent and reduce fraud are those 
associated with situational measures or methods of crime prevention which have been 
applied with some degree of success, especially with regard to the offence of burglary 
and other forms of theft. Situational measures have also been used in certain types of 
fraud such as those involving credit cards, where anti forgery and sophisticated coding 
techniques have been applied. With regard to fraud involving confidence tricks, the 
usage is limited. This is due to the nature of the crime, as the fraudster operates within 
conventional social and business practices-. In an attempt to understand how fraud can 
be prevented through situational measures, we shall take a brief look at how this 
concept has been applied to the offence of burglary. Burglary is one of the most 
common property offences in the UK and probably all over the world. 
Theory 
Clarke's (ed. )(1997) integrative illustration of the Opportunity Structure for Crime 
integrates variables of traditional criminology and situational/recent variables of the 
newer theories. In this approach the opportunity, rational choice, routine activity and 
life style theories are adopted depending on the situation or circumstance. There are 
three components of the criminal opportunity structure: targets; victims; and crime 
facilitators. The physical environment, lifestyles and routine activities of the 
population supply targets. The physical environment, lifestyles and routine activities 
are themselves determined by the broader socioreconomic structure of society. 
Offenders and their motives are partly determined by the socio-economic structure 
through mechanisms such as alienation and sub-cultural influences. Thus., situational 
crime prevention is defined as an approach that involves the use of opportunity- 
reducing measures that: 
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(1) are directed at highly specific forms of crime; 
(2) involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in 
a systematic and permanent way as possible; 
(3) makes crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding; and 
(4) excusable as judged by a wide range of offenders (Clarke (ed. ) 1997: 4). 
Criticism of this theory include that it is said to run counter to decades of evidence 
about the important causes of crime which are seen to be rooted in psychological and 
social disadvantages of the offender and society in general (Newman et al. (eds. ), 
1997). Critics have also expressed fears of displacement due to blocked opportunities 
(Bottoms, 1990). Furthermore, many opportunity reducing measures which include 
intensified surveillance of public space and other intrusions on everyday life can 
threaten civil liberties and result in a 'fortress society' (Newman et al., (eds. ) 1997). 
Other criticisms revolve around philosophical and ethical issues, which concern 
individual rights (e. g. on secret surveillance), victim blaming, and situational 
strategies benefiting mainly the affluent in society who can afford such measures 
(Newman et al., (eds. )(1997). 
Situational measures and burglary: an example 
Burglary was predominantly a night offence when 'guardianship' and 'surveillance' 
were minimal. For example, in the 17th century the 'puzzle lock' now called the 
combination lock, was one of the new inventions to forestall burglary - target 
hardening (Walsh, 1980). Burglars still operate during seasonal vacations in wealthy 
homes (i. e. taking advantage of the routine activities of victims) and if possible, they 
obtain information from servants to successfully carry out raids (this enhances their 
decision making). Walsh notes that when people began to use bank vaults, highly 
skilled burglary - targeting safes in houses, became uneconomic. Preventive strategies 
commonly adopted to combat burglary include newspaper reports and advice (a form 
of publicity campaign), property marking, neighbourhood watch initiatives and target 
hardening techniques - stronger locks etc. 
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Close Circuit Television (CCTV) and fraud 
At present, preventive strategies tend to address the situation or circumstances that 
encourage or facilitate crime/fraud. A preventive gadget that could deter burglars and 
certain fraudsters is the Close Circuit Television (CCTV). Researchers have 
investigated and assessed the role and effects of this technology especially with regard 
to its social implications and interpretation as well as its crime prevention and 
reduction benefits. Though the extent of its efficacy has not been conclusive (Brown, 
1995; Norris and Armstrong, 1997,1999; Norris, Moran and Armstrong (eds. ) 1998). 
For instance, while burglar alarms are intended to attract the attention of neighbours 
or security agents, cameras can aid the identification of offenders, and if monitored 
could prevent or forestall the crime. Studies (e. g. Bennett and Wright, 1984 and 
Cromwell et al. 1991) have shown that burglars are not comfortable when some 
surveillance may be taking place. According to Beck and Willis (1995: 159; 197)), 
though their study on town and shopping centres revealed that managers were of the 
opinion that CCTV helped to control crime and nuisance problems, they note that: 
The burgeoning use of CCTV appears to be a product of its seductive appeal 
as a 'high-tech fix'. This is seen as an example of 'security wish fulfilment'. 
CCTV may work in a number of different ways: more effective deployment of 
security guards or police; deterring would - be offenders; identifying offenders 
and obtaining photographic evidence; reassuring town centre users; warning 
those whose behaviour is suspicious; highlighting crime problems; tracking 
offenders on the move; and increasing the efficiency of town centre and 
shopping centre management. 
With particular reference to fraud, certain forms of technology can be used to deter 
fraudsters. Recordings from CCTV have been useful in apprehending fraudsters and 
conmen involved in impersonation and obtaining money from establishments, and 
cashing fraudulent cheques. For instance in a television documentary (Channel 4- 
The Art of Crime, 13/03/01), a fake auditor using false identities, appearing well 
dressed and confident, convinced offices that he was the auditor from Head office. 
When allowed access to their safes, he made away with their cash through the back 
door. This confidence trickster was apprehended when a CCTV caught him in action 
in a Travel Agency. His photo was then publicised on the Crime Watch programme. 
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Thus in relation to fraud, CCTV is capable of deterring fraudsters especially in banks 
and shops where phoney cheques are cashed. The photo identity of the fraudster can 
then be retrieved. Principally, primary crime prevention intends to increase the risk of 
offending or increasing the likelihood of being caught. It has been noted that the 
relevance of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to crime prevention is that: 
It seeks to influence the decision-making of the 'rational' offender who, on 
calculating the risks, will choose not to commit crime under the gaze of the 
cameras because there will be a possibility of being caught. It is therefore a 
strategy based on deterrence ... (Coleman and Norris, 2000: 149). 
For Coleman and Norris, there are still major questions about its effectiveness. This 
strategy is particularly useful in tackling fraudsters who operate using the face-to-face 
method and hangout in commercial areas. As noted earlier, an identified Jssue or 
situation related to the use of CCTV is that of crime displacement. With regard to 
fraud, using the dimensions of displacement noted by Coleman and Norris when 
targets are hardened, other avenues are exploited. For instance, if certain scams are 
given enough publicity, fraudsters are likely to look into other areas not so well 
known to the general public. This displacement could be geographic (geographical 
displacement), or victim based - target displacement (from fraud against businesses to 
fraud individuals, families, friends, the government etc. ). In 'perpetrator 
displacement', friends or relatives of the apprehended fraudster may continue the 
scam. 
Finally, though situational measures appear to be more associated with street crimes, 
Edwards' (2001) discussion on economic and financial crime as a problem of crime 
reduction identifies relevant aspects of the situational approach to economic crime. In 
Edwards' 'problematisation', he sums up the conventional approach - that proponents 
of crime reduction are of the view that significant reductions in crime can be 
accomplished by addressing the generation and distribution of opportunities for crime. 
Also, this is also possible without an understanding of the motivations or 
'dispositions' of offenders nor the related apparatus of detecting, prosecuting and 
punishing such offenders. Thus factors that enhance crime include the supply of 
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suitable targets (e. g. portable valuable goods), real guardianship over the targets, and 
opportunities produced by everyday routine activities of people. In this regard, it is 
possible to identify crime 'hot-spots' where most of all these conditions converge or 
are present. 
With regard to the above, this research has identified or confirmed common 'hot 
spots' or arenas for fraud, namely: in investments, medical/health services, and 
products, religion, education and training, charity, property, relationships, and general 
goods and services. Aspects of these activities can be targeted and in the process the 
bogus proprietors will be exposed. For instance, on a busy high street in most 
commercial areas of the city, advance fee fraudsters can be found operating. 
Television and newspaper advertisements carry 'too good to be true' publications 
daily, even though some also carry warning notices beside them. The elderly are often 
targeted by mail. In this regard, banks for instance can include advice notices in the 
bank statements of all customers warning them about potential scams in circulation. 
All these also fall under the umbrella of proactive policing discussed later. 
From a macro level, for economic and financial crimes, opportunities for their 
commission are generated by the increasing supply of motivated offenders. This can 
be attributed to the increased freedom of movement of citizens within the European 
Union, the creation of the Single Market, weaker border controls, and developments 
in transport and communication facilities. Second, the increasing supply of suitable 
targets such as those associated with electronically based conunerce; financial 
markets that are de-regulated; and the demand for entertainment and leisure which is 
as a consequence of disposable incomes in advanced industrialised societies. The 
erosion of capable guardianship in various personal and commercial activities is a 
contributory factor. Thus it is generally difficult to regulate communications and 
information technologies as criminals also adapt to changes in these fields (Edwards, 
2001). 
Consequently, crime reduction with regard to economic and financial offences should 
be geared towards the increasing the likelihood of apprehension, reduction of 
opportunities, targeting of repeat offenders and the creation of capable guardianship. 
For this to be accomplished, Edwards suggests that decisive interventions should be 0 
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aimed at manipulating the rational calculations of offenders about the perceived risks 
of offending - for example through the improvemea of security by Internet Service 
Providers (ISP's), and improving auditing techniques in the financial industry as 
noted by Levi (2000). Increasing the perceived effort of offending can also be 
effected. For example enhancing securities for software technology, which disrupts 
the activities of hackers. Hacking techniques could also be used to infiltrate criminal 
operations. It is possible for the fraudster to avoid these checks as his modus operandi 
may depend on the voluntary actions of the victim. 
A problem associated with all forms of situational prevention includes the social cost 
of the reduction measures. Young (1997) and Bottoms (1990) have both noted that the 
'cure' for crime reduction may well be more painful to bear than the effect of the 
crimes themselves. For Edwards (2001), the notion of the social costs of crime 
reduction is important in the politics of advanced liberal democracies. In practice in 
can be argued that certain levels of certain crimes are tolerated in order to satisfy the 
principles of human rights, freedom of movement, communication, privacy, a 
democratic and open society. For Edwards, these conditions have contributed 
immensely to the growth of the community, although they may also contribute to 
criminal opportunity. 
In conclusion, in fraud/situational prevention strategies, any measure that reduces the 
anonymity cherished by the fraudster would increase the risk of apprehension. It is not 
surprising that with the Internet - an 'improvement' to the orthodox postal system - 
the anonymity attribute is exploited. Though there could be genuine reason to conceal 
one's real contact address, in most cases, for a legitimate activity, this is not 
necessary. Advertisements and legal solicitations should be accompanied with 
adequate identity of the advertiser. There should be conspicuous avenues for victims 
to verify claims and ascertain who the proprietors are. 
On the other hand, it is important to view crime as an emergent product of social, 
political and economic relations in specific local contexts. Thus, an understanding of 
crime in any given locality would involve an examination of factors such as historical 
developments of labour markets, public services and political cultures in specific 
localities which act to produce or curtail opportunities for both law-abiding and law- 
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breaking (Edwards, 2001). For instance, in Hobbs and Dunnighan's (1998) study, the 
unintended consequence of slum clearance policies in the East of London during the 
1960s and 1970s was the dispersal of once cohesive communities, displacing them to 
the Essex and Kent hinterlands of the East End. However, Edwards notes that serious 
crime networks are not simply passive victims of political economic trends but 
possess the qualities to apprehend these trends and adapt to them. A common method 
is the marrying of illegitimate and legitimate business activities. Thus, from the 
community safety perspective, common or ideal methods of tackling crime would 
include an egalitarian distribution of civil citizenship (individual liberty etc. ); an 
egalitarian distribution of political citizenship (empowerment of citizens to participate 
in the processes etc. ); and an egalitarian distribution of social citizenship (opportunity 
to acquire the basic needs of life and more) (Marshall, 1963: 74). 
7.2 Maximising risk to fraudsters 
In the prevention of fraud, it is important for fraudsters and would-be fraudsters to 
know that they will be caught and sanctioned. It is hoped that this would act as a form 
of deterrence. In this thesis, the approach to this is twofold - through proactive 
'policing', and the use of effective punitive measures. Also, though the police or 
Police Force is the major agents in proactive crime/fraud prevention, it is argued that 
other agencies (regulatory bodies, individuals, private and public institutions 
including the media) are and could be involved in proactive crime or fraud prevention. 
Thus, with regard to this thesis/fraud, in a broad sense, proactive policing refers to the 
activities of all those involved in fraud prevention. We shall first examine prevention 
and proactive activities or policing, before and finally looking at the role of the 
criminal justice system. 
1) 9A 
7.2.1 Proactive 'policing' and investigations 
It appears that when losses to individual victims are fight, efforts at crime prevention 
and policing tend to be weak, thus allowing small groups of criminals to practise 
crime routinely as a craft. In many cases, victims are reluctant to pursue the matter. 
On the other hand, depending on the scale of the fraud and loss such as those 
involving big banks, public interest including those of politicians or the government 
could be high. According to Levi (1981), where police corruption can be arranged, as 
most notably in the United States, business type organisation of crime becomes 
possible, even though the crime is visible to law-enforcement agencies. The roles of 
key actors are discussed below. 
Law enforcement agencies 
In the UK government and police crime policy are geared towards crimes that are 
regarded as very serious. Thus, despite the extent of fraud involving the abuse of trust, 
and its toll on victims, resources and research addressing it is limited. Areas of 
interest to the authorities include organised crime (international and local operations), 
and corruption in developing countries. For Hobbs and Dunnignhan (1999), unlike 
other countries, the UK has no legislation directed specifically at 'organised crime', 
however, the government has indicated that, for the present, the law of conspiracy is 
adequate for dealing with organised crime in the UK (Home Affairs Committee, 1996: 
39). 
Law enforcement agencies have responded to the problem by moving away from 
traditional reactive methods of policing and adopting intelligence-driven strategies 
with a concomitant increase in the use of sophisticated covert techniques (involving 
both technical and physical surveillance), paid informers, undercover police officers 
and 'sting' operations (Dunnighan and Norris, 1996; Maguire, 1998). Accompanying 
this has been the growth and expansion of centralisation and internalisation of 
specialist units dedicated to tackling serious and organised crime. The National 
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Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) was formed in 1992 amalgamating and bringing 
together under one control various regional and national intelligence units. It 
maintains national indices of categories of criminals such as currency counterfeiters, 
drug traffickers, football hooligans, organised criminals, paedophiles etc. Fraud cases 
involving very large sums receive adequate attention from investigative authorities. 
For instance, the Advance Fee for Loans Scam (Case No. 6- which affected Belling, 
former cooker manufacturer), and Timeshare Racket in Tenerife Scam (Case No. 40 - 
involving John Palmer), the authorities ensured that the case was concluded. 
Police forces have also established specialist units either within, or affiliated with the 
fraud squad of the forces (Flanary, 2000). Flanary notes that in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, most fraud squads have specialist units. The most common units 
include, financial investigation (or intelligence), cheque and credit card, intelligence, 
computer crime, crime management, corporate fraud and public sector corruption. 
These specialities enhance expertise in addition to efficient investigations. 
The level of commitment/policy within police forces towards fraud has not been 
encouraging due to certain genuine problems they have to grapple with (noted below). 
With regard to police policy on how and where fraud investigation and prevention 
featured in departmental objectives, the Police Fraud Survey 2000 revealed that in 
England, only one force had fraud specifically stated as a force objective (Flanary, 
2000). This indicates that fraud as an offence needs to be given more attention. 
On the other hand, apart from public or government policy that informs police 
priorities with regard to crime prevention and investigation, the police are faced with 
other problems. These include shortage of manpower and resources to investigate all 
reported cases of fraud. Fraud squad officers note that the investigation of complex 
frauds in particular could take years to conclude and offenders may not be prosecuted 
depending on the degree of evidence required for a conviction. - Rather, while they 
pursue selected fraud cases, some others are referred to agencies such as the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), if it is within their scope. 
Also, as dictated by public interest and pressure, policing the streets, investigating 
murders, and robberies are activities that tend to receive more attention. However, 
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they recognise that this response is not consistent, and that fraud is low on their 
priorities, as investigations are long and expensive. Flanary (2000) also identified 
secondment to other duties in various police forces. The Police Fraud Survey 2000 
revealed that in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, secondment in most forces was 
discretionary. General, areas of crime fraud officers are seconded to include murder 
investigations, computer crime, mortuary duties, internal enquiries, training, 
paedophile enquiries, witness protection, court duties, general duties and public order 
duties among others. The result of this is limited attention and time to fraud cases. 
Recently, according to the BBC News (20/04/01) certain relevant issues were 
reflected in the Home Secretary's proposal in the current Proceeds of Crime Bill. One 
is to establish a Criminal Assets Recovery Agency, which will seize those finances 
and property owned by prosecuted individuals that are thought to be the product of 
criminal enterprise. The BBC News of 18/04/01 also states that the establishment of 
the National High-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) had complemented this law 
enforcement strategy. The NHTCU will be staffed, by officers from the UK 
constabularies, HM Customs and Excise, and NCIS, to. investigate crimes conducted 
through the Internet and other computer technologies, in particular the perceived 
growth in credit card fraud and computer viruses (Edwards, 2001). 
Proactive 'policing' 
Proactive policing is a strategy that has been acknowledged to be effective. Though, 
the extent of its use is another matter. We have noted that the limited resources, time, 
and policy are contributory factors to proactive policing. Certain scams that could 
have been avoided or noticed much earlier were successful because this approach was 
not rigorously pursued. For instance, a Royal Wedding led to a fraudster creating 
souvenir wines (replacing labels) and selling it without the consent of the initial 
producers or the monarch. The British beef crisis led to fraud involving the farn-iing of 
ostrich meat. Investment scams (in whisky, champagne, food, big screen displays etc. ) 
and religious scams ('world to end') were perpetrated mainly because of the 
millennium 'fever'. Some of these scams could have been detected much earlier. 
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In the Police Fraud Survey 2000, out of the 43 forces that responded, only 12 forces 
replied that their fraud squads undertook proactive and/ or intelligence-led 
investigations as opposed to purely reactive work. Lack of resources was mentioned 
as a major draw back to this strategy. Apart from I force that spent 60% of its time on 
this method, others spent between 10-20% of their time on proactive policing 
(Flanary, 2000). The survey notes examples of types of proactive methods. Some of 
these methods include: 
-P Co-operating with other forces and agencies 
9 Selective surveillance including the use of technology, observation/monitoring of 
target business as informed by intelligence, reports, ongoing cases etc. 
e Telephones billing analysis - it is possible to understand the nature of certain 
types of fraudulent activity through this method. For example, the telephone line 
is the major weapon used by the premium-rate line fraudster, and those involved 
in unsolicited calls (cold calling) demanding for payments for goods or services. 
Banking/financial enquiries - bank statements and other transactions could reveal 
the flow of money and confirm the losses incurred by victims using this medium. 
Intelligence gathering - collating relevant information that could assist in the 
investigation, prosecution and the prevention of crime. 
Undercover officers -Levi (1995: 201) notes Marx's (1988: 62) observations that 
there are a number of types of police undercover work. They include relatively 
passive intelligence operations, though they may have to participate in crime to 
gain credibility (before or after the offence); carrying out operations such as 
placing advertisements attracting would-be victims, with a view to giving advice 
to those who respond to the 'proposals'; and facilitative operations in which the 
agent is either victim or co-conspirator (e. g. in money laundering investigations). 
In addition to the above, there are certain advantages of proactive/undercover 
operations. According to Levi (1995: 207), Marx (1988) discussed how undercover 
work could be justified. Reasons stated include that: 
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- citizens, by virtue of the 'social contract' grant to goverment the right to use 
exceptional means such as coercion and deception in order to protect them and 
society at large; 
- undercover work creates a balance in law enforcement, as some crimes are 
better dealt with upfront, and other crimes such as white-collar crimes and 
drug offences are best handled with this tactic; and 
- undercover operations provide the best form of evidence, avoiding problems 
of mistaken identity, and confessions (coerced or not); 
Levi also adds that an issue not considered in the critiques of covert or undercover 
operations is the saving in court time that is generated by evidence that is 
indisputable. For instance, he notes that in fraud cases the average cost of fraud trials 
at the Old Bailey was over E100,000, a large multiple of policing costs (Levi, 1987). 
However, the impact of covert surveillance is limited, because many frauds come to 
the attention of the police after substantial financial losses have been incurred. In 
addition, of concern are issues relating to the law of entrapment (e. g. admissibility of 
evidence), disclosure rules (e. g. to the defence - of information relevant to police 
operations), and the general high cost (material, time, and human) of covert policing 
or proactive policing (Levi, 1995). 
The writer contends that the merits far outweighs the demerits, and emphases should 
always be in favour of citizens/would-be victims and victims. If all these proactive 
methods are routinely pursued, there is no doubt that it would go a long way in 
reducing the occurrence of fraud. As indicated earlier, proactive 'policing' should not 
be the preserve of the Police. For instance: 
The U. S. Postal Inspection Service placed via alias enticing advertisements 
offering an easy way to earn money or to lose weight. People who responded 
received politely worded letters advising them that they ought to be more 
careful about offers that sound too good to be true, and containing stamps for 
the postage expended and a booklet on mail fraud schemes (Marx, 1988: 65). 
In the same vein, the police or other agencies could respond to suspected 
advertisements or scams to verify the proposals or deals offered to people. This is 
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bound to present difficulties for the advance fee fraudster, and at the same time ensure 
that conmen are stopped on time before they do more damage. 
Private investigators and agencies 
The use of reputable and properly monitored private investigators would go a long in 
way in the proactive policing of advance fee fraudsters. It is more cost effective to 
hire their services than to risk one's life savings on bogus deals. In fact, in 1999, the 
Home Secretary launched the Partners Against Crime initiative, enabling accredited 
private sector investigators to work alongside the police, with access to confidential 
information on certain defmed cases. The pilot scheme was intended to free police 
resources (The Financial Times 14105101). Though the scheme was extended for 
another year, it is noted that results have not been encouraging. Difficulties include 
that of conceptualisation - e. g. is the private investigator's primary duty to their 
employer or to the police? Information and its usage to the private investigator are 
limited or as directed by the police - their employers find this uncomfortable. 
The role of private detection agencies in the prevention of fraud was mentioned in 
Levi's (1981) study of long-firm fraud. Levi notes that the detection of fraud is only 
one of the functions of most credit inquiry agencies, and that it is a source of 
considerable prestige for an agency, in so far as it is able to prevent losses by its 
members or subscribers. The number of firms upon which recommendations of 'no 
credit' were issued and which were prosecuted subsequently for long-firm fraud is a 
good indicator of success. He noted that the Manchester Guardian Society, in 
particular, enjoys an enviable reputation in this field. Although frauds are normally 
spotted by that agency, it is more difficult to evaluate the extent to which credit was 
wrongly denied to firms because of their creditworthiness was misjudged (Levi 198 1). 
The efficacy of the general use is still being monitored, though for a potential huge 
investor, the private investigator may save him from a lot of damage 
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To conclude this section, no single agency is currently capable of handling the 
problem alone especially cases of complex illegal fmancial transactions (Hobbs and 
Dunnighan, 1999). They note that as a consequence, in the UK, the Bank of England, 
the Financial Fraud Information Network, the Securities and Investment Board, the 
Insolvency Service and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) participate in operational 
groups, such as the Joint Action Group on Organised Crime, which is chaired by the 
Metropolitan Police. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) also play an 
important role in carrying out investigations under the powers conferred by the 
Companies Act 1985. 
With regard to investigations, the police play a crucial role in the whole process. As 
with other forms of crime they are the initial investigators. The police gather 
documentary evidence, interview witnesses, and generally apportion blame based on 
their findings. Levi's (1993) interviews with the -police showed that they would prefer 
a situation where those responsible for the final prosecution of cases or the case in 
question is in a position to express views at important stages of the investigation to 
guard against wasteful ventures. Levi concludes that the lessons gathered from his 
study of lawyer involvement in criminal investigation are that assisting lawyers must 
be credible in terms of expertise. They must be readily available at unsociable hours. 
Teamwork should be given priority and there should be a willingness to break down 
professional and prestige barriers. There should also be someone on the team to ask 
difficult questions and adopt the devil's advocate role if foreseeable acquittals and 
unnecessary arrests are to be avoided. 
Thus, it is important that right from the investigation stage appropriate- professionals 
are involved especially lawyers to make sure the evidence is appropriately collected 
and presented. Also the initial-investigatingýofficers should be adequately empowered 
with statutes and resources to carry out their duties efficiently. Relevant powers 
should include that of access to documentation, interrogation, confiscation of assets 
and detention before the culprit absconds. Scams can also be dealt through proactive 
methods rather than waiting for victims to incur heavy losses. 
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7.2.2 Appropriate sanctions for fraudsters 
A r% kpart from ensuring that fraudsters are adequately sanctioned at the end of a 
prosecution, it is important that punitive measures should also serve as a deterrent to 
others. The whole idea or aim of deterrence is to discourage crime and as such prevent 
it from occurring. Members of a community have to be aware especially through the 
experiences of offenders that crime does not pay. For this to be successful, certain 
methods of Punishment or sanctioning need to be adopted and properly implemented. 
Various arms of the criminal justice system (e. g. the courts, prisons and the police) 
have developed strategies (depending on the type of offence or crime) they feel would 
be effective in correcting/rehabilitating the offender. From another perspective, the 
aims of the sanctions are to decongest the prisons, reduce cost, strengthen the role of 
probation, protect the public and re-socialise the offender (Junger-Tas, 1994). Some 
researchers have identified certain measures they regard as suitable for fraudsters in 
particular. 
At the theoretical level, crime prevention through deterrence was based on the notion 
of rational choice, which has its origin in the classical theories of Cesare Beccaria and 
Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century. According to classical theory, criminals are 
free, rational and hedonistic; they choose among alternative courses of action 
according to their perceptions of the risks and gains associated with it, seeking to 
maximise gain (or pleasure) and minimise risk (or pain). Thus, for Beccaria 
punishment should be severe to the extent that it can deter offenders. According to 
Bennett and Wright (1984), one of the three main conditions for a deterrent effect is 
that potential offenders should believe they personally run some risk of getting 
caught. Second, potential offenders should fear receiving the threatened penalty; and 
third, the severity of official penalties should not be 'compensated' by the perceived 
reward of crime. Bennett and Wright conclude that unless potential offenders know 
fairly accurately what they risk, it is unlikely that minor changes in sentence will 
influence them. 
In the UK, the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1991 introduced a legislative framework 
based primarily on a 'just deserts' approach, but coupled with incapacitation for 
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'dangerous, offenders. The CJA laid down basic rules for the use of custody, 
community sentences, fines and discharges (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998). Here, 
sentences take the form of a pyramid - with custodial sentences at the top and fines 
and discharges at the bottom or base. The increasing occurrence of recorded cases of 
fraud can be said to be an indication of the ineffective sanctions or policy, in addition 
to other factors (social, economic, political etc. ). Sanctions come in different forms 
and could be enforced formerly or informally. Some of these methods are discussed 
below. I 
The concept of labelling 
In theory and as shown'in some examples below, and in practice also, the labelling 
theory offers an important dimension to the treatment of offenders. Ideas from here 
are suitable for fraudsters. In labelling theory, understanding crime should be 
approached from a broader social context. Labelling occurs when an offender is 
branded a criminal by the state, community or group. Once given the stigmatising 
label, the individual may be subject to isolation, segregation, degradation, 
incarceration, and psychological pressure (Becker, 1963). The implication of all this is 
that sanctions may serve as a deterrent - if the offender thinks about societal reaction 
to him -a result of his criminal activity. On the other hand, as a consequence, the 
individual may continue to engage in criminal activity either to 'make ends meet' or 
as an acceptance of the 'deviant label'. With regard to fraudsters, technological 
developments enhance their crimes, and could make them anonymous where the 
offences have been committed. They could also re-locate to another territory to avoid 
identificaton/attachment to their activities. The solution for this lies with various 
jurisdictions, concerning, how offenders are shamed and prosecuted internationally. 
Ideally, the criminal 'should have no place to hide'. 
Braithwaite (1989) addressed labelling through the theory of 'Reintegrative Shaming'. 
Though the researcher has expressed reservations on the efficacy of this approach as it 
concerns fraudsters - who are sometimes regarded as people who have no 'shame' or 
'conscience', this strategy is relevant as it concerns the notion that reputation and 
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status are important to the confidence trickster/fraudsters. Let us look at the nature of 
Braithwaite's explanation. 
For Braithwaite, cultural commitments to shaming are the key to controlling all types 
of crime. Criminal activity is best controlled when members of the community are 
actively involved through their participation in shaming offenders, and, having 
shamed them, take part in the process of reintegrating the offender back into the 
community. Thus, it is imperative that offenders are shamed or punished with dignity 
rather than having them stigmatised. Stigmatisation (which is disintegrative) has the 
tendency of creating criminal subcultures. Though the stigma is a deterrent and people 
prefer to avoid it, the negative consequences are unpleasant. Some of the negative 
consequences of stigma include rejection by members of the community and difficulty 
in getting legitimate employment because of the 'criminal' tag. Thus, reintegrative 
shaming means: 
that expressions of community disapproval, which may range from mild 
rebuke to degradation ceremonies are followed by gestures of re-acceptance 
into the community of law-abiding citizens. These gestures of re-acceptance 
will vary from a simple smile expressing forgiveness and love to quite formal 
ceremonies to decertify the offender as deviant (Braithwaite, 1989: 55). 
Furthermore, the theory suggests that the responsibility for dealing with certain types 
of criminal activity should shift from the state to the community. The government 
should be more concerned with monitoring the effectiveness of the community 
controls and intervening when the community attempts fail or may fail: for example in 
very serious crimes that need formal Public sanctions which help to sustain or impress 
on the public, stipulations of the criminal law. 
Braithwaite notes that the validity or efficacy of the theory of reintegrative shaming 
depends on the level of consensus in the society as to what actions are considered 
deviant or criminal. An example can be seen in Japan, a country that has recorded a 
reduced trend in crime rates since the Second World War. This is attributed to their 
cultural traditions of shaming and punishing offenders. In Japan, individual shame is 
often'born by the collectivity of which the individual is part of (e. g. family, school, 
company etc. ). For instance, parents are known to commit suicide when their children 
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are arrested for heinous crimes. In a particular case a station police chief in Tokyo 
resigned because a constable in his unit raped a woman. 
Braithwaite's theory postulates certain conditions that make for effective shaming. 
These include that individuals are more susceptible to shaming when they are 
enmeshed in multiple relationships of interdependency. Societies shame more 
effectively when they are communitarian; and variables like urbanisation and 
residential mobility determine the level of communitarianism, while variables like age 
and gender predict individual interdependency. Thus, the dominant theoretical 
conditions to consider in this integrative model are those of labelling (stigmatisation), 
subcultural, control (interdependency), opportunity (subcultures) and learning theories 
(integration of social learning theories for e. g. differential association). 
In reality, the application of Braithwaite's suggestions in multi-cultural societies 
would be Oficult. All groups concerned will have to accept whatever disciplinary 
action was taken. Though there may be some consensus in certain areas, issues such 
as religion, human rights, race etc, are bound to create problems. All these could 
reduce the effectiveness of shaming. Shame, or the threat of it, is a form of social 
control. In small face-to-face groups, shame is a fundamentally social thing. In large 
societies shame is less central because people enjoy great amounts of privacy (Nock, 
1993). Thus, shame "works" in face-to-face groups and it works among those who 
know one another. 
Some examples from the US show that shaming could have the desired impact. The 
negative consequences of sanctions of this sort are also discussed below (human 
rights violations and possibility of assaults on offenders could occur). For instance, 
the following was revealed by the Sunday Times (20/04/97: 23). A judge ordered a 
convicted burglar to stand on a street comer for three hours every three days, carrying 
a sign that read: "I'm a convicted thief'. In another incident the same judge ordered a 
woman convicted of drug-dealing to wear a sign that read: "I'm a convicted felon. I 
sold prescription drugs". Another person was ordered to wear a sign that read "I'm a 
convicted drunk driver". A judge in Ohio is said to have told a battered wife that she 
could spit in her husband's face. An Arkansas judge made shoplifters walk in front of 
the stores they stole from with signs acknowledging their thefts, and when a butcher's 
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shop was fined $10,000 for selling rotting meat, it was forced to advertise stating 
"filthy, putrid and contaminated substances". In Illinois, a convict was forced to erect 
a sign outside his home which read "Warning -a violent felon lives here. Travel at 
your own risk". Other offenders have been forced to take advertisements in local 
newspapers admitting their crimes. 
The article also notes that some victims of the shaming punishments appear to favour 
the indignity as fair punishment. For instance, a petty thief in Houston who for a 
week, paraded in front of a shop he had robbed with the sign I stole from this store. 
Don't be a thief This could happen to you", confessed that he was so 'horribly 
embarrassed by the experience', and has lost his temptation to shoplift. On the other 
band, the article notes that such practices have been controversial especially 
concerning its practical effectiveness and the moral - acceptability of public 
humiliation, and that it is a return to 17'h century America. Supporters are of the view 
that shame creates powerful deterrent to a wide range of potentially embarrassing 
crimes, such as wife-beating, drink-driving and cud abuse. The same would probably 
apply to fraud or fraudsters. 
Finally, in the same article, Professor Dan Kahan of the University of Chicago Law 
School was quoted saying that "a public sick of rwnpant crime that plagues their 
communities wants more from criminal punishment. They want a message. They want 
moral condemnation of the offendee,. On the other hand, human rights activists 
believe that shaming punishments does not serve the expected purpose, and it is more 
of revenge rather than justice. 
To sum up on the idea of shaming, as Braithwaite indicates, an assimilation 'ritual' 
should also be involved so that the offender is 'formally' forgiven and given another 
chance. Given the 'high' profile of fraudsters, it is likely that after a shaming exercise 
they would definitely reconsider their lifestyle or face the full wrath of the law and 
public in future. For corporations, one of its most important assets is its reputation. 
Thus, very visible sanctions can serve as a powerful, deterrent to corporate 
misconduct. Unfortunately, in most cases involving corporations, fines are the 
preferred method of sanction (Gabor, 1994). Garbor also notes that some corporations 
are willingly or even plan ahead for such 'expenses'. Imprisonment of company 
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executives could be effective, since this makes then loose their standing in society and 
experience some discomfort in jail. The degree of effectiveness of this depends on the 
type of prison (e. g. if it is an open or closed prison), length of sentence, and the 
general moral commitment and attitude of the particular offender. Some offenders 
simply have no scruples. In addition, the director of the SFO has consistently stressed 
the need to increase the use of fines in addition to other punishments such as the 
confiscation of assets of fraudsters and their families. Fraud investigating officers note 
that sanctions for deception and other frauds are much steeper in the United States 
than in the UK 
Criminal Courts and sanctions 
This thesis reveals that sanctions for fraudsters are generally low in the UK. For 
instance, Rider and Ashe's (1993) study of insider dealing showed that though the 
courts have spoken out against insider abuse, they have not always applied 'generally 
acceptable penalties'. This situation is not likely to discourage those concerned of 
&chancing their hand' in the future. They note that the approach in the United States 
has been to make sure that at a minimum, the insider is not allowed to keep any part 
of his illicit profit. In most cases, to make sure that he yields up a multiple of his 
profit, perhaps even as much as three times. 
Rider and Ashe also observe that in the UK, whilst it is difficult to be precise, it would 
seem that those who have been convicted have fared rather better than their US 
counterparts. Few have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment, and even fewer 
have actually gone to prison. They state that "indeed, it is the perception, and no 
doubt the reality, that economic crime pays as high-reward and very low risk 
endeavour, which has encouraged so many serious and even organised criminals into 
this area of activity" (Rider and Ashe, 1993: 90) 
The confiscation of assets of fraudsters is an area that needs to be utilised more often. 
Confiscation of assets is known to be an effective punitive tool (LevL 1987). For LevL 
there are three rmjor legal difficulties especially in intemational cases. These are the 
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absence of domestic authority to order the preservation of property pending the 
outcome of a foreign judicial proceeding. The absence of jurisdiction to transfer the 
right of ownership regarding moveable property, assets or money abroad, and the 
inability, of the courts in different countries to enforce criminal judgements from other 
countries in their territories. All respondents interviewed in this research agree that 
fraudsters should be hit where it hurts most - in their pockets. 
There is also a need for the main investigative agencies to benefit from 
confiscation/forfeiture. This additional revenue would assist them in acquiring more 
skills and resources for tackling fraud. The recent police fraud survey revealed that 
the application of the law in this regard has not been consistent. Some forces applied 
the rule more often than others did. Apart from 10 police forces that stated that they 
did not have the figures, others recovered amounts ranging from E5,000 to 0 million. 
27 forces in the survey said they did not benefit financially from the exercise, I force 
benefited indirectly and 6 forces said they benefited. Most forces stated that 
confiscated funds either went to the Treasury or to pay compensation to the victim (s) 
(Police Survey, 2000). 
Though they have limited deterrent effects, efficient criminal prosecution, 
expropriation of assets, and imprisonment are appropriate methods of dealing with 
fraudsters (Clarke, 1990). Victims are primarily concerned with reparation and the 
recovery of property. Clarke notes that insurance companies prefer to settle many 
frauds without recourse to law enforcement agencies. Also, public awareness on 
various types of fraud and deceit need to be intensified (for example, through public 
debates) and institutional arrangements should be established and committed to 
identifying misconduct. 
In addition, it will be necessary to appoint compliance officers or units charged with 
the responsibility of fraud control. It has been observed that large disparities exist in 
sentences between courts. Routine statistics indicate that there is a case for an 
assessment of what weight should be given to factors in sentencing decisions (Flood-- 
Page and Mackie, 1998). This would encourage consistency and will also address the 
questions on 'just deserts'. More so, Flood-Page and Mackie note that compensation 
orders were introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 1972 to provide victims with a 
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convenient, faster, and cheaper avenue than through civil litigation, especially in 
dealing with a criminal who clearly has the means to pay. 
The international dimensions of fraud have led to certain actions by governments. 
Advance fee fraud and other forms of obtaining money goods and services by false 
pretences are crimes that are perpetrated across national boundaries. From a legal 
perspective with regard to jurisdictions, this can be problematic. Fraudsters are known 
to take advantage of statutes of other countries to launder the proceeds of crime and 
avoid prosecution. The need to create laws that address these obstacles can not be 
overemphasised especially with various forms of Internet or Cybercrimes being 
carried out globally. An important issue of concern to the fraudster is international 
mobility and the retention of his or her illegally acquired wealth. It is good to note that 
efforts are and have been made in this regard. For instance, according to Reuvid 
(1995) in the UK, since 1990 the major conventions that have enhanced the strength 
of law enforcers internationally include: 
e The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceed of Crime (1990). The UK was the first to ratify the 
convention in September 1992. The boundaries of this convention are broad as it 
extends beyond economic or financial crimes. It is intended to facilitate 
international co-operation in all forms of criminal proceeds and transactions. 
The Community Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for 
money laundering adopted by the council of Economic and Finance Ministers in 
June 1991. In the UK, this was implemented in early 1994 by the introduction of 
the Criminal Justice Act of 1993. 
* The European Convention on Extradition (1957) which was ratified in the UK in 
1991. This has made extradition especially between European Economic states 
easier. 
With regard to domestic legislation, Reuvid identified the following: 
9 Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (DTA) which is supposed to be a comprehensive 
legislation. It ensures that the convicted is deprived of theprofits from the illegal 
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activities. The Act also made it an offence for anyone to assist a drug dealer in the 
course of his business or in retaining the proceeds of the crime. 
Criminal Justice Co-operation Act 1990. This also prohibits the transfer of or 
concealment of proceeds from drug trafficking. 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. This contains provision enabling the courts to 
confiscate the proceeds of indictable offences. 
Extradition Act 1989. This also provides that an offence, is extraditable if it 
attracts a sentence on indictment of 12 months imprisonment or more in both 
countries. 
41 Criminal Justice Act 1993). This includes new offences such as the failure to report 
suspicions of money laundering and also makes the laundering of non-drug 
trafficking crimes an offence. 
9 Criminal Law Act 1977 and Theft Acts of 1968 and 1978. 'The Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) was established under the first of these and is responsible for the 
investigation of serious and complex fraud cases usually of losses of L5 minion or 
more. The particular legislation can be found under Section 2 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1987. 
The Companies Act 1985. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is 
responsible for its implementation. Companies in the UK are expected to maintain 
records and a file containing relevant information about the business and 
ownership at Companies House. These records are available to the public. Banks, 
building societies, insurance and investment businesses are subject to external 
regulation. Sectors not subject to an external regulator can be investigated if 
necessary as directed by the Secretary of State. 
The development of Internet technology and the ability to operate effectively 
anywhere in the world has created serious problems for criminal justice especially 
with regard to jurisdictions and legality of certain transactions across countries with 
different laws (Rider, 2001). Rider asserts that rules on jurisdiction over the Internet 
and transactional crimes depend on the country involved. With regard to the World 
Wide Web, in the US, the courts apply what is referred to as a 'minimum contacts 
test'. In other words they have to ascertain that a substantial degree or connection 
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other than the mere existence of the web page is linked to the USA. Internet providers 
also have certain responsibilities by law. These covers customers and the type of 
materials made available. With regard to enforcement, the number of websites is so 
huge that monitoring them can be difficult. For instance, false information posted on 
the web in the year 2000 lured scores of investors into decisions that cost them 
millions of dollars. The US Securities and Exchange Commission receives about 400 
e-mails a day from aggrieved investors on the web (The Financial Times 07/02/01: 6). 
In addressing this problem, in May 2000, the FBI in conjunction with the National 
White-collar Crime Centre opened the Internet Fraud Complaint Centre as a means of 
tackling and gathering information on Internet fraud. As at 27d' October the centre had 
taken over 18,000 complaints from 103 different countries (Rider, 2001). Further, in 
the UK, the Computer NEsuse Act 1990 created three new offences of unauthorised 
access to computer material, and unauthorised access with intent to commit or 
facilitate commission of flirther offences and unauthorised modification of computer 
material. Section 4 stipulates its territorial scope by stating the following: 
The UK court has jurisdiction over any act or proof of an act whether the 
alleged offender is within the UK or not, so long as there is one significant 
link with the domestic jurisdiction in the circumstances of the case which 
means the offence has been committed. That significant link is that the crime 
either originated in the UK or was directed at the UK. The nationality of the 
alleged offender is irrelevant to the issue (Rider, 2001: 343). 
According to Rider (2001), the European Union has also attempted to address the 
problem through legislation. On 27'h April 2000, the Council of Europe released a 
draft convention on cybercrime. This will be the first international treaty concerning 
computer-related crime. When completed, the text will be legally binding and aims to 
harmonise national legislation on the subject. The draft treaty criminalises various 
activities such as intrusion and interception of telecommunications, computer - aided 
forgery and fraud. 
In addition to all the above, the Director of the SFO, (2000) has called for a general 
offence of fraud in the criminal law itself This is to make it relevant to the dynamics 
of the commercial world. The general offence of fraud it is argued should be based on 
the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud. For the Director, the contrary view 
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that such bm offence may be too wide and might penalise conduct which otherwise 
would not be illegal. Also, this argument omits the implications and nature of the 
present offences such as theft, which is defined as 'the dishonest appropriation of 
property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of 
it'. The Director notes that at the present time, this definition is not particularly 
relevant to the way in which business is carried out. Under the present law, unless the 
offences are carried out by a number of people or through a UK-incorporated 
company (in which case the offences of conspiracy to defraud or fraudulent trading 
can be charged) it is impossible to charge a 'system' -a series of transactions over 
period of time, in one indictment. Specimen charges result in a limitation on the 
sentencing powers of the judge, who is obliged to sentence on the basis of the 
offences charged, and to take no account of whether they form part of a series of 
transactions. For the SFO, what is important is that the defendant has acted 
dishonestly. 
Finally, areas of concern for fraud regulators and prosecutors are that of offshore 
banking and tax havens. Offshore and bank secrecy legislation has made fraud even 
more lucrative for the money laundered in particular. It has been revealed that a 
market has been developed for the purchasing and licensing of offshore banks. 
According to Reuvid (1995), these offshore banks are mere shells. They have no 
capital base, no staff and are under no form of regulation or control. It is clear that 
they are vehicles for fraud. Reuvid also notes that international banks avoid reporting 
huge frauds to the police for fear of creating panic among their customers. However 
when monumental frauds occur the police and public get to know about it (for 
example the BCCI-Bank of Credit and Commerce International case). With regard to 
capital flight and money laundering also, an effective strategy has since been 
identified within the underground banking industry. Reuvid cites the Hawala in India, 
and the Fei Ch'ien in the Chinese community as examples of virtually impenetrable 
schemes. It is important for policy makers in all jurisdictions to address these issues 
vigorously. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
This thesis has examined fraud involving the manipulation of trust and obtaining by 
false pretences in cash or kind - money, goods and services such as advance fee fraud. 
Certain strategies or courses of action are necessary to help fight fraud. These include 
giving fraud priority status within Home Office and policy objective. The researcher 
shares the views expressed by fraud investigators interviewed and findings in the 
Police Fraud Survey 2000 that having efficient rules and powers on forfeiture and 
confiscation for the police and prosecutors especially geared towards the redirection 
of confiscated money to forces would be encouraging for organisations concerned. 
In addition, there is a need to also have civil forfeiture legislation. Officers also need 
specialised skills and training in intelligence and in contemporary crimes such as 
those involving the use of the Internet. The creation of a national fraud intelligence 
database updated regularly and linked to all forces should be pursued. Other 
investigative agencies such as NCIS, SFO should also be linked to the network. In 
other words, better use of computer technology in this regard and in other areas. The 
relationship with the public and business community should be intensified. Greater 
use of proactive and covert policing strategies, and the implementation of regional 
fraud squads are necessary to be abreast with the ever changing nature of fraud 
(Flanary, Police Fraud Survey, 2000). 
The ultimate punitive measure is to take the reward of crime away from the fraudster. 
The Director of the SFO (2000) noted that the British Government's intention to 
relieve financial crooks of their ill-gotten gains could be seen in the establishment of a 
proposed National Confiscation Agency for this purpose. An example of such an 
establishment is the Criminal Assets Confiscation Bureau, which has been successfUl 
in Ireland. At present, the SFO makes all efforts to recover funds, which are 
subsequently paid to victims. The success rate in this regard is not encouraging. The 
Director notes that the legal process of freezing accounts and assets can be 
cumbersome. Fronts such as spouses are commonly used to secure assets leaving the 
victims high and dry. It is also possible for appropriate legislation to take human right 
issues into consideration. 
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In this thesis the researcher highlighted the significance of 'small' frauds to victims 
and even countries, and the attention given by authorities in favour of 'large' 
scomplex' or 'serious' fraud. This can be justified - logistics, caseload, 'high profile' 
nature of case and offenders etc., but with regard to numbers, more victims are 
neglected. For instance, investigative agencies such as the police and other specialised 
ones do not readily accept to pursue cases involving loss or losses less than a certain 
amount. Already, by definition, departments, units are established to handle 'serious 
fraud'! This is usually attributed to pressure and resources. Thus victims are advised 
to pursue the matter privately or with the institutions concerned. The 'seriousness of 
fraud or a scam' is subjective, and depends on the impact/value of loss experienced by 
the victim. 
In the UK, political or policy implications of strategies are better understood from the 
perspectives of law enforcement, crime reduction, and community safety. Each 
organisation has its accredited aetiology of crime, ethical standpoint on what should 
be done and policy recommendations. It is noted that relatively, law enforcement 
appears to be the priority (Edwards, 2001). As a consequence, the government 
addresses the problem or crime via the avenues that they can easily control and 
manipulate, which is law enforcement - the police, regulatory bodies and units of the 
criminal justice system. Though this is more of a short-term measure it also has long 
term implications for the victim, offender and criminal justice in general. All this is 
not unconnected to the general public perception on the seriousness of fraud as a 
criminal offence. 
Researchers have suggested various strategies of dealing with or preventing fraud. 
These include theories of deterrence such as shaming, confiscation, imprisonment, 
prompt investigations and prosecutions etc. While private organisations can play 
important role to ease the burden on government agencies, the state still determines 
the seriousness in which certain offences or fraud cases are regarded. The media can 
influence this decision, and at the same time put pressure on the bodies responsible for 
certain investigations. Publicity is capable of putting fraudsters out of business and the 
threat of publicity is known to have led to refunds to aggrieved customers. 
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On the macro-econon-& level, there are multiplier effects of illegal economic activity 
concerning the creation of wealth and employment opportunities in 'licit' economies 
(Edwards and Gill, 1999). This condition is often ignored when computations are 
made about the cost or value of economic crime. Thus, for Edwads and Gill (2001) 
viewing crime as enterprise raises questions about the role of illicit entrepreneurs in 
boosting macroeconomic growth, and providing employment opportunities. This is so 
especially where enough legitimate opportunities do not exist and avenues for 
alleviating severe poverty are minimal, such as in developing countries including 
those in Eastern and Central Europe (Rawlinson, 2000). Therefore, the social as 
opposed to the narrow notion of emphasising aspects of criminal justice in the control 
of fraud and other economic crimes should be emphasised. 
Frauds are not only common in periods of economic depression. In fact, during times 
of economic boom the criminals are successful in getting savings from prospective 
investors and spenders. Informants attributed crime to pure greed. This is contrary to 
certain beliefs that people who usually commit economic crimes are responding to 
disadvantageous and desperate needs. For instance it is not surprising to learn that 
most tax crimes are committed by the well to do, and shoplifting offenders for 
instance cut across all segments of society. Unlike the desire to meet one's basic 
needs, greed is by definition insatiable (Gabor, 1994). 
Legitimate or illegitimate opportunities are not issues strictly examined by the greedy. 
This thesis has shown that the manner in which fraudsters spend their ill-gotten gains 
is an indication of the value attached to such activities or acquisitions - fraudsters are 
known to acquire expensive clothes, luxury cars and to entertain themselves at choice 
holiday locations and hotels. The more a culture glorifies the unfettered accumulation 
of wealth and consumption, the more likely it is that people will be prepared to act 
criminally and unscrupulously, regardless of their employment opportunities and 
economic situation ... Wealth, after all, is a symbol of status and power" (Gabor, 1994: 
255). 
Finally, offenders usually assemble the necessary information and make use of 
professionals if necessary to cover their tracks. This makes their successful conviction 
difficult in some cases. The concept or notion of trust has been identified as a crucial 
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factor in virtually all forms of scams. Understanding how and why trust is developed 
in the various arenas of human endeavour identified in this thesis (e. g. business, 
charity, religion etc. ) would enable would-be victims, investigators and law 
enforcement agencies to adequately address this pattern of fraud. 
The victims and the police will have to be determined to bring them to book, as the 
typical conman collects small sums from several or hundreds of victims expecting to 
reduce police and public interest in the scam. However, as long as fraudsters emulate 
the practices and psychology of legitimate enterprises, it is unlikely that the crime will 
be completely eliminated. But as it involves the exploitation of trust which is 
necessary for the functioning of society, this pattern of fraud - obtaining by false 
pretences/collection of upfront fees or deposits in cash or kind, threatens to undermine 
human relations and business in particular. We have identified proactive policing, 
media coverage and warnings, leaflets of advice in bank statements, stiffer sanctions 
especially with regard to victim compensation among others for fraud to be drastically 
reduced. Proactive activities or 'policing' by the public, private/public institutions and 
law enforcement agencies are effective methods of fraud control, and should be 
vigorously pursued. 
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UNITED EQUITY LIMITED 
COMPTROLLER'S SECTION - SWEEPSTAKES AWARD ENTRY 
41ý 
UEQMUF053 
MR M WILLIAMS 313n 
31 SALMON GROVE p4 
HULL 
NORTH HUMBERSIDE HU6 7SX 
jean Wilson 
Director ofAward Prites 
PRIORITY 
September 15,1999 
Attention M Williams: 
I have been requested to contact you regarding a sum of money listed in our 
disbursement account as unclaimed and unpaid. 
This cash deposit totals E10,000.00 and constitutes the full and final payment of a 
grand prize in a national open sweepstakes created by our corporate parent company. 
Your Priority Number 002-216-966, contains nine digits which make you eligible to be 
officially awarded this cash. 
Since we are most anxious to close the books on this sweepstakes we are asking you to 
contact us as soon as possible so that we may verify your status and speed up the 
conclusion of this promotion. 
NOTE: Expiry date for final submission of a_Priority N!. imber_in this sweepstakes still 
applies. Rules state if you hold but faii" to -submit the winning Prioriiy Number 
before the published deadline, forfeiture of all funds due you is mandatory ( see 
rules and deadline on reverse side ). 
WILL YOU ASSIST OUR PUBLICITY DEPARTMENT? This sweepstakes was created to promote a 
unique, Genuine Diamond Necklace (with 17-faceted . 
25 pt. genuine diamond, inlaid in 
gleaming bright work mounts, 14 Kt. Tiffany prong gold-plated setting, Certificate of 
Authenticity. ) You are not required to order this jewellery nor make any other 
purchase. However, since this is a publicity sweepstakes we would like to be able to 
truly state you are an owner of our jewellery. Accordingly, we have made arrangements 
for you to obtain this jewellery for a service fee of E9.97. We hope you will assist 
us by requesting one or more for your personal use. Thank you in advance for your 
cooperation. 
m Williams, I am pleased to be sending you this message. But I must reiterate the 
importance of not jeopardizing your status because of a late response. Ten thousand 
pounds is a significant reason to immediately mail the enclosed Declaration attesting 
that you have not already received a payment of E10,000.00 from these offices. If you 
take the relatively little amount of time to do this, I am sure I will soon be 
closing the books on what is a substantial amount of unpaid money. 
Sincerely, 
Jean Wilson 
Director of Award Prize 
- --- - -- - ----- . ................... -- ------ -- -- - ---- ------ - ---------------- ------- ---- -------------- 1.1 M Williams hereby acknowledge your notice of an unclaimed an unpai sweepstakesswan! totalling L10,000.00. I warrant thatno funds have been RESPONSE FORM paid to me by United Equity Limited. 
2. My assigned PRIORITY NUMBER . 
002-216-966 is presented on this 
Declaration for purposes of verification of my eligibility status for full and 
final payment or the above stated undisbursed award. *ilý; 
RESPONDEE: 3.1 accept your offer or a GENUINE DIAMOND NECKLACE 
LNor-17- 
I- UEOMUFO53 (CERTIFICATE OF Aun ]JENTICIT"Y INCLUDED) for a courtesy MR M WILLIAMS 
service fee ofL9.97.1 realize no purchase orany kind Is required in 31 SALMON GROVE connection with this sweepstakes or final disbursement or its unpaid prize of 
HULL L10,000.00. 
NORTH HUMBERSIDE HU6 7SX 
NOTE NO PLKHASE ON PAYME141 OF ANY KIND IS REOUIRID TO BE A PARTICIPANT IN THIS SWEEPSTAKES HOW- 
EVER. THIS DECLARATION (IN ITS PRESENT FORM) AND ACCOMPANYING ENVELOPE ARE TO BE USED ONLY WHEN 
REOUESTING JMLLERY WHICH WE ARE HOLDING 0 YOUIR NAME OTHERWISE. USE YOUR OWN ENVELOPE SAL 
30 DAY MONEY SACK GUARANTEE- SEE RULES ON REVERSE SIDE. 
SVVFC-LF' UNITED EQUITY LIMITED PO Box 189 Redhill Surrey RHI 3YW 
I am enclosing a: 0 cheque Upostal order made payable to: United Equity 
limited for the 19.97 fee. or charge my: U VISA U MasterCard 
Credit Expiry 
Card # Date - 
4.1 understand that if requested, I wdl provide a photograph of myself for 
publicity purposes. 
Cardholdef Name: 
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MR. ANDREW WILLIAMS 
PHONEIFAX: 234 -1- 7744762 
LAGOS, NIGERIA 
ATTN: THE PRESIDENTICHIEF EXECUTIVE 
DEAR SIR, 
REQUEST FOR URGENT BUSINEiS RELATIONSHIP 
NATURALLY, THIS LETTER WILL COME AS A SURPRISE SINCE WE HAVE NOT MET. PERMIT ME 
HOWEVER, TO INFORM YOU THAT WEARE MEMBERS OF THE CONTRACT-A-=D. CDIAA41ýTTEEJCAC)- 
WEAREMAKING THIS CONTACTWITH 
IN THE YEAR 1995 TO 1997, SO MAW CONTRACTS WERE AWARDED TO FOREIGN CONTRACTORS. 
MOST OF THESE CONTRACTS WERE FULLY EXECUTED AND COMMISSIONED. AS A MATTER OF FACT, 
ONEOFSUCH CONTRACTS WAS OVER-INVOICED TO THETUNE OFTWENTY MIWON, EIGHT HUNDRED 
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$20,800,000: 00). IN THE BUDGET PRESENTATION ANNOUNCED BY THE 
FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND'AS PART OF EFFORTS TO WIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, 
THE NNPC HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO PAY MOST OUTSTANDING. PAYMENTS DUE TO FOREIGN 
CONTRACTORS. FORTUNATELY FOR*US, THE OVER-INVOICED SUM OF US$20.8M HAS BEEN LISTED' 
AS ONE OF SUCH PAYMENTS BY THE NNPC. 
HOWEVER AS CIVIL SERVANTS, WE ARE NOTPERMITTED BYLAW TO OPERATE FOREIGN ACCOUNTS. 
THIS IS WHY WE AREASKING FOR YOUR ASSISTANCETO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS TO 
FACILMATE THE TRANSFER OFTHIS FUND TO ANY ACCOUNT YOU WILL NOMINATED bFCbURSE, YOU 
SHALL BEADEQUATELY COMPENSATED: 30% SHALL BEYOURS WHILE MY COLLEAGUES AND I SHALL 
, THE REMAINING 5% SHALL R THE REIMBURSEMENT OFANY EXPENSES THAT WILL ! MYE9flo BE INCURRED IN THIS TRANSACTION. 
TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER, WE REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING FROM YOU BY FAX. 
1. A. COPY OF YOUR COMPANY'S LETTERHEAD DULY STAMPED AND SIGNED BELOW. 
2. COMPLETE PARTICULARS OF THE BANK WHERE YOU WISH THAT THE, FUNDS BE 
TRANSFERRED. 
WE SHALLAPPLYAND OBTAIN NECESSARY PAYMENT APPROVALS FROM THE RELEVANT AUTHOR ITI ES 
INCLUDING THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FINANCE (FMF). WHICH SHALL ALLOCATE YOUR COMPANY 
'FDAEIGITEXCR&GEýFOFt'THEFU', YDS. - WHEN-THE-MONEY. - IS. TRA -RUERRED 
TO YOUR ACCOUNT, WE 
SHALLTHENASKYOUTODISBURS 1. WE SýRWALMBUY INDUSTRIAL- 
GOODS FOR RESALE IN NIGERIA IF YOU WILL BE UNAULt Iu DISBURSE OUR SHARE IN CAS 
WEWAIT IN ANTICIPATION OFYOUR FULLEST CO-OPERATION. ENDEAVOUR TO REACH ME ON PHONE/ 
FAX: 234-1-7744762 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. THE CONFIDENCE AND TRUST REPOSED ON YOU 
CANNOT BEOVER EMPHASISED. THEREFORE, YOU ARE REQUIRED TO KEEPTHIS DEALTOYOURSELF 
Afl) CONFIDENTIAL 
BS Is S 
MR. ANOR 
4of4 
. 303 
THE NIGERIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. 
TEL- 234-2-2310371 
FAX, 234.2-2310370 
4TH JUNE. Ign 
ATTN-Prosident/CEO - 
SIR, 
CONFIDENTIAL PROPOSAL FOR TRANSFER OF $38.500,000.00 FROM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
OF NIGERIA THROUGH NNPC ACCOUNT 
I presume this letter wili not be of a sumpnse to you. 
Your comPany was introduced to me by International Chambers of Commerce and Industnes, but this busl- 
ness was not disclosed to, Charnbers of Commerce and Industries. -- -4-t ', ý -:: - -; - - 
I am LARRY OnDGWU an employee of Federal Govemmnt of Nigeria v. jvned Corporabon. Nigeria 
Nabmal Petmieurn Cotporaticin (NNPL) 
Few years ago, the Federal Government of Nigeria instructed the corporation (NNPC) to award contracts on 
behalf of Goverrumnt for buftrig of a Refinery in the Northern part of Nigeria. In respectof the above, I and 
three of my co-employee cf Wigerian National Petroleum Corporation was appointed as the contract award- 
ing comrnitt&e of the corporation (NNPC), to deliberate on the best foreign companies to handle the building 
of the Refinery, after much deliberations within the members of the committee, the contracts was awarded to 
some foreign firms to carry out execut. on of " projects, but before awarding this contracts, the four mem- 
bers of the contra&. s awarcling committ--e have secretly agreed to over-innate the actual contract value with 
the tune of $38.500.000.00 which we shall use a reliable foreign company to claim. 
Now, the contract are complete and the actual contract value has been paid off to the anginal contractors that 
executed the building of the Refinery, we have decided to choose your compeny to act'as the- actual benefi- 
ciary of tine over-inflated sum at $38,500.000.00. Secondly, your company will be front to get all necessary 
approvaft crid formalities that Justifies you as the actual t>eneficiary from Lhe c4cricerned Government Minis- 
tries before the fund will be transterred into your account 
1. You will retain 20% of the total sum translarred into your account for your conlributon. towards tne 
business. 
70! 1*, Ml be for the four Government officials that originated the business. 
3.10% will be set aside for deduction of an the expenses which will be encountered by you and us during 
the cause of processing the necessary approvals from the Government Ministries forlher transfer of 
the fund into your account 
NOTE. You should put the following into consideration in extent of your involveryent in this transaction- 
We ara going to encounter an up-front expenses for the processing of the approvals thatvAil justify you 
as the Actual Beneficiary. before the fund will be transferred into your account 
You will be required to assist us financially in some area of the up-ftont expenses which will be dis- 
closed to your request These up-front expenses will enable us get all necessary documentation and 
formalities required by the Federal Government of Nigena before clairrung the fund. 
Cý- 'Imnle&atelý alMletnecessary cocumeriwion. and approvals are forw3rded from the concerned Mjnýs- 
bias to the Government paying bank. you will be required to oori; g fo6vard as the Beneficiary and - 
sign for the release of the fund tellore, tile payment will be effected into the account you will nominate. 
Your coming to Nigena is opbonal, if you hire-9 Nigerian Lawyer. 
If you are interested in this b-ansaction, kindly handle this matter with SECRECY and ask for more demils by 
contacting us thlrough the above Tel ! Fax number, 
Best Regwds 
mv-ý 
Bk'G-'R- LAPRRV OVOC" I 
-3 
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APPENDIX 
List of sample cases and sources 
Cases 1-22 are advance fee frauds related to investments. Cases 23-26 are medical 
frauds. Cases 27-29 are frauds related to religious practices. Cases 30-33 are frauds 
associated with education and training. Cases 34-37 are associated with 'charitable' 
activities. Cases 38-40 are related to properties. Cases 41-50 are associated with 
relationships. And cases 51-82 are concerned with general services and products. 
1. Shipment of Sugar Scam. Leeds Crown Court Case (04/08/94). The Financial 
Times (23/04/94). Amount involved $1.771 million (over a million pounds) from a 
bank. 
2. The Solicitor Swindler. Southwark Crown Court (12/05/95). The Times (13/05/95). 
Amount involved E82,000 from one woman. 
3. Bogus Bank in Torquay. Bristol Crown Court (09/10/98). Amount involved about 
V million from several victims. The Financial Times (8/9/95 and 10/10/98). The 
Guardian (6/02/98,28/07/98,24/4/99, and 28/07/00. The Times (28/07/98 and 
10/10/98). The Independent (28/07/98). 
4. Investment in High Denomination Bills. The Independent (26/09/95). Amount 
involved in millions of pounds from several investors. 
5. The Moneywise Money Plan- a type of pyramid scheme. The Financial Times 
(3/10/95). Amount involved over EI. 3 million from about 3,000 investors. 
6. Advance Fee for Loans. Middlesex Guildhall Crown Court (25/01/96). The 
Financial Times (5110195,26/01/96); The Guardian (26/01/96); The Independent 
(25 and 26/01/96) and The Times (25/01/96). Amount involved E13 million. 
7. The Ostrich Farming Corporation (OFC) ScanL The Crown Court at Leicester 
(28/03/00,01/11/00). The Independent (11/04/96,23/06/00); The Times (03/04/96, 
06/04/96,13/04/96,17/04/96,07/05/96,11105196,19/06/96,16/12/96,04/01/97); 
The Daily Express (23/06/00); The Guardian (14/12/96,22/03/00,22/06/00). 
Amount involved was about E22 million. 
8. The Rare Coins Scam. Snaresbrook Crown Court, East London. The Times 
(20/07/96). Amount involved about E700,000. 
9. Play for Gold Pyramid Scheme Fraud. Northampton Crown Court (12/11/97). Kent, 
S. (1998) "Deception Detection", Police Review. Vol. 106,06/02/98. Amount 
involved fl. 5 million. 
10. Business Opportunity/Franchise Scam. The Mirror (15/01/99). Amount involved 
L20,000. 
11. The Accountant Fraudster. Winchester Crown Court (22/10/99). The Times 
(23/10/99). Amount involved EIA million. 
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12. Global trade in Phantom Cargoes. The Observer (31/10/99). Amount involved 
between; E300-500 million. 
13. Fake Moneymaking Scheme. 77zeXfirror (10/12/99). Amount involved in 
thousands of pounds (about E500 per victim). 
14. Invention Promotion Fraud. The Mirror (17/12/99). Amount involved E130,000. 
15. The Ingot Scam. 77ze Mirror (14101100). Amount involved E100,000 (about E61 
per victim). 
16. Peasants and the Green Back (dollar) Scam. Yhe Guardian (31101100). Amount 
involved E4,100. 
17. The Duped Who Duped Others. The 419 Coalition News downloaded on 19/04/00 
http: //home. rica. net/alphae/419coaVne,. vs2OOo. htm. Amount involved $3.5 
million. 
18. The Nato Project Scam. The Guardian and The Times (30/03/00). Amount 
involved between E30-f-50 million. 
19. The Ostrich Breeding Company Scam (later named Ostrich Centre Ltd. ). Swansea 
Crown Court (17/04/00). The Independent (18/04/00). 77ze Times (14/03/00). The 
Express (18/04100). The. Mirror (18/04/00). Amount involved over EI million. 
20. Prize Cheque in the Mail Scam. The Mirror (16/06/00). Amount involved E7,500 
(about L6.99 per victim). 
21. Whisky Sale Scarn. 77ze 771mes (24/03/97). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds. 
22. Pub License Fraud. TheMirror (24/11/00). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (about E4,000 per victim). 
23. Diet Recipe Scarn. Liverpool Crown Court (22/12/95). 77ze Times (23/12/95, 
20101/96). Amount involved in thousands of pounds. 
24. The Bogus Medical Doctor. The Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey London 
(08109198). The Independent, The Times (09109/98). Amount involved about 
E500,000 over ten years ( between f. 50-8,000 per victim). 
25. Arthritis Treatment Gadget Con. Kingston Crown Court in Surrey (February 
1999) TheMirror (12102/99,12103/99,13/10100). Amount involved in thousands 
(about L350 per victim). 
26. Potency Cream Scam. TheMirror (05105100). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (about E27 per victim). 
27. The Bogus Catholic Priest. York Crown Court (05/12/95). The Guardian, the 
Times (06112/95). Amount involved L43,000. 
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28. The Ho-no-Hana Religious Fraud in Japan. The Independent (06/01/00). BBC 
News (25/12/00) on httpJ/nm-%, s. bbc. co. ukWcnglish/lývorld/asia- 
pacific/newsid_1087000/10878. stm Telegraphco. uk (02/12/99 on -., v%vw. te1cgraphco. uk. 
CultsOnC=pus. com on httpJ/v%-v%-w. cultsoncampusconVhonsamfimkinmhunl. All 
dournloaded on 0811010 1). Amount involved about 040 million over the years 
(from f. 500-El 8,000 per victim). 
29. Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God in Uganda. 
Religious Tolerance. org at http: //www. religioustolerance. org/dc rest. html. 
Do, A, mloaded on 27/03/01.7he Independent (20/03/00), the Gu,; r-dian (29/03/00), 
the Pmes (21,29, and 31/03/00). Loss of lives and property. 
30. Ugandan School Fees Scam. 77ze Times (15/03/00). Amount involved in thousands 
of pounds (as little as; E50-200 per victim). 
3 1. Nursing Training Scam. 77ze., Virror (31/03/00). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds, about E69.99 per victim). 
32. Airline Personnel Training Fee Scam. Isleworth Crown Court. ne Mirror 
(19/05/00). Amount involved in thousands of pounds (about El 75 per victim). 
33. The International School of Finance and Management Scam. Isleworth Crown 
Court (03/04/98). 77ze Times (04/02/98,04/04/98,28/04/98). Amount involved 
fl. 5 million (from about E600 per victim). 
34. The African Appeal Scam. 7heMirror (14/08/99). Amount involved in thousands 
of pounds over the years (used clothing etc. ) 
35. Collection Racket Scam. Manchester Crown Court at Minshull Street The Times 
(27/10/98), the Guardian (27/10198). Amount involved El million over the years 
(from as little as penny coins). 
3 6. Fax Charity Donor Scam. The Mirror (22/01/99,09/04/99). Amount involved up 
to El million over the years (fax line charges about L8 per victim or respondent). 
37. Charity Request Letters With 10pence and 2pence Coins Attached. The Mirror 
(19/11/99). Amount involved in thousands of pounds (little sums per victim). 
38. Bungalow Acquisition Fraud. The Guardian (26/09/95,14/12/96). Amount 
involvcd V00,000 from an individual. 
39. Land for Purchase Scam. The Afirror (11/12/98). Amount involved over E 15,000 
(up to E12,000 per victim). 
40. Timeshare Scam. Central Criminal Court at Old Bailey Street London (22/09/99; 
23/05/0 1). The Independent, Times, Guardian (23/09/99,24/05/0 1). Daily 
Exppress (24/05/01). 77ze Afirror (30/06/00). Amount involved about 00 million 
(over f 15,000 per victim). 
lin 
41. The Fraudulent Wife. Reading Crown Court (10/11/95). The I-Imes (11/11/95). 
Amount involved about E832,000. 
42. The Casanova. Knightsbridge Crown Court in Central London (20/03/96). 71e 
7-Imes, Guardian (21/03/96). Amount involved about; E2 million (between 
E100,000-800,000 per victim). 
43. The Bogus Arab Prince. South, %-ark Crown Court in London. 77ze Times 
newspaper (08/07/97). Amount involved in thousands of pounds (over El 5,000 
per victim). 
44. Lonely Heart Column Scam. Newton Abbot Magistrate Court (02/04/98). The 
7-Imes (03/04198). Amount involved El 1,000. 
45. Marriage for Convenience Scam. Harrow Crown Court in London (04/12/98). The 
Express, Independent, Rmes (05/11/98 and 05/12/98). Amount involved L200,000 
(about E2,000 per victim). 
46. Marital Commitment Scarn. Nigeria-419 Coalition 1999 News 
(http: //homeAica. net/alphae/419coaVnewsl999. htnL Downloaded on 09/06/99. 
Amount involved 06,500 from one victim. 
47. Money for Treatment Scam. Inner London Crown Court (26/04/00). The Express, 
7"Imes, Guardian, Independent, Daily Mail (27/04/00). Amount involved about 
E55,000 (EI, 000-10,000 per victim). 
48. False Promises of Marriage. Minshull Street Crown Court Manchester (27/08/99) 
The 7-Imes, Guardian (28/08/99). Amount involved about f. 500,000 (between 
E5,000400,000 per victim). 
49. Nlothcr-in-law Swindle. Exeter Crown Court (18/08/99). ne Independent, 
Guardian (19/08/99). Amount involved about E1.5m over five years from one 
Victim. 
50. Dating Agency Scam. 77zeifirror (17/11/00). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (between E12.50-1,000 per victim). 
5 1. Manorial Titles Scarn. Southwark Crown Court in South London (19/05/95). The 
7-Imes (28/04/95,01/05195,20/05/95). 7he Guardian (20/05/95). Amount involved 
about L54,000 (about L5,000 per victim). 
52. The Professional Swindler. Southwark Crown Court (19/06/95). 7he Times, The 
Guardian (20/06/95). Amount involved E3,000 for case in question but fraudster 
made hundreds of thousands over the years. 
53. Debt Collection Fee Scarn. Isle of Man High Court (16/10/95). ne Financial 
7-imes (17/10/95). Amount involved L60,000 two victims. 
54. Bogus Illness Scam. The Guardian (21/10/95). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (from LIOO per victim) 
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55. Fake Air Ambulance Service. Southwark Crown Court (08/07/96). The Times 
(09/07/96). Amount involved about L376,670 from hospitals.. 
56. The Military Officer Impostor. Cardiff Crown Court (08/10/96). The Times 
(09/10/96). Amount involved in thousands of Pounds (up to fl, 400 per victim). 
57. Good Restaurant Guide Scam. The Independent (08/09/98). Amount involved 
about E500,000 over the years (from E 19 per victim). 
58. The Bogus Sheikh. Southwark Crown Court (09/11/98). The Independent 
(10/11/98). Amount involved up to E24,000 from various hotels. 
5 9. The Bogus Barrister. Southwark Crown Court London (19/03/99). Ae Guardian 
the Independent (27/02/99,20/03/99). Amount involved in thousands of pounds 
over the years (from E20 per victim). 
60. The Must Win Competition Club Fraud. The Mirror (26/03/99). Amount involved 
in thousands of pounds (victims lost between L9.95 and E29.95 in joiniDg fees 
and membership up-grades). 
6 1. Bogus Mail Postal Contest Scam. The Mirror (16/04/99). Amount involved over 
El million over the years (in some cases E36.97 pr victim). 
62. Advance Fee for Debt Collection. The Nigerian- 419 Coalition 1999 News on 
Nigerian Scam/419 Operations httpJ/home. rica. net/alphae/419coal/ne,. vsl999. litm. 
Downloaded on 26/03/99. Amount involved $350,000 to obtain $35 million. 
63. The Bogus Peers. Truro Crown Court (20/08/99). The Independent (21/08/99), 
Amount involved over 132,000. 
64. Fax Directory Scam. The Mirror (13/08/99). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (from as low as E3 per victim). 
65. The Bogus Tour Firm. The Times (18/08/99). Amount involved over EI million 
over the years mainly from disabled victims. 
66. Employment Service Scam. The Mirror (0 1/10/99). Amount involved in 
thousands of Pounds (from E35 per victim). 
67. Web Book Order Scam. The Times, Guardian (04/11/99). Books worth about 
E100,000 involved (some valued at E300 each). 
68. The 'Camilla' Fraudster. The Times (25/10/99. Amount involved over EI 2,000. 
69. Internet Access Scam. The Mirror (03/12/99). Amount involved in thousands 
(from about E35 per victim). 
70. Premium Phone Line Fraud. The Mirror (03/03/00). Amount involved in 
thousands of Pounds (from; El per minute- E6.75 per victim). 
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71. Service for European Business Grants. The Mirror (31/03/00). Amount involved 
up to f. 500,000 (from 050 per victim). 
72. Travel/Resident Visa Scam. The Mirror (26/05/00). Amount involved E2 Million. 
They took cash from British citizens on the false promise of getting them US 
visas. 
73. Human Hair Scam. The Mirror (30/06/00). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (from about E230 per victim). 
74. Free Holiday Offer Scam. The Mirror (21/07/00). Amount involved in thousands 
of pounds (from El a minute phone call to a processing fee of E39.50 per victim). 
75. Car Sale Fraud. The Mirror (28/07/00). Amount involved in thousands of pounds 
(from E1.50 per minute phone charge to cost of vehicles). 
76. Credit Service Scam. The Mirror (28/07/00). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds. 
77. Free Telephone Calls Scam. The Mirror (25/08/00). From il a minute as fee. 
78. Premium Line Fraud. The Mirror (20/10/00). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (from about E3 per victim). 
79. Book Publishing scam. Yhe Mirror (12/11/99). Amount involved in thousands of 
pounds (from up to E2,000 per victim). 
80. Offshore Car Sale Fraud. The Mirror (22/09/00). Amount involved over EI 
million. 
8 1. Student Accommodation Service Scam. The Mirror (0 1/12/00). Amount involved 
- thousands of Pounds (from L200 deposit fees from students). 
82. The 'Lady' Fraudster. St. Albans Crown Court (13/09/99). Yhe Times (14/09/99). 
Amount involved in thousands of Pounds. 
NB: Some samples of scam letters are shown overleaf 
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